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The TUC and the Histadrut, 1945-1982: a problematic 
relationship 
 
Ronnie Fraser 
 
Abstract 
 
The main purpose of this study is to explore and explain the attitude of the British trade union 
movement towards Zionism and Israel and how and why it has changed over the years. There 
have been several studies that concentrate on the attitude of the British Labour Party towards 
Israel but none that focus on the relationship between the British trade union movement and 
its Israeli counterpart. Although the unions and the Labour Party had a close relationship, 
their policies were not always the same with regard to Israel. 
The relationship between the TUC and the Histadrut, rooted in the 1920s and 1930s, changed 
fundamentally after the creation of Israel in 1948. This research analyses how that 
relationship developed and why. Key factors included the attitude of the TUC General 
Secretaries, the TUC's relationship with the Foreign Office, the context of the international 
trade union movement, Cold War politics, Britain's post-war role in the Middle East, and the 
(sometimes surprising) approach of individual trades union leaders such as Jack Jones. The 
four wars between Israel and the Arabs between 1948-82 also played a part. One constant 
throughout most of this study is the pro-Zionist stance of the Parliamentary Labour Party 
compared with the much more ambivalent TUC-Histadrut relations. 
The thesis investigates how the TUC's indifference towards Israel during the 1950s changed 
into a decade of positive engagement with the Histadrut, the only period of real friendship 
between the two labour organisations.  It charts the rise of the Left, during the 1970s  and the 
consequent trend  towards increasing criticism of Israel and the Histadrut within the TUC 
which eventually led to the 1982 TUC Congress condemning Israel's invasion of Lebanon 
and recognition of the Palestinian people's right to self-determination.  
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PLPC    Palestine Labour Political Committee 
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TUFP    Trade Union Friends of Palestine  
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UGTT   Union Générale Tunisienne du Travail (Tunisia)  
UKPC   UK Palestine Coordination  
UN   United Nations  
UNSCOP  UN Special Committee on Palestine  
USDAW   Union of Shop, Distributive and Allied Workers 
WFTU   World Federation of Trade Unions 
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Introduction 
In December 1917 a special conference of the British Labour movement approved the Labour 
Party’s war aims memorandum which stated; 
“The British Labour movement demands for all the Jews in all countries the same elementary 
rights of tolerance, freedom of residence and trade, and equal citizenship that ought to be 
extended to all the inhabitants of every nation. It furthermore expresses the opinion that 
Palestine should be set free from the harsh and oppressive government of the Turk, in order 
that this country may form a free state, under international guarantee, to which such of the 
Jewish people as desired to do so may return, and may work out their salvation free from 
interference by those of alien race or religion.” 1 
This statement was the first official Labour Party declaration relating to the rights of the Jews 
and a Jewish homeland in Palestine.  However the links between British Socialists and Jewish 
Labour go back to the 1880s when many British Labour and trade union leaders condemned 
the anti-Jewish pogroms of Tsarist Russia.  Their action formed the basis of a special 
relationship between the British and Israeli Labour and trade union movements which has 
continued in one form or another to the present day. 
The Trades Union Congress (TUC), the umbrella body for the British trade union movement 
which has been in existence since 1868 has always appeared to the outside world to be a 
substantial and imposing organisation playing an important role in international union 
affairs.2 Since the creation of the International Labour Organisation (ILO) in 1919, the TUC 
has played an influential role encouraging, training and supporting the establishment of trade 
unions throughout the British Empire and establishing a presence in the wider world beyond 
Britain.  
The Jewish labour movement in Palestine formed its own trade union body in 1920, the 
General Federation of Jewish Workers in Palestine, known in Hebrew as the Histadrut, to 
look after the interests of Jewish workers initially in the agricultural settlements and  
                                                 
1 This statement, which was also adopted by the London conference of the Socialist and Labour parties of the 
Allied countries. Schneier Levenberg, The Jews and Palestine: a Study in Labour Zionism, (London: Poale 
Zion, 1945), pp.204-5.   
2 Taylor, The TUC from the General Strike to New Unionism, (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2000), pp.15-16. 
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co-operatives.3 The Histadrut was much more than an ordinary trade union in the accepted 
European sense and was established as the alternative to existing bourgeois society.  
Before the First World War, Palestine was a backward agricultural economy with little 
industrial activity. The Histadrut was formed by Jews who emigrated to Palestine from 
Eastern Europe who were committed to socialist ideology and the need to organise the 
workforce. Extensive post-war immigration led to the rapid growth of Jewish industry in 
Palestine. The lack of an established Jewish middle class with few big industrialists made it 
relatively easy for the Histadrut to become established in all sectors of the Jewish economy.  
By contrast the Arab population in Palestine was a feudal society with patriarchal 
employer/employee relations which affected the development of trade unions and the 
organisation of  Arab workers. There were Arab trade unions in Palestine during this period 
but they were not as well organised nor did they have the support that the Histadrut enjoyed.4   
The Histadrut’s long relationship with the TUC began during this period. Once Britain’s 
mandate was in place the TUC became involved with labour issues in Palestine. As part of 
their strategy to create  an independent Jewish state, throughout the 1930s and 1940s contact 
between the Labour Party, the TUC and the Histadrut was maintained by means of regular 
visits to London by David Ben Gurion5 and by the permanent British based representatives of 
the Labour Party in Palestine (Mapai) and the Histadrut.6 During this period several Labour 
Party and TUC leaders went to Palestine and were impressed with the work of the socialist 
Kibbutz movement.7   
                                                 
3 The General Federation of Jewish Workers in Palestine did not officially adopt the name Histadrut until after 
the Second World War. For continuity in this dissertation, The General Federation of Jewish Workers in 
Palestine will be referred to throughout as the Histadrut.  
4 For information on the growth of the Jewish economy in Palestine see Abraham Revusky, Jews in Palestine, 
(New York: Vanguard, Press 1945), pp.55-156. For the history of the Histadrut and the Arab trade unions in 
Palestine see: Zachary Lockman, Comrades and Enemies Arab and Jewish workers in Palestine 1906-1948,  
(London: University of California, 1996).  
5 David Ben-Gurion was the first General Secretary of the Histadrut; he played a central role in the formation of 
the Mapai Party which became the most important faction in the Zionist movement. Ben Gurion was appointed 
Chairman of the Jewish Agency in 1935 which along with the Histadrut controlled the development of the 
Jewish community in Palestine. Upon independence he became the first Prime Minister of the State of Israel.  
6 Joseph Gorny, The British Labour Movement and Zionism 1917-1948, (London: Frank Cass, 1983).p.25. 
7 TUC Congress proceedings1936, The TUC Library Collection at the London Metropolitan University, pp.393-
96, (Hereafter cited as LMU). 
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The main purpose of this study is to explore and explain the attitude of the British trade union 
movement towards Israel and how and why it has changed over the years. This question is 
important because from the 1960s onwards Israel/Palestine has become an increasingly 
contentious and divisive issue. It is often assumed that it was always so, however this study 
will show otherwise.   
There is a vast array of literature available on Britain’s involvement in the Middle East8 and 
Palestine in particular, the majority of which concentrates on either the foreign policy of the 
Attlee Labour government 9 or the Suez crisis,10  none of which focuses on the attitude of the 
trade unions and the TUC towards Israel.  
The British position of predominance in the Middle East after the First World War in Egypt, 
Palestine, the Sudan and Iraq has been described as its “informal empire.” Its’ authority in the 
region was not based on formal rule or visible coercion but rather on political influence and 
military hegemony. The five essential functions of the “informal empire” were to: preserve 
Britain’s prestige and status in the world, secure its privileged position with regard to the 
                                                 
8 Examples include: Michael Dockrill, and John Young, eds, British Foreign Policy 1945-56, (London: 
Macmillan, 1989), Joseph Frankel, British Foreign Policy 1945-73, (London: Oxford University Press, 1975), 
Michael, Gordon, Conflict and Consensus in Britain’s Foreign Policy 1914-65, (Stanford: Stanford University 
Press, 1969), Partha Sarathi Gupta, Imperialism and the British Labour Movement 1914-64, (London: 
Macmillan, 1975) , Frank Heinlein,  British government policy and decolonisation 1945-63, (London: Frank 
Cass, 2002), Stephen Howe, Anticolonialism in British politics, (Oxford: Clarendon, 1993), Ronald Hyam, 
Britain’s Declining Empire: The Road to Decolonisation, 1918-1968, (Cambridge; Cambridge University Press, 
2006). 
9 The literature can be divided into two groups, the discussion of the foreign policy of the Labour government 
and other works including political memoirs. Works from the first group include; Ritchie Ovendale, Britain, the 
United States and the end of the Palestine Mandate, Governments, (Woodbridge: The Royal Historical Society, 
1989),  Ritchie Ovendale, The Foreign Policy of the British Labour Governments 1945-51, (Leicester: Leicester 
University Press, 1961), Kenneth O. Morgan, Labour in power: 1945-1951, (Oxford: OUP, 1984), and Henry 
Pelling, The Labour Governments 1945-51,(London: Macmillan,1984). Works from the second group include; 
Alan Bullock, The life and times of Ernest Bevin vol.3 Foreign Secretary, 1945-1951, (London: Heinemann, 
1983), Richard Crossman, Palestine Mission, (London: Harper, 1947), Hugh Dalton, Fateful Years, (London: 
Muller, 1957), Francis Williams, Ernest Bevin, (London: Hutchinson, 1952) and Clement Attlee,  As it 
Happened, (London: Heinemann, 1954). 
10 The literature can be divided into biographies and memoirs and discussion of the Suez campaign. Biographies 
and memoirs include Anthony Howard, RAB: the life of R A Butler, (London: Cape, 1987), Selwyn Lloyd, Suez 
1956, (London: Cape, 1978), Harold Macmillan, Riding the Storm, 1956-59, (London: Macmillan, 1971), 
Evelyn Shuckburgh, Descent to Suez, Diaries 1951-56,(London: Weidenfeld, 1986), Michael Foot, Aneurin 
Bevan vol.2, 1945-1960, (London: Davis –Poynter, 1973),  Anthony Nutting, No End of a Lesson; the story of 
Suez,(London: Constable, 1967) and Philip M. Williams, Hugh Gaitskell (London: Jonathan Cape, 1979). 
Works which discuss the actions of the British government include David Carlton, Britain and the Suez Crisis, 
(Oxford: Blackwell, 1988), Saul Kelly, ed., Whitehall and the Suez Crisis, (London: Frank Cass, 2000), Keith 
Kyle, Suez, (London: Weidenfeld, 1991) and Richard Lamb, The failure of the Eden government, (London: 
Sedgwick and Jackson, 1987).  
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USA, contain the spread of communism and protect British assets and provide stability for 
sterling.11   
In 1945 the Labour Government was swept to power.  Michael Gordon has written  that from 
the outset the new Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin recognised that although Britain needed to 
reduce her commitments and adjust her responsibilities to meet her diminished resources. 
This had to be accomplished without creating power vacuums caused any British withdrawal. 
The Middle East was “an area of prime importance impinging decisively on British defence, 
communications, investments and sources of petroleum, which the government weighed with 
extreme care all choices concerning possible reductions in the British presence.”12 
Labour’s Palestine policy, according to Ronald Hyam, was evolved by Bevin and Attlee and 
was determined by two main considerations which were conflicting and not complementary. 
The first was the need for good Anglo-American relations to which the government attached 
great importance. This pointed to a pro-Jewish solution in Palestine as the American 
government was thought to be pro-Zionist. The second consideration revolved around the 
safeguarding of Britain's interests in the Middle East especially her oil supplies from the 
region which, in 1947, accounted for 60% of her needs. The protection of her supplies with if 
necessary, a base in the Middle East, pointed to a pro-Arab solution. Bevin was persuaded by 
the Foreign Office of the vital importance of Middle East oil. A report from the Chiefs of 
Staff in July 1946 emphasised that Britain's existing sources of oil were vulnerable and 
maintaining Arab friendship was essential. In January 1947, Bevin told his Cabinet 
colleagues that an Arab uprising in Palestine would "jeopardise the security of our interests in 
the increasingly important oil production in the Middle East." His attempts to work with the 
Americans had only made matters worse as President Truman demanded that 100,000 
refugees be admitted to Palestine, which was turned down. Once Labour had exhausted all 
possibilities of obtaining a just settlement acceptable to both the Arabs and the Jews they 
returned the mandate to the UN.13 The priority then was to look for the best solution for 
British strategic interests and a pro-Arab policy took preference. It was then held that British 
interests would be best served by pursuing Arab friendship as they feared that antagonising 
the Arabs would allow Russia into the region. The British did not try to facilitate the 
                                                 
11 Heinlein, British government policy and decolonisation 1945-63,  p.1 and pp.291-294. 
12 Gordon, Conflict and Consensus in Britain’s Foreign Policy 1914-65, p.133. 
13 Hyam, Britain’s Declining Empire: The Road to Decolonisation, 1918-1968, p.123-4. 
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emergence of a Jewish state since it could not provide a base for British troops as it would be 
surrounded by hostile Arab states.14  
The authors Joseph Frankel and Michael Gordon both recognise that the experience which 
Attlee and Bevin had gained in the wartime coalition government when they faced the 
realities of foreign policy and security meant that when Labour came to power they put aside 
the socialist foreign policy advocated by various factions in the Party.15 Gordon states that 
neither attempted to re-educate the Party concerning the realities as they expected discipline 
and loyalty to both the Party and the leadership.16 Although Bevin’s realism had betrayed 
socialist principles, the result was that the Conservatives supported Labour’s foreign policy.17  
Frankel believes that the strength of Bevin’s personality and views also influenced Britain’s 
foreign policy. His forcefulness enabled Britain to preserve her independence in pursuing her 
own interests in the Middle East. Massive support from the trade unions also enabled Bevin 
to stand up to his Left wing critics who believed that the leadership had adopted many of the 
traditional British foreign policy assumptions.18  
Rhiannon Vickers in her study of the Labour Party and its foreign policy identifies two main 
approaches that have been used in the extensive literature on the 1945 and 1951 Labour 
Governments.19 The first covers the work of Bullock, Morgan, Ovendale and Pelling who 
take what she calls a “fairly uncritical approach to what was seen as a surprising degree of 
realism demonstrated by Labour ministers and praise for Bevin in particular in his role in 
involving the USA in a defensive role against the USSR.” To this list I would add William 
Roger Louis excellent study The British Empire in the Middle East which chronicles Bevin’s 
attempts to maintain Britain’s pre-war Imperial position in the Middle East.  
 Vickers’s second group are “highly critical of the Attlee government as it dashed the hopes 
of those on the left for a new more internationalist and socialist approach to foreign policy in 
terms of a missed opportunity and even a betrayal of the Left.” This approach is demonstrated 
                                                 
14 Ibid. p.129. 
15 Frankel, British Foreign Policy 1945-73,  p.185. 
16 Gordon, Conflict and Consensus in Britain’s Foreign Policy 1914-65, p.93. 
17 Ibid, p.117. 
18 Frankel, British Foreign Policy 1945-73, p.186. 
19 Rhiannon Vickers, The Labour Party and the world Vol.1 The evolution of Labour's foreign policy, 1900-51, 
(Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2003), p.161. 
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in the work of Saville, Schneer and Weiler.20 The Labour Left believed that Britain’s 
“historic role” was to beome the leader of a third force in world affairs, capable of mediating 
betwen America and Russia.  However the reality was that given Britain’s decline only 
America could counterbalance the Russian threat. Stephen Howe, in his study, 
Anticolonialism in British politics comments that there has been no other international issue 
on which British socialists have been more deeply divided than the question of Palestine. 
Attitudes to the contending claims of Jews and Arabs cut across most of the conventional 
distinctions of Left and Right, with most British socialists hoping for the coming together of 
the Arab and Jewish working class movements.21 
The majority of the literature available on the foreign policy of the Attlee Labour government 
either ignores the trade union movement completely or only mentions it with reference to 
Bevin. This is because the policies of both the Labour Party and the TUC during the period of 
this study frequently shared common ground especially on Palestine. Bevin's interest in 
Foreign affairs began in the early 1930s, long before he became Foreign Secretary. As the 
leading trade unionist of his generation his opposition to dictatorships whether they were 
fascist or communist ensured that the trade union movement influenced on Labour's foreign 
policy. Once Bevin became chairman of the TUC General Council in 1936, he along with 
Hugh Dalton, the Chairman of the National Executive of the Labour Party, took control of the 
National Council of Labour (NCL) 22 in order to revise Labour's views on foreign policy and 
defence in the build up to the Second World War.23 His influence and stature within the 
movement, along with the support of three of the six largest unions24 ensured that it was not 
                                                 
20 Peter Weiler, ‘British Labour and the Cold War: foreign policy of the Labour Government 1945-51’, Journal 
British Studies, Vol.26, No.1 (1987), pp.54-82, Jonathan Schneer, ‘Hopes Deferred or Shattered: The British 
Labour Left and the Third Force Movement, 1945-49’, The Journal of Modern History, Vol.56, No.2 (June, 
1984), pp.198-226, John Saville, The Politics of Continuity: British Foreign Policy and the Labour Government, 
1945-46,(London:Verso,1993). 
 
21 Howe, Anticolonialism in British politics,  pp.146-153. 
22 The National Council of Labour, which was established in the1930s, attempted to coordinate the policies and 
actions of the TUC and Labour party. It consisted of representatives from the TUC's General Council and  the 
Executive Committees of the  Labour Party and the Parliamentary Labour Party. In the 1930s the TUC used the 
NCL to influence Labour party foreign policy. As time went on it became less effective and by the 1960s the 
NCL had become moribund. For more information see, Jerry Brookshire, 'The National Council of Labour, 
1921-1946', Albion: A Quarterly Journal Concerned with British Studies, Vol.18, No.1 (Spring,1986), pp.43-69.  
23Alan Bullock,  The life and times of Ernest Bevin 1881-1940, (London: Heinemann, 1983), pp.590-4. 
 
24 Bevin could count on support from three of the big six unions, the Transport workers, the General and 
Municipal and the Miners. The Railwaymen and the Shop workers often voted with Bevin’s critics. Harrison, 
Trade Unions and the Labour Party since 1945,  pp.108-94. 
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necessary for the unions to use their majority of voting power at the Labour Party 
conferences in order to change Labour's foreign policy.25 In 1937, under his tenure as TUC 
President, the TUC formed its own Colonial Advisory committee to lobby government, in 
order to prevent colonies falling under influence of communism.26  
Bevin first became acquainted with Zionism at the time of the 1930 Whitechapel by-election 
through Dov Hoz, the Poale Zion representative in London. To ensure Labour won, Bevin 
successfully intervened with the Government on behalf of the Jewish voters of Whitechapel 
to reassure them that the Government had no intention of altering the terms of the Palestine 
mandate or stopping Jewish immigration. Bevin liked and admired Hoz27 which resulted in 
him understanding the efforts of the Yishuv and on more than one occasion he expressed his 
admiration of their achievements in Palestine.28 As a result of his willingness to intervene 
with the Government on the Zionists  behalf  Bevin was considered by the Yishuv to be a 
powerful political friend29. It was only in 1942 after he became aware of the complexities of 
the Palestine issue that his attitude towards the Yishuv began to change.30  
Once the Left had accepted that the Attlee Labour government would not follow a socialist 
foreign policy, the biggest political issue within the trade union movement which related to 
foreign affairs was the influence of communists within the unions and British-Soviet 
relations. Palestine was not seen as a big issue for the trade union movement and their 
involvement almost entirely fails to get any mention in the literature. Even though Bevin had 
                                                 
25 Martin Harrison, Trade Unions and the Labour Party since 1945, (London: George Allen, 1960), p.158, and 
Bernard Hennessy, ‘Trade Unions and the British Labor Party’ in The American Political Science Review, 
Vol.49, No.4 (December1955), p.1050-66. 
26 Vickers, The Labour Party and the world Vol.1 The evolution of Labour's foreign policy, 1900-51,  p.148. 
27 Bevin's friendship for Hoz  is illustrated by him speaking at a farewell gathering in London  in 1931for Dov 
Hoz prior to his return to Palestine, "Mr. Dov Hos Returns to Palestine" Jewish Telegraph Agency,  20 June 
1931 and that he sent a message to the  memorial meeting for Dov Hoz organised by the Poale Zion and the 
Zionist Federation held  in London on 14 January 1941. 'Memorial for Dov Hoz in London', Jewish Telegraph 
Agency,  14 January 1941. 
28 For examples of Bevins support and concern for the Yishuv see his Presidential address to the 1937 TUC 
Congress, MRC 1937 TUC Congress proceedings, p.75 and his comments made at a reception for an American 
trade union delegation who had visited Palestine, "Reception to American Workers Delegation which has visited 
Palestine", Jewish Chronicle, 26 February 1937.  
29 Bevin intervened with the Colonial Secretary and the Prime Minister over the establishment of Jewish 
fighting units. Gorny, The British Labour Movement and Zionism 1917-1948,  p.171. 
30 Gorny, The British Labour Movement and Zionism 1917-1948, p.171-2. 
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included the TUC in his plans to stop the spread of communism the Labour movement’s 
involvement with foreign affairs only appear to starts in the early 1950s with German 
rearmament, the Hungarian revolution, and the Suez crisis. Again, within the extensive 
literature on these issues the trade union view barely merits a mention. 
Avi Shlaim notes that by mid-1949 a distinct change had taken place in British policy which 
led to an improvement in Anglo-Israeli relations. Firstly, the risk of military hostilities with 
Israel due to the Anglo-Jordanian treaty resulted in British support for peace talks. Secondly, 
as Britain was now free from the Balfour promise she was anxious to consolidate her position 
in the Arab world.  Thirdly, Israel had emerged as the strongest military power in Middle 
East and Britain needed her cooperation to contain Soviet advances in the region. As a result 
Britain’s relations with Israel improved but relations with Egypt deteriorated. 31    
The Churchill Conservative government which succeeded the Labour administration in 1951 
and Churchill's successor Anthony Eden pursued three objectives in the Middle East: 
conciliation with Egypt by withdrawing from the Suez Canal bases, the replacement of 
bilateral treaties with countries like Iraq and Jordan by multilateral defence pacts backed by 
USA and the quest for an Arab–Israeli settlement.32 This policy suffered a series of setbacks 
in 1955 including Egypt's arms deal with Czechoslovakia which heightened British fears of 
increased Russian influence in the Middle East. Egypt perceived Britain's promotion of the  
Baghdad pact as a threat to its leadership of the Arab world and increased its hostility towards 
Israel.   
The reasons for Britain’s invasion of Egypt in 1956, and her collusion with France and Israel, 
have been the subject of extensive analysis especially since the release of official papers in 
January 1987. Israel, however, had her own reasons for wanting to neutralise Egypt’s 
growing military and political influence. The post-mortems that immediately followed Suez 
greatly exaggerated its effects. Britain it was said had been reduced “from a first class to a 
third class power.” However it did not adversely affect Britain’s influence in the region as she 
                                                 
31 This new policy was explained by Bevin in letter to British representatives in Arab capitals. “Our general 
objective must be to have cordial and intimate relations with all the states of the Middle East including the Arab 
states and Israel, to see them formally joined to the western group of states opposed to Soviet aggression and 
infiltration and cooperating among themselves as to promote stability and prosperity of the ME as a whole.” Avi 
Shlaim, ‘Britain and the Arab Israeli war of 1948’, Michael Dockrill and John Young eds, British Foreign 
Policy 1945-56, (London: Macmillan, 1989), p.96.  
32 Anthony Adamthwaite, ‘Suez Revisited’, International Affairs, Vol.64, No.3 (Summer, 1988), p.450. 
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was able to intervene in Jordan in 1958 and Kuwait in 1961.33 Hyam adds that the effect of 
Egypt’s defeat in the 1967 Six-Day War and the demise of Nasser made Britain’s withdrawal 
from the Far East easier by creating a more favourable climate; “we would never had the 
chance of making an orderly withdrawal if Nasser had not been defeated”34  
Suez divided Britain more deeply than any other event since Munich. The initial drive for 
Labour to organise an anti-Suez campaign had come from the anti-colonialist Left. Suez 
briefly united the Labour Party behind Gaitskell who “spoke for England” against 
aggression.35 Labour's “law, not war” campaign jointly organised with the TUC included 
demonstrations and meetings but not strikes.36 The Parliamentary Labour Party may have 
been divided over the invasion plans but the activists were vehemently opposed to it.37 This 
contrasted with the TUC President, Charles Geddes, who after meeting with Eden, persuaded 
the TUC International committee to support the government but the committee was dissuaded 
from publically saying so by the  younger members on the General Council who ensured that 
the TUC Congress at the beginning of September adopted a resolution calling on the 
government to refer the dispute to the UN. Many trade unionists, however, supported the 
invasion as a result of having served in Egypt during the war.38 
The Eden government’s review of its Middle Eastern commitments in June 1956 concluded 
that in order to prevent the region coming under the control of a hostile power, British 
influence should be political not military. The review decided that as Britain no longer 
wanted to be associated with an informal empire rooted in colonialism and imperialism, 
relations with all Middle East countries should be visibly based on independence and mutual 
respect.39  
                                                 
33 Anthony Adamthwaite, ‘Suez Revisited’, Michael Dockrill and John Young eds, British Foreign Policy 1945-
56, (London: Macmillan, 1989),  p.225.  
34 Hyam, Britain’s Declining Empire: The Road to Decolonisation, 1918-1968,  p.396. 
35 Howe, Anticolonialism in British politics,  pp.268-273. 
36 Leon Epstein, British Politics in the Suez crisis, (Urbana: University of Illinois, 1964), p.140. 
37 Howe, Anticolonialism in British politics,  pp.268-73. 
38 Many activists despised the Egyptians because they them remembered as opportunistic and backward. Philip 
Williams, p.428. 
39 Heinlein, British government policy and decolonisation 1945-63, p.174 and pp.291-4.  
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Wrigley observes that the major problem in assessing Labour’s foreign policy between 1964 
and 1970 was to disentangle style from substance. Foreign affairs provided Prime Minister 
Harold Wilson with the opportunity of deflecting attention away from serious domestic 
problems as well as giving the impression that Britain retained influence in world affairs. His 
government’s foreign policy followed the Bevinite tradition based on good Anglo-American 
relations and completed Attlee's foreign policy plans which included the withdrawal from the 
Empire whilst maintaining links with the Commonwealth.40  
This survey has shown that the majority of the extensive literature on Britain’s role in the 
Middle East and her involvement with Israel has concentrated on the foreign policy of 
successive governments and the role of the Foreign Office. The TUC’s international role 
envisaged by Attlee’s Labour government to combat the spread of communism has been 
totally ignored as has its involvement with the international labour movement. The TUC’s 
efforts when it was at its most effective may have been appreciated by Bevin but had been 
overlooked by subsequent British governments and historians. 
The relationship between the TUC and the Histadrut changed fundamentally after Israel’s 
independence in 1948 and the main focus of this research is to look at how it has developed 
up to 1982. Factors that affected their relationship include the attitude of the TUC General 
Secretaries, the TUC's relationship with the Foreign Office and the international trade union 
movement, international politics involving Russia and America, and Britain’s post-war role 
and her standing in the Middle East. The four wars between Israel and the Arabs between 
1948-82 have also played a part. 
During the immediate post-war period the TUC was a powerful political body both at home 
and abroad which worked closely with the Labour government. The TUC was also at the 
forefront of the battle to contain the spread of communism throughout the trade union world 
initially at the World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU) and then after 1949, the 
International Confederation of Trade Unions (ICFTU). The study will consider the TUC’s  
relationship with the ICFTU and its role in the Israel- Arab conflict.  
                                                 
40 Wilson's decision to withdraw from the Far East in 1967 was not the result of a radical review but due to a 
deteriorating economy and changed international political circumstances. Chris Wrigley, ‘Now you see it now 
you don’t: Wilson’s foreign policy’ in The Wilson Governments, ed. by Coopey, Fielding and Tiratsoo, 
(London: Pinter, 1993), p.122.  
 
19 
 
The TUC’s attitude towards Israel will be explored in depth and how the relationship changed 
over time. It will also consider if the opinions of the TUC were important to Israel.  Other 
issues that will be addressed include, the question whether the TUC’s attitude to Israel was 
always the same as that of the Labour Party or whether there were differences, particularly 
when the Labour Party was in government?   
Because this thesis focuses on changes in policy and attitudes over time the study is based 
mainly on original sources including both published documents and unpublished material in 
archives in both Israel and the UK. Material has been reviewed at the TUC archives at 
Warwick University, Labour History Archive and Study Centre, Manchester, the National 
Archives, Kew, the ICFTU files at the Institute of Social History, Amsterdam, the Histadrut 
archives, Tel Aviv, the Moshe Sharett Labor Party Archives, Beit Berl, the Israel State 
archives and Central Zionist archives, Jerusalem, Israel. The material in the Israeli archives 
frequently provided the only record of the views of the TUC on the Arab -Israeli conflict as 
well as offering an insight into personal relationships between politicians and trade unionists. 
However there are many challenges connected with this type of research; particularly as it 
depends on locating information which may be limited by document availability as some 
documents are still withheld and others are filed in unexpected locations.   
Both the UK and Israeli governments have a thirty year rule in place which has meant there is 
no access to documents created after 1982.  Some relevant documents which may have a 
bearing on this study have still not been released due to their sensitivity. The period from 
1945-55 revealed more relevant documents than for any other period because at that time 
trade unions were at the height of their power and influence both in Israel and Britain.  
The TUC archives in general have been very disappointing as there are very few documents 
available which throw any light on the TUC’s views and position apart from bland 
International committee and General Council minutes, which only rarely give the reader any 
indication of attitudes and discussions.  This lack of information has been compounded by the 
fact that  none of the TUC General Secretaries left any documents or diaries that might have 
provided an insight into TUC thinking and discussions. These difficulties have been 
compounded by the deaths of many of the participants and the questionable reliability of the 
memories of known actors still available for oral history interviews. 
This study is divided into four Chapters plus a conclusion. The first Chapter covers the years 
1948-55, the second 1956-66, the third 1967-72 and the fourth 1973-82.  Each Chapter will 
20 
 
look at changes in attitude due to Israel’s wars with its neighbours, the war of independence 
1948-49, the 1956 Sinai campaign, the 1967 Six-Day War, the 1973 Yom Kippur war and the 
1982 Lebanon war.   In addition this study will also try to explain the TUC’s relationship 
with the Foreign Office throughout the period.  
Chapter 1 starts with short review of the background to TUC and Histadrut relations from 
1920 until the outbreak of war in 1939. The evaluation of this period will briefly include: the 
Labour Party war aims declaration of 1917, a review of the TUC's attitude and links to 
Palestine and the Jewish refugee crisis, and Nazism in the 1930s. Since this research reveals 
that both the TUC and the British Government took more than a passing interest in the 
position of the Arab workers in Palestine and Israel, this chapter will review the Arab trade 
union movement  in Palestine and how the situation changed after 1948. This is followed by 
an analysis of relations during the Second World War, the handing back of the British 
mandate to the United Nations, and the declaration of the State of Israel in 1948. During the 
war period relations between the Histadrut and the TUC took on two different personas. The 
first dealt purely with trade union matters, the second with the political relationship between 
them as the Histadrut lobbied the British labour movement for support for a Jewish State in 
Palestine.  
The building of bridges between Britain and the new Jewish state was slow. Britain only gave 
de facto recognition to Israel in 1949, even though both America and Russia had recognised 
Israel a year earlier. The Labour Left were critical of Bevin until Britain formally recognised 
Israel which it thought had been delayed by the Foreign office "out of pique".41 The British 
government, who initially saw Israel as a potential ally of Russia, were concerned by the 
Histadrut's continued membership of the WFTU after the establishment of the ICFTU, 
especially as the Histadrut was part of the Mapai led Israeli government. The importance 
attached to the international labour movement by both the British and Israeli governments 
resulted in the appointment of a labour attaché to the British Legation in Israel in 1949 and 
London being chosen by the Israeli Government as their first embassy to have its own labour 
attaché.42 This Chapter asks whether TUC-Histadrut relations changed after independence, 
the effect of the Histadrut remaining a member of the WFTU, the reaction to the joint TUC 
                                                 
41 W. K. Pattison "The delayed British recognition of Israel", Middle East Journal, 37:3, (1983) quoted in Paul 
Kelemen, The British Left and Zionism History of a Divorce, (Manchester: Manchester University, 2012), p.124. 
42 Histadrut  to the TUC, 4 December 1952, The TUC archives at the Modern Records Centre, University of 
Warwick, MSS.292/956.9/5. (Hereafter cited as MRC). 
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and Labour Party visit to Israel in 1950 and the return visit to the UK by the Histadrut.  It will 
also discuss whether the Israelis were successful in cultivating new contacts within the 
British trade union movement.  The Chapter finishes just before the Suez crisis of 1956. 
During this period the Conservatives came to power in Britain and relations with Israel 
improved.  It will discuss the Foreign Office's relationship with the TUC and their  priority in 
building links with Arab trade unionists.  The TUC's  reaction , when the Histadrut eventually 
joined the ICFTU in 1953 will also be examined as well as arms sales to Israel, which were a 
key issue at this time, and if this was this reflected in the TUC's international policy.  
Chapter two starts with the Suez crisis and ends in 1966.  The 1956 TUC Congress debate on 
the Suez crisis reflects the opposition to events by the unions, although their primary concern 
was the threat to British shipping and oil supplies; Israel hardly merited a mention. At a pre-
Suez crisis meeting between the TUC General Secretary, and the Foreign Secretary, the TUC 
was described as “badly informed.”43 Yet the Labour Party was the most pro-Israel of all the 
political parties and its leadership had a close rapport with Israel, with the majority of 
frontbench members of the Labour Party taking a pro-Israel view. A constant throughout 
most of this study is the pro-Zionist stance of the Parliamentary Labour Party compared with 
TUC-Histadrut relations which only rarely reached that level. This Chapter will also 
investigate  whether the TUC was more concerned with contemporaneous events in Hungary 
than in the Middle East. After Suez, Israel’s relationship with Britain changed as the 
Histadrut built  new international relationships especially in Africa. The TUC's  reaction to 
the Histadrut's new role will be examined as well as its effect on TUC-Histadrut relations. It 
will also consider what effect, if any, the Left had when it started to question Labour’s 
traditional support for Israel.   
The Six-Day War and its aftermath are covered in Chapter 3. The Labour government’s 
priority in its foreign policy was the maintenance of British interests rather than being pro-
Israel or pro-Arab. In practice this meant maintaining a balance of arms supplies to both sides 
whilst encouraging peace negotiations. Opposition from within the Party changed from a few 
individuals in 1956 to a more organised small vocal group by the time of the Six-Day War. 
This Chapter will look at the TUC’s reaction to the war and why it differed from European 
trade unionists who were more open in their support of Israel. Because the TUC felt it had a 
                                                 
43 The minutes of a meeting with Sir Vincent Tewson at the Foreign Office, 20 August 1956, The National 
Archives of the UK (TNA): Public Record Office (PRO), FO371/119112. (Hereafter cited as TNA:PRO). 
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role to play in trying to find a peaceful settlement of the conflict immediately after the war, it 
sent fact finding missions to Israel, Jordan and Egypt. This Chapter will investigate if these 
missions were successful. It will also examine what effect the relocation of the Histadrut's 
European office from London to Brussels had on TUC-Histadrut relations.  
In order to rebuild its reputation after the Six-Day War the Wilson government evolved a 
policy which would improve Britain’s relationship with the Arab world, whilst at the same 
time, promoting a general settlement of the conflict. Once the euphoria of Israel’s stunning 
victory and the reluctance of the Arabs to recognise and talk peace with Israel had passed, 
there was a re-evaluation of attitudes within the Labour movement towards Arab-Israeli 
relations. This Chapter will investigate the rise of the Left in the party and the unions who 
questioned Labour’s support for Israel and its effect on TUC policy.  
The first part of Chapter 4 covers the 1973 Yom Kippur War, the Israeli Labour Party's final 
years in government and the UN’s “Zionism is racism” resolution.  It was during this period 
that Labour’s attitude to Israel started to change. The Labour Left, with their support for anti-
colonialism and anti–imperialism policies, which identified Israel with Britain’s colonial past, 
began to support the Palestinians and the PLO during the 1960s. The decline in support for 
Israel within the labour movement was due to the era of “third world” independence 
movements, the rise of the Left and the retirement of the generation of MPs and activists for 
whom the establishment of the State of Israel and the plight of the Jews at the time of the 
Second World War had been important. Their replacements, mainly from the Left,  saw 
support for the Palestinians as more important than Labour’s historical support of Israel. In 
addition, the establishment of links between Labour and Arab political groups, including the 
PLO, resulted by the end of the decade with the PLO being recognised by several European 
Socialist governments as the official representatives of the Palestinian people. This Chapter 
will ask what effect this had on the TUC and its relationship with the Histadrut.  The Israeli 
general election of March 1977 proved to be a landmark in Israel’s history. The Labour Party, 
which could trace it lineage back to the founding of the Histadrut in 1920 was soundly 
defeated by Menachim  Begin’s Likud Party after 29 years in power. It will investigate what 
effect this monumental change had on TUC-Histadrut relations. A feature of the 1970s was 
the success of the campaign for Soviet Jews to be allowed to leave the USSR, which 
eventually enabled large numbers of Russian Jews to immigrate to Israel. The TUC's 
involvement in this campaign will be discussed.   
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By 1980 supporters of the Palestinians realised that in order to gain Labour Party support 
they first needed to secure the support of the major trade unions because of their power to 
make Labour Party policy. As a result they formed the Trade Union Friends of Palestine 
(TUFP) which by 1982 had garnered enough support for the TUC Congress to adopt a 
resolution which condemned Israel’s invasion of Lebanon and recognised the Palestinian 
people's right to self-determination and their own state.44 Although relations were often 
lukewarm for long stretches of time, the vote by Congress marked the end of over 60 years of 
often unquestioned for TUC support for the Jews of Palestine and then Israel.  This was the 
turning point for the British trade union movement in its relations with Israel and the 
Palestinians.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
44 TUC International Committee meeting minutes, 4 October 1982, MRC, MSS.292D/901/23.  
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Chapter 1  1945-1955 
"The Histadrut, served as a loyal partner of the State and its diplomatic role was to aid it to 
the extent of its power and relations, strengthen the State's position, as well as to support the 
state in its struggles and to make friends, sympathisers and supporters amongst the workers 
movements of the world. It does not do parallel work; nor act for its own satisfaction and 
ambitions, whatever it does, it does not close co-operation and loyal co-ordination with the 
state's approval.  
In the labour field the Histadrut's mission in its diplomatic action is to nurture one of the main 
obligations of any workers movement, the obligation of international workers' solidarity. In 
this field the Histadrut's mission is to encourage co-operation for the promotion of the peace 
and freedom in the world, for the rising of the standard of living of the masses." - Reuven 
Barkatt 45  
-------------------------- 
The international labour movement was at its most influential in world politics during the ten 
years following the Second World War and no more so than in Britain and in Israel. Both the 
British and Israeli labour movements, the TUC and the Histadrut, were dedicated supporters 
of their respective Socialist Governments who unashamedly used them to promote national 
interests. Before the creation of the State of Israel in 1948, the Jewish community in Palestine 
(Yishuv) was managed by the Jewish Agency which looked after political affairs and the 
Histadrut which was responsible for its defence, economic and  social development. After 
1945 the Histadrut supported the campaign for a Jewish homeland in Palestine and after 
independence, the promotion of Israeli interests as well as the rebuilding of links with the 
British labour movement. This Chapter will consider whether TUC-Histadrut relations 
changed after independence, and how successful the Israelis were in rebuilding links the 
British trade union movement. 
The task of the TUC in international affairs was shaped by the decision of the government in 
May 1940 to give the TUC the role as the sole channel of communication between the trade 
                                                 
 45 Reuven Barkatt as Head of the Histadrut’s International Department presented a review of the last 10 years of 
Histadrut international activity to the Histadrut Executive Committee, Histadrut Executive Committee meeting 
minutes, fourth meeting, 4 March 1958, (Hebrew original) pp.161-74.  His original surname was Burstein and 
changed it in 1950 to the Hebrew version Barkatt.  For continuity in this dissertation, Barkatt will be used 
throughout. 
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unions and government. The TUC was so successful in this role that the political authority 
and prestige it gained during wartime ensured that from 1945 onwards it continued to be 
consulted by government on a variety of issues including foreign policy.46 The wartime 
experience gained by Bevin as Minister of Labour and Atlee as Foreign Secretary was crucial 
in maintaining the increased involvement of the TUC with Labour government. 
Their post-war partnership between the Labour Government and the TUC  worked extremely 
well because the Foreign Secretary, Ernest Bevin47, was assured of unswerving loyalty and 
support from Sir Vincent Tewson, the TUC General Secretary and Arthur Deakin, Bevin's 
successor as General Secretary of the Transport and General Workers' Union(TGWU).48  The 
role of defending the Labour Government’s policy in Palestine fell to two very different men.  
Tewson, who was elected TUC General Secretary in 1946, was hesitant, over-cautious, 
suspicious of change, very much the ‘insider’, having spent his working life within the trade 
union movement. Deakin, on the other hand, was a dynamic character, who by 1948, had 
become the dominant figure on the TUC General Council49 and WFTU President.  As 
Tewson unable to give strong personal leadership to the TUC, a group of four powerful union 
leaders on the General Council, led by Deakin decided TUC policy and direction which was 
then implemented by Tewson.50 Although many leading Labour politicians were pro-Israel, 
neither Tewson or Deakin visited Israel nor did they express support for the Jewish State. 
                                                 
46 For more information on the TUC's role and relationship with government, see Chapter 10, 'Confirmation and 
Consolidation 1940-1976' in  Ross Martin., TUC: The Growth of a Pressure Group, 1868-1976, (Oxford: OUP, 
1980), pp.269-324 and  Chapter 8, 'The Fourth Estate, 1939-57', John Lovell and B.C  Roberts, A Short History 
of the TUC, (London: Macmillan 1980), pp.144-164. 
47Ernest Bevin was General Secretary of the TGWU from 1922 until 1940, and a member of the General 
Council of the TUC from 1925 to 1940.  He was Minister of Labour from  May 1940 –May 1945 in Churchill's 
wartime Government . From 1945 until his death in 1951 he was Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. 
48 For more information about Sir Vincent Tewson and Arthur Deakin see: Geoffrey Goodman, ‘Tewson, Sir 
(Harold) Vincent (1898–1981)’, Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, Oxford University Press, 2004 
(http://0www.oxforddnb.com.catalogue.ulrls.lon.ac.uk/view/article/31751, accessed 26 Aug 2009).  Also V. L. 
Allen, ‘Deakin, Arthur (1890–1955)’, rev. Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, Oxford University Press, 
2004; online edition, May 2008 (http://0-www.oxforddnb.com.catalogue.ulrls.lon.ac.uk/view/article/32761, 
accessed 26 Aug 2009). 
49 TUC policy is set by the annual Congress but between Congresses this responsibility lies with the General 
Council on which all the larger unions are represented. The International Committee is a sub-committee of the 
General Council.  
50 The other three members of the group were Sir William Lawther, President of the Miners union, Tom 
Williamson, General Secretary of the NUGMW and Lincoln Evans, General Secretary of the ISTC. 
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Along with Reuven Barkatt, the Head of the Histadrut International Department,51 they were 
the key players in TUC-Histadrut relations for the next 15 years.  
According to Lochery, the role of the Foreign Office at the time was "and will always be, to 
establish and define British interests overseas, wherever possible to expand and develop these 
interests further, but always defend them when they come under perceived or real threat."52  
Lochery argues that the Foreign Office was "Arabist" because it pursued Arab interests over 
Israeli ones, by offering five often complementary explanations, colonial hangover, in which 
the British were forced out of Palestine by Zionist military and political resistance, the 
strategic value of the Arabs to Britain in terms of economic and political goals, the 
"Lawrence of Arabia" old school attitudes prevalent in the Foreign Office, Israel as an 
occupying power since 1967 as the main reason for tension in their dispute with the 
Palestinians  and the belief that there is antisemitism at the Foreign Office.53    
The international labour movement was important to both the Histadrut and the TUC but for 
different reasons. The TUC, who believed that the members of the movement could continue 
to work together as it had in wartime, were responsible for the establishment of the World 
Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU) which included both Russian and American unions. The 
WFTU failed however, because it was used for political purposes in the Cold War between 
East and West. As a result, in 1949, the TUC along with its European and American allies left 
the WFTU to form the non-communist, International Confederation of Trade Unions 
(ICFTU). The Histadrut remained a member of the WFTU until 1950 when it resigned as 
membership of the organisation conflicted with Israel’s policy of strict neutrality.  Three 
years later the Histadrut joined the ICFTU. It had used its membership of the WFTU to 
promote the need for a Jewish homeland in Palestine and of the ICFTU as a means to gain 
support for Israel.  
Even though the Histadrut considered itself as an ally of the Britain, during the 1950s, it  
became unintentionally involved in the battle between the TUC and the American unions for 
the leadership of the organisation, which in turn made it harder to improve TUC-Histadrut 
relations because the Histadrut was viewed as an ally of the Americans. Whereas the TUC’s 
                                                 
51 For information about Reuven Barkatt see his obituary, Socialist Affairs, Vol.xxii no.5 (1972), pp.103-4.  
52 Lochery, Neill, Loaded Dice; The Foreign Office and Israel, (Continuum: London, 2007), p.2. 
53 Ibid, pp.2-4 
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connection with the Histadrut had started in 1921 as part of the British Empire, the 
relationship between the American unions and the Histadrut was based solely on their support 
for a Jewish homeland in Palestine.54  
This chapter will also examine that the Foreign Office with Tewson's support showed time 
and again their prejudice against Israel and bias towards the Arab States in their fight to 
contain the spread of communism in the Middle East and Africa, coupled with their pursuit of 
regional dominance and influence. They used the TUC and the ICFTU to promote these aims 
at the expense of the Histadrut which was the largest and best run trade union in the Middle 
East.   
This story, however, starts neither in Palestine nor Britain but in Eastern Europe in the 1880s 
when as a result of the pogroms against the Jews in Russia many thousands of Jews fled the 
violence and became refugees. The majority went west to either America or Britain but a 
small number emigrated to Palestine. This chapter will review the background to the 
emergence of Zionism, Jewish settlement in Palestine and the emergence of the Jewish labour 
movement there as well as its early links to the British labour movement.  
Jews in Palestine 
Although Jews had lived in Palestine since pre-biblical times, large scale settlement only 
began in the late 19th century. The Jewish immigrants who went to Palestine from Russia in 
the 1880s were known as the first Aliyah. Although not religious Jews, they considered 
themselves pioneers, rather than refugees, who had gone there to make a connection with 
their ancestors and at the same time build a modern, new Hebrew society based on Jewish 
labour living in agricultural settlements. The next wave of immigrants from the Russian 
Empire, the second Aliyah, included a small number of socialists known as Labour–Zionists 
who believed that Jewish settlement in Palestine would allow Jewish workers to play a key 
role in determining all branches and conditions of production. These Labour-Zionists, who 
came to Palestine as individuals and not as part of an organised movement were young 
pioneers, full of revolutionary fervour and dedication to Zionism which they believed would 
solve the “Jewish problem”. They were not seeking a better personal life, as many of the first 
Aliyah did, but instead devoted their lives to the establishment of a socialist Jewish state. 
                                                 
54 Gerd Koram, ‘New Politics for an American Labor leader: Sidney Hillman, 1942-46’, American Jewish 
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Labour-Zionists brought trade unionism and political parties to Palestine, which at the time 
was a backward and feudal society. Although their European-based ideology had to be 
modified to meet the new conditions that they encountered in Palestine, they built and 
developed the concept of co-operative farming, the Kibbutz; defence units called Hashomer 
to protect the Jewish settlements against Bedouin and Arab attacks; and enabled the rebirth of 
the Hebrew language.55 
The Histadrut, which was to become the driving force for the future Jewish state, was 
established in 1920 with David Ben Gurion as its first General Secretary.56 Its activities were 
always directed towards assisting the absorption of further immigrants and their settlement in 
the country.57 The Histadrut described itself “primarily as serving the cause of Zionism and 
so makes all of its ramified activists subservient to this supreme aim.”58 While the European 
working class movement sought to defend the workers against the excesses of capitalism, the 
Histadrut’s trade unionism, which was not based on the factory system, created a working 
class from the immigrants to Palestine.  
Initially a contractor on road building programmes for the British mandate, the Histadrut 
expanded into an organisation with its own labour exchanges, co-operative agricultural 
settlements, co-operative industry projects and building companies. As well as providing 
employment it developed a social services programme for the Jewish immigrants which 
included  a network of schools, educational and cultural programmes, a universal sick fund 
(Kupat Holim), its own newspaper and bank. The Histadrut also controlled the Haganah, a 
defence force set up in up in 1921 to protect the Jewish community from Arab attacks.59 In 
                                                 
55 For a history of  the Labour Zionist movement see Walter Laqueur, A History of Zionism,(New York: 
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57 The Histadrut’s written submission to the Anglo American of Inquiry, March 1946, LMU, HD8759, p.9.  
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1920, membership in the Histadrut was approximately 4,400. By 1930 it had grown to 25,000 
members or 74% of the entire Jewish labour force in Palestine.60  
The high levels of Jewish immigration to Palestine and Jewish land purchases created fears 
amongst the Arab population and led to violence between Jews and Arabs in August 1929.61 
The Arab revolt of 1936-39 resulted in the British Government publishing the Peel Report in 
1937 which concluded that the mandate was unworkable and suggested the partition of 
Palestine between the Arabs and the Jews. After failing to reach agreement between the 
parties, the British imposed their own solution for Palestine. The 1939 White Paper proposed 
restricting land sales to Jews and limited Jewish immigration for five years, after which 
Palestine would be given independence. Both sides rejected the policy, the Arabs on the 
grounds that it gave legitimacy to Jewish claims for a national home and the Jews on the 
grounds that it was an about-turn by the British who had previously supported their right to 
an independent Jewish state in Palestine. On the eve of World War II, the Jewish population 
in Palestine had reached 445,000, 30% of the total population.62  
British Jews, the TUC and Zionism  
Jewish immigrants from Eastern Europe who arrived in Britain from 1870 onwards created a 
Jewish working class. They settled in the major cities working in sweat shops in tailoring, 
cabinet making, cigar making and boot and shoe manufacture.63 The use of the “sweating” 
system of work which caused social and economic problems in certain urban areas was first 
debated at the TUC Congress of 1875.64  The TUC campaigns between 1875 and 1905 
against the sweating trades and alien immigration did sometimes contain an anti-Semitic 
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element, but in the main they were part of the unions’ demands for better working conditions. 
Their efforts were rewarded with the Aliens Act of 1905 which was designed to curb Jewish 
immigration.65 Meanwhile many of the immigrants joined Jewish trade unions, some of 
which were affiliated to the TUC.66 Jewish involvement with the TUC Congresses was 
initially limited,67 but in 1915 Congress unanimously adopted a resolution moved by the 
Jewish Tailors Machinists union calling on the TUC to petition the government to support the 
call for political and civil rights for Jews in countries where these rights were currently 
denied.68 Jewish rights  were next mentioned in August 1917 when the Labour Party issued 
its “War Aims Memorandum” which included support for the demand that Jewish workers in 
all countries have the same rights as others and the right of the Jewish people to be allowed to 
return and settle in Palestine. The reasons why this clause was included is unclear but it did 
set the trend for Labour’s and the TUC’s support for Zionism.69  
In Britain, support for Zionism seemed to be realised when the British Government issued the 
Balfour Declaration in 1917 which announced that it favoured a national home for the Jewish 
people in Palestine. International support for Zionism followed when the Declaration was 
ratified at the Paris Peace Conference in 1919. This eventually led to the granting of the 
Palestine mandate to Britain by the League of Nations.70 In 1920 the Labour Party and the 
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TUC urged Lloyd George to accept the mandate and thereby make possible a Jewish national 
home.71  
The 1914-18 war was the catalyst for change in many fields, including the British trade union 
movement. The establishment of the International Labour Organisation (ILO) in 1919 led to 
the British government being responsible for implementing international conventions relating 
to working conditions in her colonies and dependencies. As a result of its involvement with 
the ILO and the International Federation of Trade Unions (IFTU), in October 1921, the TUC 
formed its own International committee in order to improve links with trade unions in the 
British Empire even though they had very little knowledge of working conditions there and 
had never been asked for advice by the colonial labour movements.72 
In 1920 Ben Gurion established a London office in order to strengthen links between the 
Histadrut and the international labour movement,  the TUC and the Labour Party.73 Their first 
recorded contact with the  TUC was at the 1924 IFTU Congress in Vienna.74 In 1928 the 
Histadrut first asked the TUC for help in solving labour problems in Palestine.75 By 1930, the 
only effective Commonwealth affiliates of the IFTU were considered to be the Canadian 
Trades and Labour Congress and the Histadrut.76   
From the mid-1920s, Poale Zion, the Jewish Socialist Workers group, which had taken on the 
propaganda role for the Histadrut in Europe and America had forged links on their behalf 
with the Labour Party and the trade union movement. Poale Zion's relationship with the 
                                                 
71 In 1920, the Jewish Socialist Workers group, Poale Zion which had mobilised support for Labour candidates in the 
1918 general election became affiliated to the Labour Party. Levenberg, pp.206-7, and Gideon Shimoni, "Poale 
Zion: A Zionist Transplant in Britain (1905-1945)", in Studies in Contemporary Jewry Vol.2, ed. by Peter Y. 
Medding, (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1986), p.236. 
 
72 Marjorie Nicholson, The TUC Overseas, the Roots of Policy,(London: Allen and Unwin,1986), pp.41 and 46.  
73 Gorny, The British Labour Movement and Zionism 1917-1948,  p.25. 
74 The TUC’s report to 1924 Congress noted that “An interesting feature of the Vienna congress was the 
presence of a delegate from the trades unions of Palestine who stated that there were now in Palestine about 
20,000 workers, although that number was small, it had to be borne in mind that they were pioneers in a country 
with a future. The national organisation represented by Mr. Dov Hoz was the only bone fide trade union centre 
in Palestine and he expressed his hope that the other members of the IFTU would help them in reconstructing 
his country and especially to introduce socialist legislation which at the present time was entirely lacking in 
Palestine.” LMU, TUC Congress proceedings 1924, p.224. 
75 The problems in the rebuilding of the Haifa docks were solved eventually after the TUC had intervened with 
the Colonial Office. See LMU, TUC Congress proceedings 1929, pp.229-30, 1930, p.187 and 1931, p.238. 
76 Nicholson, The TUC Overseas, the Roots of Policy pp.129 and 132. 
 
32 
 
Labour Party was crucial in defining the Left's perception of Zionist activity in Palestine in 
the 1930s.77  
Poale Zion was a small but powerful faction in Britain which between 1920 and 1948 put 
forward six motions on Palestine at Labour Party conferences.78 Despite these successes, 
Poale Zion, because of its low level of support from within Anglo-Jewry, was never more 
than a small part of the British Zionist movement.79  
The TUC and their response to persecution of Jews, 1933-39  
The Russian Revolution of 1917 led to the circulation in Britain, three years later, of the 
antisemitic forgery “The Protocols of the Elders of Zion” and the belief in an international 
Jewish conspiracy to overthrow the established order. Britain was at this time in the grip of a 
xenophobic, anti-alien, anti-Bolshevik and antisemitic hysteria which affected the status in 
Britain of both immigrant and assimilated Jews. As a result very few Labour or Liberal MP’s 
opposed the 1919 Aliens Act, which was an extension of wartime restrictions.80  Anti–Zionism  
in Britain in the early 1920s came mainly from the far Right which waged a fierce campaign in the 
press and Parliament. This, in turn endeared Zionism to the Left because they were 
supporting the underdog.81 Lord’s Northcliffe and Beaverbrook used their newspapers, the 
Daily Mail and the Daily Express to oppose Zionism and British involvement in Palestine.82 
Although Beaverbrook denied that his campaign was antisemitic his propaganda gave much 
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ammunition to genuine anti-Semites and the 1922 general election was marked by more anti-
Jewish feeling than any other election since 1905.83 
During the 1930s the TUC’s main international concern was the rise of Fascism in Europe 
which was discussed at every Congress from 1933 until the outbreak of war. However in 
1936  Congress adopted a motion on Palestine which noted the continuous support given by 
the British labour movement for a Jewish national home in Palestine.84 The following year 
Ernest Bevin, who was TUC president for 1937, described the persecution of the Jews as one 
of the great tragedies of the world and that he made no pronouncements on the merits or 
demerits of the proposal to partition Palestine. Bevin said, "the test which would  have to be 
applied by the Labour movement is whether it will contribute towards the ending, for all 
time, of the persecution of the Jewish race. Will the fact that they are a State with 
Ambassadors at the various Chancelleries of the world assist them to a greater extent than the 
mandate granted to them by the League?”85 Gorny considers that this was not a political ploy 
by Bevin but a genuine concern on his part to find a solution to the problem.86 The 1938 
Congress was dominated by the international situation and the Governments indecisive 
policies towards Germany and Italy. The President, Mr. H. Elvin, in his opening address said 
that “the expelling of Jews from Germany was an outrage and we must render all possible 
assistance to these unfortunate people.”87 The General Council followed up with a statement 
on the problems of German and Austrian refugees which referred to the setting up of a 
Coordinating Committee for Refugees. They also felt that “some practical expression should 
be given to the sympathy which is generally accepted” by these proposals which should be 
"subject to a yearly limit on the number of refugees entering Britain.”88 However the Labour 
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Party and the TUC who were ambivalent towards the influx of German Jews into Britain, 
both agreed that the refugees should be allowed to go to Palestine regardless of whether it 
was beneficial to the Arabs, or the impact the refugees made on the country.89    
As Britain held the Palestine mandate, all the lobbying of politicians by the Zionists for a 
Jewish homeland in Palestine took place in London. The Palestine Labour movement sent a 
series of permanent and temporary representatives to London to lobby the Government and 
the British Labour movement. One of the first to be posted there in 1928 was Dov Hoz whose 
role was the reorganise Poale Zion (PZ) and lobby both the Labour Party and the unions. 
Bevin came to have an especially good relationship with him as both Bevin, then General 
Secretary of the TGWU, and Mr. Middleton, the Assistant Secretary of the Labour Party, 
spoke at a farewell gathering given for Hos, before he returned to Palestine in 1931.90 PZ  
was assisted in its lobbying activities by individuals who were not only members of the PZ, 
but also often members of the Labour Party and the Zionist Federation.91 Hoz returned to 
London in 1934 after Shertok, the Head of the Political Department of the Jewish Agency in 
Palestine reported that the Zionist executive had lost contact with public opinion and 
influential figures in Britain and had neglected its ties with the new generation of leaders 
which had emerged in the Labour Party. Although Hoz was replaced by Berl Locker in 1937, 
he was sent back on more than one occasion to London by Ben Gurion to talk to Ministers 
and the Labour Party leadership before  his death in 1941.92   
Hoz and Locker's lobbying of the labour movement was focused mainly on the Labour Party. 
Politicians were deemed to have more influence than the unions, a situation not unlike that in 
Palestine with respect to the relationship between Mapai and the Histadrut. Their main 
contacts in the unions were Bevin and Walter Citrine, the General Secretary of the TUC. In 
the autumn of 1938 with the situation in Germany worsening and because there was no 
Labour Party conference planned for that year, Locker approached the TUC with a 
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memorandum asking for a declaration on the need for large-scale immigration. It was 
considered by the General Council at their pre-Congress meeting on 1 September. However it 
was only after Hoz had intervened that Citrine met Locker with the result that Citrine agreed 
that some reference might be made at Congress. However no action was taken by Congress. 
Instead, a resolution calling on Britain to carry out her mandate obligations so that Jewish 
refugees might have every opportunity to enter Palestine was  adopted by a joint meeting 
with the Labour Party NEC.93 Citrine's action had ensured that the TUC did not make 
political decisions on Palestine but was instead a silent partner to the Labour Party. It is not 
clear when or why the TUC had adopted the policy of not making any pro-Zionist political 
statements in favour of the Histadrut especially when the international movement of which 
Citrine was President as well as the Americans unions and even Bevin all supported the work 
of the Histadrut.  
When the British government decided to implement their 1939 White paper on Palestine, 
which abandoned the partition of Palestine, the Labour Party initiated a pro-Zionist campaign 
which was stepped up with the start of the war. 94 In February 1940, the National Council of 
Labour which had the support of Mapai and the Histadrut, argued that the Government was 
treating Palestine as a Colonial possession and not as a mandated territory.95 
 The following month Hoz, who had already lobbied the Labour leadership, met with TUC 
Deputy General Secretary Tewson. Hoz asked that Citrine, the TUC General Secretary, who 
was also President of the International Federation of Unions, intervene with the Prime 
Minister before the forthcoming Parliamentary debate on Palestine to tell him of the British 
labour movement's opposition to the White Paper. Tewson told Hoz that "it was true that 
Congress had made declarations in regard to Palestine at the request of the Jewish Labour 
Movement (Poale Zion), but it was after all a purely political question."96 Tewson made it 
quite clear that the TUC, unlike the Labour Party, would not become involved in what it 
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considered to be political matters which directly involved the Government. Tewson would 
not have taken this position unless this policy had been previously approved by Citrine.  
The Labour Party continued to support its Jewish comrades in Palestine and at its 1940 Party 
conference unanimously adopted a resolution critical of the British Government’s restrictions 
and the problem of anti-Semitic persecution.97 Between 1917 and 1945 the Labour Party and 
the TUC were consistent in their commitment to a Jewish national home in Palestine. It was 
only in 1945, when the Labour Government decided to ignore their previous commitments to 
the Jews and continue to implement the 1939 White Paper,  that the Party had to defend itself 
against criticism from pro-Zionist Jews. 98 
Berl Locker wrote to the TUC in September 1940 with details of the Histadrut's war aims 
which set out the problems facing the Jewish people in Palestine and the basis of any future 
peace settlement. He asked if the TUC Congress would adopt a motion which expressed the 
friendly attitude of the labour movement towards the rights of the Jewish people and the 
national home. The General Purposes committee decided to take no action99 and Tewson 
replied to Locker saying that it was “not possible to submit an emergency resolution as 
conference lasts only three days.” He added that, as the subject had been discussed by unions 
at the Labour Party conference in May, it was "felt to be adequate in the circumstances."100  
The Histadrut then sent a telegram to the TUC Congress stating that “we are working 
together in fight against Nazism and fascism.” Citrine replied that the General Council 
appreciated the sentiments expressed and assured the Histadrut that the TUC would do all 
"they can to secure for the Jews civil, political and economic equality and their national 
rights.” 101 Locker told the Mapai Central Committee in 1943 that the lack of public support 
by the TUC for the Histadrut was not unusual as the leadership (Citrine) had refused on 
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principle and had consistently declined to adopt an independent stand on Zionism and Jewish 
affairs. All their appeals had been rejected and passed onto the Labour Party. 102 He linked 
Citrine with a group of Labour cabinet ministers who thought it advisable to "water down" 
any pro-Zionist statements.103  Although the TUC were unwilling to become in what involved 
they saw as political action they happily supported Histadrut requests for intervention over 
wage rates. 104   
 
The Communist Party of Great Britain and the Jews  
The Communist Party of Great Britain (CPGB) was founded in 1920. Although the Party 
failed to be a major force in the general strike of 1926, by the 1930s it could count on the 
support of the miners union and the engineering and textile trades. It was very strong in both 
Glasgow and the East End of London which had a large Jewish population. Many Jews were 
attracted to socialism and joined either the Labour Party or the CPGB. The attraction of 
communism for Jews on the political Left was not only its ideology, but also its opposition to 
antisemitism. Britain during the 1930s saw growing support within the Left for the Zionist 
project in Palestine but not amongst the young  working class Jews of the East End for whom 
Zionism "made no headway". They  prefered instead to join the CPGB which offered them 
the best solution to their problems.105 The Party opposed the rise of fascism and was against 
the Conservative government's policy of appeasement towards Nazi Germany. The CPGB 
played a leading role in the fight against the British Union of Fascists (BUF) and in 1936, 
Jewish Socialists and Left wing Zionists came together with the CPGB to oppose the BUF in 
the "battle of Cable Street."106  
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Membership of the CPGB rose steadily throughout the 1930s and by 1939 it had nearly 
18,000 members. Communists were excluded from membership of the Labour Party and were 
restricted by the TUC's 1934 "black circular" which forbade communists to stand as delegates 
for local trade councils. As a  member of Comintern,107 the Communist International, it was 
the duty of the CPGB to support Soviet actions and explain Stalin's policies to its members. 
While the CPGB denied Jewish claims to be a political nation, from the mid-1930s onwards it 
allowed the Jews to be designated as a people or nationality, but it always stopped short of 
support for Zionism. In 1936 the CPGB founded a Jewish Bureau to advise on policy issues 
such as the 'Jewish question' and the Arab-Jewish violence in Palestine.108 The Middle East 
conflict was viewed both as a class struggle and as a liberation struggle by the Palestinian 
Arabs against British imperialism. Jews were called upon to support the Arab revolt and 
oppose Zionism - which the CPGB said served the interests of Jewish capitalists and British 
colonialists. In August 1939, the signing of the Soviet-German non-aggression pact obliged 
the CPGB to reverse its pre-war policy of standing up to Hitler. The Daily Worker described 
the agreement as a "dramatic peace move to halt aggressors."109  After Hitler invaded Poland 
on 1 September, and Britain declared war on Germany two days later, the Daily Worker 
wrote that this was "a war that can and must be won." Within weeks, however, the CPGB had 
received instructions from Moscow and reversed its policy and opposed the war. 110     
The Second World War 1939-45 
The attitude of the Jewish community in Palestine to the outbreak of war was summed up by 
Ben Gurion as: “We shall fight with Great Britain in the war as if there were no White Paper 
and we shall fight the White Paper as if there were no war.”111 Consequently Ben Gurion 
placed the resources of the Jewish community in Palestine at the disposal of the British war 
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effort whilst continuing to oppose restrictions on immigration by supporting “illegal” Jewish 
immigration. Ben Gurion believed that the only way forward was the establishment of a 
Jewish state and all the efforts of the Zionist movement should work towards that one aim. In 
1942, a conference in New York of  Zionist leaders from America and 17 other countries 
including Chaim Weizmann and David Ben-Gurion, adopted Ben Gurion’s plans which 
became known as the “Biltmore Program” whose aim was the establishment of Palestine “as 
a Jewish commonwealth integrated into the structure of the new democratic world.” The 
Biltmore conference also agreed that the Jewish Agency should have control of immigration 
and the development of the Jewish economy to allow it to absorb large numbers of Jews after 
the war.112 The Histadrut, which controlled the Jewish economy in Palestine, played a key 
role in Ben Gurion’s plans and worked with the British administration in Palestine to ensure 
industrial output for the war effort was maintained. At the same time it pursued a political 
role by lobbying Labour politicians and the TUC throughout the war. The Colonial Office 
described the power and influence of the Histadrut in Palestine as formidable.113  
By 1945 the Jewish economy and industrial output in Palestine had expanded greatly because 
of the demands of the British war effort. The Zionists had hoped that recognition of the 
Jewish war effort would, as in 1918, produce support for their claims for a Jewish state. The 
British however saw the Palestine problem and the plight of the Jews in Europe as two 
separate issues. The TUC's relationship with the Histadrut during wartime can be described 
as that of branch office and head office with the TUC being asked  several times to intervene 
with the British Government on the Histadrut's behalf on issues related to wages and 
conditions or emergency wartime legislation.114  
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The mass murder of the Jews in Europe during the war at the hands of the Nazis was first 
brought to the attention of the TUC and the Labour Party in July 1942. The Labour Party 
NEC was so appalled by the news from Poland and Czechoslovakia that they immediately 
passed a resolution on behalf of the British labour movement calling for the perpetrators to be 
brought to justice after the war. Once the TUC had signed up to the motion a deputation then 
delivered it to both the Foreign Office and the American Ambassador.115 The following 
December the TUC International committee minutes record that “Communications had been 
received from the Histadrut and the WJC asking the TUC to take all possible steps to stop the 
mass slaughter of Jews in occupied countries.” The committee also endorsed the action of the 
IFTU which had passed a strong resolution of protest embodying an appeal to former trade 
unionists in Germany.116 The following month the Histadrut sent an emotive telegram to the 
TUC: “Our members were deeply impressed by the IFTU announcement to the workers of 
the Nazi dominated countries on the wholesale slaughter of the Jews. Many of us have 
relatives in those countries, for all of us it is a question of extermination of half our nation. 
Unfortunately it seems that the measures taken until now did not stop this process.”117 It must 
have been a surreal situation for the Histadrut especially in autumn 1942, to be writing to the 
TUC on trade union matters knowing not only that events in Western desert and Egypt were 
bringing war closer to Palestine but also that the Nazis had exterminated two million Jews in 
Poland. 118  
From then on the Histadrut used every opportunity to impress upon both the TUC and the 
Labour Party the maltreatment of the Jews by the Nazis.119  In September 1943 they urged the 
TUC to consider that “Jewish labour in Palestine participating wholeheartedly in war effort 
looks to your help and understanding in its anxiety that Jewish people does not remain losers 
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in democratic victorious world. We are certain you will not fail us.”120  The following month 
the TUC International Committee, as a mark of respect, decided to record the 1943 TUC 
Congress resolution which condemned the inhumane crimes “against the peoples in all the 
occupied countries and against the Jewish race in particular.”121  
The Histadrut also asked the TUC for help when lobbying for a change in Palestine 
government policy after police and troops raided settlements looking for illegal immigrants 
and deserters.122 Similar wartime protests by the Histadrut to the TUC about the Palestine 
Government’s actions against the Jewish population often resulted in the TUC asking the 
Colonial Office for advice before replying to the Histadrut.123  However this did not affect 
their lobbying of the Colonial office on behalf of Histadrut on work related issues.  
The situation in summer 1945  
The British labour movement had, since 1917, given their complete support for a Jewish 
homeland in Palestine but after winning the 1945 general election it found itself divided both 
personally and politically over the Palestine. This conflict of interest between support for the 
Jews and Britain’s need to maintain the friendship of the Arab nations was further deepened 
by the guilt they felt for the suffering of the Jews in the Holocaust. Moreover, Britain like 
many other countries had refused entry to the Jews who had survived the war and were now 
living in displaced persons camps. Now leading the government, Attlee and Bevin soon  
realised that the problems in Palestine would have to be dealt with and they would have to 
balance the reality of Britain's post-war situation against what the party had said in the past. 
The question of how much was political posturing and how much was true conviction would 
now be tested.  
When in opposition, Labour had demanded that the 1939 White Paper be rescinded. It was 
therefore a surprise when the Bevin announced in November 1945 that they would continue 
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to maintain the 1939 White paper policy on Jewish immigration to Palestine.124 The Jews 
were outraged and decided to openly challenge British rule by attacking and sabotaging 
British property and installations throughout Palestine. The moderate Haganah, joined with 
the extremist organisations, the Irgun and LEHI125 to force the British to withdraw. The 
British brought in an extra 80,000 troops in order to put down the opposition but to no avail. 
The violent Jewish campaign continued and on 22 July 1946 the Irgun blew up the British 
military headquarters in the King David Hotel in Jerusalem killing 91 civilians. The  impact 
of the attack shocked the British both in Palestine and Britain. At the same time as the 
military campaign, Jewish emissaries in Europe were actively bringing thousands of illegal 
Jewish immigrants every month by ship to Palestine. The result was a British naval blockade 
of Palestine to try and stem the flow illegal immigrants.126  
British Labour’s position 
The Labour Party's approach to Zionism had evolved from their recognition of the right of 
Jews to return to Palestine in 1917 into their 1944 Conference declaration that Palestine was 
the Jewish national home. All previous resolutions had been based on pre-war party policy 
and the 1944 statement was the first to take into account the plight and suffering of the Jews 
in the Holocaust. The declaration stated that 'there is surely neither hope nor meaning in a 
"Jewish National Home," unless we are prepared to let Jews, if they wish, enter this tiny land 
in such numbers as to become a majority. There was a strong case for this before the War. 
There is an irresistible case now, after the unspeakable atrocities of the cold and calculated 
German Nazi plan to kill all Jews in Europe.'127 Although the Party knew that conference 
motions and policy statements such as this were not binding on any future Labour 
Government, the Zionists understood this latest pledge to be a binding commitment on their 
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behalf by the Labour Party, which was why they were so upset when Bevin turned his back 
on the resolution. The declaration was also controversial not because it stated that Palestine 
was the new Jewish national home, but because it called for the “Arabs to be encouraged to 
move out as the Jews move in.”128 The text had been written by Hugh Dalton, a committed 
Zionist who was in favour of partition. The 1944 declaration was the high point in Labour's 
sympathy and identification with the suffering of the Jewish people and the Zionists’ 
aspiration for a Jewish homeland in Palestine. 
Even though the TUC had discussed the mass murder of the Jews in Europe in 1942 and was 
associated with the Labour Party resolution that was delivered to both the Foreign Office and 
the American Ambassador, the only time during the war that the murder of millions of Jews 
by the Nazis was ever mentioned at the TUC Congress was in 1943, in an address given by 
Isidore Nagler, the AFL fraternal delegate.129 His statement reflected the fact that the 
American trade union movement was much openly more supportive of the Histadrut and 
sympathetic about the problems facing the Jews than was the TUC.  That the TUC Congress 
never discussed the 1944 Labour Party resolution or the Holocaust was not unusual behaviour 
for them. Berl Locker, who represented the Zionist leadership in London and was close to the 
Labour Party, reported to the Mapai Central Committee in 1943 that the lack of public 
support by the TUC for the Histadrut was hardly surprising as the leadership had consistently 
refused to adopt an independent stand on Zionism and Jewish affairs. All appeals to them had 
been rejected and passed onto the Labour Party130  
Although sympathetic to the plight of the Jews before the war, Ernest Bevin, who aware of 
the issues,131 believed that Jews were a religious group and not a nation. Bevin took the view 
that the Jewish refugees should be returned to their country of origin regardless of whether 
they wanted to go there, which was why the Exodus refugees were sent back to Germany. He 
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also opposed the relaxation of restrictions on the numbers of Jews entering Britain, as they 
would be accused of using the horrors of the Holocaust to go to the head of the queue.    
Upon entering office Bevin realised that the Labour Party now had to take responsibility for 
British policy in Palestine and the Middle East.  Although now often remembered as an anti-
Semite for his actions and remarks as Foreign Secretary, his primary aim was to look after 
British interests as the governing power in Palestine, which he did to the best of his ability. 
Bevin was confident that having been a successful trade union leader he could solve the 
Palestinian problem by negotiation. However neither he nor his advisors fully appreciated 
that the Holocaust had united the Jews more than ever before around the creation of a Jewish 
State in Palestine, an ideal which they were prepared to fight for. He also deeply resented 
American pressure to change his policy.132 The worsening conflict deepened the rift between 
the Labour government and its pro-Zionist MPs. Most of the criticism of the government 
came from the Tribune group of Left-wing MP's, who accused the government of trying to 
placate the Arabs and forcing moderate Zionists, who wanted to cooperate with Britain into 
the extremist camp.133   
The position of the CPGB  
The prime concern of the CPGB after Germany's invasion of Russia in 1941 was the survival 
of the Soviet Union. Support for the CPGB amongst Britain's working classes gradually 
increased and they opposed any strike that affected the war effort. Once Russia had entered 
the war the Party dropped its support for Arab nationalism but still remained opposed to 
Zionism. The CPGB backed the policies of the Moscow-based Soviet Jewish Anti-fascist 
Committee and wooed Britain's Jews to support the USSR’s struggle against Nazi 
Germany.134 The CPGB's Jewish Bureau, which had been  dissolved at the outbreak of the 
war, was reformed in 1943 as the National Jewish Committee (NJC). At its first meeting, the 
NJC, "came out in favour of the Yishuv, espousing positions that were difficult to distinguish 
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from mainstream Zionist positions." In March 1945, the NJC argued that since Palestinian 
Jewry was "the most progressive force in the Middle East," Palestine should be open to 
Jewish immigration on a mass scale and the White Paper should be denounced "by all 
sections of Jewry as wrong policy."135 The monthly magazine of the  NJC,  the  Jewish  
Clarion, which was first published in 1945, provided leading Jewish members of the CPGB 
with the opportunity to put forward the Jewish communist point of view especially on 
Palestine. 
The CPGB won two seats in the 1945 general election, one in Scotland and one in Mile End 
in London's East End. Here the Jewish vote contributed to the party's success.  Although Jews 
were not prominent within the top leadership of the CPGB, they held 7% of the full-time 
posts in the party hierarchy and administration. This was a disproportionate involvement as 
Jews formed less than 1% of the British population.136 However, it was not unusual when 
compared to the relationship between Jews and communism in other countries. nor did the 
majority of Jewish communists have a problem with openly embracing their Jewishness 
while at the same time opposing Zionism.  
The CPGB's post-war plans to work closely with the Labour government came to nothing 
because of Britain's economic problems, her dependence on American financial support and 
the onset of the Cold War. Both the Labour Party and the TUC mounted a campaign to isolate 
the CPGB, with the Labour Party rejecting the communists request for affiliation. In October 
1948 the TUC General Council accused the CPGB of pursuing a strategy of industrial 
disruption on orders from Moscow. The following year the TUC Congress overwhelmingly 
backed the TUCs anti-communist position and withdrew from the WFTU.  
The Labour government believed that the Middle East was critical for Britain's economic and 
strategic needs and saw the Soviet Union's support for Israel as a threat to its interests in this 
region. Bevin thought that Jewish emigration from Eastern Europe could turn Israel into an 
Soviet ally. The CPGB, however, thought that a pro-Soviet Jewish state would undermine 
Britain's 'imperialist' interests in the region. Soviet support for partition brought the CPGB 
into direct conflict with the Labour Party. Russia's unexpected backing for an independent 
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Jewish state resulted in the CPGB describing that decision as an act of last resort, the 
outcome of the West's failure to clampdown on antisemitism and the inability to provide 
equality for everyone. The establishment of the State of Israel was portrayed as a "a big step 
toward fulfilment of self- determination of the peoples of Palestine" and "a great sign of the 
times."137 The CPGB joined with the Labour Left in protesting against Bevin's Palestine 
policy accusing him of having committed a "shameful betrayal" of the Jews and claiming that 
"Bevinism leads to anti-Semitism and all that follows."138 Both groups were  disappointed 
with the government's approach as they both believed that the government had put at risk its 
commitment to a socialist foreign policy.  The Jewish Chronicle's claim in 1949 that the 
Jewish Clarion had reversed its position in 1948 in line with the new Soviet position was 
vehemently denied. Nevertheless the CPGB's opposition to Zionism continued after 1948, 
with the Jewish Clarion continuing back to the official Party position. 139   
The role of Histadrut lobbying TUC 
The Histadrut cabled the Labour Party immediately after its general election victory saying 
“Hope you will act without delay to help save the remnants of our brethren and enable us to 
rebuild our free Jewish homeland.”140  When they heard rumours that the 1939 White Paper 
was about to be maintained, they lobbied both the TUC and the Labour Party asking them to 
support demands for the White Paper to be abolished and that Jews would be brought to 
Palestine by all available means.141  After  Bevin's  announcement that the immigration 
restrictions in the White Paper were to be implemented, the Labour Party wrote to Histadrut 
saying that they understood and deeply sympathised with their disappointment, but believed 
it would be possible to find a fair and just solution for both the Jews and Arabs.142  
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As well as the violence directed at British troops and property, there were continual attempts 
to break the British blockade directed at restricting Jewish immigration into Palestine. As part 
of the political campaign, the Histadrut regularly protested to the TUC and the Labour Party 
throughout 1946 over the Palestine Government’s actions against the Jewish population and 
controls on immigration. The TUC General Council which always discussed these 
communications, would frequently ask the Colonial Office for advice before replying to the 
Histadrut. In July, Tewson told the General Council that the NCL had discussed recent arrests 
in Palestine and had decided that the matter should be discussed unofficially with the 
Government.143  The TUC was also lobbied by trade unionists from home and abroad to 
intervene with the Government over restrictions on Jewish immigration into Palestine.144 
Tewson’s reply to the AFL145 displays both his and the TUC’s support for the Labour 
Government “the matter is one of great complexity which British Government is anxious to 
secure a solution but obviously cannot do so on the basis of unrestricted immigration.”  
Britain was fighting an insurgency in Palestine with British soldiers and police dying in a 
foreign land and the TUC, which was a key partner of the Labour government was being 
asked to lobby the same Labour government on behalf of the Histadrut, to stop the repression, 
who themselves were a part of the Jewish insurgency. The TUC found themselves in the 
position of conflicting loyalties, loyalty towards the Labour government and loyalty to their 
colleagues in the international labour movement. The TUC choose to give unwavering 
support to the Labour government and defend the actions in Palestine. The Histadrut as well 
as Mapai continued to lobby the Labour party, the TUC and the international labour 
movement for support for an independent Jewish state in Palestine. They found they did have 
allies in the Labour Party who would speak on their behalf such as Richard Crossman M.P 
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and Harold Laski146, but there was no one in the TUC or the unions who was willing to 
challenge Bevin or Deakin over Palestine. This situation had come about because their  
lobbying of the British labour movement  which started in the 1930s,  had concentrated 
mainly on the Labour Party and not the unions and the TUC. Consequently they had failed to 
recruit any trade unionists who would speak on their behalf at the General Council. This is 
confirmed by  archives which also show that most of the contact during 1945-8  between the 
Histadrut and the TUC was by either telegram or letter.  
The emergence of the WFTU 
The World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU) 147 was the brainchild of Sir Walter Citrine, 
the then TUC General Secretary, who in October 1943 set out his ideas for a new world 
conference of trade unions which he hoped would play a substantive role in international 
affairs. He envisaged that by building on the cooperation and links that had been forged 
during the war the new organisation which would include all the unions in Europe, America 
and Russia.148  
The Soviet Union had realised early on that the WFTU would be an ideal organisation for 
promoting Communist values within the workers’ movement and as a result took the WFTU 
more seriously than the TUC. Palestine was just one of many East–West flashpoints during 
this period. As a member of the international labour movement, the Histadrut lobbied the 
WFTU to put pressure on the TUC. This provided the USSR with an opportunity to support 
the Histadrut and thwart British influence in the Middle East. The WFTU's involvement in 
Palestine affairs lasted from 1946 to the beginning of 1948.  
In order to challenge the Russians for the leadership and counter their dominance of the 
WFTU, Deakin became the organisation's President in 1946, ignoring Bevin’s advice that the 
WFTU would gradually fall under Russian control and that a non-communist President would 
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give a false impression of unity.149 Deakin remained President until 1949 when as a result of 
disputes over support for the American Government's Marshall Plan, the non-Communist 
unions led by the TUC left the WFTU to form the International  Confederation of Trade 
Unions (ICFTU). Their withdrawal allowed the Russians complete control the WFTU.150  
Representatives from 63 trade union movements from around the world attended the 
founding WFTU conference in London in February 1945. All the major powers were 
represented, including the Soviet Union, Britain and the USA.  Because the American 
Federation of Labor (AFL), which had taken an anti-communist position, refused to join the 
WFTU, its much smaller rival, the CIO, represented the United States. Palestine was 
represented by the Histadrut, which included Arab members of the Palestine Labour League 
in their delegation as well as two organisation representing Arab workers - the Palestine Arab 
workers Society and the Federation of Arab Trade Unions.151 Among other issues, delegates 
discussed the situation in Palestine.152 Article 26 of the declaration “The Union Attitude to 
the Peace Settlement”, which was adopted by the Conference, supported the idea of a Jewish 
national home in Palestine. 153  
Palestine and the WFTU 
                                                 
149  Allen, Trade Union Leadership, p.290.  
150 For an account of the involvement of the TUC and Foreign Office in the breakup of the WFTU see; Anthony 
Carew, "The Schism within the World Federation of Trade Unions: Government and Trade Union in 
Diplomacy", the International Review of Social History, Volume XX1X (1984), pp.297-335. 
151 For the background to the issuing of invitations to the Histadrut and the Arab trade unions see: TUC 
International committee minutes, 17 February and 28 November 1944, both MRC, MSS.292/901/6. 
152 The British press was more concerned about East-West relations in its coverage of the conference. Palestine  
was only briefly mentioned in their reports.  
153 The statement on Palestine which was backed by the Soviet Union, Britain and the USA was based on the 
declaration made by the allies at the Yalta Conference. A committee chaired by the CIO, who were known to 
support the Histadrut and a Jewish State in Palestine, wrote article 26  which stated “This World Conference is 
of opinion too that after the war, thorough going remedies must be found, through international action, for the 
wrongs inflicted on the Jewish people. Their protection against oppression, discrimination and spoliation in any 
country must be the responsibility of the new International Authority. The Jewish people must be enabled to 
continue the rebuilding of Palestine as their National Home, so successfully begun by immigration, agricultural 
resettlement and industrial development; respecting the legitimate interests of other national groups and giving 
equality of rights and opportunities to all its inhabitants.” See Appendix D (ii) Clause 26 of the Declaration on 
the Attitude to the Peace Settlement, the World Trade Union Conference, 6-17 February 1945, MRC, 
MSS..159/5/2/124. For a report of debate on the Declaration on the Attitude to the Peace Settlement see: John 
McIntosh and Stephen Ireland, Report of the World Trade Union conference, London, 6-17 February 1945, 
(London: TUC, 1945), pp.184-92. 
50 
 
The Histadrut wrote to the WFTU in October 1945 saying that they had called a general 
strike in order to warn Britain about continuing to restrict the rights of the Jews in Palestine 
and appealed to WFTU to stand by its conference declaration calling for immediate Jewish 
immigration to Palestine.  The WFTU Executive Board decided not to support the strike 
action but confirmed the decision taken in London. They stood by the declaration while 
“scrupulously” acting as a conciliator to both the Palestinian Arab and Jewish labour 
organisations. The TUC representative told the Board that the WFTU could give moral 
support to the Histadrut but they should not approve strike action as it could create 
difficulties with the authorities (the British Government).154   
Throughout 1946 and 1947, the Jews waged a bloody and violent insurgency to try and 
persuade the British to withdraw from Palestine.155 As well as the violence, the British 
authorities had to deal the arrival of thousands of illegal Jewish immigrants who were 
brought to Palestine each month, many of whom were survivors of the Nazi concentration 
camps. In April 1946, the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry which had been set up by 
the American and British governments to investigate the fate of the displaced persons and the 
Palestine question recommended that 100,000 certificates be issued immediately for the 
admission of Jews into Palestine.156 The Attlee government refused to accept the committee's 
recommendations as the immediate admission of 100,000 Jews would almost certainly have 
provoked an Arab uprising. 
Louis Saillant,157 the WFTU General Secretary, was in regular contact with the TUC from 
1946 onwards over the Palestine question and Tewson’s responses reflected his support for 
the British government's policies. The TUC had strong reservations about Saillant from the 
outset because of his strong connections with the Russians. Salliant was entitled to write to 
Tewson because the WFTU had adopted a resolution  at their founding conference supporting 
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the establishment of a Jewish home in Palestine. It is not known whether his interventions on 
behalf of the Histadrut were made genuinely in support of the Histadrut or if, as a Communist 
he was following orders from Moscow to try and weaken British influence in the Middle 
East.158 Whatever the reason, Tewson always replied, as was expected because  the WFTU 
was  the TUC's brainchild. 
Salliant wrote to Tewson in August 1946 asking for his opinion on the request from the  
Dutch unions, the NVV, that the WFTU should investigate the latest incidents in Palestine 
and intervene with the British Government if necessary.159 Tewson replied saying that the 
Palestine issue was a very complex problem and that it was impossible to allow unrestricted 
immigration into Palestine. He told Salliant that as this was a political problem and not an 
industrial matter he doubted whether anything would be achieved by discussing the matter 
unless “you want to see the contentions of the Arabs and the Jews being fought out within our 
Federation on a matter which has no direct industrial implication.”160 Tewson’s efforts were 
successful because Salliant told the NVV that as the WFTU had not been notified directly by 
either the Arab or Jewish trade union centres in Palestine of the problem "they must be happy 
to observe these events without calling for outside intervention.” 161 A few days later, after 
receiving another telegram from the Histadrut regarding action by British troops against the 
Jewish population, Salliant wrote again to Tewson who replied that this request also fell into 
the same category as previously but added that he was hopeful that the conference currently 
meeting in London may reach an agreement. Tewson then told Salliant that the London 
conference was held up due to absence of Jewish representatives and they were hopeful that 
negotiations will soon be able to proceed but although the British Government were anxious 
for a settlement they could not ignore the Arab point of view.162 
In November 1946 the Histadrut  requested TUC intervention in order to stop the deportation 
of 4000 "uncertificated" Jewish immigrants to Cyprus. Their request was quickly followed by 
a note from Walter Schevenels, Deputy General Secretary of the WFTU who wrote to 
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Tewson that he had received a personal appeal from the Histadrut, "which, as you know, has 
been for many years and still is one of our most faithful trade union movements, to intervene 
in a personal capacity with the TUC in favour of the Jewish refugees threatened with 
deportation to Cyprus." Schevenels asked if would be possible for the TUC to intervene 
either "officially or otherwise" with the Government on the matter of these Jewish refugees? 
He stated that he thought "that at this juncture the TUC, better than any other organisation in 
the world, could exert a conciliatory influence in the solution of this thorny problem, in 
which the labour forces constitute on both sides the main element."163 Tewson wrote back 
saying that the TUC would discuss the matter but pointed out that the Histadrut claimed to 
have "no contact with any organisation for illegal immigration". He went on to say that the 
Histadrut had also stated that although they would obviously prefer immigrants to enter 
Palestine in a normal way they would help the immigrants to reach their “homeland” in 
whatever way they could. Tewson added that a conciliatory attitude towards the Jews was 
likely to result in strong Arab protests and also be regarded "as a climb-down to the terrorist 
tactics used in Palestine".164  After the International committee had discussed the Histadrut's 
telegram, the TUC cabled the Histadrut asking “if they were asking the TUC endorse the 
policy of illegal immigration?”165 That the TUC should try to overturn the ban on illegal 
immigration was exactly what the Histadrut wanted. It is not clear why or how the committee 
arrived at this decision.  
The Histadrut's reply made it clear that the situation had arisen because of the "absolute 
inadequacy of authorised immigration" and urged the TUC to make representations for the 
implementation Anglo-American committee recommendations including the admission of 
100,000 refugees into Palestine."166 The relentless stream of telegrams that the Histadrut sent 
to the WFTU and the TUC,  as well as Deakin's Presidency of the WFTU, ensured that the 
TUC took on the role of defending the Government's political decisions and actions in 
Palestine. It was a role that it had not previously undertaken, but was now necessary and the 
                                                 
163 Schevenels was a loyal supporter of the TUC and their choice for WFTU General Secretary but he lost to 
Saillant. Histadrut to the TUC, 27 November 1946 and  Schevenels to Tewson, 28 November 1946, all MRC, 
MSS.292/956.9/4. 
164 Tewson to Schevenels, 2 December 1946, MRC, MSS.292/956.9/4.  
165 The TUC telegram to the Histadrut asked for a reply not later than Monday 16 December 1946, when matter 
was to be considered by the General Council. TUC International committee minutes, 10 December 1946, MRC,  
MSS.292/956.9/4. 
166 Histadrut to the TUC, 15 December 1946, MRC, MSS.292/956.9/4. 
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TUC International Department, with help from the Foreign Office, regularly updated both 
Deakin and the General Council on the latest developments.  At its December meeting the 
General Council167 discussed the Histadrut's telegram and agreed that the TUC would not 
intervene on the Histadrut's behalf. Their reply noted that they had considered the Histadrut 
telegrams and whilst sympathetic to the position of the "displaced persons" they strongly 
urged the Palestinian Jews to accept the British government’s invitation to a joint conference 
with the Arabs.168 Throughout the exchange of letters the TUC had continued to express their 
support for the government whilst using every opportunity to point out the problems and 
pitfalls of the situation.  
The Palestine conference met in London at the end of January 1947 and Bevin soon realised 
that it would be impossible to arrive at a peaceful settlement in Palestine on any basis 
whatsoever, except with the support of the Americans and the UN. Without an agreement in 
sight, Britain's commitment to Palestine seemed pointless as British lives were being lost, it 
was costing too much money which Britain could ill afford and above all there seemed no 
benefit, strategic or otherwise to Britain. The following month, the Government announced 
that they would refer the mandate back to the UN in April 1947. By this time there over 
100,000 British soldiers were stationed in Palestine. 
The Colonial Office, regularly updated both Tewson and Deakin on the security situation in 
Palestine.169 Deakin, who was also Chairman of the International Committee and an 
influential member of the General Council, which allowed him to dictate TUC policy. When 
the government proposed imposing martial law in Palestine in February 1947, the Histadrut 
cabled both the TUC and the WFTU. Salliant  responded immediately by asking the TUC to 
arrange a meeting with the British government in order to secure postponement of the 
                                                 
167 The International Department  provided the General Council with a six page briefing document on the 
Governments decisions regarding the recommendations of the Anglo-American Inquiry.TUC International 
Department briefing note on Palestine, 16 December 1946, MRC, MSS292C/918.23/2-TUC 
168 The General Council minutes record that Mr. Naesmith, from the Amalgamated Weavers Association, felt 
that “responsibility for the situation in Palestine should be thrown on to the Palestinian Jews and the Histadrut 
should be informed that the British TUC was not prepared to take any action on the lines suggested by them.” 
TUC General Council minutes,18 December 1946 and the telegram from the TUC to the Histadrut, 24 
December 1946, both MRC, MSS.292C/20/31.  
169 The briefing prepared by the International department in February 1947 included details of unpublished 
British government proposals for a five year trusteeship agreement, Bell to Deakin, 11 February 1947, MRC, 
MSS.292C/918.23/2.  
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proposal.170 Tewson and Deakin met with Salliant in London and it was decided that Deakin 
should informally approach the Foreign Secretary in order to safeguard the position of the 
Histadrut. It is not known if Deakin did talk to Bevin but they had managed to satisfy 
Salliant.171  
The Prague conference as a forum for Histadrut to lobby, with US Labour support 
As a result of Britain's renunciation of the mandate in early 1947, the UN established a 
special committee, the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP), to 
investigate and make recommendations regarding the future of Palestine. In June  
representatives from unions from all over the world, including the Histadrut, and the 
Palestine Arab TUC assembled in Prague for the WFTU General Council meeting. The 
conference took on extra significance as it took place just before the UNSCOP committee 
arrived in Palestine. The implications of this coincidence was understood by the Foreign 
Office who briefed both Tewson and Deakin before they left for Prague. The future of 
Palestine, although of major importance to the Jews, was just one of many issues discussed 
and the Foreign Office was satisfied that the two men would be able to defend British 
interests.172 
The Histadrut wrote the motion on Palestine which was proposed by the American trade 
union, the CIO 173 It was first discussed by the Executive Bureau174 where Deakin made it 
clear that he found the draft motion unacceptable because it attacked British government 
policy.175 After the removal of the wording attacking British policy, the Bureau approved the 
                                                 
170 WFTU telegram to the TUC, 12 February 1947 and the Histadrut telegram to the TUC, 12 February 1947, 
both MRC, MSS.292/956.9/4. 
171 The memorandum of the meeting at TUC between Salliant, Tewson and Deakin,13 February 1947, MRC, 
MSS.292/918.2/3. 
172 The Foreign Office commented that it is probable that Deakin was concerned that the WFTU had become an 
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173 PLILMR, report on the WFTU conference in Prague, Histadrut Executive Committee minutes, 25 June 1947.  
174 The Executive Bureau, which was the inner Executive of the Executive Committee consisted of nine 
members; one each from Russia, Britain, America, France, China, Holland, Italy, South America and the WFTU 
General Secretary. Deakin was the TUC representative as well as the WFTU President.  
175 Minutes of the WFTU Executive Bureau meeting in Prague, 7 June 1947, the WFTU Collection at the 
International Institute of Social History Archives, Amsterdam, WFTU series, file 66, (Hereafter cited as 
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motion for discussion by the General Council.176 The General Council debate was an 
acrimonious affair, which Deakin said illustrated the difficulties that the British government 
had faced before they had returned the Palestine mandate to the UN. Significantly the 
American, British and Russian delegates all voted for the motion which was carried by a 
large majority. However after complaints by the Lebanese delegation, a compromise text was 
produced which was unanimously accepted by all the delegations including the Histadrut.177 
The Foreign Office was highly satisfied with how both Tewson and Deakin had firmly 
defended British interests and noted that the resolution appeared "to have been intentionally 
ambiguous to avoid antagonising the Arab delegates”178 The Histadrut, who had made it a 
priority to build relations with the WFTU, must have felt enthused that their motion had been 
unanimously adopted. Uniquely, it was one the few times that Great Britain, France, Russia 
and America all agreed to support a resolution calling for a Jewish homeland in Palestine. 
What is not clear is if the Histadrut realised that they were being used as a pawn in the 
confrontation between East and West, however membership of the WFTU enabled the 
Histadrut to put pressure on Britain and the TUC. 
Another potential East-West confrontation that the TUC had to contend with was the WFTU 
plan to send a delegation to Palestine during the autumn of 1947. The British government, 
clearly did not want the mission to go ahead, and along with the TUC put several difficulties 
in the way of the mission during its preparation phase. As a result, in January 1948, Salliant 
and the WFTU were left with no alternative but to cancel the trip.179 The WFTU’s Palestine 
                                                                                                                                                        
ISSH:WFTU) and PLILMR, Histadrut Executive Committee minutes, report of the WFTU conference, 25 June 
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176 The motion also expressed the hope that the Jewish and Arab workers in Palestine, could through their 
respective trade unions, find a basis for “rapprochement." PLILMR, Histadrut Executive Committee minutes, 
report of the WFTU conference, 25 June 1947 and the minutes of the WFTU Executive Bureau meeting, 14 
June 1947, ISSH:WFTU,66. 
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Levenberg Collection at the London School of Economics Archive, University of London, file G/1/2. (Hereafter 
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178 The Foreign Office memorandum on WFTU conference, 17 June 1947, TNA:PRO, FO371/67613 and the 
Foreign Office meeting with Deakin and Tewson, 30 June 1947, TNA:PRO, FO371/6761. Deakin told the 
Histadrut that as Chairman it was his international duty to demand that the Palestine issue should not be brought 
to the Council and would not reflect badly on his government. The report of the delegation to WFTU 
conference, PLILMR, the Histadrut Executive Committee meeting minutes, 13 August 1947. 
179 TUC report IC2/1, for the International committee, 21 January 1948 includes the minutes of the WFTU 
Executive Bureau meeting, 19-24 November 1947, MRC, MSS.292/901/8, the TUC report of the WFTU 
delegation to Palestine, IC3/2, 17 February 1948, MRC, MSS.292/956.9/7 and the TUC report on the WFTU, 
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mission was the last opportunity for the WFTU and the Russians to put pressure on the 
British over Palestine. At Prague, Deakin did everything he could to stop a resolution being 
adopted which criticised his government’s actions. Even if the mission to Palestine had gone 
ahead it is unlikely that it would have achieved anything and by the time it was cancelled its 
usefulness had been overtaken by events on the ground. 
The WFTU failed because of the Cold War and was used by the TUC, the Histadrut and the 
Russians to promote their own political agendas. The TUC was always on the defensive 
whenever Palestine was discussed by the WFTU and the outcome of the Prague congress 
allowed each party to claim some success. Between 1945 and 1949, the WFTU passed two 
motions on Palestine, yet the organisation had very little impact on the emergence of the State 
of Israel.  
Impact of Antisemitism and Fascism on British attitudes and activities 
Jewish insurgency in Palestine which had intensified in 1946 continued into 1947. One of the 
most serious incidents took place in July 1947, when the radical Zionist group, the Irgun, 
hanged two British Army sergeants in retaliation for the execution of three Jewish terrorists. 
The British press and population were horrified by the hangings and anti-Jewish riots broke 
out in Liverpool, Manchester, London, Cardiff, Halifax and Glasgow. Fortunately the 
violence disappeared almost as quickly as it had started.180 Two local Trade Councils passed 
motions on the situation and sent copies to the TUC. One condemned the outrage in Palestine 
and called on the Government to punish those responsible for series of anti-Semitic outrages 
in Britain while the other demanded the recall of British troops from Palestine.181 A draft 
statement was prepared for the General Council, which was not used possibly as may have 
been decided that they wanted to “cool” the situation in the run up to the TUC Congress at 
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the beginning of September.182 The General Council, at their pre-Congress meeting, 
discussed the trouble in various parts of the country caused by anti-Jewish activities,  
including the unofficial strike by members of the Union of Shop, Distributive and Allied 
Workers (USDAW) at Birkenhead who had refused to handle kosher meat. As this action 
could be seen as antisemitic the General Council sent a message to USDAW saying it was the 
desire of the General Council that the spread of antisemitism should be discouraged.183 Nor 
did the General Council want the matter discussed at Congress as it would raise the “Jewish 
problem.” If necessary, delegates would be told that the only effective way of getting the 
“Jewish problem” examined was through the UN.184 The TUC leadership had conflated anti-
Jewish activities in Britain with the problems in Palestine. To the relief of the General 
Council there was no debate on the section of the international report relating to Palestine as 
Congress was more concerned about the rise of fascist activities in Britain than the problems 
in Palestine. The only mention came from Solomon Lever of the London Jewish Bakers 
Union who told Congress that the fascists’ activities had nothing to do with the campaign in 
Palestine. The Jewish Chronicle reported that delegates had cheered his speech  and that 
"strong demands were voiced for taking more positive and energetic measures and the 
General Council were left in no doubt that they were expected to initiate definite action for 
stopping fascism" Even though Tewson told delegates that the General Council could "handle 
the matter" delegates voted by a large majority to refer back to the General Council, for 
further action, the section dealing with the National Council of Labour report on fascism.185 
The Daily Herald wrote that “the anger and alarm expressed by various speakers at the 
Congress about the growth of fascist activities in London and other cities was widely shared 
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and appealed to the Government that a way must be found to prohibit antisemitic 
provocation.”186  
The illegal immigrants on board the ‘Exodus’  
As a reaction to the hanging of the two British army sergeants and the outrage that it had 
caused in Britain, the British government decided to return the 4,500 Jewish illegal 
immigrants aboard the ship the "Exodus" to Germany. It was a public relations catastrophe 
for Britain and a disaster for their relations with the Jews in Palestine.187 
Shortly before Salliant contacted Tewson about the "Exodus", Salliant had sent him a copy of 
a telegram from the American Jewish Labor Council referring to martial law and conditions 
in Palestine.188 Tewson replied that the letter's  “content is a travesty of the fact” and the fact 
that there was an Arab problem as well as a Jewish problem in Palestine.189 Salliant then 
cabled Tewson  urging that "the TUC to agree that an allied neutral country be found to 
receive the emigrants on the "Exodus"."The General  Council considered his request along 
with one from the World Jewish Congress and decided to take no action.190 Tewson's long 
reply to Salliant not only gives an insight into his thinking at the time but also shows his  
irritation with him.  He explained to Salliant that the matter of the ‘Exodus’ could not be dealt 
with in isolation from the whole problem of Jewish immigration into Palestine and blamed 
the instigators of the action responsible for sending the illegal immigrants on the ships, 
saying that the immigrants had declined to go to France and could not come to Britain as 
there was no suitable accommodation for them. There was a serious health risk if the Jews 
remained on the ship, but the only place "where they could be accommodated under 
reasonable conditions" was the British Zone in Germany.191 
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Tewson also described as “sheer nonsense” a message they had received from a Soviet 
organisation which claimed that following the hanging of the two sergeants in Palestine, 
pogroms were taking place in Britain but admitted that there had been trouble in one or two 
centres. He said that the General Council had not intervened because of delicate nature of the 
situation and pointed out that all foreign criticism had been directed at the British 
Government, rather than at the instigators of the problem. Tewson reminded Salliant that no 
solution could be found in Palestine without considering the wishes of the Arabs and 
although they were waiting for a UN recommendation he was not personally satisfied "that a 
solution will be found upon which both Jews and Arabs will be agreed."192  
Relations between the Arab labour movement and the TUC  
The Arab trade unions in Palestine, although not as well organised, received encouragement 
from both the Palestine administration and the TUC. After 1945, the Arabs, like the 
Histadrut, lobbied the British government and attended international labour movement 
conferences.  
In 1944, the Histadrut produced a survey of Arab labour organisations in Palestine which 
criticised the Palestine Government for giving considerable assistance to the Arab workers 
organisations regardless of their quality and “ultimate” aims as well as encouraging them to 
amalgamate into one organisation. The Histadrut believed that their organisation was only 
tolerated by the authorities and not encouraged to find an Arab partner.193   
The Arab workers organisations mentioned in the report were the Communist controlled 
Palestine Arab workers Society (PAWS), the Federation of Arab Unions (FAU), and the 
Palestine Labour League (PLL) which was part of the Histadrut.  The survey found that the 
FAU had shown no sign of genuine trade union activity but published a weekly newspaper 
containing violent anti-Jewish propaganda and that the PLL, was not supported by the Arab 
public or the other Arab workers organisations. The report concluded that the social status of 
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the Arab workers had changed radically changed since the 1920s and working conditions and 
wages were far higher than those in neighbouring Arab countries.194  
By 1943 PAWS, which had substantial support amongst Arab workers, "lacked the 
bargaining power with the British civil and military authorities nor  did it have anything 
approaching the Histadrut's close and long standing connections" with the Palestine 
government or the Colonial Office or the TUC.195  The TUC received a copy of PAWS letter 
to the IFTU asking about the 1944 Labour Party comment that the Arabs should be 
encouraged to move out as the Jews move in.  The TUC explained that it only referred to the 
voluntary evacuation of Palestine territory by the Arabs and that no compulsion of any kind 
was intended.196 During the final years of the Mandate the TUC was frequently approached 
by both the Arab unions and the Histadrut for their help regarding wages and conditions and 
the recognition of Arab unions in military workshops.197 During 1946-47 the PLL was not 
involved in Arab-Jewish workers disputes and by 1947, the Histadrut's Arab department 
knew that the PLL was ineffective and "discredited amongst Arab workers in Palestine".198  
The TUC supported the Palestine administration’s efforts to build up the Arab unions199 and 
noted that the Histadrut had been good for raising the wages and working conditions for 
Arabs workers. The industrialisation of Palestine was a consequence of the war effort also 
raised awareness amongst the Arab population of trade unions.200 These links with Palestine 
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stood the TUC in good stead for its role after 1948 which we will see involved continuing to 
monitor the progress of the Arab workers in Israel.   
The UN and Palestine  
The United Nations Special Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP), which went to Palestine in 
June 1947,  met with Jewish representatives but was boycotted by  the Arab community in 
Palestine. UNSCOP presented its report on 31 August 1947 with the proposal that the 
mandate should be terminated and the land partitioned between Jews and Arabs. On 29 
November 1947, the UN General Assembly with the support of both Russia and the United 
States, adopted UNSCOP’s partition recommendation. This was due to an effective Jewish 
diplomatic lobbying campaign and widespread sympathy for the Jewish people, following the 
death of six million Jews in the Holocaust.201 
 The British understood that partition would likely result in civil war  and thought that the 
Arabs would have the upper hand. The government announced early in 1948 that the mandate 
in Palestine would end on 14 May by which time all remaining British forces will have been 
withdrawn. 
Ben Gurion and his colleagues, who had been planning for independence, realised well 
before the UN decision that the Arab states would not accept the partition and planned 
accordingly for a military conflict with the neighbouring Arab states. The civil war in 
Palestine between the Arabs and the Jews started in December 1947 with the Arabs initially 
gaining the upper hand. Following the Haganah offensive called “Plan D” in March 1948, 
however, the Jews soon gained control of most of the areas assigned to them with the 
exception of the Negev. It was during the civil war that the “Palestinian refugee problem” 
first emerged. It started when the Palestinian leadership and middle classes left for what they 
believed to be temporary refuge in neighbouring Arab states. The rumours of an Arab 
massacre by the Jews at the Arab village of Deir Yassin in April 1948 convinced many Arabs 
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to leave and it is estimated that 750,000 in total left at this time. This radically altered the 
strengths of the two communities in Palestine.202 
In December 1947, as the situation in Palestine worsened, the Histadrut sent copies of their 
telegrams to the TUC to the WFTU and the American and Russian unions in order to put 
pressure on the TUC. They asked the TUC to intervene with the government in order to avoid 
further bloodshed and chaos and support the UN decision to establish a Jewish state in 
Palestine. The TUC, which received similar letters from the AFL and the WFTU, replied 
saying the matter was now in the hands of the UN.203 Tewson wrote the NCL statement 
regarding the British withdrawal from Palestine which followed British Government policy 
by saying that “Britain could not accept responsibility for imposing by force a solution of the 
Palestine problem which is unacceptable to either Jews or Arabs” and also called upon both 
parties to enter into negotiations for a peaceful resolution of the conflict.204 
The British mandate ended on Friday 14th May 1948 and at the same time, Ben Gurion, as 
leader of the Jewish community in Palestine, declared Israel's independence. Within twenty-
four hours armed forces from Egypt, Trans-Jordan, Syria, Iraq and Lebanon had  invaded the 
country and Israel was at war with her neighbours.205 The Arabs who had refused to accept 
the UN plan promised that the aim of the invasion was “the elimination of the Jewish state.” 
In terms of numbers, by mid-July, the Haganah which was now incorporated into the Israel 
Defence force [IDF] had 65,000 troops against 40,000 in the Arab armies. The numbers had 
increased by early 1949 to 115,000 in the IDF and 55,000 in the Arab armies, which gave the 
IDF a huge advantage.  The war of independence was over by January 1949 and Ben 
Gurion’s strategy of creating facts on the ground had paid off, because, after several UN 
called truces, Israel now controlled an area one third larger than that envisaged by the UN 
partition plan. Separate armistice agreements to end the fighting were signed in 1949 with 
                                                 
202 Morris, Righteous Victims a History of the Zionist-Arab Conflict 1881-2000, pp.205-9. 
203  The TUC also asked the Histadrut who else they had written to. The Histadrut ignored this request as the 
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205 For an account of the 1948-49 Israeli –Arab war see: Morris, 1948; a History of the first Arab-Israeli War, 
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Egypt, Lebanon, Trans-Jordan and Syria.  The UN did try to bring a lasting peace to region 
when in 1949, at Lausanne, it convened a peace conference, but no agreement was reached as 
the differences between the parties over refugees and borders were too wide. The result of the 
war left the Arab nations humiliated in defeat and Palestinian Arab society shattered. Israel 
although surrounded by hostile nations had survived and was now an independent nation that 
was internationally recognised and in 1949 became a member of the UN. It did, however, 
have an Arab minority of 150,000 out of a total population of 900,000 which were regarded 
by many Israelis as either as an unknown quantity or potential fifth column. The areas in 
which they lived were controlled and supervised by the military government and although it 
was not official policy, they were treated as second class citizens. It was not until 1966 that 
these military government controls were abolished. The proposed Palestinian state envisaged 
by UN plan did not materialise either, the West Bank was taken over by Trans-Jordan and the 
Gaza Strip by Egypt. 
After 1945 the Histadrut sent dozens of telegrams to both the TUC and the Labour Party on 
various issues and incidents in Palestine in the hope that they might interest someone who 
would lobby the Labour Government on their behalf. As a strategy it was partially successful. 
Within the Labour Party, Harold Laski, the Labour Party Chairman or Richard Crossman MP 
frequently raised  matters on their behalf. The approach failed completely with the TUC 
because Deakin was able to subdue any possible criticism from within the trade union 
movement. Unlike the Labour Party there was nobody of Laski’s stature on the General 
Council who was prepared to support the Histadrut. Although the Histadrut and the WFTU 
had tried to provoke a reaction from the TUC over Palestine, they failed because the TUC 
was totally loyal to the Labour Government.  Nor was Palestine an important issue for the 
TUC as it was not discussed at any of their Congresses during this period. Their priority was 
to oppose the spread of communism in Europe. As we shall see elsewhere in this chapter, the 
Histadrut was always fundamentally pro-British and saw it as a priority after independence to 
rebuild links with the British Labour movement.  
Rebuilding relations 1948-51 
As the second most important Jewish organisation in Palestine after the Jewish Agency, the 
Histadrut’s immediate priority after independence had been declared, was to build support 
within the international labour movement for a Jewish state. This would be the Histadrut's  
contribution to Ben Gurion’s foreign policy objectives to find friendship and understanding 
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for their cause anywhere in the world.206 Almost immediately after declaring independence 
the Histadrut received telegrams of support from both the Russian and American trade union 
movements, but not from the TUC who had backed Bevin’s Palestine policy. 207   
Once the State of Israel had been declared in 1948  the connection between the Histadrut and 
the TUC immediately changed to a relationship between two national centres rather than that 
of head office and branch office. Both still had similar political roles as they both supported a 
Labour Government and each promoted their government’s policies to the international 
labour movement. However during the final years of the mandate there had been a noticeable 
tension between the two organisations and relations with the Histadrut were by then at their 
lowest point since 1920.  
The Histadrut's first action was to thank the American and Russian trade unions for their 
support, but not the TUC. In an attempt to rebuild links the Histadrut  announced in June 
1948, that they intended to send goodwill delegations to several European countries including 
Britain and Russia to explain the Histadrut’s work and its part in the struggle for Jewish 
independence. Whereas the Russians responded immediately by thanking the Histadrut for 
their desire to strengthen relations, Tewson replied saying that their request would be 
discussed at the next General Council meeting.208 The Histadrut's telegram to the TUC spoke 
of strained relations in recent years and the British Government’s attitude towards Israel but 
they hoped that the visit would improve relations and asked if TUC would be interested in 
meeting with them.209 The TUC however continued to follow the Labour government’s lead 
by saying that as the situation in "Palestine" (not Israel) was unclear, no action should be 
taken.210  
                                                 
206 Uri Bailer, Between East and West; Israel’s foreign policy orientation 1948-56, (Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press, 1990), p.12. 
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The Histadrut attends the 1948 TUC Congress 
The Histadrut's second action was to send Reuven Barkatt, the Histadrut Political Secretary, 
to Europe in summer of 1948 in order to try and rebuild links with the European labour 
movement. When the Home Office refused Barkatt an entry visa, the Jewish Agency in 
London phoned the TUC, saying they were ringing on behalf of Berl Locker211 and asked for 
the TUC's help to obtain a visa, claiming that Barkatt was a personal friend of Tewson. The 
caller was told that “Tewson has no knowledge of Barkatt and resents him using his name in 
this connection.”  The TUC, however, did check with the Home Office and in order to cover 
themselves the TUC told the Home Office that they would have no objection to a visa being 
granted. Barkatt was given his visa and arrived in time to attend the TUC Congress at the 
beginning of September.212   
Barkatt  told his colleagues that he now had a better understanding of the current state of 
affairs in the WFTU, which he blamed on the Western Federations and the TUC in particular. 
The TUC had objected to any cooperation with Russia by the trade unions from the smaller 
countries and he thought that Deakin's TUC Congress speech was a worrying sign for the 
future of the WFTU. The TUC withdrew from the WFTU the following year. Barkatt 
described relations with Britain as the hardest and also the most important because they 
needed to find a way to rebuild and reconnect with the British labour movement.  
He was disgusted with the way the TUC had behaved towards Solomon Lever, of the London 
Jewish Bakers Union, and had submitted a motion to Congress  which called on the 
Government to  recognise the State of Israel.213 There was no way that Deakin would allow 
Congress to either discuss or vote on such a motion  as Britain had not yet recognised Israel 
and was still recovering from having recently exited a bloody campaign in Palestine. Barkatt 
was told that the President of the TUC had asked that Lever's pro-Zionist motion be 
                                                 
211 Berl Locker, was one of the founders of the Jewish Labour movement in Palestine and a member of the 
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withdrawn as Congress would not approve the motion and the Zionist cause would suffer a 
“prominent defeat.” Barkatt, who was politically astute enough to know the real reason 
described the subsequent negotiations with Lever as a “scandalous fiasco” because Lever 
agreed to withdraw the motion in return for permission to address Congress.214  
The Manchester Guardian newspaper reported that Solomon Lever had "made a challenging 
speech on Palestine in which he protested that it was a tragedy that Britain had not recognised 
the State of Israel. Were she to do so, he declared, then there was ample evidence that many 
people would follow her example and, what was even more important, that many Arabs 
would do to. It was equally possible that peace would result. Jews, he added, could hardly 
believe that Britain would be guilty of such bad faith. It was all the more deplorable because 
Britain had a Labour Government in power. How many Labour conferences had promised 
Palestine to the Jews? Why had the Government antagonised its friends the Jews? Lever's 
observations were supported Mr. Hunter, on behalf of the Union of Shop Distributive and 
Allied Workers (USDAW) who said the "Palestine problem should not be approached as an 
imperialist struggle".215 
Barkatt noted that Lever's speech was made to a half-empty hall on the last day of Congress 
passed without “any impression or reaction” and concluded that “our issue was presented 
there in a very poor way, unprepared and undignified.” Deakin had told Barkatt that he had 
opposed the discussion of the Lever's motion by Congress because people had not forgotten 
"the Sergeants’ affair” and he urged Barkatt not to raise the issue again. Deakin  and his 
colleagues had protected  the Labour government in Palestine from any embarrassment or 
criticism.216  
Barkatt's trip to Europe took two months and he left England a few days after the 
assassination in Jerusalem of Count Bernadotte, the UN mediator, by the militant Zionist 
group Lehi.  On his return to Israel  Barkatt spoke to the Histadrut Executive committee 
about his trip. He started his report with the murder of  Bernadotte which had already been 
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forgotten about in Israel but was still talked about in Europe. He commented that the British  
public had reacted more strongly to the killing of Bernadotte than had the British press, but in 
Britain, they still talk about the  hanging of the two sergeants  a year after the event. Barkatt 
told his colleagues that to the masses, Bernadotte had been a symbol of peace, who had been 
murdered by the Jews, and that his death might affect Israel's relations with both Britain and 
Europe for some time to come.217   
After Israel's independence in 1948, the maintenance and monitoring of links with the 
Histadrut became a priority for the Foreign Office because Mapai dominated both the 
Histadrut and the coalition Israeli Government.218 The importance of this close alliance was 
due to half the population being members of the Histadrut, as well as the Histadrut owning 
the biggest industrial conglomerate in Israel and being the biggest employer after the 
government.219 
The Foreign Office, which had appeared to follow a pro-Arab line during the war, now 
wanted stability in the Middle East to ensure that oil supplies would not be interrupted and 
that any unrest in Palestine would not inflame the Muslims in India who were about to gain 
their independence.220 They were also determined to curb increasing Russian interest in the 
region as they feared that Israel might become a Communist or a Russian satellite state 
because the majority of new Jewish immigrants who came from behind the Iron Curtain were 
Communists.221 Once Israel supported the UN over Korea, the Foreign Office gradually 
realised that she was moving towards the West, which was confirmed after the 1952 Prague 
                                                 
217 Barkatt visited Britain, France, Belgium, Holland and Czechoslovakia. Ibid. 
218  Mapai held 46 out the 120 seats in the 1949 government. For more information see: Peter Y. Medding, 
Mapai in Israel: Political Organisation and Government in a New Society, ( London: Cambridge University 
Press, 1972).  Mapai also controlled the leadership of the Histadrut as they received 57% of the votes in the 
1949 Histadrut elections. See the report on Histadrut elections, 10 May 1955, TNA:PRO, LAB13/449. 
219 "Trades Unions as “Auxiliary” Israeli Government", The Times, 9 May 1955, p.9. 
220 For a detailed account of Bevin’s policies and attitudes as Foreign Secretary see: Bullock, The life and times 
of Ernest Bevin vol.3 Foreign Secretary, 1945-1951, pp.121-586, also Gorny, The British Labour Movement and 
Zionism 1917-1948,  pp.214-8.  
221 Louis, The British Empire in the Middle East 1945-1951, pp.569-70. Between 1948-51,  256,639 immigrants 
out of a total  of 687,624  who came to Israel were from the Soviet Union, Poland, Romania, Hungary  and 
Czechoslovakia. The figures for 1952-60 were 96,425 out of a total of 297,138 immigrants. The Israel 
Government Central Bureau of statistics,  
http://www.cbs.gov.il/publications12/1483_immigration/pdf/tab05.pdf .(accessed 26 June 2013). 
68 
 
trials by the British Ambassador in Israel who reported that Russia had now given up "hope 
of bringing Israel into the communist orbit."222 
Unlike Russia and America, Britain waited until 1949 before it recognised the State of Israel. 
However in 1948, soon after independence had been declared, the TUC received letters from 
several American unions urging them to lobby for the reversal of British policy towards Israel 
and stop aiding the Arabs. Tewson, who had been fully briefed on the situation, was told  that 
recognition of the State of Israel cannot be given until the “usual conditions have been 
fulfilled, a functioning Government, known frontiers and the ability to carry out international 
obligations.” He therefore saw no wrong in talking about the current situation in Palestine 
rather than Israel. 223 
Reciprocal visits and improving Histadrut relations with Britain  
While he was in Britain attending the 1948 TUC Congress, Barkatt sounded out both the 
TUC and the Labour Party about sending a delegation to Israel. Deakin told him that it was 
too soon but it was the Government, not the unions, who  would make the final decision. 
With regard to the WFTU Deakin said that it was too soon for them to send a delegation 
which would be seen as a communist action which he would “vigorously” oppose. Before 
meeting Tewson, Barkatt talked to the Secretary of the parliamentary faction of the Fabian 
society, who was very keen on the idea of a delegation and raised the matter with the 
Parliamentary executive of the Labour Party, which approved of the idea of sending a 
delegation to Israel. Barkatt’s meeting with Tewson was difficult and like Deakin, Tewson 
thought the suggestion was premature and that contacts could be made without a delegation. 
Tewson offered to give Barkatt all the information he wanted without the need for a visit but 
changed his mind when Barkatt told him it had the approval of the Labour parliamentary 
group, saying, then maybe the trade unions should initiate this delegation. Barkatt then met 
with James Griffiths, the chairman of the Labour party and Morgan Philips, the Party 
Secretary. Their discussions revealed, to Barkatt, the state of mind in the Party regarding 
Israel. Griffiths told him that he would to talk with Attlee and Bevin, as this was a significant 
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political issue. The answer Barkatt received was that the government  didn't think that it 
could prevent anyone from joining an unofficial delegation. But, "if asked for its opinion on 
whether the Party should aid such a thing, then it thinks that the time is too early and that the 
delegation won't be serving any useful purpose at the moment."  After meeting with Michael 
Foot and other Labour MPs, Barkatt concluded that whoever he spoke to from the British 
Labour movement had been happy to talk to him and were ready for a new approach towards 
Israel.224 
The question of sending an official Labour movement delegation to Israel was an important 
one for the Attlee government because Britain had yet to recognise the State of Israel. Barkatt 
was very careful when he talked about a delegation, stressing that it would be unofficial. He 
also made sure that his meetings with Labour Party officials and MP's were on an unofficial 
basis. Although there was enthusiasm  for  a  visit, it  was clear that any official trip would 
have to wait until after Britain had officially recognised Israel, which took place in January 
1949.  
Barkatt concluded his report to the Histadrut Executive Committee saying that it was now up 
to them to decide whether to pursue the visit or "to wait for greater changes in England".   He 
advised that he didn't "want to make general conclusions, as anyone going to Europe today 
feels himself treading a very narrow wire, stretched above a great chasm. Many things we 
thought to be firm are found to be illusionary; there are sympathies that are built on sand. On 
the other hand, there is interest  we didn’t see from here and this is real interest. We are now, 
politically speaking, in a very fluid position, and many possibilities and many mishaps rest on 
the doorstep of our future. I have the feeling that by this trip a large opening for political 
action was opened for the Histadrut, which can be valuable if we persist in it, both to the state 
and to the Histadrut."225  
Barkatt's report to the Histadrut executive is one of the few detailed documents that have 
survived that outline his views and thoughts on the TUC and their relationship with the 
Histadrut. He indicates that Deakin made all the decisions relating to the TUC's international 
policy and that Tewson was unimpressive. One thing was clear  from his visit that there was 
support from within the unions and the Labour Party for the rebuilding of links with Israel. 
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Before independence, the Jewish Agency, the Histadrut and Mapai had their own 
representatives in Britain, often sharing offices and personnel. By 1949, Dr Schneier 
Levenberg, a lifelong Zionist and Labour Party member was the London representative of the 
Jewish Agency, the Histadrut, and Chairman of both the Palestine Labour Political 
Committee (PLPC) and Poale Zion. He also worked closely with the Israeli Legation in 
London. In August 1949, on Barkatt’s instructions, Levenberg, issued a joint invitation to 
Labour Party, the TUC and the Co-operative Union to send a joint labour movement 
delegation to Israel.226 It was accepted and organised for late December. The delegation was 
to be led by the Labour Party Chairman and Durham miners’ leader Sam Watson.227 
Levenberg advised Barkatt that other than Alice Bacon MP,228 none of the party had any prior 
connection or knowledge of Israel.229 
The delegation was received with the highest protocol; they met with the President of Israel, 
the Prime Minister, members of his Cabinet and leaders of the Histadrut. As well as visiting 
schools, kibbutzim and factories they met with the Palestine Labour League. Even Sir 
Alexander Knox Helm, the Head of the British Legation who was not known for his positive 
views on Israel, reported that he was glad the visit had taken place and that the delegation had 
realised how little was known in Britain about Israel.230 Watson made it clear he would in 
future try to correct some of the misapprehensions that existed about Israel; saying  "I came 
as a friend but somewhat ignorant of what that State was trying to accomplish and left as a 
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friend, much better informed, much clearer in their conception of Israel’s hopes and 
desires.”231  
The official report of the visit noted it had been inspired by political reasons because of the 
deteriorating relations during the mandate. The delegation was deeply impressed with the 
spirit and determination to build the country on a democratic and socialist basis which they 
hoped would prove a most valuable development in the Middle East. They also noted a real 
fear of a second round of war, and were reminded many times that Britain was supplying 
arms to Egypt and Trans-Jordan. The delegation discovered an admiration for the British 
labour movement and a desire for friendship with Britain which they hoped would be 
reciprocated and recommended that relations between the two countries be urgently 
improved.232 However the Foreign Office advised Attlee not to attend the reception 
Levenberg had organised for the delegation on their return on the grounds of not wanting to 
upset the Arabs countries.233   
The issue of arms sales to Israel figured prominently at this time as Britain was arming the 
Arab countries. In March 1950, the TUC received  from the AFL a copy of a memorandum 
they had presented to President Truman, which included a request for arms for Israel. 
Tewson’s non-committal reply noted that “we recognise difficult problems the state of Israel 
has at the present time as we sent a delegation to Israel in December.”234 Tewson told the 
TUC General Council that they would be  raising  the issue of arms sales with the Foreign 
Secretary at their next meeting with him.235 
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In March 1950 the Labour Party decided to invite a Histadrut delegation to pay a return visit 
Britain.236 The invitation was issued in spite of objections from the Foreign Office  who were 
concerned that any Histadrut delegation would also include members of the pro-Moscow 
Mapam Party.237 The visit eventually took place in December 1950 with Barkatt leading the 
delegation.238 The Israelis  talked to leading politicians and trade union leaders impressing 
upon them Israel’s wish for peace in the Middle East and the Histadrut’s desire for good 
relations with the workers movement in Britain.239 Attlee declared the visit had done much to 
promote friendly relations between Britain and Israel.240 After independence, the Histadrut's 
priority in Europe had been to rebuild relations with the British labour movement.241 On all 
levels both visits were successful, with the Labour Party being the main beneficiary as many 
senior members of the Labour Party went to Israel during the next few years, several of 
whom encouraged both Tewson and Deakin to visit Israel. As it turned out neither man 
visited Israel and maybe if Tewson had done so the experience gained would have improved 
relations with the Histadrut. The Foreign Office also used the visits as part of their 
monitoring of Israel’s intentions towards the Communists.  
As we shall see, the TUC only ever had problems in dealing with the Histadrut when it came 
to political issues and the Israel-Arab conflict. Relations between the two organisations did 
improve as a result of the visits but not to the same degree as those with the Labour Party. It 
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did not help that the Histadrut had remained in the WFTU after the TUC had resigned. Sadly, 
until they joined the ICFTU in 1953, Tewson made sure that he was never directly in contact 
with Barkatt. 
In March 1950 the Histadrut approached the British Legation in Tel Aviv with a proposal to 
send workers to Britain for training.242 Levenberg met the TUC to discuss arrangements for 
the training243which was approved by the TUC General Council  and the visit went ahead in 
July 1950. That this three-month trip was successful244 was due in part to the success earlier 
in the year of the NCL delegation to Israel.  
The role of British Labour Attaché in Tel Aviv 
Because of the importance the Foreign Office accorded to events in Israel, Ivor Thomas was 
appointed the first Labour Attaché to the British Legation in Tel Aviv in January 1950 shortly 
after Britain had recognised Israel.245  Previously, the British Labour Attaché based in Cairo 
had covered labour issues in Palestine, but after 1948, he was no longer allowed to travel to 
Israel or directly contact his opposite number in Tel Aviv in case he jeopardised his 
credibility with the other seven Arab countries he covered in his work. The MOL sent copies 
of Thomas's reports to the Foreign Office, who before sending them onto the TUC, often 
edited out passages which it did not want them to see, which were usually references to 
political matters. This was because the Foreign Office decided in January 1948 as a matter of 
policy that in future the TUC would not normally be sent material on "hot political subjects".  
This decision only compounded the TUC's lack of knowledge and understanding of the 
politics of the region.246    
Was Bevin’s international labour policy successful? 
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Bevin who understood the importance of the international workers’ movements suggested to 
the Foreign Office in 1946 that  there should be an exchange of information between the 
Labour Party, the TUC and the Foreign Office,. Consequently Hubert Gee became the first 
Foreign Office Labour Advisor in April 1949. 247 His main duties were public relations work 
with the TUC, unions and employers organisations and to provide a link with British labour 
attachés abroad in order to counter Communist influence in international federations and 
conferences. Bevin then recruited the TUC to work closely with the Labour attachés and by 
1952 it was a government priority to encourage the development of bone fide trade unions in 
the Middle East.248 With their own advisor on international labour questions and their 
network of labour attachés the Foreign Office was often better informed on events in Israel 
than the TUC. 
Bevin’s Middle East policy was dictated by the need for Britain to regain its position of 
influence in the Arab world as well as securing oil supplies for Britain and a military base in 
the region; whilst actively opposing the spread of communism and Russian efforts to gain a 
foothold in the region. The emergence of a Jewish state which was opposed by the Arabs 
complicated matters.  His choice of the international labour movement as one of several 
avenues open to him to implement these aims was very successful, and successive British 
governments continued to support the movement long after his death. On his instructions the 
Foreign Office worked closely with the TUC and both were well supported by the labour 
attachés based in Tel Aviv and Cairo. The post of Foreign Office Labour Advisor, has 
continued to exist right up to the present day. His plan was for the Labour Attachés and the 
TUC to establish and build pro–British links with trade unionists internationally rather than 
just in the British Empire, which had been the TUC’s pre-war policy. The TUC was unable to 
fulfil this role because, although they were highly influential at the WFTU and subsequently 
the ICFTU, they were unable to compete with the American unions which  were backed 
financially by the CIA. They could afford to develop contacts in Africa and Asia.249 The TUC 
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lacked the necessary resources for this work because of the poor economic conditions in post-
war Britain, and had to depend on the labour attachés who were civil servants and not trade 
unionists. Tewson rarely went on foreign visits and when he did it was frequently on 
international labour movement business. Because the TUC's wartime involvement with the 
government and their  loyalty to Bevin and  the Labour Government they continued to align 
their Middle East policies with those of the subsequent Conservative governments. Without 
Bevin none of this would have happened.  
The Histadrut leaves WFTU 
As was evident at Prague, not only was the WFTU being used by both sides as a weapon in 
the Cold War, but the TUC were also fighting the Russian unions for control of the WFTU.  
Matters came to a head in early 1949 when the TUC, along with the American and European 
trade unions, resigned to form the anti-Communist, International Confederation of Trade 
Unions [ICFTU].  When it was clear that the TUC were about to leave the WFTU, Barkatt 
asked Levenberg to monitor the attitude of the TUC towards the WFTU. It was important for 
the Histadrut at that time to maintain contact with and follow the developments both inside 
and outside the WFTU, but it had to balance this against the stance taken by the TUC. 250 The 
break-up of the WFTU, which coincided with the Israeli government's negotiations with 
Russia, Romania and Hungary about Jewish emigration to Israel, presented Mapai and the 
Histadrut with a problem. Should the Histadrut remain a member of the WFTU? The 
subsequent discussions highlighted the political and ideological differences between Mapai 
and Mapam. The issue was first discussed at the Histadrut's conference in 1949.251 Although 
delegates formally adopted the recommendations of the Mapai secretariat for the Histadrut to 
remain part of the WFTU, they also agreed to send observers to both the forthcoming WFTU 
conference in Milan and the preliminary conference in Geneva to prepare for the formation of 
the ICFTU.252 This decision, which followed the Israeli government's policy of neutrality 
between West and East, was at the time a convenient solution.  The Head of the British 
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Legation in Tel Aviv reported to Bevin that there was a strong divergence of views between 
Mapai who wanted the Histadrut to leave the WFTU immediately and declare its neutrality 
and Mapam and the communists who argued that the Histadrut should remain a member and 
condemned those who had left the WFTU.253 
Barkatt attended both conferences as a neutral observer and reported that at Geneva there was 
not just an ideological battle but also a tactical one between Britain and America for the 
future leadership of the ICFTU. The attitude toward Israel, he noted, had changed since they 
were “no longer the world's focus of attention” nor had  “to beg for the help of our friends 
and sympathisers,” but overall “we were treated with coolness and lack of knowledge.” He 
also reported that the Lebanese delegation had queried the Histadrut’s right to be present at 
Geneva. As the Histadrut was a neutral observer, all Barkatt could do was to work behind the 
scenes to ensure that question of the Histadrut's status did not receive official approval. He 
warned that once the many unions in Asia and Africa had become members of the new 
Federation, the Histadrut had to expect to find serious problems caused by the increase of 
these unions' disproportionate voting power in the new organisation.  
He described the Milan conference as a show of power, with the atmosphere as one of 
“unanimous voices of all the speakers” with applause after every speech. Whereas in Geneva, 
because according to protocol the Histadrut was not allowed to address the conference, in 
Milan, Histadrut delegates spoke twice. Although their speeches were accepted coolly 
because they were so different and they were given disproportionate importance because the 
Russians wanted to impress the non-communist members of WFTU. In addition the Russians 
wanted the Histadrut to remain as members of the WFTU and not join the ICFTU. Barkatt 
described the atmosphere as "a unanimous voice of all speakers, show of power, applause 
after every speech". The main aim of their delegation, however, was to try and negotiate with 
the Russians, Romanians and Hungarians about the right of Jews to emigrate to Israel. 
Barkatt revealed that that the Russians had made it clear that leaving the WFTU "would 
seriously damage our relations with Russia" and put an end to the talks about discussions 
regarding Jewish emigration. It was more difficult for the Histadrut to maintain their neutral 
status in Milan because some Mapam members their delegation had given an interview to the 
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press in which they attacked the ICFTU and opposed the Histadrut's neutrality.254  Barkatt 
asked Levenberg to find if the Histadrut were to be given observer status at the founding 
conference of the ICFTU in London or if they would be excluded because of their WFTU 
membership.255 As the British were keen for the Israel to stay out of the Russian sphere of 
influence, the Histadrut were invited to attend as observers. 
These two meetings were very important for the Histadrut which was just coming to terms 
with its newly gained status as a minor but independent member of the international labour 
movement. Many Israelis, including the Histadrut, saw themselves as natural allies of Britain 
and since their priority was the rebuilding of relations with the TUC they were concerned that 
by going to Milan their  invitation to come to London would be withdrawn. They need not 
have worried, because Tewson had already said that the Histadrut was a special case. Since 
the TUC had left the WFTU, Barkatt no longer had any direct contact with the TUC and was 
dependent on Levenberg to act as a go-between. The British Legation closely observed these 
developments reporting that the Histadrut was thinking hard about its international policy but 
their government’s concern for the Jews in the USSR and satellite countries as well as the 
strength of the Left wing minority in their organisation would prevent any change of course 
for some time.256  
In March 1950, Thomas, the Labour attaché, reported that in the light of their continued 
membership of the WFTU the Histadrut had become “very cagey” when discussing their 
"international position" which was in sharp "contrast to their former readiness".257 He then 
reported that Barkatt had said that the TUC had wanted the Histadrut to leave the WFTU but 
in his  opinion Bevin’s recent comments in Parliament had undone all the work they had done 
to improve Israel-UK relations and there was no way that they could now leave the WFTU. 
Thomas commented that while Barkatt had used the opportunity to air his views on Bevin, 
partly in the hope that his views would be passed on to the TUC and to justify their continued 
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membership of the WFTU. Thomas concluded that he was most anxious to remain on good 
terms with the TUC.258 
It soon became clear that Israel, as only one of two non-Communist members of the WFTU, 
could no longer remain in the organisation. In addition, the three issues that had resulted in 
their 'neutral' stance were no longer relevant. The Israelis now realised that the matter of 
Jewish emigration was no longer conditional on the Histadrut remaining a member of the 
WFTU.259 In addition, Mapai had been unable to form a government coalition with Mapam 
while the split between the ICFTU and WFTU had become irreversible. The debate over 
affiliation resumed on 30 March 1950 at a joint meeting of the Mapai secretariat, Mapai 
Knesset members and the executive committee of the Histadrut.260 Discussions continued two 
weeks later at the Mapai central committee. Finally on 11 May, the Histadrut Executive 
Committee decided, after a lengthy debate, by 26 votes to 16 to leave the WFTU. In moving 
the resolution Barkatt argued that the realignment of the international labour movement was 
an extension of the Cold War and both the WFTU and the ICFTU were political in character 
and purpose. Whilst membership of either organisation conflicted with Israel’s policy of strict 
neutrality he denied that the decision  to leave the WFTU was the result of pressure from the 
West and said that "the British labour delegation which visited Israel had expressed 
sympathetic understanding of the delicate position in which the Histadrut found itself." The 
Histadrut also decided that for the time being to maintain friendly relations with labour 
organisations irrespective of their affiliation and not align itself at present with either of  the 
ICFTU or the WFTU.261  
The British Legation noted that “It is too soon to cast Mapai in the role of the “Western” 
party", or that the Histadrut's withdrawal from the WFTU indicated an "early move towards 
closer relations with, or membership of the ICFTU".  He noted that withdrawal from the 
WFTU was not designed "to orientate the Histadrut westwards", but an "attempt to shake it 
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free of an affiliation which was sincerely felt to be incompatible with the official policy of 
“non identification”. He concluded by saying that neither the Histadrut as a whole, nor the 
Mapai element within it, are yet ready to make a positive move towards the West." Although 
the TUC’s main focus for the next few years was the leadership of the ICFTU, along with the 
Foreign Office they continued to monitor the Histadrut. In order to maintain its neutrality the 
Histadrut turned down the WFTU's request to discuss their withdrawal. 262  
Even though leaving the WFTU was an important decision for the Israelis, persuading the 
Histadrut to join the ICFTU as Israel was moving towards the West was not a priority for 
either the Foreign Office or the TUC. There is very little evidence of direct contact between 
them before the Histadrut joined the ICFTU in 1953.263 The Histadrut used the British and 
Israeli Labour Attaché's, the ICFTU and Levenberg, as intermediaries with the TUC.  Nor did 
Tewson deal with the Israelis directly for possible fear of offending the Arabs in his role as 
President of the ICFTU and his connection with the Foreign Office. The excellent work of the 
first Israeli Labour attaché in London is discussed later on in this chapter.  
The Histadrut joins the ICFTU  
Israel's foreign policy orientation which in 1950, when the Histadrut had resigned from the 
WFTU, was one of neutrality, started to change after the Korean war to one which by 1956 
fully indentified with the Western powers. The question as to whether the Histadrut should 
join the ICFTU was part of a much wider debate in Israel at this time which focused on 
whether Israel should be aligned with the West or the Third World. By 1952, the Israeli 
government had realised that it could no longer remain neutral and the country’s survival 
depended on friendship with other powers.  But the ruling Mapai party postponed making a 
decision to join the ICFTU264, firstly for foreign policy considerations and secondly because 
the pro-Soviet  Mapam opposition, which had opposed the Histadrut’s decision to resign from 
                                                 
262 The British Legation to the Foreign Secretary, 26 February and 16 April 1951, both TNA:PRO, LAB13/554 
263 Levenberg told the TUC in March 1952 that Mapai was very keen to establish as soon as possible a closer 
relationship with ICFTU, but  they were  not yet ready to affiliate as they expected that this would mean another 
serious fight with Mapam. This information  was passed onto the ICFTU along with a request for the Histadrut 
to be invited as observers to  the next ICFTU meeting in Berlin.  ICFTU memo from Krane to Oldenbroek, 19 
March 1952, ISSH:ICFTU, 3501. 
264 The ICFTU wanted the Histadrut to affiliate earlier to their organisation but did not pressurise them to do so. 
ICFTU to the NVV, 14 February 1951, ISSH:ICFTU, 3501. Tewson, as President of the ICFTU gave an 
assurance that no pressure would be put on the Histadrut to join the Federation. “American Trade Unionists 
visit,” Jewish Chronicle, 27 July 1951. 
80 
 
the WFTU, was still strongly supported and Mapai did not want to cause a domestic crisis by 
splitting the Israeli labour movement.265   
In June 1952, Barkatt travelled to Brussels, Helsinki and London in order to ascertain the 
ICFTU’s plans for the Middle East. Tewson only agreed to meet him after being told that the 
discussions would be about the Histadrut’s future relationship with the ICFTU.266 Their 
meeting was reported to have been very friendly and the Histadrut indicated that they would 
have sent observers to the next meeting of the ICFTU General Council if it had been held 
anywhere else other than Berlin. Tewson had said that it would improve matters if the 
Histadrut became an affiliate in order to help build up the ICFTU's Middle East regional 
organisation and he did not believe that the Arab-Israel conflict presented any “insuperable 
obstacles” to the development of the regional grouping.267 The cooperation between the 
Foreign Office, the TUC and the ICFTU was apparent when, in October 1952, Mapai 
resumed participation in the Socialist International which it had suspended after West 
Germany had been admitted to the International. The TUC told the ICFTU that Israel could 
no longer afford to be isolationist and that the Socialist International was a suitable forum for 
its activities, which indicated that they may soon affiliate to the ICFTU.268 Shortly afterwards 
Israel was invited to attend the Asian Socialist conference, a move which interested the 
Foreign Office because Attlee was to be part of the British delegation.269 
The Slansky show trial in Prague November 1952 provided Mapai with the opportunity to 
move against Mapam, because one of their leaders, Mordechai Oren, was arrested in Prague 
and charged with spying for western intelligence. His arrest split Mapam, while Jews both in 
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the Diaspora and Israel were shocked by the antisemitic nature of the trial.270 The first thing 
Mapai did was in January 1953, was to ban Communists from holding office in the 
Histadrut.271 By May the Mapai leadership had decided that the Histadrut should join the 
ICFTU and the following month the 68th Council of the Histadrut approved the decision by 
109 votes to 63. Barkatt told delegates that affiliation was necessary for the Histadrut and a 
diplomatic necessity for Israel in order to fight the political battle for Israel's survival in the 
international labour movement. The Histadrut, he had argued, could no longer remain neutral 
as they had been rejected  by the WFTU whilst the ICFTU and its affiliates had shown 
sympathy and understanding towards them and had not done anything so far that might have 
been interpreted as an unfriendly act towards them. he said it would also enable them to 
strengthen the friendships with the trade unions of the USA, England, Scandinavia and other 
non-communist states. In order to be able to attend the ICFTU Congress in Stockholm at the 
end of July, the Histadrut applied immediately to affiliate to the ICFTU.272 Barkatt hoped that 
membership of the ICFTU would also provide an opportunity for closer cooperation with the 
TUC.273 Although there had been no direct contact with the TUC or the ICFTU since 1949, 
Barkatt had received updates about the TUC and the ICFTU's plans for the Middle East from 
the British Labour Attaché.274    
The Histadrut’s presence in Stockholm justified their participation and served the interests of 
the State of Israel 275 because they had returned with a seat on the Executive Board and had 
prevented Congress discussing the report on the Arab refugees which contained several 
unfriendly statements towards Israel. Barkatt was assured that the proposal for a regional 
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office in Beirut was to be only an information office for Arab countries.276 Barkatt had 
already known about the ICFTU's regional office plans, as he already discussed them with 
Thomas, the Labour attaché in Israel.277 But he did not mention the office when the Histadrut 
Central Committee voted to join the ICFTU.   
However their participation in the 1953 Stockholm conference led to more than they had 
bargained for. Several European unions had originally proposed expanding the executive but 
it was the American's proposals that won in the end.  In their bid to wrest the leadership of 
the organisation away from the TUC and Europe, the Americans had made it known that they 
would not accept Tewson's re-election as ICFTU President.  
Windmuller wrote that "the expansion of the executive was "in part precipitated and certainly 
aggravated" by the recent affiliation of the Histadrut. The Histadrut's argument was that 
should have a seat on the Executive otherwise they would be represented by an Arab union 
with far fewer members and from a country that did not recognise Israel. It was also possible 
that if the Executive had not been enlarged the Arab unions might have resigned rather than 
give up their place to Israel.278 The Histadrut, as the largest and most successful trade union 
in the Middle East was then enlisted in US plans to enlarge the Executive as part of the AFL-
CIO's bid to extend American influence through cooperation between trade unions in the 
Americas and Asia. To do this they needed more places on the Executive for their allies. 
Although this only seems to have come about in Stockholm, it is possible that Barkatt would 
have known in advance of the AFL-CIO's plans because the Histadrut had a very close 
relationship with the American unions.279 It also seems probable that he would also have 
discussed the ICFTU regional office plans also with the Americans especially as he had 
already talked to the British about them. Barkatt, however, made no mention of any prior 
knowledge of any of this in his post-Congress report to the Histadrut executive because he 
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told them that they had only found out about the ICFTU plans to expand the executive on 
their arrival in Stockholm. Their delegation then discussed the matter and decided to wait two 
or three years before standing for the Executive. But once they learnt of ICFTU's report on 
Arab refugees and their regional office plans, they changed their minds, because membership 
of the Executive was then no longer about “representation and prestige,” but an issue of 
“political realism” which was essential for the Histadrut and Israel. Barkatt did not "go into 
detail regarding the delegation's actions" but said they "felt a terrible tension" and worked 
hard during the rest of the conference.  Barkatt described the two days spent discussing the 
enlargement of the executive as a dramatic struggle which he believed was a fight for Israel. 
He felt there were four reasons why delegates were opposed to the enlargement of the 
executive; a divided Executive, the maintenance of the status quo, the feeling that the 
Histadrut's presence on the Executive would affect ICFTU activity amongst the Arabs and a 
small amount of an anti–Israeli feeling. 280   
The British embassy in Stockholm reported that the TUC’s opposition to the enlargement of 
the executive had disappointed Barkatt because, they had in the past strongly advised them to 
join the ICFTU and had therefore hoped for a more sympathetic attitude from the TUC. The 
report suggested that the TUC should be advised that next time “it would be worth showing 
the Histadrut a little extra consideration.”281 Poulsom, the Labour attaché in Israel, was told 
that when discussing the Stockholm Congress with the Histadrut he should be aware that 
although the Israelis might say the Congress was worthwhile, deep down this might not be 
the case.282 Mason, the Foreign Office labour advisor, saw no reason for the Israeli delegation 
to feel hurt and suggested their disappointment was due to the domineering role played by the 
Americans. Not everybody agreed with him, as the Foreign Office files reveal “the Israelis 
are inclined to be oversensitive, but they generally respond well to being given explanations 
in confidence, and it would be our interests to preserve good relations” and “it was incumbent 
on the TUC to explain fully why they could not support their candidature.” 283 When Poulsom 
informed London that the Histadrut were more concerned with the wider aspects of the 
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ICFTU than about what happened in Stockholm,284 Mason defended the TUC by saying that 
their actions were understandable as the Histadrut had only joined the ICFTU just before 
Congress and because of American pressure to enlarge the Executive to make room for the 
Histadrut. He blamed the American unions rather than the TUC for pressing the Histadrut to 
join the ICFTU. He adding that the TUC would discuss the matter with the Histadrut at the 
following month's TUC Congress.285   
The appointment of an Israeli Labour Attaché in London 
The building of bridges between Britain and the new Jewish state was slow and it was only 
after the NCL and Histadrut visits that the British Labour Party began to return to its previous 
pro-Zionist stance. The arrangement between the Israeli Embassy and Levenberg, as their 
contact with the TUC, lasted until December 1953,286 when Moshe Bar Tal was appointed 
Labour Attaché.287 His appointment reflected the importance Israel placed on its relationship 
with the TUC, as London was the first Israeli Embassy to have its own Labour Attaché.  Bar 
Tal made a huge impact building relationships with the TUC and the unions.  Unlike British 
Labour Attachés who were civil servants, Bar Tal’s membership of the Histadrut enabled him 
to relate to his fellow trade unionists.  They could now also count on support from Sam 
Watson, the Durham Miners leader and member of the Labour Party National Executive, Bar 
Tal reported that his “influence, importance and respect that he gets from all circles were 
readily apparent." 288 After his return from Israel in 1949, Watson was true to his word and 
went on to become a leading supporter of Israel in Britain during the 1950s. The TUC‘s 
growing cooperation289 with the Histadrut included official invitations for them to attend the 
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TUC Congress in 1953 and 1955. 290  With the build up of arms in the Arab States from the 
autumn of 1954 onwards the Histadrut returned to its policy of contacting its friends in the 
TUC 291 and the Labour Party asking them to oppose arms deals which threatened peace and 
stability in the region.292 The Histadrut thanked the TUC in December 1955 for their 
opposition to the British arms deal with Egypt.293 The Israelis, who had adopted the strategy 
of inviting politicians and trade unionists to Israel, in the early 1950s, soon discovered that 
this was to be best way to gain support. The Israeli embassy in London divided Israel's 
parliamentary supporters into two groups; the first group who were loyal supporters and 
helped on every issue included MPs Janner294and Greenwood. 295  The second, Sam Watson's 
group, which didn't want to be characterised as pro-Israeli, would help in most of the time but 
occasionally turned down requests for help.296  
The Israeli ambassador repeatedly complained to Barkatt that the trade unions were being 
neglected as Bar Tal had not been replaced, and the embassy did not have the time or anyone 
with the necessary experience to do the work.297  Although the Embassy appreciated the 
benefits of having a Labour Attaché, Bar Tal was never replaced and another five years 
would pass before the Histadrut posted a permanent representative to London.  
The Foreign Office monitors the Arab population in Israel 
                                                 
290 TUC International Committee minutes, 19 April 1955, MRC, MSS.292/901/11. 
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www.oxforddnb.com.catalogue.ulrls.lon.ac.uk/view/article/31285, accessed 17 May 2013. 
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297 Elath to Barkatt, 5 July 1955 and 18 Aug 1955, (Hebrew original), PLILMR,  IV-219A-1-14A.  
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Even though Britain had withdrawn from Palestine, she was still a dominant power in the 
region and the Foreign Office monitored the status of the Arab population which had 
remained behind in Israel after 1948. They wanted to know if the Arabs would become a 
‘fifth column’ in any future wars  and their attitude to the possibility of Israel aligning with 
Russia.  
Bevin was told that the Arabs had suffered few problems but due to the economic crisis, Arab 
unemployment figures were proportionally higher as a result of Jews being given work in 
preference to Arabs. 298 Thomas, the Labour Attaché reported that the Histadrut planned to 
raise the standard of living of Arab members, he noted that if successful this would go far to 
prevent Arab grievances being exploited by the Communists.299 In January 1954 the Foreign 
Office were told of the growing co-operation between Arabs and Jews but were warned that 
if war broke out the 14,000 Arab Histadrut members were considered to be a potential fifth 
column and that the political factors that kept "the Arabs in a condition of inferiority" 
outweighed the benefits of the measures introduced for improving the Arab standard of 
living.300 
The Foreign Office uses the TUC-ICFTU link to promote British interests in the Middle 
East  
The TUC’s international work during the 1950s included supporting both the ICFTU and 
British Labour Attachés in their efforts to build independent trade union movements in the 
Middle East. The Foreign Office played a major role in influencing TUC actions and policy 
and worked hard behind the scenes to bring to fruition the ICFTU proposal for a regional 
office in Beirut.   
The ICFTU first became involved in the Middle East in April 1952 when a delegation went 
Lebanon, Syria, Iraq and Jordan to investigate trade union activity.301  The mission reported 
that generally speaking labour codes existed but governments had the power to refuse 
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299 Thomas to Greenhough, 1 April 1950, TNA:PRO, LAB13/554.  
300 Poulsom to Greenhough, 12 January 1954, TNA:PRO, LAB13/449.  
301 The TUC advised the Foreign Office of the ICFTU mission, which arranged for the delegation to meet with 
Audsley, the labour attaché in Damascus The ICFTU Executive Board meeting minutes, 13EB/21, 9 November 
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authorisation and suspend or suppress any organisation. Their report recommended opening 
an information centre in Beirut. 302 The Foreign Office already had their own report on trade 
unionism in the Middle East which described the Histadrut as the most powerful trade union 
organisation in the Middle East and the most influential organisation in Israel.303 Barkatt, 
who was aware of the ICFTU mission and the proposal for a Beirut office, asked Thomas, the  
British Labour Attaché  if Audsley, the British Labour Attaché in Cairo, could come to Israel 
to discuss the issues with him. Sir Francis Evans, the British Ambassador, supported 
Barkatt’s request warning that if an ICFTU office was opened and operated only in Arab 
States, Israel would become more isolated.304 He also advised that as the Histadrut was 
moving cautiously towards the ICFTU and it was important that the ICFTU should not make 
further progress impossible.305 Although the Minister was originally in favour, the Foreign 
Office vehemently  opposed the visit, arguing that if it became public knowledge it might 
seriously prejudice Audsley’s standing in Arab countries.306  
The Foreign Office also believed that there was a risk that the Israelis might use his visit for 
propaganda purposes. Undeterred, Evans then wrote that although it seemed almost 
impossible to realise British policy to integrate Israel into a secure Middle East, Britain 
should try to encourage better relations between the ICFTU and Jewish and Arab trade union 
leaders. He warned that if the ICFTU recognised the much smaller Arab unions and 
established an office in the region without making an approach to the Histadrut, such a move 
would be regarded by them as blatant discrimination. Despite his opposition, the weight of 
opinion within the Foreign Office was against the visit and the meeting between Audsley and 
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Barkatt never took place.307 The TUC was never officially consulted by the Foreign Office 
although if Tewson had been asked he would no doubt have supported their decision. 
After the Stockholm Congress, Barkatt wrote to Oldenbroek the ICFTU General Secretary,  
warning that the principles of international labour cooperation would be breached if the 
Histadrut was not allowed to enter the country where the office was established. 
Oldenbroek’s replied saying that the ICFTU had never intended to set up a regional office in 
Beirut, but only an information centre.308  Meanwhile the Foreign Office told the TUC that 
although the Histadrut had misgivings, their embassy in Israel supported the proposal and that 
they had advised Lebanese trade unionists  to support the proposal.  They then told their 
embassy in Israel that the TUC hoped that trade union leaders in Israel and the Arab states 
could rise above national political feelings and be prepared to work through the ICFTU office 
wherever was established. Their letter declared “this may be utopian” but asked for advice on 
how the Histadrut could be persuaded to work along these lines. The Labour Attaché's reply 
which the TUC saw, stated that as it was impossible for an Israeli to enter an Arab country, 
the Histadrut felt that a neutral country should be chosen such as Cyprus, though they knew 
that the TUC did not support this idea.309  From the subsequent correspondence it appears that 
the Histadrut were aware of the Foreign Office’s position and made no secret of their 
worries.310 With the ICFTU having serious second thoughts on the matter, a TUC delegation 
visited the Lebanon in November 1953 to show support for a Beirut office.311 Oldenbroek 
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told the ICFTU Executive Board in November 1954 that their proposal now was for was an 
information and advisory centre in Beirut, not an office.312 Over the winter the ICFTU sent a 
representative to the Middle East whose recommendations were leaked by the British Labour 
Attaché in Brussels.313 Finally in May 1955, nearly three years after it had been first 
discussed, the ICFTU Executive Board finally agreed a compromise which allowed their 
Middle East representative to work in an “appropriate way” in consultation with Histadrut. 
The TUC told the Foreign Office that the representative would have a roving commission in 
order to overcome rivalry between the various national Federations and the difficulty with the 
Histadrut.314  
Audsley reported in May 1955 that Egypt was considering forming an Arab Federation of 
Labour, which would be an independent labour bloc of Arab nations free from foreign 
influence.315  He was also told that that Egypt would not join the ICFTU whilst Israel was a 
member and that Egypt considered that the American government which was controlled by 
the Jews had been responsible for the Palestine war and were now heavily financing Israel.316  
The Foreign Office who were trying to improve relations with Egypt saw this as a setback 
and did not pass this information on to either the TUC or the ICFTU.317   
At the fourth ICFTU Congress in Vienna in May 1955 the Lebanese and the Tunisian trade 
unions used the opportunity to present to Congress the Arab side of the conflict with Israel.318 
                                                                                                                                                        
heard from Brussels that the ICFTU is not to open a regional office in Beirut but something much smaller and 
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312 Bar Yaccov to Barkatt, 24 November 1954, (Hebrew original), PLILMR, IV 104-1296–5.  
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90 
 
Barkatt thought this attack on Israel had done Israel more good than harm.  Although his 
meetings with Tewson had a “cordial and lively attitude”, the TUC had seemed to be rather 
aloof as they had not been conspicuous in the main Congress.319 According to the Ministry of 
Labour (MOL), the TUC had been anxious not to put a foot wrong by appearing to be 
friendlier with one delegation than another.320 Barkatt was pleased however that this time, the 
Histadrut had been allowed to manoeuvre at Congress without being seen by the Europeans 
as “hostages of the USA.”321 
At the end of 1955, Oldenbroek presented comprehensive proposals for future ICFTU work 
in the Middle East to the Executive Committee. He acknowledged that the ICFTU was seen 
by Arab trade unionists as part of the Western bloc, and they had been reproached by them 
for not having taken a position on the Palestinian refugee problem and for not having 
established a regional office. Oldenbroek said the Arabs believed that the ICFTU had been 
unable “to act in their favour” because Israel's influence was so great. He concluded that the 
ICFTU's programme for  peace and social progress in the region was handicapped by Arab 
political demands and Israel’s desire for recognition by its neighbours. The committee 
accepted his plan to divide the region into two fields of action, one for the Arab countries and 
the other for Turkey, Iran, Cyprus and Israel.322 Although the regional office plan had been 
rejected Barkatt knew that they would have to continue to monitor future events.323 
Conclusion 
This chapter has shown that the TUC gave unquestioning support to British government 
policies towards Palestine both during and after the mandate and after the emergence of the 
State of Israel. The difference between the TUC and the Histadrut was that whilst the 
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Histadrut knew that its international role both before and after independence was to support 
the State of Israel, the TUC, which had previously operated independently of the British 
Government, found itself in partnership with the Government after having been given a role 
for which it was ill-prepared and under resourced. The TUC was suddenly asked to expand its 
international work having previously only worked with the unions in the British Empire.324 
Given Britain’s financial problems at the time it is highly unlikely that the Government gave 
the TUC extra funding for its expanded international role.  This was confirmed by Taylor 
who wrote that "the TUC has almost always tried to punch above its weight to the outside 
world" and "may have seemed like a substantial and imposing organisation." However in 
reality it has "been very much a shoestring operation, dependant on the willingness of its 
affiliate unions to provide it with the limited authority and financial resources to promote the 
wider influence of organised labour in the political workplace"325 
After the First World War the TUC’s primary international role was to build links with trade 
unionists in the British Empire which enhanced their reputation in the international labour 
movement. Building links with the Histadrut was never a problem for the TUC who were 
always willing to contact the Colonial Office on their behalf or give advice. Even after 1948, 
the TUC continued to work with the Histadrut on trade union related issues.  
While Bevin had a vision of what he wanted the TUC to do, its international work was 
implemented not by him but by his two close allies; Deakin, who had told the Histadrut in 
Prague in 1947 that his masters were Bevin and the Labour government, and Tewson, who 
made sure that there was no direct contact between himself and Barkatt until the Histadrut 
joined the ICFTU. Tewson, who played a major role in establishing the ICFTU, was by all 
accounts a mediocre General Secretary and hesitant policy maker. The British Government 
supported his main concern to ensure that the emerging unions in the Middle East, Africa and 
Asia supported the ICFTU and would not join the communist backed WFTU. Tewson made  
many references in his correspondence to the situation the Palestinian Arabs found 
themselves in, we do not know if this was genuine concern on his part, a stalling tactic or 
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support for Bevin. We do know however, that Tewson always wanted to do the right thing for 
his country and regardless of any personal feelings towards Jews and the Holocaust, he 
believed that if he openly gave his support to the Histadrut and Israel it would antagonise the 
Arab world and damage British interests. This explains both his and the TUC’s continued 
support for the Middle East policies of the Conservative Government which took office in 
1951. Israel was not important for the TUC or the unions, and only Sam Watson showed the 
same level of support for Israel as the Labour Party leadership.  
The TUC's relationship with the Histadrut was affected by the TUC's connection with the 
American unions. After the First World War both the American and British labour 
movements supported the creation of a Jewish homeland in Palestine. Whereas all the TUC 
did from then on was little more than pass motions at Congress and support Labour Party 
policy, the American unions gave both political and financial support to the Histadrut for the 
establishment of a Jewish State which they saw as a safe haven for  European Jews fleeing 
persecution. They believed that the establishment of a democratic state supported by a strong 
labour movement would be an example to others in the Middle East. Whereas grassroots 
support in Britain was mainly limited to a small number of union branches with a large 
number of Jewish members, the Histadrut had the backing of all the major trade unions in the 
United States. The political support for the Histadrut by the unions in America included 
lobbying President Truman as well as Attlee and Bevin. Indeed, the Foreign Office was so 
concerned by this that it monitored the pro-Jewish activities of the American unions.326 
Because the TUC and the Americans had been on opposite sides when it came to the 
establishment of a Jewish State in Palestine, it is clear that in the 1950s  the TUC saw the 
Histadrut as a close ally of the US  and a threat to the TUC's  aspirations at the ICFTU. The 
Americans unions, who not only had a large number of Jewish union leaders, lobbied the US 
government and the ICFTU on behalf of Israel. This was in complete contrast to the TUC 
who promoted British Middle East policies. Compared to the Americans very few Jews held 
leading positions in the British unions. 
The Foreign Office also had its own agenda in the Middle East and used the TUC to help 
rebuild British interests in the Arab world at the ICFTU, often at the expense of the Histadrut. 
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Their desire to establish an ICFTU office in Beirut is an obvious example. The TUC would 
only support Israel and the Histadrut as long as it did not cut across Foreign Office 
guidelines. Unlike Bevin, the Foreign Office did not totally trust the TUC and held back 
information about Israel and the Histadrut. Direct contact between the Histadrut and the TUC 
which resumed after the Histadrut's election to the ICFTU Executive Board in Stockholm was 
seen by the TUC as a setback to British interests. This resulted in TUC-Histadrut relations 
being cordial at best and certainly not at the level of the Labour Party's good relations with 
Israel. 
The relationship between the Histadrut and the TUC had fundamentally changed after Israel’s 
independence. The Histadrut's priority was to rebuild relations with the British labour 
movement and their success was due to the efforts of Schneier Levenberg, Moshe Bar Tal, 
and Sam Watson. Along with Barkatt and the Histadrut leadership they all believed they had 
successfully rebuilt relations with the TUC, especially when related to trade union matters but 
there is no evidence to suggest that they fully understood the TUC’s position on political 
matters. However it does indicate that support for the Histadrut over trade union issues 
appears to have been conflated with political support for Israel. It is also possible that because 
there was a very close relationship between the union and political leadership in Israel some 
Israeli’s may have also believed that a similar relationship between the Labour Party and the 
TUC existed in Britain. Although the unions had the power to make policy through the block 
system voting at the Labour Party conferences, Israel was never an important enough issue 
for them to make policy and were happy to always support the Labour Party, firstly over 
Palestine and then Israel in the period up to 1955.   
From 1948 onwards, Israeli policy was to invite politicians and union leaders to visit Israel in 
order to find out for themselves firsthand about Israel and the political situation. They 
believed then and still believe, that until one visits the country one cannot understand Israel’s 
problems. What stands out is that whilst many leading Labour politicians and a few trade 
union leaders made the trip and were impressed with what they saw, neither Deakin nor 
Tewson went to Israel. Tewson never went because he would never purposely put himself in 
the position of taking sides.327 Once again, it is not clear whether Barkatt or his colleagues 
understood Tewson’s real reasons for not accepting.  
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From the very beginning in 1920, the Histadrut successfully lobbied both the Labour Party 
and the TUC for the establishment of a Jewish homeland in Palestine.  However once the 
Labour Party came to power in 1945, this support rapidly ebbed away. However from 1943 
onwards the Histadrut knew that the TUC would not become directly involved in political 
matters as a matter of policy and passed on all such requests to the Labour Party.328 This was 
why the continuous stream of telegrams to the TUC asking for their intervention with the 
Labour Government, ultimately came to nothing. The Histadrut chose to do this in order to 
keep their options open for the future and also retain close relations with the Labour Party.  
Similar telegrams, which were also sent to the Labour Party, were frequently acted upon by 
Harold Laski who was able to discuss the issues at the highest levels of government. 
Although there were senior Labour politicians and even Bevin himself who had admired the 
development of the socialist Jewish community in Palestine before the war, there was no-one 
of a similar stature to Laski within the trade union movement who was committed to the 
Jewish cause and prepared to question Bevin or Deakin over government policy. Sam Watson 
was the first sympathetic union leader to emerge after the Labour party visit to Israel in 1949 
and that was unexpected as he had never previously had any connection with the Jewish 
community. There is no evidence that Histadrut leadership realised that the “good” contacts 
they had with the TUC, which had been developed over the previous 25 years, were not going 
to pay off. What we do know is that they had tremendous respect for Deakin. It also must be 
remembered that the TUC supported both the Labour and Conservative governments' Middle 
East policies.  
While the establishment of the State of Israel in 1948 was an important event for the labour 
movement, the Labour Party and the Left, subsequent events in the Middle East involving 
Israel were ignored as other issues such as the Cold War between Russia and the West 
assumed greater importance.  Cold War events such as the 1949 Berlin airlift, the Korean war 
of 1950 and the debate over Britain’s nuclear deterrent during the 1950s dominated their 
discussions.  The Iranian oil crisis of 1949 and the emergence of Nasser and relations with 
Egypt were at the forefront of their discussions relating to the Middle East and not peace 
between Israel and her neighbours. The priority for many of the prominent Labour politicians 
and trade unionists who visited Israel during the first part of the 1950s was the rebuilding of 
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links with the Labour Party and the TUC. In the next Chapter I will examine how the Labour 
Party and the TUC reacted to the Suez crisis and Britain’s involvement with Israel.  
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Chapter 2   1956-1966  
Israel's collusion with the UK and France in the 1956 Suez conflict was totally unexpected 
considering how poor Anglo-Israel relations were at the time.329 TUC-Histadrut relations  
which had reflected Anglo-Israel relations since 1948 were also at a low ebb. However unlike 
Anglo-Israel relations, which started to improve in 1958, the TUC's dealings with the 
Histadrut remained indifferent for another four years. This chapter will show that Sir Victor 
Tewson, the TUC General Secretary, was main reason for the TUC's continued indifference 
towards the Histadrut. His primary aim after Suez was to support the Foreign Office and help 
Britain regain her credibility and influence with the Arab states. It was only after Tewson had 
retired in 1960, that TUC-Histadrut relations started to improve and the chapter ends with 
beginning of a "golden" period in relations. Tewson opposed the Histadrut's international aid 
programme in Africa and the Histadrut's Afro-Asian institute, which he saw as a direct 
challenge to the ICFTU's own efforts. Rather than embrace the work of the Histadrut, 
Tewson saw them as a threat. Nor did it help that these Histadrut programmes were 
financially supported by the TUC's arch rival, the AFL-CIO, with whom Tewson clashed 
regularly at the ICFTU over various issues, including how the organisation should support 
trade unions in the newly independent African states. By 1959, the Foreign Office had come 
to appreciate the success of the Histadrut's Afro-Asian institute and their international aid 
work, yet it would take the TUC a few more years to reach the same conclusion.   
Anglo-Israeli and TUC-Histadrut relations 
Since gaining her independence in 1948, Israel's chief concern had been her survival and 
maintaining equivalence militarily with her Arab neighbours. Israel's poor relations with 
Britain were due to her requests for British arms, which were constantly turned down as it 
would upset Britain's Arab allies. The Foreign Office had realised that it was regularly saying 
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'no' to Israel and had tried to improve relations with Israel, as long as no damage had been 
done to its relations with the Arab world.330 
By 1955, Israel, like Britain was concerned by Nasser's ambitions to be the leader of the Arab 
world. Egypt, who had blockaded of the Straits of Tiran and the Suez Canal to Israeli 
shipping in 1950, raised the tension between the two countries again in September 1955, by 
closing the airspace over the Gulf of Aqaba to Israeli aircraft and signing a major arms deal 
with Russia. Nasser was also supporting the fedayeen terrorist raids to Southern Israel. 
Although Israel had considered retaliating by launching a pre-emptive strike against the 
Egyptian army while they was still relatively weak, it was Egypt's nationalisation of the Suez 
canal in 1956 and the military intervention by Britain and France, which provided Israel with 
the opportunity to defeat the Egyptian army and the recognition of the Straits of Tiran as an 
international waterway open to Israeli shipping. 
Israel's 1948 war of independence had also had a catastrophic effect on British influence in 
the region as many Arabs blamed Britain for the creation of the State of Israel. The defeat of 
the Arabs had led to a rise in Arab nationalism which threatened both the regions existing 
governments and ruling monarchies. Britain's immediate post-war aim, as we have seen, was 
to try to stop the spread of communism throughout Africa and regain her influence in the 
Middle East. Good relations with Egypt as well as her military bases in the Suez Canal zone 
were key to this policy. Nasser's rise to power in the early 1950s resulted in Britain to trying 
appease Nasser who became more belligerent and anti-British. In 1954, Britain agreed to his 
demands withdraw their troops from the Canal Zone within two years. Britain attempted to 
reassert its position in the region with the signing in 1955, of the Bagdad pact, with Iran, Iraq, 
Pakistan and Turkey. The Foreign Office attempted to bring other Arab states into the 
military pact and even considered punishing Israel when her actions threatened the policy of 
extending the pact framework.331 By supporting Iran and Iraq, Britain found herself opposing 
the Arab nationalists backed by Nasser, who had also upset the French government with his 
support for the independence movement in Algeria.  
British policy towards Israel has always been decided by self-interest and throughout the 
1950s, her Middle East policy was determined by her need for the friendship of key Arab 
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states as well as regular oil supplies.  By the spring of 1956, Britain's relations with both 
Israel and Egypt were at a low point. The Foreign Office was aware that the Israelis might 
launch a pre-emptive strike, but made no attempt to tell the Israelis that they would also like 
to see Nasser overthrown. Once Egypt had signed the arms deal with Russia, Israel made 
plans to acquire a similar quantity of arms in order to redress the balance. Because both 
Britain and America had refused Israel's requests for arms, she turned to France, so that, by 
the autumn of 1956, France had delivered sufficient arms to Israel to overcome any possible 
Egyptian threat. Israel's involvement in the Suez war was closely connected to her 
relationship with France which began with the supply of arms and quickly developed into 
political and military cooperation.332  
Almost immediately after Nasser had announced the nationalisation of the Suez Canal on 26 
July, both Britain and France made plans to regain control of the canal by either diplomatic 
means or military force. France also made contingency plans for joint military action with 
Israel, independent of any action with Britain. Even though there was a deep suspicion 
between the British and the Israelis, because of their strained relations over the previous 
eighteen months, Israel joined forces with France and Britain in October to launch a tripartite 
assault on Egypt. Given the extent of the collusion, the stakes for Britain were extremely high 
as her true interests lay with the Arabs and not Israel.333 The Suez war began on 29 October 
when Israel invaded the Sinai Peninsula and was followed a few days later by the Anglo-
French landings at Port Said and Suez. Pressure from the Americans, who had refused to 
support the venture, meant that British and French troops were withdrawn shortly afterwards. 
The result was an unfinished Suez operation and a humiliating political disaster for both 
Britain and France. Israel, on the other hand, had achieved all her objectives. The Suez 
conflict had very little impact on Anglo-Israel relations which remained unchanged until  
1958, by which time the Foreign Office had recognised Israel's role in preventing Nasser's 
expansion in the region and  as a result agreed to sell Centurion tanks to Israel.334 
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Throughout the 1950s and 60s the TUC, which was well respected in international trade 
unions affairs vied with the American unions for the leadership of the ICFTU, the 
international body for democratic free trade unions which had been formed in 1949 when the 
TUC and others left the Russian dominated WFTU. The TUC's delegation to the ICFTU 
throughout the 1950s was led its General Secretary, Sir Victor Tewson, who had been 
involved with the Foreign Office since Bevin's time and was known not to favour one side 
over the other in the Israeli-Arab conflict. Under his leadership, the TUC actively supported 
British government Middle East policy at the ICFTU. While Tewson was in charge, the TUC 
was indifferent to the Histadrut and for most of the 1950s, relations mirrored Anglo-Israel 
relations.  Whereas Anglo-Israel relations improved after 1958, TUC-Histadrut relations did 
not.  
Unlike Gaitskell and his Labour Party colleagues who understood the Arab-Israel conflict and 
also received regular briefings from the Israelis, the Suez conflict demonstrated the TUC's 
lack of understanding of the politics of the Middle East. Labour's Middle East policy received 
support from both the Left and the Right wings of the Party because, whilst supportive of 
Israel for its social democratic values, the policy also backed Britain's alliance with the 
United States and her strategic interests in the region.335 Although the TUC was in regular 
contact with the Foreign Office, they did not collaborate with the Labour Party on 
international issues and had no first-hand knowledge of either Israel or Egypt. The result was 
that they were described by their own government as 'ill informed.'336  
The Israeli Government along with the Histadrut from 1953 onwards, pursued a very active 
international policy with two main aims; first, they sought to demonstrate to the world Israel's 
achievements and, second, to win friends and influence people in countries outside the Arab 
World. The Histadrut made a fundamental change of direction in international affairs in 1953 
when it joined the ICFTU; as previously the Histadrut’s international activity had been 
limited to America and Europe. Confirmation that the ICFTU was important to Israel came 
from Reuven Barkatt, Head of the Histadrut’s Political Department, who told the Histadrut 
Convention in March 1956, that at a time when Israel had few friends in the world, the 
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friendly attitude of the labour movements in Western countries was due to Israel's active 
membership of the ICFTU. 337   
Although the Histadrut had tried desperately hard after Suez to improve relations with the 
TUC, change only came in 1960 when Tewson retired as TUC General Secretary. A new 
positive relationship between them began with the appointment of George Woodcock338as his 
replacement, and was aided by the enthusiasm for international affairs and Israel by the new 
generation of trade union leaders. The appointment of a Histadrut representative in London,  
coupled with Woodcock’s visit to Israel in 1962, the first by a TUC General Secretary, plus 
the enthusiasm for the Histadrut's work in Africa shown by Woodcock and the Foreign 
Office, ensured that the 1960s would be a 'golden era' in Histadrut-TUC relations.  
Africa was targeted by both the ICFTU and the WFTU between 1956 and 1966 as a key area 
in their expansion plans for the international labour movement with both organisations 
offering aid and training packages to local trade union movements. The British and American 
governments worked closely with the TUC and the AFL-CIO respectively to further these 
aims339 using their labour attachés to monitor, the ICFTU, the rise of Arab nationalism, the   
Arab trade unions and the Histadrut. Throughout this period the TUC liaised with the trade 
unions in Britain's colonies and helped them get ready for independence. 340   
With the support of the Americans and the Israeli government, the Histadrut worked hard 
throughout the second half of the 1950s making new connections with the trade union 
movements in Asia and especially in East and West Africa. This led to the Histadrut, 
providing aid and training for the African trade unions and helping them prepare for 
independence. This brought the Histadrut into conflict with Tewson who believed that it was 
the TUC's role to train the trade unions in Britain's African colonies. It didn't help either that 
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Tewson identified the Histadrut as a close ally of the AFL-CIO, with whom he regularly 
clashed with at the ICFTU.  
The build up to Suez  
By 1956 Britain was beginning to enjoy the benefits of the legacy of the Attlee government, 
the welfare state, full employment, the general recognition of the trade unions and British 
involvement in the Cold War. The Parliamentary Labour Party had also changed and was 
now a mixture of working class trade unionists and middle class intellectuals. Although the  
majority of trade unions were still led by colleagues of Bevin and Deakin, new leaders on the 
Left such as Frank Cousins were starting to emerge with new radical ideas.341 The primary 
concern of the trade unions throughout the fifties, apart from support for nuclear 
disarmament,342 were domestic economic issues. They had little involvement in international 
issues.  
Even though Labour lost the 1951 general election, the TUC's relations with the Conservative 
government remained unchanged as Prime Minister Churchill and his Minister of Labour, 
Walter Monckton, continued to consult and collaborate with the TUC as frequently as had the 
previous Labour government because the General Council were not prepared to relinquish 
over ten years of consultation and cooperation with the government.343 The TUC General 
Council continued to be dominated by the cabal of union leaders led by Arthur Deakin who 
were powerful enough to dictate TUC policy. They were solidly behind the Labour Party and 
openly hostile to the Communists.344 This status quo continued until Deakin died in May 
1955, only a few weeks after Churchill and Monckton had resigned from the Government. 
The outcome was that Eden's government adopted a harder line towards the TUC and with 
Deakin's death the consensus within the General Council disappeared once Frank Cousins, 
the new General Secretary of the TGWU joined the General Council as his left wing views 
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were consistently at odds with the other members of the Council.345 Although by middle of 
the 1950s, the Labour party had moved away from many Left wing policies, Left wing union 
support for the party was split into three distinct groups of unions. The largest group346 often 
disagreed with the party but almost always gave its support. The second group,347 the extreme 
Left, usually voted together but were sharply divided on issues such as communist affiliation 
to the Labour party, Hungary and nuclear disarmament. The third group,348 the moderate 
Left, consistently voted against the party and with the collapse of Bevanism split into either 
consistent opposition or regular support for the party. However the majority of votes at 
Labour party conferences remained in the hands of the big six unions.349 
Throughout this period the Foreign Office were concerned about the rapid industrialisation of 
the Middle East and any possible inroads the communists could make within the Arab labour 
movements. It was to the government's advantage that Tewson and the TUC continued to 
back Britain's need for good relations with the Arab world, resulting in minimal connections 
with Israel and the Histadrut. It made no difference that the Histadrut was a member of the 
ICFTU executive or the leading labour movement in the region. The British government’s 
awareness of Israel’s political and economic problems was heightened by a series of reports 
written by Marsh, the British labour attaché in Tel Aviv. He noted that the Histadrut was the 
most powerful institution in Israel employing about 25% of the country's wage earners and 
producing a somewhat larger proportion of its national income.350 In August, after Egypt's 
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nationalisation of the Suez canal, Marsh commented that “Israel believes herself at present to 
be in greater danger than at any time since 1948.”351  
The ICFTU's plans for a regional office in Lebanon were enthusiastically supported by the 
Foreign Office because their own plans for the Middle East were broadly similar to that of the 
ICFTU. The Foreign Office, which had a reputation for being strongly pro-Arab,352 were 
unhappy with the Histadrut's continued opposition to an ICFTU regional office.353 After 
Barber, the British labour attaché in Brussels, had reported in January 1956, that the Israelis 
and Jewish American union leaders were very touchy on the subject of the Beirut office,354 an 
official at the Foreign Office noted that the prospects for the ICFTU in the region were not 
bright because of the hold "the American Jews and the Israelis had over the foreign policies 
of the American labour movement" which effectively antagonised the Arabs, preventing any 
ICFTU action which might be regarded as deferring to Arab opinion.355 Barber then wrote 
that the ICFTU were worried that Egypt's moves to link the Arab labour movements of North 
Africa were another anti-Israel move, as the ICFTU, which was also trying to forge links in 
the region, might now face a hopeless situation that could exclude it indefinitely from these 
Arab countries.356 Barber who frequently knew more than the TUC about the business of the 
ICFTU and its intentions in the Middle East, was often reluctant, like the Foreign Office to 
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share information with the TUC.357 It is clear that the Foreign Office used the TUC for their 
own ends, while being totally aware of Tewson's limitations and lack of ability. Their 
concerns  about the region were reinforced by an Ministry of Labour report published in 
March which concluded that the combination of  nationalism and pan-Arabism along with the  
suspicion of Western countries ensured there was no easy solution of the problem of 
establishing sound trade unions in the region. The situation in the region was not helped by 
the recent Russian diplomatic offensive in the Arab countries which involved an 
intensification of WFTU propaganda.358  
At their meeting in early July 1956, the ICFTU Executive committee decided to accept an 
invitation from the Histadrut to send a delegation to Israel.359 Barkatt told Marsh, the British 
labour attaché, after the ICFTU meeting that he had been happy with the discussion on the 
Middle East by the Executive, especially as a paper on the Middle East situation, prepared by 
the secretariat, had been withdrawn.360 Greenhough, at the MOL, however, thought it odd that 
Barkatt should be "happy" with the situation as the inability of the ICFTU "to make any 
progress would cause alarm and despondency in any ICFTU member, particularly one from 
Israel."361 He obviously did not know that Barkatt's priority was to defend Israel and avoid 
any discussions that would invite criticism of Israel. Barkatt told Elath that although he 
hadn’t originally supported inviting the ICFTU to Israel, he now thought that it was the least 
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that the ICFTU could do after everything that they had put the Histadrut through. However it 
appeared to him that the ICFTU were now trying to cancel the invitation as it could 
jeopardise their efforts with the Arab unions.362 Despite the Histadrut's  success in thwarting 
Oldenbroek’s plans for a Middle East office and his attempts to bypass the Histadrut rather 
than consult with them, the Israelis now faced a new problem; Oldenbroek and the Americans 
were "running" after the Arab trade unions. In September Barkatt discussed with Namir, the 
Histadrut General Secretary, how best to deal with the “Arab issue” at future Executive 
meetings. They anticipated that the developments over Suez might cool or even postpone 
discussions but as a precaution they decided to activate their friends in the American workers' 
movement.363 
As a result of the pressures which were building in the Arab world, ensuing from the 
nationalisation of the Suez Canal and Egypt's aspirations to lead the Arab Federation of 
Labour,364 the ICFTU received an urgent request, in late August, from its Tunisian affiliate to 
issue a statement of solidarity with Egypt and Arab aspirations.365  Conscious of the ICFTU's 
desire for links with the Arab unions and with the knowledge that the WFTU had already 
issued a statement supporting Egypt, Oldenbroek believed that the ICFTU should take a 
position and immediately sent out a draft statement asking for comments.366 The statement 
emphasised the need to find a solution for freedom of passage through the Suez Canal, and 
the need for all interested parties "to live together in peace with one another as good 
neighbours." It overlooked, as had others, that when it came to freedom of passage Egypt had 
not allowed Israeli ships to use the canal.  Since the statement did not criticise British actions 
over the canal, Tewson agreed with the statement and suggested only a slight change, that in 
the sentence demanding that any agreement on the Suez Canal should be under the auspices 
and guidance of the United Nations, the words "under the auspices" should be replaced by the 
phrase "associated with". After receiving replies from several others, Oldenbroek decided that 
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the ICFTU was unable to issue a statement at that time as there were “considerable 
differences of opinion” but left himself the option of reactivating the matter if necessary.367  
Throughout the first half of 1956 the rising tension in the Middle East caused by the Egypt's 
alignment with Russia was at the centre of all contacts and correspondence between the 
British labour movement and the Israeli embassy in London, the Israeli Labour party, Mapai, 
and the Histadrut.368 Elath, the Israeli ambassador met regularly with Hugh Gaitskell, the 
Labour opposition leader throughout the year and sent over twenty reports of meetings with 
Gaitskell and other members of the Shadow Cabinet to Jerusalem.369 Their relationship with 
the Labour party was so good370 that when Labour were about to send another deputation to 
see the Foreign Secretary, they first asked Mapai if they had any special points that should be 
made at the meeting. 371 
A key figure in the Labour Party and close confidant of Gaitskell was Sam Watson, the 
Durham miners’ leader and chairman of the Labour party’s international committee.372 It was 
due to the efforts of Watson, who was a keen supporter of Israel, and Elath that the Labour 
party at that time was the most pro–Israel of all the political parties. Elath could also call on 
support from the Socialist International, the worldwide organisation of social democratic, 
socialist and labour parties which was based in London. Apart from Watson, the only other 
union leader the Israelis could count on was Solomon Lever, the General Secretary of the 
London Jewish Bakers’ Union, one of the smallest unions affiliated to the TUC. Lever was 
willing to speak on behalf of Israel at TUC Congress and submit, if necessary, motions to 
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Congress. All the effort that Bar Tal, the Israeli Labour attaché, who had returned to Israel in 
1954, had put into building relationships with the unions had not been followed up as the 
TUC was now very reticent towards the Histadrut. 
 Apart from receiving a letter from the Histadrut in January 1956, which explained Israeli 
concerns about the Egyptian arms deal, the  TUC  International committee did not discuss the 
mounting tension in the Middle East until August by which time Nasser had nationalised the 
Suez canal.373 Schneier Levenberg who, as UK representative for Mapai, and the Embassy’s 
link with the Labour Party, was also their link with the Socialist International.374 Both Mapai 
and the British Labour Party supported the Socialist International, but for different reasons. 
Although the Socialist International had very little real influence in world affairs it was one 
of the few international bodies at Israel's disposal for strengthening their position 
internationally, in Europe, America, Asia and Africa.375 In February 1956, the Socialist 
International adopted, with Levenberg and Watson's support, the British and Norwegian 
Labour Parties resolution on the growing tension in the Middle East.376  
The TUC and Suez 
Two weeks after the Suez canal had been nationalised, the British government felt it 
necessary to consult with the unions and the TUC, not only because of their immense power 
base within the Labour party but because of the possibility of industrial action as part of their 
opposition to government plans to retake control of  the canal by force. Ian Macleod, the 
Minister of Labour, met with Tewson, who told him that the TUC Congress in September 
was likely to pass an emergency resolution on the Suez situation and that although there had 
been no discussion or consultation, he thought that the TUC would follow Labour Party 
policy, while insisting that the Government should refer the nationalisation of the Suez canal 
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to the UN and not use force to retake the canal.377  Tewson thought it would be difficult to 
draft an acceptable resolution which "provided for action outside the United Nations."378 The 
position of the TGWU and Frank Cousins, Macleod reported, was crucial if the Left wing 
unions united to oppose the use of force in any circumstances. He recommended that the 
TUC be properly briefed as he thought that Tewson was "very feeble and ill-informed about 
Suez."379 The Cabinet decided that that the Prime Minister would  meet with a TUC 
delegation on 20 August in order to ensure that both the resolution and debate would not 
embarrass the government.380 The TUC President, Charles Geddes, who led the delegation, 
sent Eden a personal letter afterwards saying that the TUC International committee had 
reached agreement on the need for a firm and positive General Council statement and 
requested Eden not to let the government say anything that could undermine the TUC's 
statement.381  
Both the General Council and the International Committee were able to refer in their 
discussions to a comprehensive TUC report on the Suez crisis which dealt with the political 
and trade implications for the United Kingdom.382 The only mention of Israel in the report 
referred to the 1950 Egyptian decision to impose a blockade  on Israeli shipping to stop Israel 
receiving oil though the canal. The General Council was split between the older members on 
the Right, led by Geddes, who prefered not to have a motion at all, or one which was so 
uncritical of Government policy that it made no difference, and the younger members on the 
Left led by Alan Birch of the Union of Shop Distributive and Allied Workers (USDAW) who 
took the view that Britain must refer the dispute to the Security Council. Birch threatened to 
put down a hostile amendment if the General Council sponsored a motion which supported 
the government's actions.383 Eventually on 30 August, after hours of discussion the Right-
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wingers eventually agreed to a compromise emergency motion to be put to Congress. The 
motion was certainly not dynamic or forceful but it told the Government that, if the Cairo 
talks broke down, “force should not be used until the question has been referred to the United 
Nations and with its consent."384 The Congress debate lasted over an hour and delegates 
voted unanimously in favour of the resolution. The case for Israel was put by Solomon Lever 
from the Jewish Bakers union, who said that Nasser had sworn to wipe Israel off the map and 
called on the General Council to do their utmost not to permit it. Other speakers told 
Congress that Israel was worthy of the TUC's support and that peace depended on the Arab 
states recognising Israel. Later that day delegates applauded the announcement that the 
Government had decided to recall Parliament.385   
Political commentators noted afterwards that although Congress had been united over Suez 
and their opposition to the Government’s economic policies, neither the General Council nor 
the General Secretary had shown any signs of leadership.386 Four days later Tewson sent a 
copy of the resolution to Eden 387 which was discussed the following day by the Cabinet. 
Their chief concern was how would the unions, especially the dockworkers and the 
mineworkers, would react if it came to military action. Macleod was asked to ascertain the 
likelihood of serious industrial trouble if Britain invaded Egypt.388 
The effect of the government's Suez invasion plans was to unite the Labour Party behind 
Gaitskell's anti-war campaign. Labour's strong support for Israel was due to its links with the 
Israeli leadership and an awareness of the potentially damaging political effect of adopting an 
anti-Israel policy given the long relationship that had existed between Jews and the party.  It 
did not have comparable links at the time with Arab nationalists.389 The Labour Party felt that 
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protests against military action should be kept strictly within the law, and jointly organised, 
with the TUC, nationwide anti-war protests including a rally in Trafalgar Square as well as 
sixty local meetings.390 The leadership were also aware that  a high proportion of  the Labour 
Party’s working class supporters approved of the Suez intervention and that no resolutions 
were adopted at local and national level at branch level either in the party or the unions which 
directly supported the Eden government’s actions. 391 In Parliament, 81 Labour MP's signed a 
pro-Israel early day motion.392  
Once military action began, the National Council of Labour, representing the Labour Party, 
the TUC and the Co-operative movement, issued a statement which not only condemned the 
invasion but also urged workers not to take industrial action.393 The government’s concerns 
about industrial action were justified, but protests were confined to local and regional levels. 
They included the call from the Sheffield district committee of the AEU for a total stoppage 
of the engineering industry, the leaders of the Fire Brigades union who called for a national 
strike, whilst the South Wales area of the  Mineworkers union rejected a call for industrial 
action.394 The only strike action that took place was at Crawley when 1200 workers attended 
a protest meeting to urge for an immediate ceasefire.395 
The ICFTU and Suez 
On 31 October the ICFTU issued a statement which protested against the military action in 
the Middle East and proposed an equitable solution of the Israel-Arab problem.396 The 
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Hungarian revolution, which took place at the same time as the Suez intervention was more 
important for the ICFTU, because it had taken place in Europe, involved working class 
freedom, trade union rights and democracy. The Suez crisis on the other hand, was seen by 
the ICFTU partly as Israel’s fight for survival and for recognition by her neighbours. At its 
meeting at the end of November, the ICFTU Executive committee discussed a report on the 
ICFTU's reaction to events in Hungary and the Middle East. The report concentrated mainly 
on Hungary and possible repercussions with regard to Russia and the Cold War. It also 
expressed the hope that the UN could find a genuine solution to the problems of the Middle 
East including the Suez Canal and Israeli-Arab relations. The debate on the report 
unequivocally condemned the Soviet intervention in Hungary, yet the discussions on the 
Middle East were muted by comparison.397 At the back of everyone’s mind was the fear of a 
third World War. The Anglo-French invasion, which had divided the democratic world, was 
hardly mentioned even though the report described their military action in Egypt as 
“absolutely inexcusable.”398 The Arab and Muslim states were understandably more 
interested in the Middle East than Hungary and viewed Israel’s involvement as secondary to 
the imperialist military action by Britain and France. Throughout the crisis, the TUC had kept 
the ICFTU informed of their opposition to military action. In the debate, Sir Charles Geddes, 
demanded that every effort be made to achieve peace between Israel and Arabs and  that a 
way should be found to guarantee Israel's continued existence.399 
The Histadrut felt that Israel’s actions had attracted a great deal of sympathy and 
understanding from all sides and that the British had been more sympathetic towards them 
compared with three years earlier in Copenhagen.400 The Histadrut recognised however that 
the ICFTU’s problem in future was how it was going to balance the Histadrut's  needs with 
ICFTU plans for growth in the Middle East. The challenge for the Histadrut would be how to 
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use their position on the ICFTU executive to make new connections and gain understanding, 
and support for Israel throughout the world. 
The crisis also exposed the ICFTU’s shortcomings in the Middle East and North Africa and 
showed that they would have to work harder in future to gain acceptance especially after the 
emergence of the Egyptian-led Arab Confederation of Labour and Russian  links with Egypt. 
Two weeks later the ICFTU issued a statement on the Middle East crisis which recognised 
Egypt's right to nationalise the canal  and  expressed the hope that the UN would find the 
basis for a just and durable peace, which included the recognition of Israel and her borders.401 
The CPGB, the Jews and Suez 
The 1956 Suez crisis saw the CPGB adopt a pro-Arab position as a result of its close relations 
with Russia. The communists saw the nationalisation as of the canal as 'Egyptian defiance of 
western imperialism' and the Anglo-French invasion as evidence of the West's intention to 
undermine national liberation movements in the Middle East and North Africa.402 Israel was 
seen as an imperialist state and as an ally of the West. Although the Labour Party and the 
CPGB were both opposed to the Suez invasion, Labour clearly indicated that its anti-war 
stance was not anti-Israel and that its opposition to the war did not mean support for Nasser's 
nationalist aims. The CPGB joined the anti-war demonstration in Trafalgar Square, along 
with the Labour Party and the TUC, but explicitly identified itself with Arab nationalism and 
anti-Zionism.   
1956 was a landmark for the Jewish members of the CPGB. Until then, the Soviet authorities 
treatment of the Jews had never been openly questioned by the party's Jewish members. 
Although the NJC had discussed the charges of antisemitism at the time of the Doctors plot in 
Russia and the Slansky trials in Czechoslovakia, the NJC and the Jewish Clarion  strenuously 
denied the accusations -  describing them as being part the Cold War rhetoric. However, in 
1956, the party's position on Israel was challenged from within the CPGB  by leading Jewish 
Communists on the NJC who questioned whether the Soviet Union was a safe haven for the 
Jews. The subsequent revelations of Soviet antisemitism spilt Jewish communists in Britain, 
with many resigning from the Party. Disillusionment with the Soviet Union as a society free 
                                                 
401 ICFTU statement on the crisis in the Middle East, 12 December 1956, ISSH:ICFTU, 65. 
402 June Edmunds, The Left and Israel, party policy change and internal democracy,(London: Macmillan, 
2000), p.113. 
113 
 
of antisemitism, and the cover-up of the truth about Stalin’s anti-Jewish moves, compounded 
the effect of the upward social mobility of Jews in post-war Britain which made communism 
less and less of an attractive option.403 This was the beginning of the end for Jewish 
communism which by the end of the 1950s ceased to have any significance in Jewish life in 
the UK.404   
The immediate aftermath 
The Suez fiasco had shown that Britain was no longer a global power and had confirmed 
Britain's reliance on the USA. Post-Suez, the British government pursued a policy of 
attempting to rebuild its position and  influence in the Arab world and consequently Israel 
was not given an easy ride by the Foreign Office.405 Relations remained at a very low ebb 
until the end of 1957 and were characterised by the Shell Oil decision to stop supplying Israel 
with Iranian oil and the closure of all its operations in Israel. The affair was resolved not by 
direct discussion with the Israelis, but by a meeting between the Labour party and the Prime 
Minister who agreed to under the counter sales.406 1958 saw a steady improvement in 
relations as Britain supplied Israel with jets and artillery. By June, that year, the Foreign 
Office had started to recognise Israel's positive role in checking and preventing Nasser's 
expansion in the region. A coup in Iraq had made the government realise that the help and 
cooperation of Israel was 'strategically vital' to support British interests in the region such as 
happened in Jordan. Soon after a meeting, in August 1958, between the British and Israeli 
Foreign Ministers,  Britain agreed to supply Centurion tanks to Israel.407  
Although Suez had reunited the Labour party, the invasions of Suez and Hungary "gave birth 
to an independent anti-colonialist Left and sounded the death-knell of unthinkable obedience 
to the Kremlin."408 In Britain, the changes in the Soviet Union following Stalin's denunciation 
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by Khrushchev in 1956 and the crushing of the Hungarian uprising led to the formation of 
what became known as the New Left. It brought together those members of the Labour 
movement who rejected the existing Labour Left led by Aneurin Bevan and  saw the Suez 
invasion as an example of imperialism and the supporters of the Communist party, which 
included many trade unionists, who had disapproved of the Soviet actions.409 
The Labour Party believed the way forward was without the continued commitment to 
defences east of Suez.410 Elath continued to lobby Gaitskell and his shadow cabinet because 
the Israelis wanted to make sure Labour understood Israel’s motives for her strategies and  
possible actions, which included resolving the Shell Oil affair.411 
Reuven Barkatt told the Histadrut Convention in March 1956, that the friendly attitude of the 
labour movements in Western countries was due to Israel's active membership of the 
ICFTU.412 Although the Israelis received the outright backing of the American unions and 
limited support from the ICFTU over Suez, the TUC had  remained silent. Even though Israel 
had joined with Britain in the battle for the canal, nothing had changed. Barkatt knew that 
relations with the British unions were problematical and needed to be improved. Their failure 
to build a network of contacts within the TUC and the unions became immediately obvious 
once Egypt had nationalised the Suez canal. Barkatt first raised his concerns with Elath, in 
August, saying that the situation was far from satisfactory and that the TUC was being 
overwhelmingly cautious towards Israel.  Elath suggested that while Watson continue to try 
to persuade the TUC General Council to publish a declaration supportive of Israel, the 
American unions should be asked to publically support the efforts made on Israel's behalf by 
the Labour party.413 What neither Elath or Barkatt admitted was that there was no one on the 
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General Council apart from Watson who was pro-Israel or, if there were, they were never 
mentioned. It appears that they had  assumed that as the Labour Party and the TUC were part 
of the same labour movement, the TUC would automatically support the Labour Party in a 
similar manner to which the Histadrut would support Mapai. As Barkatt had other priorities 
as Head of the Histadrut International department, relations with the TUC and the unions had 
been left to the Embassy, the labour attaché and Levenberg, who all seem to have equated 
friendship with support in times of crisis. But it is still not clear why the obvious difference 
between the support for Israel by the leaders of the Labour Party and that of the TUC 
leadership had not been flagged up before.  
Although both men continued to lobby for another labour attaché based in London,414  
Barkatt suggested that in the meantime they should work together to try and recreate Elath’s 
successful lobbying of the Labour party within the TUC and the trade unions. The Histadrut 
was ready, to invite a TUC delegation to visit Israel but only on the condition that the 
invitation would be accepted, which he thought was unlikely at that time. He also proposed 
that they should invite people who could influence attitudes on Israel, if not the view of the 
TUC.415 Whereas many Labour MPs had visited Israel in the past, very few trade union 
leaders other than Watson had made the trip.416 As a first step, Levenberg was asked to make 
contact with the TUC and in January 1957 he met with Vic Feather, TUC Deputy General 
Secretary, who told him that although politically the TUC backed Labour party policy, there 
was a certain amount of internal criticism. Feather assured Levenberg that the TUC was 'fully 
appreciative of Israel's point of view' and their  friendly feelings towards the Histadrut were 
unchanged.417 Although Feather was known to be sympathetic to Israel, he appears to have 
been saying what he thought Levenberg wanted to hear. Levenberg also floated the idea of a 
visit by a National Council of Labour  delegation with Gaitskell, Bevan and Frank Cousins all 
showing interest in the suggestion.418   
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In what appears to been part of the same strategy, Marsh, the labour attaché, had contacted 
Greenhough at the MOL to say that Hayut, the Director of the Histadrut’s International 
Department, had told him that the Histadrut did not have a regular channel of contact with the 
TUC and that Tewson had blocked the opportunity to build  informal relations at ICFTU 
Executive meetings. Tewson more than likely had not wanted to appear to be friendlier to the 
Israelis than the Arabs. Marsh pointed out that although the Histadrut had more in common 
with the TUC than they had with the American unions, relations with the TUC were poor 
compared with the Americans. Relations had been strengthened in recent years with 
exchange visits and declarations of support for Israel. Marsh suggested to Greenhough that he 
make discreet enquiries with the TUC about establishing a direct contact.419 Greenhough, 
who had known for some time that the Histadrut were using Marsh rather than the TUC made 
arrangements for the Histadrut to contact the TUC directly.420 Because there is no other 
mention of his intervention in the either the TUC or Histadrut archives and in the light of how 
TUC-Histadrut relations remained cool were during the rest of the 1950s, nothing changed.  
In February 1957 the TUC General Council discussed the freedom of passage through the 
Suez Canal. Although Britain was the biggest user of the canal it is not clear who was 
responsible for putting this on the agenda. Concern were raised that the earlier blockade by 
Egypt, of Israeli ships and the ships from other nations trading with Israel including Britain, 
should not be renewed in the event of Israel complying with the UN resolutions calling for 
her withdrawal from Sinai. Tewson reported that he had been visited by a representative of 
Histadrut (probably Barkatt) who was touring Europe, who asked that he write to the UN. He 
discussed the request with the chairman, but since it came within the “established policy of 
the Council”, he wrote to the UN without further consultation, strongly urging that any 
solution should effectively safeguard the Suez Canal and the Gulf of Aqaba as international 
waterways open to the shipping of all nations without discrimination.421 This was an 
important moment in TUC-Histadrut relations because, at last the TUC had responded 
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positively to a Histadrut request concerning a political matter rather than a straightforward 
labour issue.  The Israeli withdrawal from the Sinai and the Gaza Strip was only completed in 
March after they had received international reassurances that the Straits of Tiran were 
recognised as an international waterway and would be open to Israeli shipping. This 
development allowed Israel to establish trade links with Asia. The Egyptians, however, 
refused to open the Suez canal to Israeli ships.422 
The lessons of Suez  
Where did this leave the TUC? Bevin and Deakin had provided strong and decisive 
leadership for the TUC until 1955, but with their departure, no-one had yet come forward to 
fill the void. Tewson was clearly not capable of leading. In addition, the close ties on 
domestic issues that existed between the Labour party and the TUC were absent when it came 
to foreign affairs. The TUC had been ill-informed about the Middle East and Israel and had 
little real contact with the Histadrut. Lobbying by the Israeli embassy of the Labour Shadow 
cabinet, whose natural inclination was to be friendly towards the Jews and Israel, was 
capitalised on during the Suez crisis especially when there was little or no lobbying from 
Arab supporters. As a result of his inability to lobby the TUC during the crisis Barkatt had 
concluded that fresh efforts must be made with the unions, who still held an important and 
influential role in British society, in order to counter the pro-Arab inclinations of the Foreign 
Office and the ICFTU. The TUC, under Tewson saw its international role after Suez as active 
participation in international organisations such as the ICFTU and the ILO and the need for 
strong and independent trade unions throughout the free world, including those in the soon to 
be independent countries of the British Commonwealth. The TUC, along with the Labour 
Party opposed British Government policy over Suez, and supported all efforts to bring 
peaceful solutions to the problems of the Middle East. Its international work was however 
severely hampered by a lack of resources and manpower, depending on others such as the 
Ministry of Labour and the ICFTU to provide training, support and technical assistance.423 
When it came to Israel and the Middle East, Tewson continued to be guided by the Foreign 
Office, who would, in theory, not do anything that would favour one side over the other and 
despite the efforts of the Histadrut, kept contact with the Israelis to a minimum.   
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Rather surprisingly, during the summer of 1958, and out of character with the pro-Arab 
sentiments shown by the TUC, the General Council endorsed a statement issued by the 
National Council of Labour on threats to peace in the Middle East.424 This pledge provided 
Levenberg with the opportunity to discuss with the International departments of both the 
Labour Party and the TUC the possibility of a debate on the Middle East at their respective 
annual conferences.  Levenberg drafted a motion to be submitted to the TUC Congress which 
reiterated Labour party policy whilst taking into account TUC caution and ICFTU plans to 
gather support in the Arab States. The resolution, which was adopted by Congress was 
proposed by Solomon Lever from the London Jewish Bakers' union who used the opportunity 
to promote Israel’s desire for peace and her economic progress since independence.425 The 
Israelis were extremely pleased when the Labour party conference in October adopted a 
similar resolution.426 Levenberg also raised the possibility of sending a TUC delegation to 
Israel in the light of improving Anglo-Israel relations. He was fobbed off once again with the 
excuse that even though Tewson and Roberts would like to visit Israel it was unlikely as they 
were both extremely busy and that there was concern about the political implications such a 
visit would have on ICFTU aims in the region.427  
After Suez, Israel’s search for diplomatic support had  became increasingly important and the 
Histadrut reassessed its role in Europe. The Israelis had always assumed that they could count 
on the friendship of the European Labour movement, but by 1958, Barkatt had realised that 
Europe, as a political force in the world, was becoming more important and that they would 
have to become more active in Europe as a new generation of leaders emerged.428 As a result, 
in September 1958, Hugo Morratt was appointed as the labour attaché at the Israeli Embassy 
in Brussels to deal initially with the ICFTU. Parker, the British labour attaché in Tel Aviv, 
reported that the question of Israel appointing a labour attaché in London was still under 
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discussion  and that since that  role was unlikely to be covered by Morratt, Ambassador Elath 
would continue to cover the British labour movement.429  
Whilst the TUC had yet to visit Israel, the TUC arranged, with Foreign Office agreement,   
for Sir Alfred Roberts, chairman of the International committee, to visit the Lebanon in 
November 1957. The aim of the visit was to help reverse any anti-British feeling which had 
occurred after Suez as well as boost support for the ICFTU and build links with the TUC.430 
Eighteen months later, Roberts again showed his pro-Arab side, when he supported the 
ICFTU's plans to invite, as observers, to the next ICFTU Congress, the Egyptian 
Confederation of Labour (EFL).The Histadrut, along with the AFL-CIO opposed this  
proposal on the grounds that the ICFTU should not compromise its principles by inviting a 
government controlled organisation like the EFL.431  Barkatt, who did not believe that that the 
Egyptians would be willing to join the ICFTU, interpreted ICFTU's move as part of an 
intensive effort by them and the TUC to woo the Egyptian trade unions whilst at the same 
time attempting to weaken the Histadrut's position within the ICFTU. Barkatt was also 
concerned that the TUC’s support for the ICFTU’s overtures towards the Arabs indicated that 
relations with the British labour movement were still not good, especially as he was aware of 
the recent improvement in Anglo-Israeli relations.432 The TUC seems to have been either 
very badly advised or Tewson and his colleagues were too set in their ways, because, while 
the TUC was still trying to improve Britain's relations with the Arab trade unions, the Foreign 
Office had moved on and were now trying to reduce Nasser's influence in the Arab world as 
well as being committed to improving relations with Israel.  
With the TUC continuing to show interest in the Arab world, Barkatt asked Elath in 1959, to 
give top priority to persuading the TUC to send a delegation or as an alternative, encourage 
visits by Sir Alfred Roberts, the International committee chairman or Cousins. He warned 
Elath against "running after” Roberts as they had made many attempts in the past to take him 
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to Israel.433 The following year, Morrat the Histadrut's European representative, was told that 
a visit by either Tewson or Roberts was unlikely and he should concentrate instead on other 
members of the General Council.434  
The Histadrut in Africa – the new beginning for relations with the TUC 
When the ICFTU was established in 1949, it was agreed that it would take the lead in 
international policy and affiliates would assist agreed programmes and not work 
independently.  However throughout the first ten years of ICFTU’s existence, the rivalry and 
mistrust that existed between the ICFTU’s  two dominant affiliates, the AFL-CIO and TUC, 
was at the root of its failure to develop and support international trade unionism, and no more 
so than in Africa.435 Trade unionism was at the heart of the independence movements which 
flourished in 1950s in the British and French colonies in Africa both before and after 
independence. Not surprisingly the AFL-CIO and TUC disagreed over how the ICFTU 
should deal with pan-Africanism and communist infiltration in Africa.  The TUC, which had 
worked closely with the British Government and their colonial administrations since the 
1930s, knew that Britain’s colonial interests and the TUC’s interests would be protected with 
Oldenbroek in charge of the ICFTU’s African programmes.436 The TUC believed that 
because of their colonial experience in Africa only they understood what was needed for 
trade union development, which in their opinion, was to build from grass roots upwards in a 
similar fashion to how the British trade unions had developed a century earlier. This strategy 
was threatened in 1957 by the AFL-CIO who were looking to invest in African trade 
unionism as well as encouraging the ICFTU to adopt a more forceful approach. The AFL-
CIO and the ICFTU both took the opposite view to the TUC, believing that they needed to 
recognise and support these emerging labour movements now, even if they lacked an 
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organisational structure. By actively giving their support to the leadership they hoped that the 
African trade unions would affiliate to the ICFTU rather than the WFTU or an independent 
African trade union federation.  The TUC, although concerned about African nationalism did 
not believe that communism posed a threat whereas the Americans believed the opposite. It 
was against this background that the Histadrut, a member of the ICFTU executive, decided 
with the backing of their government to develop their own aid programmes for Africa. 
Although the TUC was initially wary of the Histadrut’s activities, their development 
programme proved to be a significant factor in the improvement of relations between the 
TUC and the Histadrut during the 1960s.  
Prior to 1948 the Histadrut’s international activity had been limited to America and Europe. 
Once the State had been established, as it was no longer necessary for them to promote the 
Zionist movement, it became an active member of the ICFTU making connections, especially 
in Asia and Africa, building links and understanding for Israel. From 1953 onwards, the 
Israeli government pursued a very active international policy with two main themes, one to 
demonstrate to the world the achievements of the State of Israel and the other to win friends 
and influence people in countries outside the Arab world, as she needed friends whenever she 
could find them as well as votes at the UN. Israel was also concerned about the spread of 
Arab nationalism and Russian influence in Africa and her African policy developed through 
political necessity, once the Arab states had attempted to persuade the non-aligned countries 
in Asia and Africa to isolate Israel both politically and economically.  
One of Israel’s first attempts to make friends in the Asian world was in 1952, when she 
attended the Asian Socialist conference in Rangoon. This led to the establishment of 
diplomatic relations and from 1954 onwards Israel worked with the Burmese authorities on a 
variety of medical, agricultural and industrial development projects with the technical support 
for the majority of these programmes provided by the Histadrut. Once news of these 
programmes spread, Israel’s standing in the Far East improved. Israel’s reputation spread in 
West Africa in a similar manner once it had established relations with Liberia in the early 
1950s.437  Her plans received a setback in 1955, when the Arab nations succeeded in blocking 
Israel’s participation in the Bandung conference, the first big Afro-Asian meeting of ex-
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colonial states.438 This decision came as a big shock to Israel’s leaders as they had believed 
they were members of this group, but her relations with the third world were not helped a 
year later by Israel’s participation in the Anglo-French intervention at Suez.  In order to 
challenge the isolation that the Arabs wanted to impose on Israel, from 1956 onwards, both 
the Histadrut and the Israeli government targeted Africa because Israel was in a unique 
position to offer her nation building experience in the form of development and technical 
programmes to the newly independent counties in Africa and Asia. In return,  Israel hoped 
that aid would bring both diplomatic and political support. The Histadrut, with its myriad of 
enterprises and institutions was set to become the cornerstone of Israel’s plans for 
cooperation and support in the third world. 439  
In spite of the Arab tirade against Israel at Bandung, branding Israel as the bridgehead of 
western colonialism, four African trade unionists visited Israel in 1957 as guests of the 
Histadrut.440 The visit had a tremendous impact on John Tettegah, from Ghana, who 
announced that the Ghana TUC was to remodel itself on the Histadrut.441 This decision upset 
the TUC, who jealously guarded their own interests in Africa and not only felt let down by 
the Ghanaians, but were also worried about their future relations with them.442  
The  Histadrut attended the ICFTU World Congress which took place in Tunis in July 1957, 
which was the first time it had been held in the Arab world. Although there had been calls, 
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prior to the Congress, for Israel’s membership to be withdrawn, the Histadrut's attendance did 
not cause any major problems.443 Barkatt told Congress that the Histadrut’s experience 
gained in building the state of Israel was similar to that of the emerging nations in Asia and 
Africa and offered to train and promote co-operatives and trade unions in those nations.444 
The Americans disappointed him as they were busy promoting the work of the ICFTU in the 
Arab world and had not come to Israel’s aid when the Arab states attempted to exclude Israel 
from the Afro-Asian framework. The attempt failed because several Asian and African 
delegations opposed the Histadrut’s exclusion and created instead an atmosphere of sympathy 
for Israel. Barkatt was disappointed by the overtures made towards the Arab unions by the 
Americans and the ICFTU which were supported by some members of the TUC 
delegation.445   
After more than four years of vehemently opposing plans for an ICFTU regional office in 
Beirut, Barkatt announced in November 1957, that the Histadrut had withdrawn its objections 
to the appointment a regional representative in the Lebanon, provided that his main role 
would be to assist the development of trade union movements in Arab countries. He asked for 
a clear undertaking that their representative would maintain regular contact with other 
affiliated trade union movements in the area, including the Histadrut and the Cypriot unions. 
Barkatt also emphasised that the Histadrut would welcome the emergence of a genuine free 
and democratic trade union movements in Arab countries, which could help to establish 
relations and mutual respect between Israel and the Arab countries.446 This change in attitude 
was probably due to a number of factors, including the fact that there already been for several 
years an ICFTU presence in Beirut. While not wishing to further antagonise the ICFTU, 
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Barkatt felt that this gesture might assist towards the ICFTU’s acceptance of Histadrut’s aid 
programmes in Africa and Asia.447  
 
In 1958, Marsh, the labour attaché in Tel Aviv reported to the MOL about the work of the 
Histadrut and their relationship with the Ghanaians commenting that “the free trade union 
movement generally can derive a good deal of benefit from contact between Israel and 
underdeveloped countries.448 He admitted that “Israel had a good deal to offer by presenting 
herself as a model, an alternative adviser to the ex-colonialist powers of the West and as a 
counter-attraction to communist countries.” He also pointed out that the Histadrut could, 
through its links with other labour movements, act as the agent of the Israeli Government and  
further the general interests of the country in a way that might be blocked to normal 
communication, for example in the Muslim States.449  The ICFTU, was  also unhappy that the 
Histadrut as a member of the ICFTU, was undertaking activities in Africa which the ICFTU 
felt should be under its auspices. Barkatt justified the Histadrut’s actions by saying that the 
Histadrut’s growing links with Ghana allowed them to further the cause of international 
labour solidarity and to contribute to the growth of free trade unions in Africa as well as 
acting as a buffer against Soviet efforts at penetration in Africa in general and in Ghana in 
particular.450  
As news of Israel’s aid programmes spread, more people went to Israel each year to study the 
Histadrut's blend of trade unionism and commerce. This led to the Histadrut organising a 
three month study programme in November 1958 for workers from Asian and African 
countries. Four months later, Parker,  Marsh's replacement as labour attaché, reported that the 
Israeli government fully supported the seminar and that “Israel has proved to herself and to 
many of the "uncommitted" nations that she has a variety of expert technical knowledge and 
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experience.” He warned that “The Israelis are still sometimes nervous that we may resent 
their efforts to take an interest in Africa and I imagine we should want to disabuse them of 
this idea in as far as we can. At the same time it might be no bad thing to mitigate the stigma 
of "colonisation" by a display of our own knowledge and experience, as well as our good 
intentions, on these occasions. This is in addition to taking the chance of channelling Israeli 
efforts in this field in an acceptable direction.”451 Tewson, whilst agreeing that African  
co-operative movements could benefit from Israel's knowledge, queried what exactly the 
Histadrut seminar had to do with the unions and why they had not invited the East African 
labour movements.452 There is no evidence of any reply to this letter. As a probable response 
to Tewson's letter, Barkatt asked Elath, to discuss the Histadrut’s African development 
programme with the TUC.  In order to minimise TUC objections, Elath was told to say that 
the Histadrut would be willing to share information with the TUC  about their activities as 
well as coordinating with them in areas which overlapped.453 We do not know if this meeting 
took place as there is no further information available in either the TUC or the Histadrut 
archives. Even if an approach was made, it is probable that the TUC would not have been 
interested as they backed the ICFTU stance on the Histadrut. Nor is it known if the either 
MOL and the Foreign Office shared with the TUC the  regular updates they had received on 
the Histadrut's African activities.454  It was a shame if they did not receive copies because 
Marsh's reports were significant because they were written at a time when the Anglo-Israel 
relations were just starting to change for the better. The Foreign Office was also greatly 
impressed by Marsh's reports on the work of the Histadrut and those by Parker, his successor.  
 
Between 1958 and 1961, Britain came under great pressure to grant independence to her 
colonies, especially in Africa.455 She also attempted during the same period to counter the 
Soviet Union's drive for greater influence on the continent. In August 1958, as a result of the 
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coup in Iraq and the need to support Jordan, Britain agreed to full co-operation with Israel. It 
was the start of  new era of Anglo-Israeli relations especially as they both agreed to the need 
to halt the spread of both Nasser's and Soviet influence in the region.456  
The Foreign Office wrote to the Colonial Office in January 1959, suggesting  that it would be 
in Britain’s interests to help the Israelis in British territories in Africa. The advantages for 
Britain "in this spread of Israel's contacts and influence" included the Israelis acting as a 
"counterweight to the spreading of Arab nationalist ideas and Nasser's activities " and as way 
of demolishing Israel’s suspicion of Britain’s hostility towards them. In this way it would  
increase Britain's "chances of restraining their (Israel's) perennial urge to act tough with their 
neighbours." The Foreign Office concluded by asking that Britain's Colonial Governors, High 
Commissioners and Foreign Office representatives in Africa to help the Israelis as a general 
rule.457 The British Ambassador to Israel also advised Selwyn Lloyd, the Foreign Secretary, 
that Israel’s courtship of both former and current British and French colonial territories in 
West Africa was by no means a unilateral exercise as there was evidence "that her attentions 
were eagerly sought by a number of countries because she had a rich fund of technological 
know-how and experience which the Afro-Asians badly needed for their development", and 
was "untainted by the suspicion of imperialist ambition." The Ambassador suggested that 
Lloyd might consider giving the Israelis some discreet encouragement as there did not seem 
to be any real conflict between British and Israeli policies or tactics in Africa.458 The 
endorsement by both the Foreign Office and the Ambassador of Israel's foreign aid 
programmes is further evidence of the changing balance in Anglo-Israel relations and the 
transformation of Israel's image post-Suez. Parker, the labour attaché in Israel, who was 
monitoring the overseas work of the Histadrut suggested that as large numbers of labour and 
political activists from Britain's African territories were visiting Israel, it provided an ideal 
opportunity for Britain to assess their thoughts on future political developments in Africa.459 
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Unfortunately Tewson either ignored or was unaware of these changes in British policy 
towards Israel and continued to oppose the Histadrut's work.    
The Histadrut then announced in March 1959, that it was to establish a liaison centre in 
Africa to maintain contact with local labour movements as well as acting as an information 
centre.  Parker reported that the real purpose of the centre was yet another part of Israel’s 
campaign for friends amongst independent and dependent countries, and would probably be 
active in those areas where Israel had no diplomatic representation.460 Whilst the British 
Government was eager to find out more about Israel’s future plans,461 it was reported that the 
ICFTU was concerned that this development could provide the Americans or the British with 
the justification they needed for their own independent activity.462 They were concerned 
about the economic and political benefits that a liaison office would provide, but considered 
that being directly involved with the local trade unions, the Histadrut would undercut the 
work of the ICFTU.463  
The differences between the TUC and the AFL-CIO over the issues of the African colonies 
resulted in open conflict between them at the sixth ICFTU Congress held in December 1959.  
Tewson had his own agenda regarding Africa, and opposed any attempts to muscle in on 
what he regarded as his domain, Britain's African colonies. He also knew that the TUC did 
not have the necessary resources to run their own programmes and was also concerned that 
the Americans might start their own independent activities, which would directly affect the 
ICFTU's own work.464 His position on African trade unionism was that trade unions should 
be built from the ground upwards along the lines of the British model, whereas the Americans 
believed that the way forward was to support national trade union centres.465 The AFL-CIO 
thought  that that Tewson was being unrealistic because of the TUC's colonial background 
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and the current conditions which indicated that the Communists could gain a foothold in 
Africa as a result of the prevalent anti-colonial outlook. Despite opposition from the TUC the 
ICFTU agreed to establish an African regional organisation to support the new unions in 
Africa.466 Six months later, the Histadrut announced that as a natural development of their 
existing training schemes, the Afro-Asian Institute of Labour Studies would be established in 
Israel to run two five-month courses a year each for around 60 trade unionists from Asian and 
African countries.467 Financial support for the project would come from the AFL-CIO and the 
Israeli government.468 This move was made independently of the Israeli government’s own 
assistance programmes which were now administered by a separate department in the Foreign 
Ministry. The ICFTU, who were initially unhappy with the proposed college reluctantly 
agreed to support the plans as they knew that the Histadrut would go ahead with the scheme 
with or without their approval.469 
By the end of 1960, both the TUC and the Foreign Office had expressed an interest in the 
Institute.470 The Colonial Office commented that if the Institute developed as forecast it could 
make a significant impact on the shaping of any new trade union structures which might 
emerge as Britain’s African colonies moved towards independence.471 From then on, Parker’s 
reports about the Institute were of great interest to his colleagues in London. His report about 
the Institute’s second course in 1961 noted, that, by establishing an institute which was 
independent of the ICFTU, it might achieve more for Western trade unionism than if it were 
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associated directly with an ICFTU scheme, as not all students supported the ICFTU in Africa. 
He also reported that although the AFL-CIO was meeting half the cost of the first year's 
working, it took no part in the direction or the management of the Institute.472  
On his return to Israel after visiting East Africa in March 1963, Levin, the Director of the 
International department of the Histadrut told Marshall that he was beginning to think that the 
ICFTU was finished in Africa unless it became more flexible and more realistic in its attitude 
towards African trade unionism. He said that the international and Western trade union 
movements might not like what they saw in the African trade unions, but African unions, he 
felt, were beginning to have less and less in common with the ICFTU and Western unions 
and were turning more and more towards association with other African unions. Wherever he 
had gone, there had been evidence of Russian influence in the  unions, but it was clear, he 
said, that both the Russians and Chinese understood as little about the Africans as anyone 
else, and had very little influence there and none of the unions were communist. Levin had 
concluded that the training facilities provided by the West for African union officials in 
future should be in situ rather than outside Africa. The Histadrut, Levin said, should 
encourage African trade unions to ask for the services of Israeli trade union experts, rather 
than send their officials to the Afro-Asian Institute.473  
 
The result of the ever increasing expansion of Israel's assistance to the third world, meant that 
by 1966, 28 countries in Africa, Latin America, and Asia had signed technical aid and co-
operation agreements with Israel, Israeli experts  were working in 62 countries and students 
from 80 countries studying in Israel.474 Her success was summed up by a British Foreign 
Office official who wrote “Israel has either given some form of aid to, or opened negotiations 
on aid with, most newly independent countries in Africa. Israeli assistance has attractions for 
African countries since she has no colonial associations, has won her independence very 
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recently, and has successfully created a modern state and an impressive defence force by 
methods applicable to Africa.”475 
The 1960s, a new era in TUC – Histadrut relations  
Two significant decisions were made in 1960, which were both instrumental in improving 
TUC-Histadrut relations over the next decade. The first was made by the Histadrut, when in 
March 1960, they decided to open a European office in London in order to strengthen 
contacts with the British and European labour movements. London was chosen because the 
majority of the leaders of the international organisations and trade federations were 
Europeans and based there.476 The Histadrut had decided to present Israel’s case themselves 
rather than continue to depend on the Israeli embassy, as recent developments at the ICFTU 
with their overtures towards the Arab unions, had proved once again to them that they should 
not neglect Europe. The second decision came in September 1960, when George Woodcock 
was appointed TUC General Secretary. Woodcock, who had no previous experience of 
international affairs, decided that the TUC would, in future, only deal with issues which 
directly related to the TUC and would work on other issues by supporting organisations such 
as the ICFTU rather than through direct action by the TUC.477  
Gideon Ne'eman, who had been appointed in 1960 as the Histadrut representative in London,  
worked hard trying to build bridges and the first step towards a better relationship was taken 
when a Histadrut delegation of trade unionists came to Britain in November 1961. This was  
followed, in January 1962, by a visit by Frank  Cousins who had previously  admitted that he 
knew very little about the Arab-Israeli problem. Simchoni, the Head of the Histadrut 
International department, wrote that “Cousins will be helpful for us regarding constructive 
action”478 His visit, although not the first by a British trade unionist to Israel, was extremely 
successful and caused a positive change in his opinions. Although other British trade 
unionists such as Sam Watson had visited before, they came either as MP's, or members of 
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the Labour Party, or as representatives of the international trade union organisations. 
Marshall, who had recently been appointed as British labour attaché, noted that the visit 
showed the importance of visits by leading British trade unionists. Although no practical 
benefit had resulted from the visit the opportunity to discuss problems with a leading trade 
union figure was worthwhile in terms of  goodwill created towards Britain and its trade union 
movement. Five months later, a delegation from the General and Municipal Workers Union 
(GMWU), led by Fred Hayday, became the first ever British trade union delegation to visit 
Israel. The visitors remarked after visiting the Afro-Asian institute, that the Histadrut had 
contributed much more to the underdeveloped states than their British colleagues.  The aim of 
all these visits was to provide the visitors with a good understanding of the Histadrut and 
Israel’s problems and the Histadrut soon realised that they urgently needed to educate the 
British labour movement who knew very little about the subject.479 
Eighteen months  after  coming to London, Ne'eman persuaded  George Woodcock to visit 
Israel. Woodcock became the first TUC General Secretary to go there, forty years after the 
Histadrut had first made contact with the TUC. Marshall wrote to Woodcock saying that his 
visit along with those by Cousins and Hayday had finally dispelled any suspicions the Israelis 
had that their own warm feelings towards the British trade union movement had not always 
been reciprocated.480 A report on TUC-Histadrut relations compiled by the Foreign Office 
labour advisor, in April 1963, was very positive and noted that Woodcock had frequently said 
publically that he was deeply impressed with Israel and with the Histadrut’s achievements, 
including its aid programmes.481 
British Unions investments and visits   
One unexpected outcome of the improvement in relations was the announcement in the Daily 
Herald of April 1963 that the TGWU and NUGMW were to invest £250,000 in Histadrut 
enterprises and that other unions were thinking of following suit.482  The investments would 
be in the form of loans to be used for whatever purposes the Histadrut thought fit, but would 
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be subject to some conditions as to how it was used.483 Ne'eman, who had been negotiating 
with the unions since the previous autumn, went to the press once he became aware of 
opposition to the project from those who believed that the unions should remain neutral in 
light of the political climate in the Middle East. He commented later, that when the Egyptians 
found out that the unions were about to invest money in Israel, they had reacted in a similar 
manner as they had previously, when the West German unions announced plans for economic 
cooperation with Israel and attempted to pressurise the TUC and the unions into changing 
their minds.484 
The British ambassador commented that the increased interest in the Histadrut over the last 
two years by British trade unions and the TUC, would increase goodwill towards the British 
labour movement, and towards Britain. The single most important reason for this increased 
interest was the "enthusiasm for Israel brought back" by the various British trade union 
visitors to Israel. They had all been impressed by Israel's achievements at home and their 
technical assistance abroad.  Both Hayday and Woodcock had praised the Histadrut's work in 
Africa and said that the Histadrut could do much for the trade union movements of Africa 
that Western trade union movements could not do. The Ambassador concluded that the 
announcements  by the TGWU and the NUGMW showed how successful the Histadrut had 
been and "the stock of Britain and of the British labour movement could hardly be higher in 
Histadrut eyes than it is today. Relations between Britain and Israel are the better for that." 485 
However negotiations over terms and conditions were long and convoluted and, by August 
1966, the conditions for investing in Histadrut dollar bonds were no longer financially 
attractive and the Histadrut investment managers decided to reject the deal.486 However as 
both unions, especially the TGWU, were still willing to make the loans, discussions 
continued for another two years until August 1968 when the Histadrut finally told Cousins 
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that because of the difficulties involved due to the British government's financial restrictions 
on overseas investments they had no alternative but to cancel the proposed investment.487  
 
TUC support for the Afro-Asian Institute 
On his return to London after visiting Israel, Woodcock asked the International department to 
write a paper on the Afro-Asian Institute. The TUC asked Walter Treganowan, the Foreign 
Office labour advisor, for help in compiling impartial evidence on the Institute. Treganowan  
contacted the labour attachés in West Africa, Singapore and India asking them to make 
discreet enquiries about the effect of the training on individuals who had been through the 
course. He said that the TUC’s interest in this, as far he was aware, was that the apparent 
success of the Institute might tend to undermine its own efforts, such as they were, in 
Commonwealth countries.  He continued “we are all, I think, anxious to see the TUC and the 
British unions themselves giving a lot more help with trade union training abroad, whether 
directly or in partnership with the ICFTU.  It is perhaps no bad thing that Congress House 
should have been spurred on by the potential challenge of the Israeli effort to embark on an 
assessment which could have quite wide implications.”488 The labour attaché in Dakar  
responded positively about Israeli influence on labour movements in West Africa, saying that 
most of these territories had sent trainees to the Institute and had also received Israeli advisers 
who were generally held in high esteem.489 
In April 1963, the report on the Afro-Asian Institute was presented to the TUC International 
committee along with the proposal that the TUC should finance a number of scholarships at 
the College, which since its establishment in 1960, had trained more than 300 students and 
that the courses now included students from Latin America and the Caribbean. The report not 
only discussed the course programme and how students were selected but also the history and 
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structure of the Histadrut, its relationship with trade unions and the relevance of the Histadrut 
model.490 In its discussion the committee raised concerns about the special relationship 
between the Histadrut and the state, and were apprehensive that after attending courses in 
Israel students might be inclined to model their own particular institution too closely on the 
Israeli model, as had happened in Ghana.491 Their discussions noted that the problems facing 
many underdeveloped countries were similar to those which had faced Israel. They were  
critical of the approach of the TUC to the problems of working people in these countries 
especially those who were outside the scope of the unions because they regularly thought the 
solution lay with trade unions when they would benefit more readily from bodies similar to 
Israel's co-operative groups. It was recognised that by promoting the Institute for both 
political and altruistic reasons, the Histadrut's had sought to develop relations with countries 
which might support Israel. The view was expressed that in many respects the Histadrut 
example was excellent especially as regards agricultural co-operation, but doubted whether 
the Israeli trade union structure provided a suitable model. After an extensive discussion the 
committee agreed to provide £2,000 for four scholarships at the Afro-Asian Institute492 which 
the Histadrut agreed would be reserved for trade unionists from either Africa or the West 
Indies.493  
This generous gesture by the TUC, following on as it did so quickly after the announcement 
to invest in the Histadrut, showed a positive appreciation of the Histadrut's work in the third 
world as well as the limitations of the TUC's own efforts.  As a measure of the TUC's and the 
Government's appreciation of the value of this work they continued to fund scholarships at 
the Institute for the rest of the decade. With both the TUC and AFL-CIO support, the ICFTU 
soon dropped their objections to the Institute and accepted that useful lessons could be 
learnt.494 Although the British Government had realised in 1960 the value of the Histadrut's 
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work, it had taken the TUC another three years to reach the same conclusion. Histadrut-TUC 
relations had finally caught up with Anglo-Israel relations. It was also clear that the Foreign 
Office, who for some time had wanted the TUC to become more involved in this kind of 
work, had yet to persuade them to do so.  
 
Two months later, Ne’eman discussed with Simchoni, the future programme of work for the 
Histadrut in Britain. He felt that the Histadrut’s political activity in Europe faced an 
important challenge, not only in Britain but also in several other countries where the 
popularity of the Socialist parties was increasing. Since Britain was facing an election in 
1964, with the possibility of a Labour win, the Histadrut decided in December 1963, to 
relocate Eli Marx to London to work alongside Gideon Ne'eman and reinforce their 
connections with the unions and the TUC.495 Although nobody knew at the time, this move 
was to have an enormous influence on future relations.  
The Arab boycott of Israel and the Mancroft affair 
The Arab boycott of Israel did not start as many people believe in 1948, but in December 
1945 when the Arab League issued a formal boycott declaration urging its members not to 
import or use the products of Palestinian Jews. The League reaffirmed its ban in 1948 on all 
commercial and financial transactions when the State of Israel was established.496 During the 
1950s, the British government made it clear on a number of occasions that the boycott was 
illegal and unjustified, but left it to individual companies to decide whether to comply with 
the boycott or not.497 The result was that  amongst the Western nations, Britain was one of the 
most cooperative in complying with the Arab boycott. Many of the British companies which 
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found themselves on the Arab League's boycott list took the commercial decision to comply 
with the request.498  
The TUC, which was aware of the boycott call, did not become involved until December 
1963, when Lord Mancroft, a British Jew, was forced to resign, as a result of Arab pressure, 
from the Board of Directors of the Norwich Union insurance company.499 The British 
government acted quickly by informing the Ambassadors of three Arab states that it opposed 
outside interference in British domestic affairs and strongly resented pressure on British firms 
to discriminate against their staff. 500 Once Norwich Union had admitted their compliance to 
the boycott request, the incident became a public scandal and was widely covered in the 
media and Parliament.  
On hearing the news, Ne’eman met with twelve members of the TUC International 
committee to express the Histadrut's serious concern about the issues surrounding the 
incident including racial discrimination, antisemitism and a boycott of Israel. He reported that 
they all had unanimously agreed that the TUC should speak publically about this issue and  
advised Ne’eman that since this was mainly an "internal" British affair it would be best if one 
of the unions wrote to demand a discussion on the issue rather for the Histadrut write to the 
TUC.501 Cyril Plant, the leader of the Inland Revenue Staff Federation, who had previously 
visited Israel, wrote to the TUC demanding  a discussion of the affair and suggested that the 
General Council issue a statement.502 A clash at the General Council with Woodcock was 
inevitable because, since becoming General Secretary, the TUC had avoided making political 
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statements. Woodcock told Ne’eman that the boycott was a political issue and that if the 
boycott was causing serious damage to the Israeli economy and the livelihood of Israelis, 
which it was not, then it only served as an expression of the animosity between the Arab 
states and Israel, so he saw no reason to take a stand.503   
The International department prepared a report for the General Council on the activities of the 
Arab boycott office which noted that fifty  British companies had been blacklisted and fifteen 
British companies including Shell and BP had taken steps to comply with the boycott. The 
report stated that General Council policy on international trade did not have guidelines on 
trade with Israel nor many restrictions as it had been formulated to support the defence of the 
West.504 The view of the General Council and the International committee was that it was 
impossible for the TUC to remain silent on the issue, because not only was the Mancroft 
affair related to racial discrimination, but the Arab boycott might affect British jobs. 
Woodcock found no backing for his belief that the TUC did not have to take a stand in this 
issue as it was a political dispute. The General Council also realised that a formula had to be 
found which allowed them to support the proposed boycott against South Africa, while at the 
same time condemning the Arab boycott, and supporting those British companies that were 
willing to make a stand against it.505 The result was a TUC press statement which called on 
British companies not to surrender to any pressure which aimed at discrimination "by either 
side" in a political dispute to which Britain was not a party.506  
 
The fact that Ne'eman  was able to engineer a response from the TUC highlighted the good 
relations that he had built with the unions. It also provided him with an opportunity to learn 
about the character of the TUC as well as their friends and sympathisers. Ne’eman 
commented that “of course there could have been a better decision, but this is the TUC we are 
talking about and its response to an issue that a British union had put forward and not the 
Histadrut.”  He also knew that the TUC’s approach was that Britain was not directly involved 
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in Israel’s dispute with the Arabs and that TUC policy in general was to avoid taking political 
decisions. The Israelis however were pleased with the outcome, especially as the TUC had 
taken a decision that every other non-Jewish body had so far refused to take. In order to build 
on their success, the Israeli embassy and the Histadrut tried unsuccessfully to get the Arab 
boycott discussed at the 1965 TUC Congress. Their plan would have included asking the 
American unions to encourage the TUC to take immediate public action  against the boycott 
in Britain.507 Twelve  years would pass before the TUC and the Histadrut would next discuss 
the Arab boycott of Israel.   
Woodcock’s special relationship with Becker  
In many ways 1963 was the year when Histadrut-TUC relations really started to improve. 
Aharon Becker's successful visit to London in May 1963, his first as Histadrut General 
Secretary, was seen in Israel as a turning point in the Histadrut's "European relations" which 
would influence future relations with other labour movements in Europe.508 It was reported 
that the TUC General Council had never spent so much on an overseas guest. Woodcock said 
it showed the TUC's special appreciation of Israel and the Histadrut. In London Becker met 
several politicians including Harold Wilson, the Labour Party leader who listened to what he 
had to say both as trade unionist and a member of the Knesset for Mapai, the ruling party in 
Israel. The visit consolidated the understanding and friendship between the two organisations 
as well as between Becker and Woodcock. Hayday assured Ne’eman that “You can trust even 
in troubled times your many friends and their enormous empathy towards the Histadrut and 
Israel.” Woodcock described Israel as indestructible and emphasised that the free world 
would support Israel against the Arabs. When asked if the TUC would issue a statement 
supporting Israel, Woodcock said that he understood the Histadrut’s need for supportive 
statements, like those from the American unions, but he preferred not to do this unless a 
special development took place in the region. Any decision, he said, would be made in 
consultation with the Labour party, as had happened during the Cuba crisis.509 There is 
evidence that a close relationship existed between the two men when in November 1963, 
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Becker, went at short notice to London prior to the meeting of the governing body of the ILO 
and the ICFTU Executive committee in order to talk to Woodcock about several issues 
including the TUC attitude towards South African membership of the ILO.510 
By the end of 1963, British trade union delegations started to visit Israel on a regular basis. 
The purpose of the trips was to learn about Israel, the work of the Histadrut and the Arab-
Israeli conflict. Cousins returned to Israel in November 1963 as the leader of a TGWU 
delegation. After meeting with the Foreign Minister, Cousins said that "if a Labour 
government came to power, Israel would gain a better understanding from the Foreign 
Office".511 A TUC General Council delegation, led by TUC President, George Lowthian, 
visited Israel in April 1964. The delegation met with the President, the Foreign Minister, 
Golda Meir, and the Minister of Labour, Yigal Allon. The visit was very successful, with 
Lowthian promising continued TUC support for the Afro-Asian Institute. The Histadrut felt 
let down when the report of the visit, which concentrated on work and welfare in Israel, was 
published, as it summarily dealt with Israel’s aspirations for peace and the Histadrut's 
position in the state, with no mention of its economic activities.512 
Two visits to Britain by the Histadrut in the autumn of 1964 are worth mentioning. The first 
was by a delegation of Histadrut Workers Council General Secretaries who came to learn 
about the structure of British trade unions, both at a local and national level. The delegation 
noted the warm and friendly reception they received as well as the positive attitude of their 
hosts the AEU and the NUGMW.  The second visit was a return visit for the one made by the 
TGWU to Israel a year earlier. The Histadrut's visit was seen as a return visit by friends, and 
the TGWU insisted that it should go ahead as planned even though Cousins had recently been 
appointed as a Minister in the new Labour government. Marx, the Histadrut representative in 
London, wrote that there was still of work plenty to do with the British unions, who knew 
very little about the Histadrut and Israel, especially as the Labour Party was now in 
government and the trade unions were a powerful group within the party.513  
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Becker used his special relationship to write to Woodcock, outlining the Histadrut’s view of 
the current situation in the Middle East, reminding him of the continuing threats of war and 
annihilation from Israel’s neighbours as well as the abuse the Histadrut had received when 
they offered the hand of friendship to the Arab trade unions.514  Woodcock responded saying 
that they were studying developments and the TUC supported the peaceful settlement of all 
outstanding problems between Israel and the Arab States. Becker's reply suggested that any 
steps that the TUC might be able to take in supporting peaceful negotiations towards the 
settlement of these differences, would carry great weight, and prove a positive factor in the 
promotion of international peace and understanding.515 
Their close relationship was also reflected in the access Marx was given to Woodcock, who 
regularly discussed with him ICFTU business including the Afro-Asian Institute. The 
importance that the Israelis placed on relations with the labour movement was emphasised 
when in March 1965, Israeli Prime Minister Eshkol came to London for a week of meetings 
with the British Government and a meeting was arranged for him with the TUC.516 Zev 
Levin, the Head of the Histadrut International department, who met separately with TUC, the 
Labour Party and the MOL, reported that the TUC was taking even less interest in 
international issues than before, with Woodcock taking an extreme position by talking about 
the ICFTU withdrawing from the underdeveloped states in Africa. The MOL also referred to 
the TUC's lack of interest in international issues and blamed Woodcock 's passive approach 
as a serious obstacle to providing British aid to the unions in underdeveloped states. Levin 
noted that although the people he met understood Israel's political and security problems 
friendly and were sympathetic towards Israel and the Histadrut, there was a lack of interest 
and willingness to get involved in new international crises. Their attitude towards Israel's 
problems, he said, was more rooted in British politeness than real sympathy, as if to say "I 
pray that we won't have to test the British friendship." He concluded that they should 
continue to foster direct contact with the unions as well as the TUC as this would strengthen 
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support within the Labour Party and that the visits to Israel by union leaders were very 
valuable as they were the best ambassadors for Israel.517  
Addressing the tenth Histadrut Convention in December 1965, Becker said that with a Labour 
government in Britain, the Histadrut was entitled to a more truthful view of the Middle East 
situation and demanded that British workers abstain from strengthening those forces in the 
Middle East which regularly called for the destruction of Israel.518 His comments reflected 
the state of Histadrut-TUC relations which had improved out of all proportion compared with 
five years earlier. The TUC failed to attend the convention, but Victor Feather, TUC Deputy 
General Secretary, who had visited Israel for the first time earlier that month, met senior 
members of the Histadrut and the government. Even though he described himself as an old 
friend of the Histadrut, it was apparent that he knew very little about Israel or the 
Histadrut.519  
Problems at the ICFTU  
In November 1964 Marx approached Woodcock with a draft resolution to be submitted to the 
next ICFTU Executive Board meeting on the need for a peaceful settlement of all outstanding 
problems between countries, especially in the Middle East. He told Woodcock that the 
Histadrut and their friends thought that the ICFTU could no longer remain silent whilst 
continued threats to Israel were voiced by its neighbours. Marx pointed out that the ICFTU 
had never issued a clear and positive statement on behalf of the Histadrut concerning Israeli-
Arab relations even though it regularly expressed its views on other international issues. 
Woodcock  advised Marx that whilst having no objection to the motion it should be tabled by 
the Histadrut.520 The Histadrut took Woodcock's advice and their resolution appealing  for the 
differences between Israel and various Arab countries be settled by peaceful means was 
adopted by the ICFTU Executive Board.521 
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Because the TUC and the AFL-CIO  clashed over the future direction of the ICFTU, Marx 
started to monitor TUC relations with both the ICFTU and the AFL –CIO because he thought 
that the TUC, who led a pro-European faction favouring a strong European organisation, 
could mean a weaker ICFTU, which in turn could work against the Histadrut.522 
 
The Histadrut, used its position as a member of the ICFTU Executive Board, to defend Israel 
from criticism and censure. When the Lebanese unions submitted a motion regarding 
Palestinian refugees to the 1965 ICFTU Congress in Amsterdam, the Histadrut briefed its 
friends on the ICFTU Congress motions committee including Fred Hayday, Chairman of the 
TUC International committee which ensured the motion was removed from the Congress 
agenda.523 The Congress, which was notable for the dissent and ill feeling amongst 
delegates,524 resulted in a series of acrimonious exchanges between the Israeli and the 
Lebanese delegates during the discussion of the General Secretary's activities. Khoury, the 
leader of the Lebanese unions, introduced the Palestinian refugee problem into his speech and 
questioned Israel's right to exist. He said that the lack of support for the ICFTU in the Arab 
world was because the West supported Israel and had ignored the Palestinian refugee 
problem. Khoury called on the ICFTU to condemn Israel’s policy towards the Palestinian 
refugees and their discrimination against Israeli Arabs. Mrs. Simchoni, replying on behalf of 
the Histadrut, told Congress that the Executive committee had decided that the Lebanese 
motion was not the right place for this kind of discussion. She emphasied that Israel wanted 
peace with her neighbours but the Palestinian refugee problem was part of a wider political 
issue in the Middle East, which presented a constant threat to regional and world peace.525   
 
By now the TUC was on very good terms with the Histadrut and helped the Histadrut 
whenever it could. In May 1965, the Histadrut asked both the ICFTU and the TUC to write to 
the Syrian President asking for clemency for Eli Cohen, an Egyptian-born Israeli agent living 
in Damascus who had been sentenced to death for spying.526 The TUC responded positively 
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whereas ICFTU refused to help.527 The following year, Becker successfully lobbied both the 
ICFTU and the TUC for help in gaining Israel's admission as an associate member of 
European Community.528 
 
Conclusion 
 
Many Israelis including the Histadrut identified themselves more with Britain than America, 
yet the Histadrut was considered by the TUC to be an ally of the AFL-CIO as the Histadrut 
always seemed to have the support of the Americans. In 1953, Tewson opposed the election 
of the Histadrut to the ICFTU Executive Committee which had been arranged by the 
Americans. Three years later, the TUC, unlike the AFL-CIO, were unable to publically 
support the Histadrut and Israel’s involvement in the Suez crisis. The TUC also opposed to 
the activities of the Histadrut in Africa, including the Afro-Asian Institute which was 
supported financially by the AFL-CIO.  
It was unfortunate that, given the status of the unions and the TUC in British society at the 
time of Deakin's death, the subsequent leadership vacuum allowed Tewson to continue to 
give priority to the TUC's interests in Africa and support for the ICFTU in its efforts to get 
the Arab unions onside, which helped towards Britain regaining its influence in the region. 
However his failure to modify his stance, once Anglo-Israel relations improved meant that 
Bevin's influence on foreign affairs and the Middle East in particular persisted at the TUC 
until Tewson retired in 1960.  
While the Labour Party was building strong links with Israel in the 1950s, the TUC was 
committed to supporting the Foreign Office in the Middle East and Africa. The retirement of 
the last of Bevin and Deakin's colleagues on the General Council in the early 1960s  plus the 
arrival of a new General Secretary provided Frank Cousins and his colleagues on the Left  
with their opportunity to influence and direct the TUC 's international policies. Unlike their 
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predecessors, the Left pursued international issues on the basis of peace, agreement and 
cooperation rather than those on the Right of war, conflict and competition. 
Although Tewson professed to have a long-felt ambition to visit Israel, he turned down six 
invitations using his heavy workload as the excuse. The real reason was that he always tried 
not to favour one side over the other as happened during the final years of the mandate.529 
Once Bevin and Deakin had departed, the TUC lacked strong leadership and relations with 
the Histadrut were left to Tewson and the remainder of the old guard, which were only polite 
at best and why very few union leaders went to Israel during this period.  
Why then did the Israelis continue to issue invitations to the TUC?  Primarily because they 
believed that it was the best way for visitors to learn about the country and its problems. Even 
though they had received many European and American union delegations since 1948, the 
Histadrut was concerned that a TUC delegation had never been to Israel. When the General 
Council, turned down an invitation to send an official delegation to Israel in 1958, by then the 
TUC had already hosted, during the 1950’s, several Histadrut leaders and delegations. 
Between 1956 and 1965 the Histadrut were invited to attend the TUC Congress four times, 
yet the first time the TUC sent a representative to the Histadrut Convention was in 1965, long 
after Tewson had retired. 
This chapter has shown that even though Israel was a partner to Britain in her Suez campaign, 
Anglo-Israel relations only started to improve in 1958. The Histadrut's relationship with the 
TUC however never got out of first gear until Tewson retired in 1960 because he had 
remained wedded to Bevin's view of the Middle East and the restoration of Britain's influence 
with the Arabs.  Unlike the Foreign Office, Tewson saw the Histadrut's aid work in Africa as 
a threat, especially as it was supported by the Americans with whom Tewson regularly 
clashed at the ICFTU.  
 
By 1966, given that Britain needed to maintain her interests in the Arab world, Foreign 
Office relations with Israel were at an all time high and the Histadrut were for the first time 
able to believe that their own warm feelings of friendship towards the British trade union 
movement were finally being reciprocated. It was due to the personal relationship between 
Woodcock and Becker along with an immense contribution from Frank Cousins which meant 
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that by 1966, TUC-Histadrut and Anglo-Israeli relations were now on the same page. This 
new relationship was about to be tested at both the ICFTU and the TUC when war came to 
the region the following year. 
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Chapter 3   1967-1972 
 
The main focus of this chapter is the work and hopes of two men, Frank Cousins and Fred 
Hayday who endeavoured to use the international trade union movement as a force for good 
and peace in the immediate aftermath of the 1967 Six-Day War. Although their brave attempt 
to persuade their fellow trade unionists in the Arab world to talk directly to the Israelis failed, 
they never gave up, but found it difficult playing the role of honest broker as the TUC was 
perceived by the Arabs as a pro-Israel organisation. Along with the ICFTU, who in October 
1967 arranged a face to face meeting with both parties, their efforts have gone unnoticed and 
never been given the credit they deserve. This period also saw an unprecedented divergence 
between the TUC and the Foreign Office.     
Woodcock's priority as General Secretary was to safeguard the interests of the TUC,  support 
the UN and the Labour government's Middle East policy.530 Even though he considered 
Becker to be a personal friend, Woodcock always did this best to appear to be supportive of 
the Histadrut and Israel. Always reluctant to make any written or public commitment on any 
international political issue, let alone towards Israel, Woodcock was more than happy to work 
on their behalf behind the scenes, especially at the ICFTU. It took the Histadrut three months 
to persuade the TUC to call for Arab recognition of Israel and direct peace negotiations 
between Israel and the Arab states which more than compensated for their previous lack of a 
public commitment to Israel.  
Cousins was very much the driving force behind the TUC missions to the Middle East as he 
realised there was an opportunity for the British labour movement to play its part in breaking 
the deadlock between Israel and Egypt and Arab states. Despite Hayday being the chairman 
of the TUC international committee, he was very much the junior partner to Cousins on their 
trips. The pair also gave their visits balance; Cousins represented the Left wing of the party 
and Hayday the Right. Cousins was also very close to Harold Wilson, the Prime Minister, 
who was very supportive and looked upon him very much in the way that Attlee had looked 
and depended upon Bevin.531 Cousins was very strong on international affairs and had serious 
conversations with Golda Meir and President Nasser as he very much wanted there to be 
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cooperation between the Israelis and the Arabs. Their initiative had the backing of the 
Foreign Office  even though the Wilson government had adopted  a neutral policy during the 
Six-Day War. The Foreign Office saw the TUC missions as an opportunity to boost British 
interests in the region and re-engage with the Arabs whilst at the same time reducing the 
power and influence Israel and the Histadrut had on the TUC General Council. The visits, 
however,  opened up an extraordinary gap between TUC and the Foreign Office because the 
two men saw their primary role as trying to bring peace to the Middle East through the 
international labour movement and not as part of an effort to rebuild  British relations with 
the Arab States. The government, established the Overseas Labour Consultative Committee 
(OLCC) in 1968,, one of whose aims was to encourage the TUC to become more actively 
involved in international affairs. 
The Labour party had continued to be pro-Israel but the big difference between 1956 and 
1967 was that both the British Labour Party and the Israeli Labour Alignment were in  
government with broadly similar ideological and political policies. The Israelis also believed 
that this time they had friends in high places. There was some support for the Arabs in 
Parliament in 1967, although within the Labour party pro-Israel MPs vastly outnumbered 
pro-Arab MPs who were on the Right of the Party.532 The Left were divided over the war, 
and some of the Tribune group of 41 MP's were concerned that Israel might retain some of 
the newly occupied territory, while others remained supportive of Israel.533 
The Histadrut's move to Brussels in 1968, whilst making perfect sense in terms of their 
relations with the international labour movement had not, by 1972, seriously affected their 
relations with the unions and the TUC, as Jones had replaced Hayday as chairman of the 
International committee. What had happened was very similar to what had taken place in the 
early 1950s after Bar-Tal, the Israeli Labour attaché based in London had returned to Israel; 
connections were not as strong, with greater reliance, once again being placed on the Israeli 
embassy. Being based in Brussels and flying into London only for a short visit once or twice 
a month was clearly not the same as being permanently based in London as the opportunity to 
network with the new generation of unions leaders  network was no longer an option. 
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By 1970, the warning signs for continued good relations with Israel and the Histadrut were 
there for all to see. As well as the renewed interest in the Arab world by both the British 
Government and the TUC, the Arab unions had started to lobby the TUC and the ICFTU to 
specifically counter Histadrut and Israeli influence. Not only had the TUC moved to the Left 
but the younger members of the Labour party and the unions especially those on the Left 
were beginning to show an active interest in  foreign affairs and the Arab-Israeli conflict by 
questioning Labour's traditional support for Israel at the expense of the Palestinian Arabs. 
The cancelling of the TUC financial support for the Histadrut's Afro-Asian institute, whilst 
on its own was not a major event, when viewed through the changes in attitudes that came 
about after the 1967 war was significant and a warning for future relations.   
Anglo-Israel relations 
Israel's victory in the Six-Day War  in June 1967 not only totally changed the dynamics of the 
region but also altered Anglo-Israel relations. Before the war, Britain's Middle East policy 
was one of disengagement from the region whilst attempting to achieve a balance and even-
handedness towards the Arabs and Israelis. The war provided Harold Wilson with the 
opportunity to deflect attention away from Britain's economic problems, and also heighten 
expectations of Britain's influence in world affairs.534 His proposal on 23 May, which was 
overtaken by events, that an international naval force should  keep the Straits of Tiran open 
was made to discourage Israel from going to war. He wanted to be seen as working with 
Washington and the UN, and to avoid any charges of imperialism being levelled against 
Britain.535 The key issue for the Wilson government in 1967 was Britain's poor economic 
performance and its prospects for recovery. Even though the UK had tried to remain neutral  
during the war it was accused of involvement by Egypt in the war, which resulted in an Arab 
oil embargo on the West and the withdrawal of funds from British banks by the Arab 
states.536 The disruption caused by the Six-Day War and the closing of the Suez canal had a 
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damaging affect on Britain’s balance of payments, which Wilson said was the biggest 
contributing factor in the devaluation of sterling which came in November 1967.537  
The war transformed Britain's Middle East policy as the government adopted a more active 
foreign policy in the hope of securing an Arab -Israeli peace agreement. The initial upsurge 
of pro-British sentiment in Israel disappeared once Britain publically disagreed with Israel on 
how best to achieve a political settlement to the Arab-Israeli conflict and over contentious 
issues including Jerusalem, refugees, and the Suez Canal.  Britain did, however, continue to 
play its part in world affairs when in November 1967, the UN Security Council adopted 
resolution 242 which had started life as a British initiative. 538   
Once the euphoria of Israel’s stunning victory had passed and it was clear that the Arab states  
were unwilling to talk peace and recognise Israel, there was a re-evaluation of attitudes 
within the Labour party towards the conflict between Israel and her Arab neighbours. Dissent 
against Labour’s support for Israel came from MP's on both the Right and the Left in the 
party. The priority for those on the Right was the promotion of British interests in Arab 
States,  whilst those on the Left began to question Labour’s traditional support for Israel.539   
Anglo-Israel relations deteriorated from 1969 onwards due to Israeli concerns about Britain's 
involvement in the great power talks in New York, which they believed was motivated by 
Britain's  attempts to remain a world power, and by pro-Arab feelings in the Foreign Office, 
British criticism of Israel's policy on Jerusalem and the sale of British tanks to Israel, which 
had yet to be agreed. Britain's view was that her diplomatic efforts were an attempt to ensure 
that hostilities between Israel and her neighbours were not resumed which could endangering 
Britain's oil supplies.540  
Between 1970, when the Conservatives came to power, and 1973, although relations 
appeared cordial  on the surface the Israelis felt that the British effort at the UN to secure a 
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settlement was motivated by their interests in the Arab world at the direct expense of Israel. 
The British government, who saw the Israelis as being totally inflexible over territorial 
concessions were gradually moving away from Israel, towards the Arabs.541  
The 1967 Six-Day War and the Labour movement  
Israel's stunning victory in the Six-Day War had an immediate effect on all parts of her  
society. Not only had victory reunited Jerusalem but the newly occupied territories provided a 
buffer zone for her security along with the promise of recognition by her enemies and an 
agreement on peace and security.  However Israelis were divided over how to deal with the 
occupied territories. Shortly after the war the 'Land for Israel' movement was formed  by 
leading members of Mapai and the religious parties who called for Israel to retain the 
territories not only for security reasons but also on religious and historical grounds.542 They 
were opposed by the Israeli Left who feared that holding onto the territories would be too 
much of a financial and political burden as well a demographic problem. As time went on 
more and more Israeli settlements were built in these areas  and this debate would become a 
major issue and divide Israeli society. 543 But for the next few years Israel's  priority was, with 
the help of her allies, to try and reach a peace agreement with her enemies. 
The Arab leaders however decided at their summit meeting in Khartoum in August 1967 
there should be no peace, no recognition and no negotiation with Israel.544 Nevertheless in the 
autumn, the UN adopted resolution 242. As a result  over the next year the four great powers  
became involved in trying to reach a peaceful settlement. 1968 saw the emergence of the 
PLO as a third world independence movement as well as the start of their terror campaign 
based on the hijacking of passenger aircraft. 
The Histadrut's priority in January 1967 was to lobby the ICFTU and affiliates for support 
with the Israeli government's application for associate membership of the European 
Community. Following the Histadrut's complaint that the ICFTU had never visited their 
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country, a ICFTU delegation went to Israel in March 1967, led by its Secretary General, 
Harm Buiter, who promised that he would make the necessary recommendations at European 
and national level to ensure that Israel’s application was not "pushed off the conference 
table."545   
When Egypt concentrated large-scale forces in the Sinai on 15 May, tension in the region 
increased. The Histadrut's regular work was set side and replaced by intense lobbying on 
behalf of Israel. This was followed four days later with the withdrawal of the UN Emergency 
Forces in Sinai  and the blockade of the Straits of Tiran by Egyptian forces during the night 
of 22-23 May, actions that were seen by Israel as a threat to her security.546 The Histadrut 
reacted by sending telegrams appealing for support for Israel to twenty-four unions 
worldwide including the TUC.547 The response from the international labour movement was 
overwhelmingly sympathetic, and statements of support for both Israel and the Histadrut 
were received from many ICFTU affiliates.548  
The TUC General Council issued a statement before the war, which expressed their concern 
at the recent developments in the Middle East. They appealed to the governments of both 
Egypt and Israel to withdraw "from positions of confrontation" and called on the British 
Government and others to bring the matter before the UN Security Council, as a matter of 
urgency. Copies of the statement were sent to the British Government, the UN, the Israeli and 
Egyptian Governments, the Labour Party, the ICFTU, the Histadrut and  the Federation of 
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Labour of the United Arab Republic. 549 George Brown, the Foreign Secretary, in his reply to 
the TUC after the war had started, said that “prior to the outbreak of hostilities on 5 June the 
Government had made strenuous efforts to avert an armed conflict and had subsequently 
taken energetic action aimed at bringing about a general cease-fire and, without taking sides 
in the conflict, were concerned to ensure a peaceful solution to the problems of the area.”550 
Although the minutes of the TUC's International committee and the General Council which 
had met on the 23 May, do not show that there was any discussion of events in the region, the 
speed at which the TUC issued a statement the next day indicates that Woodcock, Hayday 
and Cousins must have previously discussed and agreed the TUC's rapid response.551 To the 
disappointment of the Israelis both the TUC and the ICFTU had issued statements which 
discussed the run up to the war in general terms without a direct mention of Israel, or 
solidarity with the Histadrut, or the Egyptian actions which had precipitated the crisis.552   
Histadrut lobbying of the TUC  
On 31 May, the TUC received a letter from the Histadrut asking “the General Council to 
express as a matter of urgency, open solidarity with the Histadrut in supporting Israel’s right 
to unchallenged peace for the continuation of its social and economic development.”553 Even 
though the friendship between the Histadrut and the TUC was at an all time high, the TUC's 
statement of the 25 May had been carefully constructed so as not to mention Israel or Egypt 
by name and was their only public declaration on the war. This was not totally unexpected as 
the TUC had never previously issued a statement in support of Israel or on the Arab-Israeli 
conflict.  
Throughout the Six -Day War, the Labour Party produced a series of internal briefing papers 
and daily updates on the war, the military balance in the region, a list of Labour Party 
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motions and party statements that had been issued between 1955-67 and a discussion 
document reflecting on the aftermath of the war. The Labour Party's last statement on the 
Arab-Israeli conflict dated back to 1960. It is unlikely this information was shared with the 
TUC as all these papers were marked "private and confidential."554 The only British union to 
issue their own statement on the war was the TGWU led by Frank Cousins, whose 
declaration followed the same format of the TUC and failed to mention either of the 
participants in the conflict.555   
As had happened at the time of the Suez campaign, Israel used the Socialist International as a 
means of gaining international support. On 26 May, the International adopted a resolution on 
the crisis.556 The German trade union federation, the DGB, unlike the TUC, condemned the 
Arab threat to destroy Israel, and as an expression of  solidarity with the Histadrut had agreed 
to invest DM 3 million in Israeli bonds.  
By following the Labour government’s policy of remaining neutral in the dispute, the TUC 
International committee waited until the war was over before meeting to discuss their 
response to the Histadrut letter as well as those received from Arab trade unions accusing  
Israel of aggression.557 The International department prepared a briefing note for the meeting 
written by Alexandra Kolarz, who had been Tewson's personal assistant and was now a 
senior member of the International Department, which clearly outlined the committee's 
options. They were advised that if they decided to comply with the Histadrut request it would 
be impossible to satisfy the Histadrut completely without at the same time losing the goodwill 
of the unions in the Arab states for many years to come. It was also pointed out that the 
Histadrut could reasonably expect an expression of TUC solidarity on the basis of Israel’s 
right to exist and in the light of the friendly relations that had existed between the Histadrut 
and the TUC over a long period.  An alternative suggestion was that the Histadrut might 
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accept a truthful explanation from the General Council that it was really hard for them to 
issue a statement which was satisfactory to them  mainly because of Britain’s special position 
in relation to a number of Muslim Commonwealth countries. The report advised that as 
hostilities had ended another acceptable alternative might be a non-committal statement on 
general lines which also included a call for all parties to observe the cease-fire and 
negotiations on a peace treaty which recognised Israel’s right to exist.558 
Only Hayday, Cousins, Douglass, and Woodcock attended the special meeting of the 
committee to discuss the war.  No reasons were given as to why only the four of them 
attended or why they had waited so long to respond, but it is clear that Woodcock had been in 
no hurry to reply. The minutes show that that the cease-fire was welcomed as it offered an 
opportunity for both sides to arrive at a negotiated settlement which was in line with TUC 
policy.  The General Council took the view that it “should avoid formally taking sides in the 
conflict even though their sympathies may lie in a certain direction.” After the committee had 
been told that “the General Council might wish to indicate their views informally to the 
Histadrut as it would be unwise for the General Council to make public pronouncements that 
might add to present difficulties,” it was agreed to a draft reply to the Histadrut along the 
lines of a non-committal statement for the committee's next meeting.559 No record exists of 
this letter and it is unlikely that it was ever drafted.  
The CPGB 's position towards Israel from the 1950s onwards consistently reflected the Soviet 
Union's anti-Zionism and support for the Arabs nations. Hence, the 1967 Arab-Israel War led 
to  another spate of anti-Zionism from the CPGB. The party demonstrated its solidarity with 
the Arabs and accused the Labour Government of colluding with the United States by 
supporting Israeli aggression. Leading the party's attacks on Israel was Bert Ramelson. He 
was born a Jew but was a fervent anti-Zionist who believed that Jewishness was defined only 
by religion and not nationality. Ramelson wrote in his pamphlet on the Middle East crisis, 
that "Zionism as an ideology is based on false premises" which was "incapable of solving the 
real problems of the Jews."560 He  maintained that Israel intended to periodically " teach the 
Arabs a lesson and intimidate them" and that Israel's "military, financial, strategic" force 
depended on "imperialist arms and general support in exchange for acting  as the West's 
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watchdog in the Middle East" and "Zionist inspired financial, economic and "pressure group" 
support from the widespread Jewish communities, conditioned by years of Zionist 
propaganda to believe that they owe allegiance to the Zionist State of Israel."561 Ramelson 
also claimed that it was "no accident that the "new found friends" of the Jews and Israel 
during 1956 and 1967" were "often the same ones who supported Munich and the rise of 
Hitler and Mosley, and for exactly the same reasons - considerations of imperialist 
advantage."562 
The Histadrut has concerns about the TUC and ICFTU  
The Histadrut did not wait long to thank their friends for their support. Shortly after the war 
had finished, it embarked on a worldwide information campaign to explain Israel's case to the 
labour movements with a view to retaining their support for Israel's cause. Delegations were 
sent to the USA, West Germany, Holland, Scandinavia, Austria, Switzerland and a number of 
Latin American countries with reciprocal visits occurring in many cases.563   
Skinner, the British labour attaché in Tel Aviv, reported that the Histadrut was very 
concerned that the TUC  "as the one prominent labour movement in the free world (which) 
had not yet taken a positive stand on the current Middle East situation." Nor were the 
Histadrut totally happy with the "non-committal and disappointing” policy of the ICFTU 
"towards Arab-Israeli affairs" They had made it their first priority "to obtain a clear 
expression of solidarity and support from the TUC, both in its own right and as a member of 
the ICFTU."564   
As a first step to obtaining a positive statement from the TUC, in June, Becker went, to 
Geneva for the ILO conference where he met with Woodcock, who informed Becker of  
“Labour's warm support for Israel's cause in her just fight." Woodcock also accepted 
Becker’s invitation to visit Israel to see for himself the effects of the war and indicated that he 
might be able to make a short visit in August.565 However, after his meeting with Woodcock, 
Becker decided that the best course of action would be to come to London himself  to discuss 
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the issues face to face with the TUC.566 This move enabled the International committee at 
their next meeting to delay discussion of the Middle East situation until the General Council 
had met with Becker. The committee were advised that any future TUC statement which 
stressed the need for a negotiated settlement, freedom of passage through the Straits of Tiran, 
and the settlement of the refugee problem would not satisfy Histadrut who wanted the TUC 
to openly express support for Israel. The meeting heard that recognition by the Arab states 
was a basic requirement for Israel's future security and that the Wilson Government “was 
bound to be concerned at the possible repercussions of Arab hostility on the level of sterling 
balances.”567 Woodcock subsequently told Marx, the Histadrut's representative in London, 
that he would not be able to go to Israel before the TUC Congress in September but would 
support the alternative suggestion that a delegation of at least two Council members shouldgo 
to Israel as it was important that a statement about Israel appeared in the General Council’s 
report to the forthcoming Congress. He suggested that Cousins and Hayday would be the 
ideal members of the delegation.568 
Becker’s meeting with the TUC General Council took place on 10 August, but immediately 
before the meeting he had a private discussion with Woodcock who made it clear to Becker 
that he was personally dissatisfied with the TUC's position regarding the situation in the 
Middle East as well as the lack of progress of the discussions both in the International 
committee and at the General Council. Woodcock pointed out to Becker that there were a 
number of senior members of the Council who had prevented the TUC from taking a clear 
position on the subject. He also told Becker that apart from making the general decision to 
call on all countries in the area to avoid warlike actions, the TUC had made no other 
decisions. He explained to him that in the past he had always tried to postpone discussions on 
political problems in the General Council, especially those which related directly to British 
government foreign policy. On the question of Israel, however, Woodcock said that he would 
like to see a clear declaration of policy from the TUC, because, in his opinion, the TUC could 
not avoid this problem and must therefore make its opinion heard. He urged Becker to stand 
by his demands and not shy away from criticising the TUC’s inaction. Woodcock then 
explained to Becker that the rulebook would not allow an emergency resolution to be 
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submitted to the TUC Congress in September. This was Woodcock’s way of ensuring that 
although Congress would be able to debate the war, there would be no official TUC policy in 
place which could either restrain future TUC action or embarrass the Labour government. 
Becker agreed to Woodcock’s suggestion that when he met with the General Council he 
would mention the invitation to send a delegation to Israel, but he made it clear to Woodcock 
that in order to achieve this aim the TUC must make a clear declaration of policy at the 
beginning of the meeting without the need for questions or comments from him.569  
In his address to the General Council, Becker called on the TUC to issue a constructive 
declaration of sympathy with Israel's requirements for negotiations and peace in the Middle 
East. When Woodcock’s turn to speak came he told his colleagues that "Becker had not 
expressed strongly enough the Histadrut’s unhappiness with the neutral stance of the TUC" 
and that apart from wanting to send a delegation, the TUC had not yet said anything 
regarding the Middle East. Woodcock “praised the victors for talking about peace, whilst the 
defeated Arabs still talked of their plans to destroy Israel, and denied any attempts at 
negotiation.”  He also said that that "the most important thing to do was to bring the Arabs to 
the negotiating table, thus making them recognise the existence of the State of Israel," and 
that this should be agreed as the official policy of the TUC. When Cousins spoke he 
immediately offered to be part of the delegation and said Israel's friends would better serve 
her interests by using their influence directly on the Arabs, to convince them that Israel exists 
rather than going to Israel and tell them that they should talk the Arabs. The TUC, Cousins 
said, should use its international position to bring both sides together.570 The meeting decided 
that Hayday and Cousins should to go to Israel to report on the country's economic and 
political situation, which would be presented to the TUC Congress. Becker was quoted as 
saying on his return to Israel that “he had been delighted by the unanimous support of Israel’s 
position by members of the TUC General Council.”571  
Why did Woodcock, who usually did not favour the limelight for the TUC in international 
affairs, make a positive intervention and  meet with Becker beforehand to ensure that Cousins 
and Hayday would be asked to visit Israel? This move was certainly out of character as 
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Woodcock had previously ensured that the TUC would not embarrass the Wilson 
Government or the Labour party by issuing a statement in support of Israel. So why would 
Woodcock, normally so cautious, suddenly demand that the Arabs be brought to the 
negotiating table and the TUC make a stand?  We know that he privately deeply cared about 
Israel and felt that the time had come for the Arabs to recognise Israel.572  He probably saw 
this as an opportunity to allow him to make a positive contribution behind the scenes. It is 
possible, as he himself said later, that without his intervention the visit might not have taken 
place. Friendship and support for Israel may have helped but it is not the complete answer. 
Goodman suggests that the Foreign Office, as they had in past, saw an opportunity for the 
TUC to assist the British government and help bring about a peaceful solution in the Middle 
East. 573 In addition the Histadrut who, had made it a priority to obtain a positive statement of 
support for Israel's aims from the TUC, would not have embarked on such a mission without 
the prior agreement and support of the Israeli government of which they were an integral part. 
It is not known whether the suggestion for the visit was a purely Israeli proposal or had been 
planned beforehand between Britain and Israel as Harold Wilson was also known to have 
close personal and political ties with Israel. What we  do know is that the MOL and therefore 
the Foreign Office knew in June of the invitation and whilst the official British position was 
to be neutral the Government were trying to take a leading role in Arab-Israeli peace 
efforts.574 Therefore by supporting the Cousins initiative, Britain became involved 
immediately, several months before their participation with UN resolution 242. 
Whatever the reason, the visit provided Cousins and Hayday with an opportunity to mediate 
in the Arab-Israeli conflict, a role which lasted several years. The TUC's message to both 
sides was that peace and a permanent settlement could not be reached unless the Arab States 
recognised the permanent existence of the State of Israel. This visit had the approval of the 
Foreign Office and it was only when their mission was extended to visiting Arab states that a 
rift developed between them and the TUC. 
Cousins and Hayday's fact finding trip to Israel  
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Cousins and Hayday left London on 17 August for a hectic three day fact finding trip. Their 
visit was highly regarded by the Histadrut and meetings were arranged with the Prime 
Minister, Levi Eshkol, the Foreign Minister, Abba Eban and  the Minister of Labour, Yigal 
Allon.  They also attended of the opening of the Histadrut branch in East Jerusalem.  Cousins 
and Hayday's  speeches were non-controversial and they called on Arab workers to work 
together with Jewish workers. They advised the Arabs that it was in their own interests to join 
the free trade union movement through the Histadrut. Both men were deeply impressed by 
what they saw and Hayday indicated to Marx on their return that their report would include a 
recommendation to the TUC to support direct negotiations between Israel and the Arab 
states.575 Skinner, however, told the MOL that his impression of the visit was that it was 
"friends meeting with friends", and it “provided welcome confirmation for the Israelis that 
the events of June 1967 have not altered the strong bonds which exist between the TUC and 
the Histadrut.” Skinner was left "in no doubt of their sympathy and support for Israel." He 
referred to an interview with the Jerusalem Post in which Cousins and Hayday said that the 
recognition of Israel by the Arab states and direct Arab-Israel peace negotiations were among 
the basic Middle East policy recommendations which they would be submitting to the TUC 
General Council.576 
As part of their visit, the two men had a meeting with Hadow, the British Ambassador to 
Israel. They told Hadow that their primary international objective was to strengthen trades 
union cooperation and the free world trade union movement, but in the present situation “the 
political aspect was bound to impinge on their views and actions.” Hadow advised the 
Foreign Secretary "that the Israelis have been both skilful and successful in putting across 
their point of view" as well as "the political solution they would like to see as the outcome of 
the war." The Israelis were "well satisfied" with the outcome of the visit. Although Cousins 
had told Hadow that it was up to the General Council to decide on any resolutions dealing 
with the Middle East situation which might be put before Congress, Hadow commented that 
the Israelis are unlikely "to have anything which they would find unsympathetic.” He added 
that it was unfortunate that arrangements could not be made in time for Cousins and Hayday 
                                                 
575 Marx to Becker, 21 August 1967, (Hebrew original), PLILMR, IV-219A-3–33. 
576 Skinner to MOL, 22 August 1967, TNA:PRO,  LAB13/2445.  
160 
 
to visit Jordan immediately after their visit to Israel. The result, he said “may lead to the Arab 
case going largely by default in important trade union circles in England.”577  
 
The close links the Israelis had with the Parliamentary Labour Party ensured that there was 
very little dissention, even from the Left over their support for Israel. Nor was there much 
support for the Arabs.578 The Histadrut's hard work in the previous five years had ensured 
that there was a  similar degree of support within the unions even though the TUC had yet to  
make a public commitment.  
Woodcock told the General Council at their pre-Congress meeting on 31 August, that it was 
essential for the Council to make a statement to Congress, but it "should be limited to 
expressing the hope that the parties concerned in the conflict in the Middle East should 
negotiate and settle their differences." He also advised that the Council should not become 
involved in the question of Israel’s occupation of Jerusalem or the territories that had recently 
been gained. We do not know for sure, but the advice about Jerusalem which Woodcock gave 
the Council indicates that he had received instructions from the Foreign Office.579 Hayday 
told the Council that any declaration it made must make it "clear that the Arab countries 
should recognise the existence of Israel and should be willing to negotiate with Israel" on the 
problems that had arisen as a result of the recent conflict. Mr. McGarvey of the Boilermakers 
union, reminded the Council "that the Government which the General Council wishes to 
support had a specific policy on the Middle East which should be backed .....rather than 
expressing a policy of their own." In response, Woodcock said that although it was preferable 
for the General Council not to get involved in international politics, "it was however, 
important that the recognition of Israel was necessary in order to avoid further conflict in the 
Middle East." 580 The Council generally agreed with this sentiment and decided that Hayday 
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would make a short statement on paragraph 226 of the General Council’s report to 
Congress.581 
Such was the interest in the Six-Day War in Britain, that the Congress debate was shown live 
on television. Hayday began with a report of  their visit to Israel the previous month. The 
view of the General Council, he said, was that the Arab nations should recognise the 
existence of the State of Israel and that direct negotiations should take place between the two 
sides over the problems arising out of the war which the Council hoped would lead to a 
general settlement of the Middle East situation. Israel, he said, desired to live in peace, secure 
from future attacks, but the war aims of the Arab states were very simple, to drive the Israelis 
out of Israel and to destroy them as a people. Cousins said that "one of the greatest 
disservices Congress could make was to divide into pro-Jew and pro-Arab." He added that 
they had told Arab workers that they had met in Jerusalem, that the TUC would be happy to 
meet the representatives of workers in the Arab states. He appealed to Congress saying that 
"if we have done part of a job of expressing your views about the need for peace in the 
Middle East, what you ought to be saying is that you endorse the action we have taken and 
ask the TUC to go on with it. It is not over yet but it will be over much quicker if we can 
convince the Jordanians, the Egyptians, the Lebanese, and the people who are not as violently 
opposed to the State of Israel as are some others that their workers' interests will best be 
served by sitting down and talking on how the two sides can help to emancipate the total area 
for the benefit of the total people."582  
Although it had taken the Histadrut three months to accomplish, the TUC’s public call for 
Arab recognition of Israel and direct peace negotiations between Israel and the Arab states 
was exactly the outcome they had sought when they invited the TUC to come to Israel. 
Woodcock told Marx afterwards, that he was very pleased with the outcome and that without 
Becker’s influential presence at the meeting he doubted if the General Council would have 
agreed to send Cousins and Hayday to Israel.583 The fact that the TUC Congress had not 
formally adopted a statement of intent did not dim the Histadrut’s enthusiasm for the TUC’s 
support, which they hoped would have a big impact on public opinion in Britain and 
elsewhere. Both the General Council and Congress, who were broadly pro-Israel, had also 
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given Cousins and Hayday a mandate to talk to the Arab trade unions. This had a twofold 
advantage for Britain,  not only it would enhance Britain's role in the peace process but also 
would help to rebuild her image in the Arab world by building links with the Arab trade 
union movement.  
 
Three weeks later, Marx met separately with both Woodcock and Cousins to discuss the 
TUC’s next move. Woodcock told him that there was a strong possibility that a letter 
outlining their position would be sent to the Foreign Office.584 He was however apprehensive 
about Cousins plans to visit various Arab states and make contact with, not only the unions, 
but also with their governments and political parties. The TUC, he said, should only interact 
with trade unions in countries like Jordan and Lebanon and he was opposed to the TUC 
having contact with governments, especially those who were members of the Arab League. 
Woodcock asked Marx to tell Becker that he was always ready to discuss matters with him 
and that Becker should contact him whenever necessary. 
A few days later Marx raised the same issues with Cousins, who told him that he had already 
received requests for visits from Lebanon,585 Jordan, Kuwait, and the Secretary of the Arab 
League. He added that “it was important that the TUC take an active role in furthering peace 
in the Middle East, and therefore must be in contact with the Arabs.” Cousins said he was not 
concerned that the TUC might be seen as a tool of Israeli propaganda, as he saw the TUC’s 
role as trying to influence the Arabs into taking a realistic view by recognising Israel and 
entering into peace talks with them. After telling Marx that he wanted to develop contacts in 
the Arab states in order to bring peace to the region, Cousins emphasised that the Histadrut 
could count on his friendship and sympathy adding that was glad that he "had not inherited 
the opinion of his predecessor Bevin." 
When Marx pointed out that there were only a small number of Arab states that allowed 
independent trade unions, Cousins  agreed, adding that  he wanted also to make contact with 
other groups and would not hesitate to meet government representatives, as he had in Israel.  
The scope of his visits and contacts, he said, would however be decided by the General 
Council but would not include the Arab League. These conversations confirmed Woodcock's 
personal attitude, TUC policy and the wider context involved. Marx concluded that Cousins 
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understood Israel’s position and that there was only so much pressure that the Histadrut could 
put on the TUC as they were not going to make any more pro-Israel statements until they had 
seen if their policy would work.586  
The ICFTU Executive Board meeting at the beginning of October 1967 provided Woodcock 
the opportunity to use his friendship with the Histadrut to ensure a positive outcome to 
discussions about the Middle East conflict. This meeting of the Executive was the first since 
the June conflict and both the Israelis and the Arabs were determined that their views should 
be heard and not ignored. Barritt, the British labour attaché in Brussels, described the debate 
as a "draw" as both the Histadrut and the Arab representatives, the Tunisian and Lebanese 
unions, were satisfied with the outcome and the Histadrut had considered that victory was 
theirs. He added that, for once, in his opinion, the ICFTU had given the impression that it 
really had a job to do. The  initial difficulties over the draft statement, had been overcome by 
establishing an ad-hoc committee which was the very first time, in an international labour 
forum, that Arabs and Israelis had sat down together and discussed their respective 
viewpoints. This working group eventually produced two draft statements, one supported by 
the DGB, Histadrut and the AFL-CIO , which called for bilateral Arab-Israel peace talks and 
the other supported by the UGTT and the Lebanese Federation of Trade Unions, which called 
for the Arab refugee problem to be solved as part of a general settlement. Both statements 
were then composited into a final resolution for approval by the Executive Board. The 
identical paragraphs in the two statements were adopted unanimously and the statement 
supported by the Histadrut adopted by a majority of ten votes to one with two or three 
members of the Board abstaining. Although not an agreed statement, as the ICFTU had 
originally hoped for, this declaration called for direct negotiations between Israelis and Arabs 
on all issues including the refugee problem. This was a truly important initiative not only for 
the international labour movement  but also for world affairs, as the ICFTU had achieved a 
successful outcome to direct talks between the Arabs and Israelis, a feat which had not yet 
been equalled by any other forum in the world.  
The ICFTU also decided that because of the good atmosphere in the debates, the ad-hoc 
committee should be given permanent status in the hope that it might help further in bridge-
building between the two parties. After the vote, the Lebanese delegate withdrew from the 
meeting in protest, whilst the UGTT representative stated that his future attendance would be 
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decided by his organisation. Haring reported to the Histadrut Central Committee, that the 
worldwide information campaign that the Histadrut had carried out played an important part 
in securing support for the ICFTU resolution and gave special mention to the friendship 
shown by the American and German unions.587 The only mention of the role played by 
Woodcock in the negotiations, came from Haring, who is quoted in the Jerusalem Post 
praising Woodcock's personal role "in behind-the-scenes talks." Nor do we know how 
Woodcock voted.588 The continually changing political landscape in the Israel-Arab conflict 
meant that the moment in the spotlight for the ICFTU working group on the Middle East 
passed and did not reconvene until November 1968 when the working group decided not to 
discuss the conflict as it appeared at the time that the current UN mediation process would 
yield positive results.589   
The ICFTU was forced, for financial reasons, to close its Beirut office in October 1968.590  
From then on, mainly due to pressure from the TUC and the AFL-CIO  who wanted to run 
their own aid programmes, the ICFTU only offered advice and the coordination of  activities 
on behalf of affiliates rather than run the programmes themselves.591 During his time in 
Beirut, the ICFTU representative had never been to Israel or met with the Histadrut outside 
ICFTU meetings, probably because the ICFTU felt that his credibility with the Arab trade 
unions would have been compromised if he been in regular contact with the Israelis. For the 
same reason, the British Labour attaché in Israel was never allowed to travel to neighbouring 
Arab States, yet the ability of the TUC  meet with both Arab and Israeli trade unionists was 
never questioned. The ICFTU had been unable to get both sides together, primarily, because 
it was used as a political battleground by both the Arabs and Israelis whose trade union 
movements were also part of their political infrastructures.  
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TUC missions to Jordan, Lebanon and Egypt 
Cousins and Hayday's missions to Jordan, Lebanon and Egypt came about as the result of 
their successful visit to Israel in the aftermath of the Six-Day War. Yet none of this would 
have happened if the TUC had not prevaricated over a public response to the war. The two 
men  only went to Israel in the first place because the Histadrut were concerned about the 
TUC's silence. When the visits to Jordan and Lebanon were first discussed in September 
1967, the Foreign Office immediately saw them as an opportunity to re-establish links 
between the TUC and Arab trade unions which they believed would be helpful in their efforts 
to restore Britain's position in the Arab world after the setbacks incurred due to the war. They 
considered that the trade unions in the Arab states had been ignored for far too long and as a 
result many were now under Egyptian influence.592 However, the visits caused an 
unprecedented difference of opinion between the TUC and the Foreign Office who had 
worked together in the past on international affairs, especially in the Middle East. 
It was not the missions as such that caused the Foreign Office concern, rather the TUC itself 
and Cousins and Hayday. The Foreign Office wanted to use the visits to counter the strong 
influence of the Histadrut within the TUC General Council, which in their view, had taken "a 
rather one-sided view of Arab-Israel affairs." They were also aware that "as the Histadrut had 
exchanged visits with the TUC and had previously attempted to get the TUC to make 
statements favouring the Israel position on the settlement of the Middle East crisis, they will 
want to keep the TUC in play." It was only after Woodcock and Cousins had taken charge at 
the TUC five years previously that the Histadrut's influence on the General Council had 
started to increase. Cousins was also a concern for the Foreign Office, because as an ex-
government minister his views and opinions were respected. He had also in the past, been 
critical of the government's Middle East policy on the grounds that it was too pro-Arab. The 
Foreign Office had already noted, even before the visits took place, that if either Cousins or 
Hayday were asked "to make any public comment on the Histadrut’s extension of trades 
union activities in the occupied territories, especially Jerusalem," they should be made aware 
of the political implications of such a move.593  
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Foggon, the Foreign Office Overseas labour advisor,594 welcomed the reopening of relations 
with the Arab world as he saw this as an opportunity for further visits by the TUC to other 
countries in the region.595 He recommended that because of the longstanding relationship 
between the labour movements in Britain and Israel there was an imbalance in the number of 
visits the unions made to Israel and to the Arab countries and if the TUC was to participate in 
bringing peace to the area it needed to try and follow the British Government's example 
ofattempting "to be scrupulously neutral in the Arab-Israel dispute." He warned that it was 
important not to neglect Arab trade unionists who had been ignored for far too long and as a 
result many were now under Egyptian  influence and might turn to Moscow for help.596   
The Foreign Office advised the TUC, that in order to avoid any embarrassment when 
travelling to the Lebanon and Jordan, Cousins needed a new passport as his current one 
contained an Israeli visa. Cousins declined their request and told the Lebanese Ambassador in 
London that he saw no reason why he should travel to the Lebanon on the basis of a lie and 
that since everyone knew he had been to Israel, why did he need a new one in order to go 
there?  His refusal was seen as a setback which could cancel the whole initiative. However, 
after an intervention by the Foreign Office, the Lebanese and Jordanian Ambassadors, to 
everyone's surprise, issued the necessary visas on his existing passport.597 
Hayday told the Foreign Office that their visits would enable the TUC to try to get the Arabs 
and Israelis talking to each other. He made the point that the TUC was only interested in non-
political contacts because of Woodcock's "very rigid views on this subject" and therefore they 
"would not want to get too close to the British diplomatic network."598 The visit to Jordan and 
Lebanon was eventually arranged for December 1967 and in addition to briefing Cousins and 
Hayday, the Foreign Office arranged a meeting with Goronwy Roberts, the Minister of State 
                                                 
594 The post of Foreign Office Overseas Labour Advisor had been established by Bevin in 1948 to advise the 
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for Foreign Affairs.599 The Foreign Office, which in the past had a reputation for being pro-
Arab, had supported TUC and the ICFTU activities in the Arab world when it was to their 
advantage. This meeting was arranged because one of their most loyal supporters had  
"changed sides" and they needed TUC support for British diplomatic efforts attempting to 
bring the Arabs to the negotiating table. The Israeli Government viewed these efforts as 
further appeasement of the Arabs.600 
Cousins and Hayday were told that the Histadrut had just completed arrangements for full 
representation for East Jerusalem Arabs in the next elections for the Jerusalem Labour 
Council to be held in 1969 and that since the Histadrut had  not shown any interest in other 
towns on the West Bank, the Foreign Office felt that the political significance of this decision 
was to extend the Israel municipality of Jerusalem to include East Jerusalem. The two men 
were then asked to ensure that if they made public comments on the Histadrut's future role in 
the occupied territories they should be aware of the political implications.601 This discussion 
was significant because it highlighted the government's concerns about Jerusalem and how 
soon after the war it had already been flagged up by the Foreign Office as a possible sticking 
point for future peace negotiations. Hayday was asked by Roberts, "if he would, in future 
contact with the Histadrut, advise them of the political difficulties and dangers of pre-judging 
the future of Jerusalem." He replied saying that "neither he nor Mr. Cousins would be able to 
say to the Histadrut that they would not like to see Jerusalem unified. Divided cities produced 
nothing but bitterness and misery and the Jews should have access to their historical and holy 
buildings." Hayday was told that "the Arabs would be bound to resent this pre-judging of the 
final solution and the consequences could be dangerous". Hayday was "unmoved" by their 
request to adopt a more pro-Arab line and the Foreign Office concluded that he was 
"obviously no help to us."602 The Foreign Office were left in no doubt that the two men's 
priority was to use the international trade union movement as a force for good in the Middle 
East and that in future they were not going to take a more pro-Arab line.603  
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On their return from the Middle East, Cousins and Hayday reported to the International 
committee that they had met with trade union leaders, ministers and officials, and had visited 
factories and refugee camps. Their report acknowledged that the conditions in Lebanon and 
Jordan differed considerably, though in both countries there were extremes of poverty and 
wealth. A dominant feature in both was the refugee population and both men were upset by 
the conditions they had witnessed in the refugee camps. Neither country had pursued, in their 
opinion, effective measures of settlement and refugees were being encouraged to look 
towards a return to the Palestinian territories with no regard to the human problem that they 
presented. The men gained the impression that the Lebanese saw the Palestinian refugees as 
foreigners and a burden on society and the conditions in the camps in Jordan illustrated 
clearly for them that there was very little social conscience in the Arab world. In all of their 
meetings with trade union and Government officials, Cousins and Hayday explained 
Congress policy and the need to enter into a dialogue with the Israelis. All they heard in 
return, especially in Jordan, was "a recital of all the political arguments dating back to the 
time of the Turks, followed by the colonial powers of Britain and France in the time of the 
mandate, the Balfour declaration, Zionism, the war of 1948, the constant acts of Israeli 
aggression since  that time, Eliat in 1949, Sinai in 1954, the 1956 Suez campaign and the 
Gulf of Aqaba passage conceded by the UN. At no time in these discussions was it accepted 
that talks could commence with the Israelis other than on the basis of a restoration of the pre-
1948 situation." In their opinion, the human problems involved, appeared not to have had 
priority and were secondary to the political arguments, that Israel was considered the 
aggressor and the enemy. The trade unions in both countries had originally been established 
to serve political ends, rather than the interests of the workers, particularly in Jordan, where 
the trade unions were the only mass organisations allowed. The political views that were 
presented to them were dominated by the Israel question and the Jordanian  trade unionists 
tended to support the views of President Nasser which isolated and reduced the influence in 
the Arab world of the Lebanese and Tunisian ICFTU affiliates. Cousins remarked on a 
general lack of concern about the immediate need to relieve the suffering of the refugees and 
noticed there was greater concern that a settlement consistent with Jordan's honour and 
justice should be achieved. Hayday thought that the Jordanian trade unionists in particular 
laid too much emphasis on well known Arab political points of principle and too little on the 
social welfare of their members or their fellow countrymen. Both men were worried by the 
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Jordanians willingness to accept the inevitability of further war if they were unable to achieve 
Arab rights through negotiations.604 
This remarkable document not only concisely and clearly revealed what the Jordanians 
thought of the refugees and how they were treated by them but also that the Palestinians were 
being used as political pawns in the long running Arab-Israeli conflict. Both Cousins and 
Hayday were distressed by what they saw in the camps and it is clear that their discussions in 
both countries readily confirmed that the Arab-Israeli conflict dominated both political life 
and trade union activities in the Arab world. The Jordanians' willingness to accept the 
inevitability of another war if they were unable to achieve Arab rights through negotiations 
also gave them concern. Although they never gave up, they must have realised then that it 
would be an almost impossible task to bring about direct negotiations between the parties. In 
the circumstances a more realistic goal was the building of relations with the Arab trade 
union movement, which would please the Foreign Office.  
After the TUC's successful visit to Jordan and the Lebanon, the Ministry of Labour (MOL) 
were extremely upbeat about future relations with the Arab unions especially as the TUC had 
received an invitation to visit United Arab Republic (UAR).605 The MOL thought that this 
was because the trade unions in the Arab world were "now beginning to appreciate the degree 
of isolation into which they had allowed themselves to lapse."606 The TUC however had no 
plans to visit any other Arab states than the UAR.607 
Cousins and Hayday went to the UAR in March 1968, The pair held extensive discussions 
with the UAR Federation of Labour, government officials and President Nasser. Whenever 
they discussed the Arab-Israeli conflict, they were told that there would be no negotiations  as 
long as Israel occupied the Sinai. They reported that their hosts "constantly referred to 
Zionists and the choice of Palestine for the Jewish state" as well as questioning "the right of 
the British government to issue the Balfour declaration which they declared allowed the Jews 
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to have dual loyalties." It soon became apparent that whenever Cousins and Hayday referred 
to direct talks with Israel in their discussions it was seen by the Egyptians as "a constant 
irritant" and they came to the conclusion that in order to move the peace process along, an 
alternative to direct negotiations would be needed. President Nasser told them that he would 
only accept the existence of Israel provided the borders were based on the original UN 
boundaries and a satisfactory solution to the refugee problem had been negotiated. While he 
presented a picture of Israel as the aggressor, Nasser flatly denied ever making a declaration 
that his aim "was to drive the Israelis into the sea."  He also said that a settlement could not 
be achieved by direct talks and the UN and the great powers would need to underwrite any 
agreement. Hayday and Cousins accepted his contention.608 
 On their return to London, Cousins and Hayday presented a report to the General Council 
recommending that when deciding future policy the Council consider UN initiatives. 
Although the two men had succeeded in establishing contact with the trade union movements 
in Egypt, Jordan and Lebanon, they had been unable bring about a better understanding and 
an improvement of relations between the Arab states and Israel. Because of the deep-rooted 
opposition to direct negotiations with Israel in all three countries they had been continually 
rebuffed whenever they had suggested that a permanent settlement of the conflict was 
possible only if the Arabs were prepared to recognise and to accept the existence of the State 
of Israel. After considering their report the General Council decided that contact with the 
UAR Federation of Labour should be maintained and that both TUC and member unions 
should consider inviting UAR federation representatives to UK. In order to avoid any 
misunderstandings with the Histadrut, the committee sent copies of the report to the 
Histadrut, the UAR embassy in London and the ICFTU.  
Two years later, Hayday spoke to the British labour attaché in Beirut about their visits. He 
said that it had not been easy for them to play an impartial role in the Arab-Israel dispute as 
many of his colleagues were sympathetic towards Israel and had also previously visited Israel 
as guests of the Histadrut. He added that the TUC had followed Government policy and they 
had tried to steer a middle course in order to build bridges between the two sides. Hayday 
                                                 
608 Copies of the reports of their visits to Jordan, Lebanon and Egypt were sent to ICFTU, "on the understanding 
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revealed that the Israelis knew of TUC's contacts with the Arabs and had not been opposed to 
their initiative.609  
The Foreign Office was certainly happy with the outcome of Cousins and Hayday's visits as 
they had succeeded in reopening contacts with the Arab trade unions. However their efforts 
to persuade the Arabs to come to the negotiating table were unsuccessful because, not only 
were they were perceived as friends of the Histadrut, but also seen as promoting the Israeli 
point of view for direct talks, which the Arab states were opposed to.  
The Foreign Office forms the Overseas Labour Consultative Committee (OLCC)  
The OLCC was formed shortly after Hayday and Cousins had made their initial trips to the 
Middle East which gave their work credibility and support.  
In 1965, a Foreign Office review of British influence and organised labour overseas revealed 
that despite the TUC's influential position within the international labour movement the TUC 
was not really interested in international affairs and building links with their foreign 
counterparts.610 Woodcock was blamed for the TUC's indifference, primarily, because his 
priority was domestic affairs  and that he considered the ICFTU to be wasteful and dominated 
by the Americans. The review had been instituted because the Government was concerned 
that British influence abroad was falling behind that of Germany and America. In addition 
organised labour was being targeted by the Communists because of their influential role in 
political decision making in many of the newly independent states in Africa and Asia. The 
role of the labour attaché was considered to be vital along with that of the TUC. The outcome 
was that in September 1968 the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) established the 
Overseas Labour Consultative Committee (OLCC) on which both the TUC and the CBI were 
represented.611 The OLCC, which met regularly, expanded the work started by the TUC visits 
to the TUC's involvement in the Middle East. In Cousins and Hayday, they had two trade 
unionists who believed that the labour movement could play its part in bringing peace to the 
region.  
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The trade union situation in the Middle East and the Arab-Israeli conflict were discussed at 
the second meeting of the OLCC in February 1968. Lord Shepherd, the Minister of State, told 
the committee that the unsettled conditions of the Palestinians had been made worse by the 
Israeli occupation of the West Bank and that they were treated as second class citizens in all 
Arab countries except Jordan. The Minister said that the only point of direct contact between 
Jews and Arabs at present was at the ICFTU Executive Board which the Israelis hoped would 
lead to political talks. He asked for the TUC to help with this aim. The committee used as a 
basis for their discussions a paper that had been prepared by Foggon, the Overseas Labour 
Adviser. His report, which focused on Britain’s oil interests in the Middle East, included an 
assessment of the activities of the oil companies, the trade union situation, and the influence 
of the ICFTU, the WFTU, and the ILO. Foggon concluded that the ICFTU had lost ground in 
the Arab world to the Egyptian led International Confederation of Arab Trade Unions 
(ICATU). He thought the situation was unlikely to change as long as the Histadrut, with 
AFL-CIO support, continued to be a leading ICFTU affiliate. Hayday and Cousins reported 
on their recent visit to Jordan and the Lebanon. Hayday, while agreeing with Foggon's 
evaluation of the situation regretted that it did not deal with the refugee problem which was 
hugely important in Lebanon and Jordan. He thought Foggon had over-estimated the 
influence of Histadrut in the ICFTU.612 At the next OLCC meeting in April 1968, Hayday 
and Cousins reported on their visit to Egypt. They added that as well as the TUC, some of the 
larger British unions now wanted to develop friendly relations with their counterparts in the 
Arab States. Relations with the Histadrut, he said, would not be affected, because the TUC 
was "convinced that understanding between Israeli and Arab workers was necessary for 
peace and all their (the TUC's) efforts would be directed to Arab-Israeli reconciliation."613 
Foggon told the FCO in May 1968 that the OLCC had already helped "lever the TUC out of 
its self-imposed isolation. " The OLCC had supported the TUC's efforts to improve relations 
with the Arab  trade unions as it was in  the government's interests to continue to do so. He 
reported that the TUC General Council had already endorsed a proposal to finance a 
Foundation for overseas work, which along with governmental financial help could support 
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future aid programmes.614 The fourth meeting of the OLCC meeting discussed the work of 
non-governmental organisations operating in the labour field overseas; the German Friedrich 
Foundation, the American Institute for Free Labor Development, and the African American 
Labor Centre, and the Histadrut. The meeting noted that all the organisations had government 
and trade union support and that funding for their activities was provided not only by the 
organisations themselves, but from other sources as well. The report on the Histadrut 
presented to the OLCC, had been originally written by Skinner, the labour attaché in Israel 
and included details of the history, structure and international activities of the Histadrut as 
well as the Afro-Asian Institute.615 The TUC continued to take a keen interest in the work of 
the OLCC and cooperated with the government whenever possible on a wide range of issues 
over the next few years which included discussions relating to the future of the labour attaché 
service, various aspects of overseas aid, the work of the ILO and the development of TUC 
contacts in the Middle East. They notified the OLCC of all the TUC's overseas visits as well 
as visits by trade union delegations to Britain.  
In September 1969,  Foggon explained to Lehmann, the Histadrut European representative, 
that relations with the Arab unions were under Foreign Office supervision. Their policy was 
to try and improve relations with those unions with whom they had contact with prior to the 
1967 war as well as preventing the Arabs moving closer to the WFTU. Foggon told  
Lehmann that an Egyptian delegation had visited the UK that year and that Cousins future 
plans included visits to Egypt, Sudan and maybe Libya. Lehmann warned that these visits 
might be exploited by the Arabs for anti-Israel propaganda. Foggon admitted that "there was 
a risk and that the Foreign Office is trying to prevent this by giving guidance in advance and 
advising all British trade unions not to intervene in the Israeli-Arab conflict."616 
By 1970, the TUC's links with the UAR had expanded, even though not all the major  British 
unions were as keen the TUC to build links with their Arab counterparts. The OLCC reported 
that with the exception of the TUC all the major Western European trade union movements 
had either neglected the UAR or were pro-Israel. The TUC told the OLCC that they had 
attempted to involve their European colleagues, but had made little progress, as support for 
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Israel was very strong both in Germany and Scandinavia.617 All this effort by the TUC to 
build links with the Arab  trade unions paid off, when in  September 1970, the approach made  
by the TUC to the UAR Federation of Labour regarding the hijacking of a British airliner by 
Palestinian terrorists received a more positive response from Egyptians than similar requests 
made by others.618  
The OLCC was successful as it brought together government, industry and the unions and 
helped change the TUC's attitude to international affairs. It was an honest attempt by the 
Foreign Office to rectify the mistakes made by disbanding the Colonial Committee in 1961 
and downgrading the role of a specialist labour advisor two years later. The OLCC was 
formed shortly after Hayday and Cousins had made their initial trips to the Middle East, 
which gave their work credibility and support. The committee did not directly input into the 
TUC's involvement in Arab-Israeli affairs, but it did allow the Foreign Office to influence 
their international work. The main thrust of the transformation in remodelling the TUC's 
international presence in the Middle East only came after Woodcock's retirement and from 
within the TUC itself with the energy, enthusiasm and vision of Feather, Cousins, Hayday 
and Jones. But the reality was that a lack of resources did not allow the TUC to run its own 
aid programmes in developing countries or send specialists abroad, which meant that its 
international work was limited to making contacts and the ICFTU.  
 
Building on improved TUC -Histadrut relations  
Building on the  success of Cousins and Hayday's visit to Israel in August 1967, several of  
Britain's largest trade unions sent delegations to Israel over the next year including the Inland 
Revenue and Staffs Association,619 the ETU,620 and the TGWU621 The unions' unique 
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Cousins, who refused to discuss Arab-Israeli relationships or any matters arising from his visit to Egypt earlier 
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relationship with Israel was signified by Aharon Becker, who as Head of a Histadrut 
delegation to Britain, addressed the 1968 TUC Congress, saying that "the people of Israel 
yearn for peace and  are willing to start negotiations today rather than tomorrow.622 Becker 
used the opportunity at Congress to talk with other fraternal delegates including those from 
Lebanon, Tunisia, Cyprus and Turkey.623 In October 1968, a Histadrut delegation visited 
Britain. The delegation recommended that relations with the British unions could be 
strengthened further by appointing a labour attaché and sending more delegations to meet 
with the unions. They realised that the problems of the Middle East were only a minor topic 
in their talks and felt that the TUC and the majority of unions had a positive attitude towards 
Israel. They noted that people like Hayday, insisted on taking an "objective" stand in order to 
be an capable mediator between the Arabs and the Israelis. But the TUC did reaffirm their 
support  for the Histadrut and Israel's right to exist.624  
Although there was no debate on the Middle East at the 1968 TUC Congress, the 
International committee published a report about the visits to Jordan, Lebanon and Egypt, 
which they hoped would eventually lead towards an improvement of relations between Israel 
and the Arabs. The TUC expected that these initial contacts with the Arab trade unions would 
eventually build into relationships similar to those which existed with the Histadrut. The 
report warned that the delegation had discovered that in all three Arab countries there was a 
general and deep-rooted opposition to direct negotiations with Israel, although the suggestion 
that they should recognise and accept the existence of the State of Israel was not totally 
rejected.625   
The Histadrut moves its European office to Brussels 
The relationship between the Histadrut and the Israeli government has always been a 
complex one. Before 1948 the Histadrut played a major role in the organisation and economic 
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expansion of the Yishuv in addition to its role as a trade union movement. After 
independence the relationship between the Histadrut's institutions, the state and its leadership, 
and the government were widely discussed. Eventually, the Government and Mapai, as the 
governing party, gained the upper hand and took control of the Histadrut's institutions; with 
all major political decisions and policy relating to the Histadrut made by the Mapai leadership 
who were also the government. 
As long as Mapai remained in government, they both shared a common ideology and history, 
as well as the same loyalty to State of Israel and a mutual desire for Mapai to remain in 
government. There was however a  conflict between them regarding the right of the Histadrut 
to act independently when it came to domestic economic matters.626 The tenth Congress of 
the Histadrut in 1965 resolved that "the Executive Committee will act to guarantee 
cooperation between the Government and the Histadrut, while safeguarding the Histadrut's 
independence and authority. ...This cooperation is essential for the realisation of the national 
and social missions of the entire nation."627 
There was however no such conflict when it came to the Histadrut's international role, which 
was to be a loyal partner of the State. Its function in international affairs "was to aid it to the 
extent of its power and relations, strengthen the State's position, as well as to support the state 
in its struggles and to make friends, sympathisers and supporters amongst the workers 
movements of the world."628 The interests of the State were uppermost and transcended party 
politics. The Mapai leadership - which included the General Secretary of the Histadrut, who 
was also member of that government - made the decisions relating to the international role of 
the Histadrut. These lines were subsequently approved by Histadrut's executive committee.  
Mapai and not the Histadrut decided  when, for example, the Histadrut should resign from the 
WFTU or when it should  join the ICFTU. 
The Histadrut's main role in Europe was to maintain and develop direct ties with trade 
unions, promote friendly relations and information exchange through delegations and support 
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Israel's membership of international organisations. Their London representative had proved to 
be very good in this role, especially when it came to building good relations with the TUC. In 
1962 the Histadrut opened their European office in London  The Histadrut's European office 
was opened in London in 1962 in order to develop this work as well as strengthen the then 
loose ties with the TUC and the unions. By February 1968, Marx considered that this initial 
objective had been achieved and that he was now spending 70% of his time  in Europe rather 
than London. Marx told Haring that he didn't think that a single European representative 
could work efficiently in France, West Germany, Italy, and Scandinavia and urged that a 
labour attaché should be based in each country. Britain, he said, needed its own fulltime 
representative or a labour attaché. He urged them not to undervalue "the importance of an 
independent European Histadrut representative, who was not under a diplomatic stricture, and 
his independent status let him work and penetrate places and circles that are closed to 
diplomatic officials. The presence of labour attachés in several of the European capitals could 
only help the Histadrut representative."629 
In April 1968, the Histadrut decided to relocate the office to mainland Europe because they 
realised that the EEC would become increasingly important to Israel and the Histadrut in the 
years to come. Alternative locations including Amsterdam and Paris were considered but the 
Histadrut chose Brussels, as it was centrally located and many of the organisations such as 
the ICFTU, the ILO, and the International Trade Secretariats were already based there.630 
Hans Lehmann, Marx's replacement was given the responsibility for not only maintaining 
relations with the UK unions but also for building relationships with the German, French, and 
Scandinavian unions. Woodcock said he understood the motives for the move and the 
Foreign Office regretted that they would no longer be in regular contact with the Histadrut 
representative.631 
While at the 1968 TUC Congress, Becker told Lehman that the leadership of the TUC, the 
unions and the Labour Party was changing because the incumbents were getting older and he 
had warned his colleagues that the Histadrut needed to build relationships with the younger 
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generation who would eventually replace them.632 Despite his admonition, the building of 
long term relationships with the next generation of leaders suffered because their European 
representative could only meet with them once a month. 
The Histadrut's move to Brussels, whilst making perfect sense in terms of their relations with 
the international labour movement, had not by 1972 seriously affected their relations with the 
TUC. Even though Jones had replaced Hayday as chairman of the International committee, 
the Histadrut failed to grasp that it made no sense to close their London office when relations 
with the TUC were at an all time high and attitudes towards Israel were starting to change. 
With their representative based in Brussels now flying into London only for a short visit once 
or twice a month the opportunity to build long-term relationships with the next generation of 
leaders suffered. What happened was very similar to what had taken place in the early 1950s 
after Bar-Tal, the Israeli Labour attaché based in London had returned to Israel; connections 
were no longer as strong, with greater reliance, once again being placed on the Israeli 
embassy. The consequence was that the excellent relationship between the Histadrut, the 
TUC and the unions that had taken years to achieve started to breakdown.  
For the moment, however, relations between the British trade union movement and the 
Histadrut continued to be close and friendly.633 Feather, who attended the 50th anniversary 
Histadrut Convention in December 1969, told delegates that the closest links between 
Histadrut and the TUC were in the international field.634 Feather returned to Israel, six 
months later, as part of the first ever British trade mission to Israel. Feather met with Golda 
Meir, the Foreign Minister, who gave him a “scathing rendering of her views on the UN and 
the British Governments  role in New York" and their general attitude to Israel.635   
The Histadrut delegation  which came to Britain in May 1970, as guests of the GMWU, AEF 
and TGWU was a return visit for a British delegation that went to Israel the year before. They 
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met with the TUC and the Labour party and the visit was deemed to be very effective in 
terms of Israeli propaganda. The Israeli embassy reported that the success of the next 
Histadrut visit in December 1971 had been due entirely to the combined  efforts of "our 
friend" Jack Jones and Marx, who now worked for the TGWU. While praising the advantages 
of exchange visits between Histadrut and the British unions, they commented that without a 
permanent Histadrut mission in London, the effectiveness of the embassy in the labour field 
was limited and could only be fundamentally improved in future by appointing a labour 
attaché.636  A similar plea had been made fifteen years earlier with the same message, if you 
want to keep the British unions on your side then you need a permanent representative based 
in Britain.  
Afro-Asian Institute  
The British government continued to receive from their labour attaché in Israel regular 
updates on the Afro-Asian Institute637 and the Histadrut's overseas aid programmes.638 The 
government's own advisory committee on trade union courses were so impressed that they 
recommended that they look at the Institute's programme of studies because of the relevance 
of its content to their own courses.639   
In March 1972, the TUC ended its association with the Afro-Asian Institute when the General 
Council approved its final scholarship grant. They withdrew their support as the original 
reason for backing the Institute was no longer valid. In 1964 sponsorship of the Institute was 
seen as a means of building a relationship with the Histadrut and direct relations between the 
two organisations over the next eight years became a lot closer. In addition, the General 
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Council were told that the Institute itself now had access to more sources of funding than 
previously.640 Yagol, the new Histadrut European representative, on his next visit to London 
asked Feather if they would reconsider the matter, but by then it was too late.641 If the 
Histadrut had still been based in London then Yagol might have been able to intervene before 
the decision had been taken. This episode was a perfect example of how the Histadrut's 
relationship with the TUC and unions had suffered because of the move to Brussels. Another 
measure of the loosening of ties was that Yagol sent the Histadrut fewer reports about Britain 
compared to his predecessors. By 1972, with the TUC now controlled by the Left, many of 
the original supporters of the Institute were no longer members of either the General Council 
or the International committee and had been replaced by people who had other priorities. The 
TUC's attitude to foreign aid programmes and its relationship with the developing countries 
in the Commonwealth had also altered and although it was working with the Foreign Office, 
its focus was changing from global issues to European ones.   
The TUC, the Histadrut and terrorism  
Arab terrorism towards Israel had a global impact in 1968, when Palestinian groups launched 
a terror campaign based on the hijacking of passenger aircraft. Between 1968 and 1977 their 
organisations hijacked or attempted to hijack twenty-nine aircraft.642 The hijacking campaign, 
which peaked in 1972-3 impacted on the ICFTU and the TUC as they came under pressure to 
ensure the safety of aviation workers.  
One course of action that has always been taken by the Histadrut, when either the State of 
Israel or any of its population comes under threat, is to appeal to its friends for help and  
support. One such threat was the hijacking, in July 1968, of an El Al Boeing 707 by Arab 
terrorists, which was flown to Algeria.643 The Histadrut immediately sent a telegram to the 
ICFTU and the International Transport Secretariat (ITS) asking them urgently to do 
everything they could to obtain the immediate release of the aircraft, its crew and passengers 
by Algerian authorities.644 Both the ICFTU and the ITS responded without delay as did 
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several major affiliates because this was primarily a problem for the civil aviation industry 
and not directly related to the politics of the Middle East.645 Although the Algerian 
government had released all the non-Israeli passengers almost immediately they refused to 
release the Israeli passengers, the crew  and the airplane. The Histadrut was concerned that 
apart from the German trade union organisation, the DGB, all their "friends" in Europe 
including the TUC had remained silent over the matter. As well as sending telegrams asking 
for assistance to Woodcock and Cousins, Lehmann, the Histadrut European representative, 
contacted the transport unions in Scandinavia and the Benelux countries urging them to 
"enthusiastically" implement the ITF’s Congress resolution on the matter.646  
 
The TUC, however, had their own reasons for not taking any action, as revealed in a memo to 
Woodcock  from  Kolarz  which  presented him with two alternatives. The TUC  could either 
send telegrams to the Algerian Government and the Algerian transport union demanding the 
release of the plane and the passengers as the Histadrut had asked them to do or make a 
formal approach to the government asking them to intervene. The  problem was that in the 
past, the TUC had almost always avoided becoming  involved in sending messages of protest 
about particular incidents. Woodcock was also advised to take some action in anticipation of 
questions being asked at the forthcoming TUC Congress in September.647 The TUC also 
discussed the matter with the British Airline Pilots Association, the Civil Aviation authority 
and the government, because they were concerned about the implications for workers in civil 
aviation. Two weeks passed before the International committee discussed the incident and 
decided to write to the Algerian trade union centre rather than Algerian government. The 
Committee  saw little value in protesting to the government given that it might lead to the 
TUC being asked in future to protest to foreign governments on other matters.648  By agreeing 
on this course of action, the TUC had bypassed the need for a public statement on the matter. 
The letter which Woodcock wrote on behalf of the General Council  was weak and said very 
little apart from noting that the TUC "deplored incidents of this kind" and that "the adverse 
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repercussions of this incident are bound to have (an effect) on public opinion in this country 
and others regarding the situation generally in the Middle East." But he failed to ask the 
Algerians to take action to obtain the release the hostages and the plane.649 It seems that 
although Woodcock and several members of the committee were friends of Israel, they had to 
put their personal feelings to one side, as they had agreed with the advice they had received,  
as well as their concern for those working in the civil aviation industry. When, a few days 
later on 1 September, the Israeli hostages were released in exchange for sixteen convicted 
Arab terrorists, the Histadrut wrote only to the ICFTU and no one else thanking them for 
their support and prompt action.650  
 
How seriously the TUC now took its role as potential peacemaker in the Middle East was 
illustrated by their reaction to a series of  events which started with the next Palestinian  
terrorist attack on an Israeli airliner in Athens on 26  December 1968.651 The outcome may 
not have been to the Histadrut's satisfaction, but the TUC certainly did what they thought was 
best for them. Israel's response the following night was to destroy thirteen passenger 
airplanes at Beirut airport.652  Victor Feather,653 who had just succeeded Woodcock as TUC 
General Secretary met with Lehmann, the Histadrut European representative, on 20 January 
to discuss recent developments including the Israeli operation at Beirut Airport, which had 
just been condemned by the UN Security Council.654 Support the UN was very important for 
the TUC and was a key part of their international policy.655 Lehmann explained the 
Histadrut's concerns, including their fears about an enforced settlement in the Middle East 
and asked for a statement or a letter from the TUC expressing solidarity which would  
reiterate their policy regarding a direct settlement between both sides in the conflict. Feather 
explained that despite their friendship with the Histadrut, the atmosphere at the General 
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Council was hostile to the Histadrut following the Beirut action, and it therefore would not be 
wise to ask the Council at this time for a decision on a letter. He went on to say that a pro-
Israel statement from the TUC now would damage their ability to put pressure on the Arabs. 
Their "robust" discussion on the matter lasted more than two hours and ended with Lehmann 
refusing to accept the TUC's position.656 Feather's reaction was not totally unexpected as 
Lehmann already knew that Israel's Beirut action had produced a negative response from 
other European unions.657  
At the beginning of February 1969, news came through that nine Jews had been publically 
hanged in Baghdad after being convicted of espionage.658 The immediate reaction of the 
Histadrut  was to ask the TUC, the ICFTU and other affiliates, to protest at the hangings and 
to demand no further killings, the release of detainees and that the remaining Jews be allowed 
to leave Iraq.659 The ICFTU action to circularise their affiliates brought an immediate 
sympathetic response.660 Hargreaves prepared a summary of the situation in the Middle East 
which discussed the Histadrut request and  international  response to the Iraqi hangings, the 
four power talks which were about to begin in New York and Palestinian terrorist activity.661 
Hargreaves advised Feather that the General Council would back his judgment if he decided 
to take immediate action on the Histadrut's request. Feather, who at the time  had only just 
been appointed acting General Secretary, decided not to take any action and wait until the 
next International committee meeting three weeks later. By then of course the need for a 
public condemnation would have passed and he would also have known that the TUC had not 
made public statements of that nature in the past.   
At their meeting, the International committee were informed of the Histadrut's request and of 
the telegrams that had been received from the International Confederation of Arab Trade 
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Unions (ICATU ) and the Arab Federation of Petroleum Workers (AFPW) asking the TUC to 
protest to the British Government against the supply of arms to Israel. They were also advised 
of a terrorist attack on a civilian aircraft at Zurich which the International Transport 
Federation (ITF)  had condemned. The minutes of the meeting record that the committee 
discussed at length the four power talks and the likelihood of a settlement being reached. 
During the discussion Hayday reaffirmed that the committee's role was to bring together both 
the Israeli and Arab organisations in order to bring about a settlement between them.662  
The minutes do not show if there was any discussion of the Histadrut's request for a letter of 
protest to the Iraqi authorities nor if a letter was written.  The most likely scenario is that 
International Committee did not take any action because Cousins and Hayday were in regular 
contact with both sides in the Arab-Israeli dispute and wanted to avoid being seen as taking 
sides if they just responded to the Histadrut's request. Because there were now a number of 
issues involved the Committee decided instead to advise the General Council to seek a 
meeting with the Foreign Secretary to discuss the situation and the means of reaching a 
settlement. At the meeting with the Foreign Secretary, Cyril Plant, a friend of the Histadrut 
and a member of the TUC delegation asked the Minister "what could be done to prevent such 
incidents as the hangings of Jews and others which had taken place in Iraq." The Foreign 
Secretary, Michael Stewart, replied "that representations had been made to the Iraqi 
Government even before the first of these incidents. The disapproval of world opinion had 
been to some extent effective, particularly since other Arab governments had made it clear 
that they thought the actions of the Iraqi Government were unwise." 663 
The International Department had prepared detailed briefing notes for the delegation on the 
situation in the Middle East and what questions to ask the Minister relating to arms supply to 
the region, the possible imposition of  an interim settlement, and the refugee problem.664 The 
General Council were told that the Foreign Secretary had broadly agreed with the TUC's 
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views and that government policy was based on support for UN resolution 242, which had set 
down guidelines for a permanent settlement. There was also agreement that the problem 
could not be solved "without sustained efforts over a period and flexibility of attitudes on 
both sides." The TUC then sent identical letters to the Histadrut, ICATU and the AFPW 
informing them of their meeting with the Foreign Secretary.665 
The worldwide increase in the hijacking of aircraft during this period resulted in two 
meetings between the British government the TUC in February and March 1970. Various 
measures were discussed to improve security including the suggestion, that crews be 
permitted to decline flights to some countries in the Middle East if they wished. Neither Israel 
nor the Arab states were condemned as their main concern was for the safety of airline 
workers, and the travelling public.666 In January 1971, the TUC asked the government to 
ratify the Hague convention on hijacking and sought assurances regarding their concerns.667  
The British government, the Labour Party and the TUC, along with the majority of the British 
population were horrified by the attack on Israeli athletes at the Munich Olympics. News of 
the kidnapping was received whilst the TUC Congress was in session and Yagol, the 
Histadrut representative, put pressure on the leadership to condemn the attack whilst the 
hostages were still alive. Initially the TUC was reluctant to agree to his request, but 
eventually agreed to send a telegram to the Foreign Office, which  condemned the "horror at 
Arab banditry and murder in Munich" and called on the government to make representations 
to all Arab governments to immediately bring these activities to an end.668 The Foreign 
Secretary replied  saying that the Government had repeatedly condemned such acts.669 When 
the news of the deaths arrived, the next morning's session opened with a minute of silence 
followed by an emotional  statement from the TUC President.670 Harold Wilson, the Prime 
Minister, condemned the murderous attack on the Israeli team and the Labour Party sent 
telegrams to Mrs. Meir, the Israeli Prime Minister and to the Israeli Labour Party expressing 
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“deepest sympathy" and that the crime would be condemned “by the whole civilised 
world."671 
 Conclusion 
 
The Six-Day War provided the TUC with the opportunity to play its part on the world stage 
to try and bring peace to the Middle East. Ironically if it had not played safe by not issuing a 
statement in support of Israel at the beginning of June, it is unlikely that any of Cousins and 
Hayday's missions to Israel and the Arab States would have taken place. The Histadrut who 
were disappointed by the TUC's response to the war, originally invited Woodcock who was 
unable to go. His replacements, Hayday and Cousins, then took full advantage of the situation 
to use the international trade union movement as a force for peace. Cousins, who was very 
strong on international affairs and had serious conversations with both the Israelis and the 
Egyptians to bring about cooperation between them. The TUC's efforts have not been given 
the recognition they deserve. The two men's plans, as well as the success of the pro-Israel 
lobby at the TUC, caused alarm at the Foreign Office, who openly admitted that it wanted to 
reduce the influence of the Histadrut on the TUC General Council. The TUC's efforts failed 
for a number of reasons, but mainly because both the Arab and Israeli trade unions 
movements were very closely allied to their respective governments and were unable to 
deviate from their government decisions and policies. The ICFTU similarly suffered as it was 
used for political purposes by both sides. The Foreign Office, which formed the OLCC to 
assist in rebuilding British interests in the region, brought the TUC on board with the hope of 
emulating the successful Israeli, German and American overseas aid and training 
programmes. These plans never succeeded, because the TUC were never given the necessary 
resources or funding.   
The Histadrut never took advantage of this "golden" period in relations and squandered most 
of this goodwill, by not only moving their Europe base from London to Brussels, but also by 
changing their representative at the same time. They may have had good political reasons for 
moving to Brussels but relations between them and the TUC and the Foreign Office labour 
advisor were never the same again. The warning signs for the future, especially with the 
deterioration  in  Anglo-Israel relations  and  move towards the Left at the TUC, could never 
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be fully covered by monthly visits to London. As a result the excellent relationship between 
the TUC and the Histadrut started to unravel. 
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Chapter 4   1973-1982  
If the 1960s were the golden years for TUC-Histadrut cooperation, then the 1970s brought 
about a move towards increased support for the Palestinians by the TUC which was matched 
by a falling away in support for Israel. The various factors that brought about this change  
included the growing influence of the political Left both at grassroots and leadership level 
within the Labour Party and the trade unions, calls for the recognition of the PLO, support for 
a Palestinian homeland and the election in 1977 of a Right wing Likud government in Israel.  
At the same time there was a rapid decline in influence and power of the Histadrut in Israel, 
as well as the retirement of Israel's friends within the British labour movement. A 
contributory factor was Anglo-Jewry's lack of interest in the trade union movement and their 
move away from the Labour party to the Conservatives.  
The signs of change were already apparent in 1973 with the TUC's response to the Yom 
Kippur war. Their reaction this time was even more muted than their reaction to the 1967 
Six-Day War. The culmination of grassroots support for the Palestinian cause came in 1982 
with Israel's invasion of Lebanon. It provided the Left with the opportunity to change both 
TUC and Labour Party policy with both organisations adopting resolutions which criticised 
Israel’s military action as well as recognising the Palestinian right to their own homeland. 
The TUC's approval of this resolution marked the final collapse of the pro-Israel consensus 
within the labour movement. It had a dramatic effect on the TUC-Histadrut relations and 
marked the end of nearly 25 years of  unquestioned support for Israel and the Histadrut. The 
key element which determined the TUC's attitude towards Israel and the Histadrut, and 
certainly applied to each of the decades in this study were the views of six biggest unions, 
especially the TGWU, and the attitude of their leaders, Bevin, Deakin, Cousins and Evans. 
The smaller unions were only able to promote successful motions at Congress if they had the 
support of the large unions as happened in 1982. Even without the opportunity presented by 
Israel's invasion of Lebanon it was more than likely that a motion critical of Israel and 
supportive of the Palestinians would have been adopted by Congress within the next few 
years.  
The TUC's own priorities also changed during the 1970s. It became a main policy goal to 
cooperate more closely with their European colleagues and build links with its Eastern 
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European counterparts. The two leading Left wingers at the TUC, Hugh Scanlon672, the 
President of the AEU, and Jack Jones, General Secretary of the TGWU, were behind the 
move towards a closer relationship with the Russian and Eastern bloc.  In order to achieve 
this, Jones, who succeeded Hayday as Chairman of the TUC International committee in 1972, 
avoided political problems by focusing on the issue of international trade unionism. On 
international human rights, Jones took a 'trade union point of view' by supporting protests and 
sanctions against government policy on trade unions in Bolivia, Chile, South Africa and 
Spain. He considered that trade union rights were the proper concern of trade union leaders 
but not human rights, which, were a matter for Amnesty International.673  
Jones who had fought for the International Brigade in Spain was a lifelong supporter of the 
Left and Russia. He always gave the impression that he had never been a member of the 
CPGB even though he had been a member from 1932-41 and was reported to have left the 
party in 1949. Jones resumed contact with the CPGB 15 years later and during the 1960s 
passed confidential Labour Party documents to the Russians.674 He was someone with whom 
the Communists felt comfortable with and with their help was elected TGWU General 
Secretary. However  because of his long-term connections with the Russians  and  his desire 
for the TUC to normalise relations with the Russians, Jones opposed all moves for the TUC 
to support the public campaign to allow Soviet Jews to emigrate to Israel. Yet behind the 
scenes the TUC worked for the release of individual Russian Jews. The Histadrut were in 
regular contact with him as chairman of the International committee and saw him as a friend 
of Israel, which he was. Jones told this author that his friendly attitude and sympathy towards 
the Jews and Israel was conditioned by his mother who had a high regard for Jewish 
people.675  Jones nevertheless opposed all moves for the TUC to support the public campaign 
to allow Soviet Jews to emigrate to Israel. He also opposed Arab attempts to bring Middle 
East politics to the international trade union movement.676 Although he was personally 
                                                 
672 For more information about Hugh Scanlon see the Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, Oxford 
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horrified at the politicisation of the ILO, the TUC supported the compromise regarding the 
recognition of the PLO. Behind the scenes however the TUC worked with the ICFTU to build 
up relations between the Histadrut and the Palestinian unions.677 
The Histadrut's stock along with that of its partner in government, the Israeli Labour 
Alignment gradually declined throughout the 1970s. Although the Alignment managed to 
hold onto power until 1977, the Histadrut was by then in need of radical reorganisation 
having lost influence and prestige.678  That year the political landscape in Israel dramatically 
changed with Likud's election victory and policies for a "Greater Israel". Anglo-Israel 
relations suffered as well as those with the British Labour party, making it easier for the Left 
to give their support to the Palestinian cause. By this time Histadrut-TUC relations had also 
declined and Begin's election gave no reason for them to improve. The result was that by the 
time of Israel's invasion of the Lebanon in 1982, the Histadrut appeared to have made no 
attempt to lobby the TUC as it had in 1967 and 1973.  
Anglo-Israel relations  
Between 1973 and 1982, a period during which Britain had three Prime Ministers, two of 
whom, Wilson and Thatcher were seen as pro-Israel, Anglo-Israel relations were not easy. In 
1976, when Callaghan replaced Wilson, the Foreign Office began to reappraise its 
relationship with Israel, with the result that Britain took a more a much more critical line with 
Israel over actions while at the same time moving towards becoming part of any EU initiative 
or statement.679  One issue which the British government saw as a serious threat to the peace 
process was the rapid expansion after 1977 of  the settlements in the occupied territories of  
the West Bank and Gaza. Although successive Israeli governments since the 1967 war had all 
supported the building of settlements, it was the Begin government's settlement drive that 
was seen by both Thatcher and Callaghan as an obstacle to any future peace agreement.680  
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The Venice Declaration of June 1980 was an attempt by the nine members of the EU, 
including Britain, to formalise the rights of the Palestinians in the peace process.681 As well 
calling for the acceptance of the Palestinians’ right to self-government and the PLO’s right to 
be involved in any peace initiative, the EU also called on Israel to end the occupation of 
territories it had held since 1967. Although the Camp David accords were mentioned in the 
TUC committee minutes, the Venice agreement was not.  
The settlements were never a key issue for either the TUC's  International Committee or the 
General Council, nor did they ever differentiate between the settlements in the West Bank 
and Gaza.682 While they were always aware of the issue, their priority from 1978 onwards 
was to try and bring the Histadrut and the Egyptian trade unions closer together. Both Len 
Murray and Tom Jackson, who succeeded Len Jones as chairman of the International 
Committee, knew that the Histadrut was opposed to the building of Israeli settlements in the 
occupied territories as well as direct contact with the PLO.683  The two men ensured that there 
was little  public criticism of Israel's actions by the TUC and worked behind the scenes with 
the ICFTU who put out public statements when necessary. The Left's main concern was not 
the settlements but building support for the recognition of the PLO and a Palestinian 
homeland. The situation changed after 1982, by which time the TUC was fully committed to 
supporting the Palestinians' right to self-determination. The 1983 TUC Congress defeated a 
motion proposed by the EETPU which was an attempt by friends of Israel to regain some of 
the lost ground. The motion, which acknowledged the legitimate rights of the Palestinian 
people, called for the recognition of the achievements of the Histadrut called on the General 
Council to increase bilateral contacts with the Histadrut. Supporters of the Palestinians made 
the point in the debate that the  Histadrut  owned "the construction sites that were being 
illegally built on the occupied parts of the West Bank" and that  "to declare solidarity with 
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Histadrut at the very moment when Arab lands are being seized;....and illegal settlements 
built" condoned acts that had been denounced by the UN.684  
Throughout this period, which started with the Yom Kippur war and ended with the Lebanon 
war, Britain continued its gradual move away from Israeli positions and towards support for 
the Arab and Palestinian view. Although Britain continued to support Israeli interests which 
included the blocking of the "Zionism is racism" issue at the UN and opposition to both the 
creeping legitimisation of the PLO and the Arab boycott, the Foreign Office had unofficial 
contacts with the PLO. Both Mrs. Thatcher and the Foreign Office believed that pressure had 
to be put on Israel to make concessions using the 'land for peace' formula and were irritated 
by the lack of progress in the peace process. She also used her position as a friend of Israel to 
criticise actions of the Begin government, such as Israel's bombing of the Iraqi nuclear 
reactor in 1981 and the Knesset vote to annex the Golan Heights which were seen as having 
the potential to lead to renewed fighting. Israel's invasion of Lebanon in 1982 only added to 
British concerns and frustration. 685    
The Left and the TUC 
The final two years of the 1960s were momentous years both in Britain and abroad. There 
were the anti-war movement protests against the Vietnam war and the worldwide 1968 
student revolution,686 while in Britain in 1969, the government issued its white paper "In 
Place of Strife'" aimed at curbing trade union "power" which had dominated the industrial 
scene for most of the decade. There was a direct link between the Far Left's involvement in 
the "1968 student revolution" and the change in the attitude of the Labour Party and the 
unions towards Israel during the next decade. 687  
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The 1968 student revolution, which caused much upheaval and bloodshed in France and the 
United States, was by comparison small and muted in Britain. Although the media portrayed 
this period as the age of student revolution, the British student movement protests were much 
less radical and less violent than elsewhere, focussing mainly on reforms to the governance of 
the universities, teaching methods and student living conditions.688 Nevertheless, the student 
protests elsewhere in the world  provided  a minority of revolutionary students and Far Left 
Trotskyist groups with the opportunity to enthuse the majority of British students, who were 
not politically motivated, to join them in similar demonstrations against the authorities.689 
The result was that Trotskyist groups such as the International Marxist Group (IMG) and 
International Socialists (IS) were very active in the protests and played a central role in 
organising many of the demonstrations and sit-ins. The University administrations in Britain, 
unlike their colleagues in France and Italy who were heavy-handed in the way that they dealt  
with the student protests, took a more low key approach when dealing with the sit-ins and 
demonstrations. Although there was some over reaction, namely at the LSE, which was 
understandable given the media hype surrounding the protests.   
In 1968, American involvement in the Vietnam war was an emotive issue amongst young 
people and students. The Far Left once again took full advantage of the situation. The 
Vietnam Solidarity Committee, which comprised of a variety of groups with different 
political aims including the IMG, IS, Young Liberals and the Campaign for Nuclear 
Disarmament (CND), organised a series of increasingly violent demonstrations, all of which 
resulted in conflicts with the police and arrests.690 The largest demonstration with 100,000 
marchers took place on 27 October 1968. It attracted unprecedented media attention and  is 
remembered for the clashes with the police outside the American embassy in Grosvenor 
Square, which resulted in 43 arrests and 50 injuries. The Government, concerned that the 
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student demonstrators might copy the violence in Europe, monitored events and dealt firmly 
with the Grosvenor Square protesters. Civil servants estimated that there were only around 
1000 revolutionary students in Britain in 1968 out of a student population of 450,000.691 
Although student demonstrations continued into the 1970s, they never again reached the 
heights of 1968.  
The "power" of the unions and Left wing shop floor militancy were widely blamed for 
Britain's economic decline throughout the 1960s and 1970s. The Wilson government 
attempted to solve the country's industrial and economic problems by confronting  the TUC 
and the unions over 'excessive' wage demands and lack of productivity. The unions  rejected 
the proposals. The government's 1969 white paper attempted to use the law to reduce the 
power of the unions especially in relation to unofficial strikes. The proposals never passed 
into law and were replaced in the 1970s by a voluntary agreement brokered by the TUC. By 
1969 the leadership of the TUC was controlled by Left wing trade union leaders692 who led 
the confrontation with the government. This also affected the political alignment of the block 
vote at the Labour Party conference which would in time impact on any Israel-related 
conference motions. The change only came to influence the TUC's relationship with Israel 
during the next decade. The move to the Left in the unions occurred because the Wilson 
government, had continued to move the Labour party away from traditional socialism in 
order to solve the country's economic problems, and also attempted to capture the middle 
ground of national politics. The two most influential Left wingers were Hugh Scanlon, 
President of the AEU, and Jack Jones who, in 1969, succeeded Frank Cousins as General 
Secretary of the TGWU. Jones was seen by the Histadrut as a friend of Israel who opposed 
Arab attempts to mix Middle East politics with international trade union issues. The two men 
tried to change Cold War alignments, in particular the divided international trade union 
movement and achieving unilateral nuclear disarmament. When Jones succeeded Hayday as 
Chairman of the TUC International committee in 1972, he attempted to build new 
relationships with unions outside the ICFTU including the Russian trade unions which was to 
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affect the TUC's position on human rights and Soviet Jewry.693 Although Cousins, Hayday 
and Jones held the line against the Left who were becoming anti-Israel, when they retired 
they were replaced by a new cadre, who had been ignored by the Histadrut, and saw Israel in 
a different light. This move to the Left both within the Labour party and the unions meant 
that by 1972, Labour's traditional support for Israel was being questioned by grass roots Left 
wing activists who were beginning to show an active interest in foreign affairs and the Arab-
Israeli conflict in particular. 
Labour's support for Israel 
One of the many changes that took place in Britain in the 1970s was that support for Israel 
was no longer guaranteed within the Labour movement. It was replaced by grassroots support 
for the Palestinians, built up by the activism of the generation that became involved in 
politics of the New Left. There were several reasons for this change which resulted in the 
Labour Party, like the TUC, breaking with tradition in 1982 and adopting for the first time 
motions critical of Israel and support for Palestinian nationalism. 
The move to the Left amongst the leadership of the larger trade unions and the TUC General 
Council at the end of the 1960s committed the Labour Party NEC to socialist economic 
policies, but this shift to the Left did not immediately affect the Party's policy on the Middle 
East, which remained pro-Israel. The situation started to change around the time of the Yom 
Kippur War in 1973. Although the Parliamentary Labour Party supported Wilson's pro-Israel 
stance, local constituency parties did not, with three times as many constituency parties 
adopting a pro-Arab rather than pro-Israel line. The "old" Labour Left was not critical of 
Israel but called for a ban on all arms sales to the Middle East 694 
The activists of 1968 soon moved on to other causes. These former students from the two 
main Trotskyist groups, Militant and Socialist Organiser, which grew out of the IMG, 
infiltrated the Labour Party constituency organisations with the aim of influencing Labour 
policies and the Left's politics. They were at the heart of the change of attitude towards Israel 
within the Party that took place after the 1973 war. As had happened in 1968, it only took a 
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small number of activists to instigate change. Because older members of the constituency 
Labour parties in the early 1970s were more concerned about local issues and economic 
policies and ignored the Middle East, the Far Left activists were successful in raising 
awareness about Palestinian nationalism.695 
By the early 1980s Militant supporters were well established within the Labour Party and two 
unions in particular, the Civil and Public Services Association (CPSA) and The Post Office 
Engineering Union (POEU).696 Socialist Organiser, associated itself with leading figures on 
the Left of the Party, such as Tony Benn, Ken Livingstone, leader the Greater London 
Council (GLC), and Ted Knight, leader of Lambeth Council. Far left activists such as Knight, 
refused to recognise Israel and proposed instead the establishment of a democratic, secular 
state. Others espoused anti-Zionist themes, equating Zionism with Nazism or racism.697 Their 
support for anti-colonialist and anti–imperialist policies identified Israel with Britain’s 
colonial past. They supported the PLO which was seen as a “third world” independence 
movement.  
The International Socialists(IS) concentrated on infiltrating the unions. By the 1970s IS had a 
strong industrial base having built its up membership by supporting workplace disputes. In 
1977 the IS transformed itself into a political party, the Socialist Workers Party (SWP). With 
4000 members it was the largest Trotskyist party in Britain.698 The SWP was virulently anti-
Zionist, a position that stemmed from its leader Tony Cliff. He was Jewish and born in 
Palestine, but turned into a notorious anti-Zionist. Cliff produced an SWP booklet in which 
he set out the conspiracy theory of Zionism.  He accused the Zionist leadership in Palestine of 
collaborating with the Nazis in the destruction of the Jews.699 The SWP insisted that it was 
not antisemitic, only anti-Zionist: it denied that the Jews were a nation and characterised 
them as primarily a religious group. Consequently they advocated dismantling the State of 
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Israel, which they described as a racist state.700 The CPGB, which was the largest communist 
party with around 20,000 members, was also anti-Zionist (although it never advocated 
destruction of the State of Israel). It had not been allowed to affiliate to the Labour Party and, 
like the SWP, concentrated on infiltrating and  influencing the unions. 
Support for Israel within the Labour Party and the unions had also waned due to the 
retirement of the generation of MPs, party members and trade unionists who had witnessed 
the plight of the Jews during the Second World War and sympathised with the establishment 
of the State of Israel. They had been replaced by a number of MPs and local activists for 
whom the problems of the Palestinians were more important than Labour’s traditional 
identification with the Jews and Israel. Nor did it help that British Jews who in the 1930s and 
‘40s had been natural supporters of the Labour Party had by the 1970s also moved away from 
the Party. The electoral significance of Jewish voters was taken over by the Afro-Caribbean 
immigrant population who were more receptive to supporting third world movements like the 
PLO. 
The stunning victory of the right-wing Likud party in Israel’s 1977 general election701 also 
had an effect on the remaining friends of Israel in the Labour ranks. As a result of the Labour 
Alignment's defeat and the advent of a right wing government that rejected socialism, many 
on the Left of the Labour party questioned their continuing support for Israel. Furthermore, 
the election of Menachem Begin as Prime Minister brought back memories of the 1946-48 
when he led the terrorist group Irgun Zvai Leumi against British rule in Palestine. 
The pro-Arab lobby in Britain 
Another factor in the change was the work of pro-Arab political groups in Britain to counter 
the influence of the pro-Israel lobby. Two of the largest and oldest organisations were the 
Council for the Advancement of Arab-British Understanding (CAABU) established in 1967 
and the Labour Middle East Council (LMEC) formed in 1969. CAABU's aim was to foster 
"mutual understanding and sympathy between the people of Britain and the people of the 
Arab world.....(and to express) sympathy for the aspirations, achievements and rights of the 
Arab peoples, especially the Arabs of Palestine, for whose administration Britain was 
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responsible until 1948, and whose case must not be permitted to go by default." Its General 
Committee included current MPs, former government ministers, former British ambassadors 
to Arab states, journalists and academics.702 LMEC was a pro-Arab pressure group which 
operated mainly within Parliament and was not affiliated to the Labour Party. LMEC 
submitted a memorandum to the Labour Party in April 1973 which attacked the Party's pro-
Israel views, "double standards" on Palestinian rights and called for the  implementation of 
Security Council Resolution 242, calling for Arab recognition of Israel and Israel's 
withdrawal from the occupied territories.703 The success gained on university campuses 
during the 1970s as a result of a coalition between Palestinian,704 Arab and Left-wing British 
students was, as we shall see, repeated within the trade union movement during the early 
1980s, with the British anti-Zionist trade unionists as the driving force in the Trade Union 
Friends of Palestine (TUFP). 
By 1970 the PLO had links with the Labour Party, thanks to connections made by CAABU 
and LMEC and fringe Palestinian groups that had attended several of the party's annual 
conferences. Over the next decade, the PLO was accepted by several European Socialist 
governments as the official representatives of the Palestinian people.705 Meanwhile, Israel's 
position as the sole representative of the Middle East at the Socialist International ended in 
the late 1960s when the International built links with third world organisations such as the 
PLO and Arab socialist groups.706  
Although change was starting to happening at the grass roots in both the Labour Party and the 
unions at the beginning of the 1980s,  the pro-Arab lobby in Britain had not yet succeeded in 
influencing British public opinion and nor did it have the support of a major political party or 
the trade unions. Other than CAABU and LMEC the lobby consisted of a number of mainly 
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small organisations often founded by the same people which had the effect of spreading their 
propaganda net as wide as possible to ensure they attracted a wide range of people including 
trade unionists, students and politicians. They organisations in the pro-Arab lobby included 
the London Friends of Palestine (LFP), the Trade Union Friends of Palestine (TUFP), the 
National Organization of Labour Students, the Universities Education Fund for Palestinian 
Refugees (UNIPAL), the British Anti-Zionist Organization (BAZO) and the SWP. LMEC 
also provided an umbrella under which Palestinian or Arab activists could come together. For 
example, its Honorary Secretary in 1981, was  Ernie Ross MP, who was also chairman of the 
TUFP and a leading mover of the twinning of Dundee with Nablus. In many cases, these 
groups with the exception of the SWP were very small and were able to call on the resources 
of the PLO if necessary.707 The TUFP operated from the same offices as CAABU and had 
close links with the PLO and their trade union arm the Palestine Trade Unions Federation 
(PTUF),  who also operated from the same address as the Arab League. .  
TUC reaction to the 1973 War  
It was debatable whether the cycle of violence and reprisal in the Middle East which had  
frequently dominated the headlines during 1972, and included the massacre at Lod airport, 
the killing of Israel athletes during the Olympic Games at Munich, and Israeli attacks on 
Fedayeen bases, increased or decreased public support for Israel in the West. The TUC, like 
the ICFTU now only issued statements which were dependent on the seriousness of the 
incident, such as when a Libyan  airliner on a  scheduled flight with 113 people on board 
became lost due to a combination of bad weather and equipment failure over northern Egypt 
and was shot down by Israeli fighter jets. The TUC followed the lead of the ITF708 and the 
ICFTU709 by  issuing  its own statement.710  
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The British Ambassador to Israel reported in January 1973 that "the Israelis are none too 
happy with our approach to the Arab-Israel dispute. They think they have detected a tendency 
on our part to make a slight shift towards the Arab positions. They recognise we have wide 
interests in the Arab world which cannot be put at risk for their sake."711 Both countries were 
concerned about the impact of Britain's recent entry into the EEC and how it would affect 
them.712 The key domestic issue for the majority of Israeli trade unionists at the start of 1973 
was the same as for their counterparts in Britain - the economy and the rising cost of living.713 
The work of the Histadrut in Europe and Britain had continued much as before. It included  
lobbying for curbs on aviation terrorism and support for Israel's formal application for 
permanent observer status at the recently formed European Trade Union Confederation 
(ETUC).714 Yagol, the Histadrut's European representative, warned that some European trade 
union leaders had voiced their concerns that because of the Histadrut's close relations with 
the American unions, any extra involvement by the Histadrut in the ETUC would assist the 
American unions with their plans for the African and Mediterranean areas, which went 
against the European's interest.715 Yagol reported that the TUC's long term aim was to build a 
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strong European organisation of unions (The ETUC) as well as rebuild relations with the 
Communist bloc. He noted that this change of direction could seriously harm both Israel's and 
the Histadrut's position in the international labour movement especially as the Histadrut had 
recently failed to achieve official ETUC recognition. Their application had been refused even 
though Jones, and Len Murray,716 the incoming General Secretary of the TUC, had both 
indicated that they had supported the Histadrut's plans. Feather had previously indicated to 
the Histadrut that the ETUC would not allow any non-European organisation official status. 
He also stressed the contradiction between the Histadrut joining an Asian organisation and its 
desire to attach itself to the European one.717 
On October 6, 1973, Yom Kippur (the Day of Atonement), the holiest day in the Jewish 
religious calendar, Egypt and Syria simultaneously launched a surprise attack against Israel. 
Egyptian forces crossed ceasefire lines to enter the Israeli held Sinai peninsula and the Syrian 
Army moved into the Golan Heights, which had been occupied by Israel since the 1967 war. 
Within a week the Israelis had successfully counterattacked and the war ended on 24 October 
when both sides agreed to a UN brokered truce.718 
The Histadrut sent telegrams to the ICFTU and its leading affiliates, including the TUC, 
saying that Israel had been attacked on the holiest Jewish holiday and that Israel would drive 
back the aggressor beyond the agreed cease-fire lines. They called on the workers of the 
world irrespective of their political opinions and trade union affiliation to demand that the 
aggressor withdraw his forces and resume peaceful negotiations.719 The same day, Murray 
received a separate telegram from the Histadrut  asking for a "public expression of solidarity 
with Israel."720  
 
                                                 
716 For more information about Len Murray see Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, Oxford University 
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717 Lehmann to Gat, 6 January 1973, (Hebrew original), PLILMR, IV-219A-4-7A, Yagol to Ben Aharon, 
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The Labour Party, like the TUC decided to keep a low profile during the crisis, but unlike the 
TUC were willing to help behind the scenes if necessary. 721 Once again, as in 1956 and 1967, 
the Party leaders were briefed on the latest developments by Israeli diplomats.722 The 
Histadrut were now, however, paying the price for moving to Brussels as Murray and Yagol 
did not have the close personal relations that had existed in 1967 between Woodcock and 
Marx. Yagol's difficulties were illustrated by what happened on 19 October when he was told 
that it was unlikely that Murray would be unable to get back to him for several days. Yagol 
left a message for Murray asking if the TUC would supply material support for workers in 
Israel who were victims of the war and that all ETUC affiliates had been approached. He  
added that the Dutch, Belgian, Austrian and West German unions had agreed either to make 
direct financial contributions or donations such as medical supplies, ambulances or similar 
equipment.723 
In preparation for the TUC International committee meeting on 23 October, Alexandra 
Kolarz, wrote a well informed briefing document which discussed the action taken by the 
four powers and whether Britain should impose an arms embargo on the Middle East but it 
did not advise the Committee on which course of action to follow.724 The Committee appear 
to have been divided over the Histadrut request for aid which some members thought 
committed the European trade union movement to providing aid to only one side rather than 
both sides in the conflict. They eventually agreed to provide assistance through the Red Cross 
after being told that it had been the long established policy of the TUC to provide assistance 
through internationally recognised bodies such as the Red Cross. Feather then wrote to Yagol 
explaining why they were unable to agree to the Histadrut's request.725 The TUC issued a 
'neutral' statement on 23 October, which welcomed the announcement of a ceasefire in the 
Middle East and appealed to trade union organisations in those countries involved to call on 
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724 Ibid. 
725 The General Council offered to explain their attitude on this matter to ETUC affiliates and to ask if the 
ICFTU could be of any assistance. TUC International Committee minutes, 23 October 1973, MRC, 
MSS.292D/901/6, TUC General Council minutes, 24 October 1973, Feather to Yagol, 26 October 1973 and 
Murray to Kersten, 30 October 1973. The Red Cross  sent the TUC details of their operations in the region, Red 
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their governments to respect the ceasefire agreement in order to reopen peace talks.726 By 
comparison, the AFL-CIO emphasised its support for Israel and condemned the actions of the 
Soviet authorities in the Middle East.727  The Labour Party, however, was not concerned 
about British policy and condemned  Israel's' attackers and "the British Government's pro-
Arab bias." Their statement, which included their correspondence with the Israeli Labour 
Party noted that the majority of the Labour MP's had voted against the Government's 
embargo policy.728 Given that both the TUC and the Labour Party were part of the same 
British labour movement, the willingness on behalf of the Parliamentary Party to openly back 
Israel was in complete contrast to the TUC response reflecting the different positions between 
the party leadership and grassroots activists support. An example of this grass roots support 
from within the trade union movement came from the Ealing Trades Council which 
supported the return of the Palestinians to their homeland and the creation of a secular 
Palestinian state. They also called on the TUC to organise a boycott of all Israeli imports and 
to oppose any arms deals with Israel.729 The TUC's decision to do nothing until the next 
General Council meeting, was either intended to support UN efforts and back the 
government's neutral position or a deliberate move by Jones and Scanlon to support the 
Russians and the Palestinians at Israel's expense. Yagol believed it was the latter and was in 
no doubt that the TUC's position on the war as the most anti-Israel in Western Europe with 
the exception of Italy and France.730 It was even more remarkable when compared to the 
Labour Party's position, which constantly criticised the Conservative government about 
Israel. This disengagement from Israel, Yagol believed, had come as the result of the TUC's 
move towards Europe and their desire to work more closely with the Russians. He noted that 
the personal friendship shown by Feather, Jones and Scanlon towards the Histadrut had only 
made it easier for them the accept a conciliatory position. The hostility of the Council 
towards the Histadrut had been aided by accusations that Israel had started the war and an 
anti-American attitude. He was also convinced that the TUC's neutral position as well as their 
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silence on the Arab aggression was intended to ensure that they would continue to able to 
play an active role in the future. Alan Hargreaves, the Head of the International Department, 
told Yagol that "you will need us and our intervention. You won't be able to manage without  
any intervention and coercion from outside." It was well known at the time that Hargreaves 
was very much a Foreign Office man and it was rumoured that he had been placed in his post 
by the Foreign Office.731 Although he was the TUC's chief advisor on the Arab -Israel 
conflict he never visited Israel. Yagol observed that "It is noticeable that in the past he was 
offended by something we did, either real or imagined" and that "Hargreaves continues to 
follow Foreign Office policy" and will never do or say anything without first getting 
"guidance."732 The TUC had also tried to play down their disagreement with the Histadrut by 
explaining that their statement was limited only to one issue, the implementation of the 
ceasefire and the ending of hostilities, adding that they "will soon look for an opportunity to 
circulate their connection to the Histadrut and Israel." Murray, Hargreaves and Jones had all 
told Yagol that they had not been surprised by the Arab attack as, in their view, it had been 
expected due to the lack of progress in peace negotiations.733 It was therefore no surprise that 
the Histadrut's request for material aid was refused and replaced with a token donation of 
£250 to the Red Cross.734  Yagol also advised that the Histadrut should ignore the "warm and 
emotional attitude" shown by "some of our British friends" and that the Histadrut should 
review its relationship and connections with the European unions' especially in Britain. He 
thought that Murray, who had been recently appointed TUC General Secretary, had not yet 
got to grips with his new job.735 Israel Gat, who represented the Israeli Labour Party in 
London, was so concerned by the TUC's lack of solidarity towards Israel both during and 
after the war, that he wrote to the Histadrut saying that it was impossible to deal satisfactorily 
from Brussels with an organisation the size and importance the TUC. He urged the Histadrut 
to take action before it was too late by appointing a Histadrut representative in  London  as 
well as a labour attaché at the London embassy.736  
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The purpose of Yagol's next visit in December was to examine and find ways to improve 
relations with TUC leaders, in the light of the "hesitation" shown during the recent war. He 
reported that Murray told him that he was looking forward to the possibility of visiting Israel 
for the first time during the next Histadrut conference and was also willing to host visitors 
from the Histadrut. Murray also expressed a complete understanding of the difficulties facing 
Israel and the Histadrut over the forthcoming Israeli-Arab peace conference. It appears that 
Yagol was being told what he wanted to hear, but it is not clear if Yagol was aware that of 
Murray's predecessors as General Secretary, only Woodcock had shown a real personal 
affection and understanding towards Israel and the Histadrut. Nor does he appear to 
distinguish between Murray's personal beliefs and those of his role of managing the diverse 
views within the General Council, which ranged from support for Russia, the Arabs and the 
Palestinians, to opposition to American involvement and Communism as well as support for 
the British government and Israel. Whereas Woodcock had shown his support for Israel 
several years before the 1967 war and knew how to manage the Council at important 
moments, Murray, had only just been appointed General Secretary and had yet to make his 
mark on the council. With his economics background, he was new to international affairs, not 
known to the Histadrut and had never been to Israel. Yagol wrote that Jones blamed 
Hargreaves influence for the recent unfriendly decision but stressed the importance of visiting 
Egypt in order to try and make connections between the Egyptian unions and the Histadrut.737 
What is clear is that the TUC lacked strong leadership on this issue and with no consensus on 
the Council it allowed Hargreaves to present a viable alternative that everyone could support.   
 
Since its move to Brussels five years earlier, the Histadrut's priority had been the ICFTU and 
they had realised that with Cousins retirement, the TUC were no longer playing the lead 
European role in the ICFTU and had been replaced by the Germans and the Scandinavians 
who were very supportive of Israel.738 The TUC's focus was now the ETUC and improving 
links with Russia. The Histadrut's change of priority also meant that they no longer attempted 
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to seriously lobby the TUC and had no one to blame but themselves for the TUC's response 
to the war. 
 
Since the Six-Day War both the Histadrut and the Arab unions had used the ICFTU to 
campaign for support and once the fighting had stopped, the lobbying restarted. The Histadrut 
were unhappy with what they saw as the ICFTU's lack of support during the recent hostilities.  
Yagol wrote that a "general and hypocritical formula had taken over, saying "don't worry we 
will not abandon Israel's existence, but behind it there's even less real political and protective 
substance then in the Rogers peace plan."739  He reported that Kersten, the ICFTU General 
Secretary, and his friends had wanted to repair the "shocking impression their former 
declarations made, but the general attitude is superficial, evasive and insincere."740 Yagol also 
referred to both the West German DGB and the TUC when highlighting his concerns that the 
rise in the anti-Israeli and anti-Histadrut attitudes in Europe had been in some part due to the 
Europeans strengthening their connections with the Soviet bloc. He was concerned that many 
European trade unionists, mainly in Belgium, had avoided meetings and discussions with him 
because they were unwilling to commit support for the Histadrut and the TUC's "general and 
elusive statement focussing on humanitarian aid" was an example of this practice. 741  
British Government action  
The Foreign Office decided that in order to save costs Israeli labour issues would be covered 
in future by the labour attaché based in Athens, who would visit Israel at regular intervals.742 
The problems that had beset the Histadrut when they moved to Brussels were about to be 
repeated and the Foreign Office soon would discover that long-term personal relationships 
and understanding that had been built up over time could not be maintained by spending a 
few days in Israel every few months. How Corcoran, the new labour attaché, would deal with 
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the role which the Histadrut might play in any new political crisis in the Middle East, while 
based in Athens had yet to be resolved. What would definitely be missing in future would be 
the in-depth reports that had been prepared by his predecessors.  
In March 1974, the Histadrut held its 12th national convention which provided an opportunity 
for the international trade union movement to show solidarity with the Histadrut. Whereas the 
French, the Germans, the Belgians and the Dutch immediately accepted, the TUC once again 
declined their invitation. Murray rejected the invitation on the grounds of pressure of work 
even though he had previously  given Yagol the impression that he might attend. When Yagol 
asked him to reconsider, Murray was told by Hargreaves that "in the present circumstances 
given the General Council’s strict impartiality with regard to the Middle East conflict it might 
be we wise if we avoided accepting invitations in that area."743 The International committee 
decided however that although the TUC had not previously attended the convention in order 
to not to appear to take sides in the conflict, a refusal this time could be misunderstood. They 
decided to send  Hugh Scanlon, a senior member of the General Council, who would be able 
to explain the TUC's approach to the conflict.744 After informing the Histadrut that Scanlon 
would attend, Scanlon withdrew. As they were unable to find a replacement the General 
Council once again limited itself to sending  fraternal greetings.745 Although it appeared that 
the TUC had wanted to do the right thing, Scanlon, a powerful personality within the TUC 
who had been to Israel before, knew that it was politically expedient for him to turn down the 
invitation. Add to this the anti-Israel feelings on the General Council and it is hardly 
surprising that no replacement for Scanlon was found. Although their decision not to attend 
the convention could have been calculated not offend their Arab friends, the General Council  
decided to invite the Histadrut to attend their next Congress and resolved that Murray should 
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visit Israel during the next twelve months. The Histadrut were well aware of his unfamiliarity 
with the Arab-Israeli conflict and that there was an urgent need for Murray to go to Israel.746 
As a reaction to the Ma'alot massacre  of  22 children on 15 May 1974, the Histadrut wrote to 
the TUC insisting that they unequivocally condemn this atrocity and actively support the 
Histadrut's demand to immediately convene the ICFTU Executive Board. The incident, which 
had enraged the Histadrut had started when three armed Palestinian terrorists held 105 
children  and 10 adults hostage at a school in a town in Northern Israel. Hargreaves advised 
Murray that there was no need for independent TUC action as the ICFTU Executive Board 
would be meeting at the end of May and the TUC would be associated with their 
statement.747Although the ICFTU had condemned the terrorist act at the time, the Executive 
Board took no further action on the incident.748 
Yagol spent two weeks in Britain in December 1974 talking to leading members of the 
General Council about the rumours regarding a downturn in support for the Histadrut. He 
concluded that despite the warm welcome which he had received, a real threat to relations 
came from the PLO and the TUC's improving relations with the communist bloc.749 Once 
again he stressed the importance of arranging visits for British union leaders to Israel in order 
to show solidarity with Israel.750 He noted that the Miner's union executive with the exception 
of their President, Joe Gormley and General Secretary, Lawrence Daly, were all on the 
political Left and recommended that the Histadrut should strengthen ties with them.751 
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The  Labour Friends of Israel (LFI) was founded in 1956, in the wake of the Suez crisis, to 
promote support for Israel throughout the British labour movement and to strengthen the 
links between the British Labour Party, the trade unions and the Israeli Labour Party. In order 
to try and fill the void left by the Histadrut move to Brussels, the LFI concentrated its efforts 
on building support amongst the leadership of trade unions by taking study missions to Israel 
for both Labour MP’s and trade union officials. Although it succeeded in building good 
relations with many trade union leaders, it was unable to repeat that success with the TUC. 
Union leaders who supported the LFI during the 1970’s included  Joe Gormley, Gavin Laird 
(AEWU), Clive Jenkins and Doug Hoyle MP (ASTMS) and Geoffrey Drain (NALGO). 
In 1975, the LFI wrote to the Histadrut pointing out the "deterioration in the day to day 
relationship" with the unions and the TUC and urged them to appoint an UK Histadrut 
representative. They also warned of the strenuous efforts being made by the pro-Arab 
activists which made  the situation worse.752 The work of the LFI with regard to the unions 
was described as a holding operation, because, although it had the leadership of many of the 
unions on its side during the late 1970’s and up to the Lebanon war, it had by that time lost 
grassroots union support for Israel. 753 A 1978 confidential LFI report noted that they were 
unsuccessful in building support for Israel "in the group that will provide the next generation 
of trade union leadership".754 In order to formalise the LFI's work within the trade union 
movement, the Trade Union Friends of Israel (TUFI) was formed in September 1983.755   
The LFI reported, in January 1975, that six Labour MPs had met with Yasser Arafat, the PLO 
leader and had made plans for PLO “trade unionists” to meet with their British 
counterparts.756 Both Murray and Hargreaves reassured Yagol that they had no intention of 
inviting Arafat's "unions." Murray also told him of his intention to visit Israel and Syria later 
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in the year and hoped this visit would bring the Histadrut and the Arab unions closer 
together.757  
After the Yom Kippur war, Britain reassessed its policy towards Israel because of the Arab 
threat to use oil as a weapon and the threat to cut supplies to the UK. This revised  policy was 
illustrated by the ‘Craigium Dictum’. Its proponent, James Craig,  argued that, while Israel's 
security should not be compromised, Britain's extensive interests in the Arab world required 
that foreign policy had to be more sensitive to Arab attitudes than Israeli ones. Another factor 
for the change of policy was a sense that that many Arab states had some justice to their 
grievance when they blamed Britain for the establishment of the State of Israel due to the 
Balfour declaration and the decision to hand back the mandate to the UN in 1947.758 
In June 1975, the General Council, which preferred to have their own meetings with the 
Foreign Secretary rather than work through the Labour Party, discussed the situation in the 
Middle East with James Callaghan, the Foreign Secretary.759 Callaghan's comments reflected 
the Craigium Dictum:  he told the TUC that Britain could help both sides by remaining non-
aligned in the conflict and  while attempts were being made to re-establish links with Egypt 
and other Arab states without alienating Israel. The TUC also adhered to the Craigium 
Dictum and was encouraged by the Foreign Office to express this by rebuilding relations with 
the Arab trade unions. The TUC suggested that in order to reach a peaceful settlement in the 
Middle East the Government should try to counteract the impression that Britain was 
favouring Israel. Callaghan answered by saying that the Labour Party had made no secret of 
their close friendship with Israel or their desire to maintain those close relationships but also 
had made it clear that they wanted closer relations with the Arab States.760 Although the 
TUC-Histadrut relations had been very warm during the 1960s, they now had a much more 
critical and cooler relationship.  
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Murray's long awaited visit to Israel took place in August 1975.761 He was given briefing 
notes by the Foreign Office which included the Government's view on the conflict, the PLO, 
the moves to expel Israel from the UN, and the Arab boycott.762 Prior to his departure the 
International committee had recommended that the General Council approve their statement 
opposing moves to expel Israel from the UN. The declaration, which was issued after 
Murray's return, made it clear that they did not approve of the decision taken by UNESCO (in 
1974) to exclude Israel from membership of any regional organisation and would resist any 
attempt to limit Israeli participation or to exclude Israel from any other UN organisations 
including the ILO.763 On his arrival in Israel, Murray said that the proposal to suspend Israel 
from the UN would be a grave error and that "the TUC has a clear stand on attempts to 
suspend Israel....and we have given our opinion to the British government and to any 
organisations that have asked us about it."764  He was also reported as saying that that 
Britain’s unions supported Israel’s right to exist.765 Murray's three day visit, included a one 
hour meeting with Prime Minister Rabin, in which they discussed both political and 
economic issues.766 He returned to London with a much greater understanding of both Israel 
and its problems. Barnea, the Histadrut European representative, thought that his meeting 
with Rabin had "fundamentally changed how he thought of the conflict" and had a profound 
influence on him which shaped his view of the PLO for years to come.767  
Shortly after Murray had returned to London, the Jerusalem Post wrote that traditional trade 
union friendship for Israel was threatened as the younger union leaders had very little contact 
with Israel and that the Histadrut had not devoted enough time to the TUC since moving to 
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Brussels. The article warned that TUC continued to be "a dominant element in British life 
and its millions of members influence the Labour Government through its bloc votes. The 
fact of Histadrut neglect in fostering valuable ties here is something that needs immediate 
rectification."768  
The UN adopts its 'Zionism is Racism' resolution      
Matters came to ahead at the UN on 10 November 1975, when the UN General Assembly 
adopted an Arab backed resolution by 72 votes to 35 with 32 abstentions, which stated that 
"Zionism is a form of racism and racial discrimination." The Histadrut immediately wrote to 
the ICFTU and the TUC calling on them to demonstrate solidarity with the Histadrut and to 
publicise their views. The following day Barnea requested a meeting with Murray.769 The 
ICFTU statement declared that "the UN decision will hinder the establishment of peaceful 
relations in the Middle East and that it is morally and historically wrong to equate Zionism 
with racism."770 The ETUC also published a statement saying that the resolution showed "an 
alarming lack of responsibility on the part of the UN."771 Murray did nothing for two weeks 
until after the next General Council meeting even though he had previously spoken out about 
the TUC 's position on Israel and the UN. After the meeting Murray wrote to the Histadrut 
informing them of the TUC's backing for the ETUC statement explaining that they had raised 
the matter with the Foreign Secretary.772  
The TUC goes to Syria 
In September 1975, immediately after the TUC Congress, Murray and Jones went to Syria for 
a short visit. Most of their discussions related the Arab-Israeli conflict and they told their 
trade union hosts that the TUC supported the UN resolution 242 and the need to work for a 
secure and lasting peace for every state in the Middle East. They were concerned that the 
threats to expel Israel from the UN had been initiated by Syria and made it clear that the TUC  
was not aligned with either side in the conflict as their only concern had been to promote a 
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peaceful negotiated settlement. They did not receive a positive response from the Syrians  
when they offered to assist in promoting discussions at trade union level. The Syrian reply 
reflected the hard-line of their Government, that there could be no solution of the conflict 
without the total withdrawal of Israeli forces from occupied territory, the creation of a 
Palestine state, and a ban on further emigration into Israel. They did however accept that "the 
issue was the provision of suitable guarantees of security to Israel and to the new Palestinian 
State." The two organisations agreed to develop further contacts in the future.773  Jones and 
Murray reported that the Syrians "had shown some willingness to reach agreement on the 
basis that a secular state should replace the present state of Israel" which was not acceptable 
either to Israel or the General Council which had always believed "it should give a guarantee 
to Israel of her continued existence as an independent state."774 It was noticeable that while 
Jones and Murray submitted a report on their visit to the General Council, Murray did not 
present either a written or verbal  report on his visit to Israel. Jones spoke at the 1976 TUC 
Congress about their visit to Syria and asked delegates to support their aim of developing 
contact between the trade unions of the Arab countries and Israel. He told Congress that "You 
may say that is a dream, but we are still going to work for it. We do not believe that it is 
beyond the bounds of human ingenuity to find a peaceful and a just solution to problems of 
the Middle East."775   
The TUC and the campaign to allow Soviet Jewry to emigrate to Israel  
International relations between East and West improved during the 1970s because of the 
policy of detente between America, Russia and China, which culminated in the signing, in 
1975, of the Helsinki Accords which committed the 35 signatories, including Russia to 
respect the human rights and fundamental freedoms of their citizens.776 The improvement in 
diplomatic relations between London and Moscow during this period helped Jones and 
Scanlon rebuild links with the Russian trade unions. The effect of the burgeoning cooperation 
meant that Jones vehemently opposed moves for the TUC to support the international protest 
movement on behalf of Soviet Jewry, which were given a boost after the signing of the 
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Helsinki Accords.777 Jones believed that trade union leaders should be concerned about 
international trade union rights but not human rights, which he thought were a matter for 
Amnesty International.778  Even so this did not stop Jones, agreeing to become a spokesman 
for the Histadrut when dealing with the Russians.779 
The campaign by Jewish communities in America and Europe, which started during the 
1960s, aimed to persuade the USSR to allow Jews to peacefully practice their religion within 
Russia, and to leave the country if they so wished.780 Although Stalin had supported the 
establishment of the State of Israel in 1948, between 1949-53 Russian Jewry experienced 
extreme antisemitism and discrimination in religion, culture, and education. Overseas travel 
was prevented. The 1953 "Doctors plot", an alleged conspiracy to kill leading government and 
party officials was intended by Stalin to be the beginning of a new purge against the Jews. Stalin's 
death that year may have saved the Jews  from pogroms and deportation but did not save them 
from both "popular" and official government antisemitism. Nor was there was any change in 
Soviet policy regarding the recognition of Jews as a national group, which would have given 
them similar status to other minorities. When Stalin's successor, Khrushchev denounced Stalin 
in 1956 he said nothing about Stalin's anti-Jewish policies. Antisemitism in Russia continued 
under Khrushchev's leadership. His policies towards the Jews, which were moderate when 
compared to Stalin, were still harsh and based on "popular" antisemitism that rested on envy, 
suspicion and hatred. Khrushchev, who was personally prejudiced against Jews, introduced 
between 1957 and 1964 a series of measures which discriminated against Jews in 
government, education and employment and were aimed at stamping out the Jewish religion 
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and Jewish culture. After he was replaced in 1964 there was no real change in the 
Governments policies towards the Jews. However Israel's success in the Six-Day War 
sparked a revival of Jewish pride and interest in Israel amongst some Russian Jews and 
Soviet support for the Arabs led to a new crackdown which resulted in increased 
antisemitism.781  
The Government of Israel had been trying since 1948 to persuade the Soviet Union to allow 
its Jewish community to emigrate to Israel and used every opportunity to raise the issue. On 
the eve of  Khrushchev's visit to Britain in 1956, the Israeli ambassador to Britain  reported  
that  issues that would  be raised include "Russian Jewry, Israel and the Middle East and the 
Labour Party and Israel"   He  also noted that almost all the British press including the Times, 
Spectator, Manchester Guardian and Tribune had written about these issues and had called 
for a more liberal attitude to the Jews in the USSR.782 In Harold Wilson, the leader of the 
Labour party and future Prime Minister of Britain, the Israelis had someone who was very 
supportive and could be relied upon. On his return to London in the autumn of 1963, after his 
eleventh visit to Russia, Wilson told Ne'eman, the Histadrut London representative, that he 
had not been impressed by the authorities' treatment of the Jews in Russia, as every time he 
raised the issue the officials avoided getting into a discussion. Wilson admitted that he had 
only been able to achieve the confirmation of a few exit visas and thought that the situation 
would only get better if the Russians ever needed American government support.783 
The international trade union movement first became involved in the Soviet Jewry campaign 
in the autumn of 1972 when the ICFTU circulated the Histadrut's appeal for support for the 
campaign to allow Jewish emigration from Russia. Although many unions throughout Europe 
sent telegrams to their Russian counterparts it is not clear if any came from Britain.784 Yagol 
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reported that Feather had discussed Jewish emigration when he met the leaders of the Russian 
trade union movement (AUCCTU) during his visit to Moscow in December 1972. 785 
Between 1973 and 1977, Frank Chapple, the General Secretary of the Electrical, Electronic, 
Telecommunication and Plumbing Union (EETPU), who had left the Communist party over 
Hungary in 1956, regularly raised the issues of Soviet Jewry and human rights in Russia at 
both the International committee and the General Council. Along with Joe Gormley786 of the 
NUM, he was one of the first trade unionists to support the British 35s Women's Campaign 
for Soviet Jewry (the 35s) for the release of Jews who had been imprisoned in the USSR for 
applying to emigrate to Israel. The unions on the Left, which were led by communists or 
communist sympathisers had nothing to do with the 35s, whereas those unions on the Right 
supported them.787  
In March 1973, in response to Chapple's campaigning, the International department  prepared 
a briefing document “Minorities in the Soviet Union” which examined the position of all 
minorities in the USSR but focused mainly on the problems facing Soviet Jewry. 
Antisemitism was mentioned but not discussed in any detail. Whilst the USSR recognised 
national and ethnic groups, it did not recognise religious groups. Jews were therefore 
registered a national group and while individual Jews had the right to practice their religion 
they did not have the right to teach it. According to the report, the Soviet authorities had 
exerted pressure on Jews who they suspected had dual loyalties to the USSR and Israel. 
Zionism was seen as an international anti-Soviet movement which supported Israel and 
American foreign policy. Although it was not against the law to emigrate, various difficulties, 
which were not seen as discriminatory by the government, had been placed in the way of 
those Jews who had applied to emigrate to Israel.788 In the light of Jones and Feather's 
forthcoming visit to Moscow in July 1973789 and the temporary suspension of the education 
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tax levied on Jewish emigrants due to world opinion, the International committee decided to 
discuss the issues with the Foreign Office.790  
Yagol, who attended the 1973 TUC Congress, reported that the TUC wanted to achieve 
international unity amongst the European unions which he felt would lead to more contact 
with  Russian and Eastern bloc unions and have implications for Israel and the Jews. When 
Jones was asked, at the Congress, by a journalist about the persecution of Jews, he attempted 
to justify the persecution by quoting the President of the AUCCTU who had told him that 
anti-Semitism was forbidden by law.791 Yagol's fears were confirmed, in November, when 
Murray announced an agreement between TUC and the AUCCTU that emphasied the 
importance of cooperation between the TUC and AUCCTU and between ICFTU and the 
Communist unions.792  
Chapple continued to press the TUC to discuss civil liberties in the USSR. In September 
1973, his letter to the General Council was sent directly to the Soviet Ambassador in London, 
whose reply in January 1974 was forwarded to the EETPU.793 Chapple did not consider this a 
proper course of action and wrote again to the Council asking  why they had not discussed 
the issue of Soviet dissidents.794 At their April meeting, the International committee were told 
that the General Council would only protest in cases of Soviet dissidents that involved trade 
unionists or trade union matters and not political cases. It was made clear that "dissidents in 
the Soviet Union were either individuals seeking greater freedom of expression or minorities, 
such as Jews who wanted to go to Israel, but that trade union freedoms were not at issue in 
these cases." This view allowed the TUC to ignore the issue of Soviet emigration to Israel 
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and the committee took no further action on the matter.795 Not disheartened, Chapple wrote 
again in June  asking the committee to reconsider their decision as he had found it "difficult 
to understand how individual liberties could be separated from trade union liberties" and 
suggested they recommend to the General Council "that they should protest strongly against 
the continued suppression of liberty in the Soviet Union."796 It was made it clear to Chapple 
that the General Council position "regarding different regimes might not appear even handed 
but that situations varied from country to country" and "that in some cases persuasion was far 
more effective than public denunciation."797  
At the end of March 1975, a delegation from the Soviet All-Union Central Council of Trade 
Unions (AUCCTU), led by Alexander Shelepin, their Chairman and Politburo member, 
arrived in Britain as a guests of the TUC. The visit, which was a return visit for the TUC's 
trip to Russia two years earlier, was very controversial. Even before Shelepin arrived in 
London questions were asked in Parliament by MP's on both sides of the house as to why as 
the former head of the KGB who had been accused of complicity in the assassination in West 
Germany of two exiled Ukrainian leaders was being allowed to enter Britain.798 Wherever he 
went he was met by noisy demonstrations organised by the Women's Campaign for Soviet 
Jewry(the 35s), as well as Ukrainians, Lithuanians and other ethnic minorities in Britain 
whose homelands were, they felt, under Soviet occupation. Many politicians and trade 
unionists could not understand why the TUC had invited him, nor the TUC's indifference to 
the plight of the persecuted minorities in the Soviet Union. The Russians were so 
embarrassed by the strength of the demonstrations that they cut short the visit from four to 
two days and left the general impression that the visit was a fiasco, especially for the TUC. 
Shelepin blamed the “Zionists” for the demonstrations against him.799 
Prior to Shelepin's visit the Histadrut arranged for their friends, such as Scanlon to ask the 
Soviet delegation questions about Israel's borders, the Histadrut and Soviet Jewry. Yagol 
reported that Shelepin was "empathic and supported the international promise of Israel's 1967 
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borders". His answers about Soviet Jewry were "shorter and standard", nor did he rule out 
meeting with the Histadrut's General Secretary in the future.800  
Chapple asked the General Council, in February 1976, if it would be willing to deliver to the 
Soviet Ambassador in London a petition, organised by the 35s campaign, for onward 
transmission to the AUCCTU, because the Soviet Embassy had refused to accept it. The 
petition, which had been signed by General Council members and many TUC Congress 
delegates, called on the AUCCTU to investigate the arbitrary dismissal from work of Soviet 
trade unionists who had applied to emigrate to Israel.   Chapple also asked if the Council would  
approach the AUCCTU for information about a Soviet Jew, Sender Levison a metalworker, 
who had recently been sentenced to seven years imprisonment for "parasitism."801 The 
General Council decided instead to ask the Soviet Ambassador for details of their emigration 
policy and about the cases to which the EETPU had referred.802 The Embassy's reply denied 
that Soviet Jews who had wished to emigrate had been dismissed from work adding that only 
those applicants who had access to State secrets or who had been convicted of crimes had 
been refused permission to leave. Two months later, the General Council told the EEPTU that 
they would not forward the petition because the TUC should not become involved in campaigns 
organised by non-trade union organisations and particularly on sectarian issues when the facts in 
contention had not been clearly established. They advised the EETPU that it might be better to 
raise individual cases on an informal basis rather than by making official representations.803  
The EEPTU raised the matter of Soviet dissidents once again at the 1976 TUC Congress 
stressing that they would continue to press the General Council to take action on behalf of 
workers in the Soviet Union who were being arbitrary dismissed because they were Jewish.804 
In January 1977, Chapple once again asked the General Council to protest to the Soviet 
Government about the persecution of individuals and minority groups in the Soviet Union. 
Their letter commented that "it was difficult to understand how individual liberties could be 
separated from trade union liberties and that the General Council protested in every way 
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possible on matters affecting such countries as Spain or South Africa but did not act in a like 
manner with regard to the Soviet Union." The following month, the Council decided to 
continue with their existing policy of raising such cases informally. Chapple then requested 
that the General Council publish a statement in support of the Labour Party resolution 
protesting against unfair trial of Yuri Orlov, a non-Jewish Soviet dissident. who founded  the 
Moscow Helsinki Watch Group and was sentenced to 10 years penal detention in 1978. The 
request was refused on the grounds that it was not a trade union issue and therefore not 
covered by the TUC's policy on human rights.805 
The  1977 TUC Congress debated  two motions relating to human rights. The first, which was 
adopted, condemned the gross violations of human rights that continued to take place 
throughout the world and asked member unions to support campaigns on behalf of 
imprisoned and tortured trade unionists conducted by Amnesty International.806 Congress, 
rejected the second motion which criticised the lack of credibility in the TUC's response to 
the suppression of freedom of speech and human rights in the USSR and the Eastern Bloc. 
Jones, opposed the motion arguing that the TUC supported detente between East and West 
and if adopted this resolution would not help as "we look for ways to open doors, to create 
opportunities to change, not to close doors or to create continued division."807 
During 1978, Chapple notified the General Council of several instances of job dismissals in 
the Soviet Union, but once again was told that they could only act on behalf of dissidents if 
they were members of a trade union. The EEPTU did successfully move a motion on human 
rights at the 1978 Congress which called for the TUC to actively support a charter for basic 
human rights in all countries. Chapple told delegates that they had only brought this matter to 
Congress because of the General Council’s narrowly defined interpretation of human rights 
when they applied it to communist states which concerned itself purely with trade union 
rights and ignored the upsurge in demand for civil liberties in the Soviet Union.808 The 
adoption of this resolution allowed the TUC over the next decade to become more flexible in 
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their dealings with Soviet Jewry which was helped by the ending of the Cold War and the 
Gorbachov reforms in Russia. 
Frank Chapple and his union were very much the flag bearers in 1970s when it came to 
speaking out  for human rights and Soviet Jewry, especially at Congress. There was however 
intense rivalry between Chapple and Jones which was  partly due to domestic industrial 
rivalry between the EEPTU and TGWU, their views on the USSR, as well as a very strong 
personal dislike between them.809  
The reluctance of the TUC to become involved can be explained by the strong influence of 
the Left on the General Council and the leadership skills of Jones who ensured that the TUC 
did not criticise Russia over human rights, or acknowledge officially the plight of Soviet 
Jewry.810 Jones, who had led the TUC's drive for detente with the Soviet Union, used every 
possible tactic to not become involved with the Soviet Jewry campaign. This  included the 
argument that the Jews were not members of trade unions, or that British trade unions did not 
have the full facts or that they were only following government policy.811 It is also possible 
that Jones, although not a Communist, behaved as he did because of the support he had 
received from the communists when he was elected as General Secretary of the TGWU.812  
Whatever the reason, the TUC were out of step with the Labour Party, who were much more 
flexible and frequently gave their support to the 35s.  The TUC, which had denounced 
antisemitism and discrimination against the Jews in the 1940s, accepted without question the 
denial by the Russian authorities that antisemitsm existed in the Soviet Union. Jones in 
particular seemed to have made no connection between Soviet Jewry and his friendship with 
the Histadrut, Israel. He kept each one separate, and because of his position on human rights 
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and the desire to normalise relations with the Russians, Jones opposed all moves for the TUC  
to support the public campaign to allow Soviet Jewry to emigrate to Israel. 
With the TUC moving closer to Europe and Russia, the TUC became less of a priority for the 
Histadrut once Cousins had retired. The Histadrut concentrated instead on building links with 
the German and Scandinavian unions.813 This explains why the Histadrut, who were very 
active in mobilising support for Soviet Jewry with the ICFTU and trade unions in the USA 
and Europe, only raised the issue of Soviet Jewry with the TUC during the early 1970s.  
Yagol, their European representative, however, helped the 35s build their own links with 
several British trade unions.814 
The International Labour Organisation ( ILO) 
 
During the 1970s the Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO) tried to obtain international 
diplomatic and political recognition for the Palestinians. In February 1975, they applied to the 
ILO, which was part of the UN, for observer status at all future meetings. The application 
was made on the grounds that they had already been given consultative status in other UN 
organisations and had been recognised as the sole spokesman of the Palestinian people. The 
national liberation organisations in the Portuguese African territories had been allowed to 
attend ILO African region meetings as observers because they were responsible in part for the 
internal administration in their territories, a status the PLO had yet to achieve.   
 
The TUC International department discussed the matter with the German DGB union and  
advised the General Council that the PLO's application was bound to divide the ILO.815 
Yagol wrote to Murray saying that they were concerned about the application and that 
regardless of the outcome they expected the TUC to support the Histadrut. He urged the TUC 
to enforce "measures aimed at the preservation of the constitution and future of the ILO." 
                                                 
813  Author's discussions with Shmuel Bahat, the Director of the Histadrut International Department, 1968-74, 
and the Deputy Chairman until 1983, London,10 October 2012. 
814 For the 35s links with the unions see Gerlis, "Those Wonderful Women in Black", pp.121-9. The 35s received 
very little assistance from the BOD. The Prime Minister discussed Soviet Jewry with the BOD on 19 September 
1973, 7 April 1975 and  24 May 1977. TNA:PRO, PREM15/1853 and PREM16/1815. 
 
815The TUC had abstained in June 1974 at the ILO meeting which had adopted a resolution condemning the 
Israeli policy of discrimination, racism, and violation of trade union freedoms against the Arab workers in the 
occupied territories. Memo for TUC/DGB Meeting, 14 December 1974, MRC, MSS.292D/956/511/1, TUC 
General Council  minutes, 5 August 1974, MRC, MSS.292D/901/6 and LMU, item 278, ILO conference, TUC 
Congress report 1974, p.196. 
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Murray answered by saying that the "General Council will take your views into 
consideration."816  
 
As no decision on the application was made at the February 1975 meeting, the PLO were 
invited to attend the next ILO meeting in June.817  Yagol was reassured by both Murray and 
Jones that the TUC would continue support the Histadrut.818 The debates at the June meeting 
were at times highly contentious, with an emphasis more on political issues rather than the 
work of the ILO, as illustrated by the Algerian delegate's comments "We must give the PLO 
observer status as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people who are waging 
a just struggle against Zionism, imperialism and the imperialists' agents to gain their freedom 
and dignity."819 Although the TUC supported an unsuccessful Australian amendment, the 
meeting agreed to allow the PLO to attend general and regional ILO conferences.820 Later 
when the PLO delegate addressed the meeting, both the Israeli and American delegations 
walked out.821 Consequently, the US House of Representatives decided to suspend US 
financial contributions to ILO and the American Government gave notice to leave the ILO.822 
As well as contacting the Foreign Office, the TUC issued a statement emphasing their 
opposition to attempts to exclude Israeli participation in UN organisations.823  Jones, told the 
1975 TUC Congress that the ILO was the only forum  where all the trade union movements 
of the world met and was split, "not industrially, but politically." He explained that the move 
to allow the PLO to attend meetings had been opposed by the General Council, because the 
                                                 
816 Yagol to Murray, 23 January 1975 and Murray to Yagol, 29 January 1975, both MRC, MSS.292D/956.9/1. 
817 A majority of unions including the TUC, had wanted to postpone the proposal to allow the PLO to attend the 
June conference. TUC International Committee minutes 7, April 1975, MRC, MSS.292D/901/8. 
 
818 Yagol to Meshel, 20 March 1975, (Hebrew original), PLILMR, IV-219A-4-149B and Meshel to Murray, 15 
April 1975, MRC,MSS.292D/956.9/2.   
819 Yves Beigbeder, "The United States’ Withdrawal from the International Labor Organization," Industrial 
Relations, vol.34, no.2, 1979, p.227. 
820  The Australian amendment wanted to ensure that all liberation movements admitted to ILO meetings fully 
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Ibid, p227. 
821 TUC International Committee minutes, 7 July 1975, MRC, MSS.292D/901/8. 
 
822 The United States eventually rejoined the ILO in 1980. Beigbeder, "The United States’ Withdrawal from the 
International Labor Organization", p.228. 
823 The TUC wrote to the Foreign Secretary who concurred with the TUC’s opinion on the matter. TUC 
International Committee minutes, 4 August 1975,  TUC General Council Statement, 29 August 1975, Murray to 
Foreign Office, 28 August 1975, Foreign Office reply 8 September 1975, all MRC,MSS.292D/956.9/1. 
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PLO was not a country nor an established trade union movement.824 Both Jones and the TUC 
had been true to their word and had backed the Histadrut.  
Arms to Egypt 
In June 1975 Egypt announced that they were negotiating with Britain for the supply of arms 
and equipment, a move which angered Israel. Britain argued that it did not wish to upset the 
balance of power in the Middle East but it was important that Egypt was not totally 
dependent on Russia.825 Although no arms were ever supplied, the issue strained Anglo-Israel 
relations The importance of this issue was that it took place at the same time as Israel 
negotiating with Egypt over the future of the Sinai. Gormley wrote to Murray in December to 
ask that the International committee discuss the Egyptian arms deal which he believed might 
lead to increased British involvement in any future conflict. To reinforce his concerns he 
included with his letter a short paper on the negative aspects of the proposed sales.826 It not 
known who provided Gormley with the detailed information for his analysis attached to his 
letter, but because of his support for Israel for it seems likely it came from an Israeli 
source.827 The Foreign Office then provided a briefing paper for the International committee 
which stated that the Government would be willing to consider requests for arms from 
Middle East countries which in their opinion would not endanger "the achievement of a just 
and lasting solution of the dispute between the Arabs and Israel."828 Reports of an arms deal 
with Egypt were "speculative," but if the Egyptians were to ask for arms, their request would 
be given a sympathetic hearing as long as Egypt was seen to be seeking a negotiated political 
settlement for the Middle East. The Committee agreed that the government's aim should be to 
promote negotiations for a peace settlement and the expansion of trade links, other than the 
trade in arms, with both sides in the conflict. They agreed to forward their views to the 
Gormley and the Foreign Secretary.829  After reading about the TUC's attitude to arms sales, 
                                                 
824 LMU, International debate, TUC Congress 1975 report, p.490. 
825 For more information on Anglo-Israel relations during this period see Lochery, Loaded Dice; The Foreign 
Office and Israel, pp.161-63. 
826 Gormley letter and report  to Murray, 22 December 1975, MRC, MSS.292D/956/511/1.   
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828 TUC Memo to Murray, 30 December 1975,  MRC,MSS.292D/956/511/1.  
829 TUC Memo to Murray, 5 January 1976, TUC International Committee minutes, 5 January 1976, Murray to 
Gormley, 14 January 1976,  Murray to the Foreign Secretary, 6 February 1976, Foreign Office reply to Murray, 
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Barnea wrote to Murray about what he described as "the impartial approach of the TUC 
regarding Israel and Egypt."  He explained that "a weak Israel is a danger to peace and could 
encourage its neighbours to launch a war against it." Barnea ended by asking Murray the 
question,  if  Israel was "the sole working democracy in the Middle East, why should the 
TUC support the weakening of Israel?" Murray made no attempt to answer his questions and 
once again replied by saying we "have noted your views."830 
The Arab Boycott of Israel  
In the aftermath of the Yom Kippur war, while bilateral relations between the UK and Israel 
had improved, British companies became increasingly reluctant to trade with Israel due to the 
fear of a potential boycott that would affect their trade with the Arabs.831 When, in 1976,  
Israel urged the British Government to adopt similar anti-boycott measures to those planned 
by the Americans, the Foreign Office advised the Prime Minister, James Callaghan, that 
"with the possible exception of the United States, we do not think it is true to say that there 
are any major trading countries whose attitude to the boycott is more helpful to Israel than 
ours."832  Nor did the Foreign Office hide the fact that trade with the Arab States was worth 
far more to Britain than trade with Israel.833 The nub of the matter was that the Arab boycott 
had caused problems for the British Government's policy which was to maintain friendship 
with both Israel and the Arab states in order to promote trade as well as back international 
initiatives for a settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict.  
In February 1977, Gormley asked the TUC to discuss the case of the Metal Box company 
which had been threatened with the loss of substantial business in the Middle East unless it 
disposed of a 25 year old investment in an Israeli canning company. As a result of informal 
discussions with the International committee, the TUC decided to leave matters to the unions 
                                                 
830 Barnea to Murray, 26 February 1976 , TUC reply, 8 April 1976, both  MRC, MSS.292D/956/511/2. 
 
831 The British Ambassador to Israel, annual review for 1974, 8 January 1975, TNA:PRO, FCO93/704 and 
annual review for 1976, 10 January 1977, TNA:PRO, FCO93/1146. For more information about the actions of 
British Companies towards the boycott during the 1970s. Prittie, The economic war against the Jews, pp.120-36. 
 
832 The Israel Minister for Foreign Affairs to the Prime Minister, 2 January 1976, Foreign Office to the Prime 
Minister's Office, 15 January 1976,  TNA:PRO, PREM16/1473 
833 In 1975 the UK's trade with the Arabs increased by 75% to a figure of about £1.4 billion. Trade with Israel 
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concerned in the company.834 The TGWU did approach Metal Box to discuss the matter as 
they had been told that any closure of the Israeli company could result in substantial job 
losses.835 The Government  also expressed its concern, but refused to intervene saying that 
"the decision is purely commercial and must be taken by the companies concerned."836 Metal 
Box subsequently decided to surrender to the boycotters demands and sold off its investment.  
On his return to Israel after the 1977 TUC Congress, Meshel, the Histadrut General secretary, 
asked the TUC to intervene on the Arab boycott which he said had affected unemployment in 
some sectors in Israel and asked Murray "in the name of workers solidarity to do everything 
in your power to prevent British firms from giving in to the Arab boycott"837 This appears to 
be the last time until 1983 that the matter of a boycott was raised with the TUC. In 1978 the 
Government ignored the recommendations of a report of the House of Lords Select 
Committee on anti-boycott legislation, preferring instead to support what it called "European 
Community initiatives" to combat boycotts but continued to discuss the effects of the Arab 
boycott with the BOD and the Israel embassy.838  
Israeli Politics move to the Right   
Three weeks before the Israeli general election in May 1977, Mason, the British Ambassador 
to Israel wrote a report on the decline of the Histadrut, which he described as one of the triple 
pillars of the State. Once a great and powerful institution, it now had little influence and 
prestige. Mason noted that even with all its problems, the Histadrut was the second largest 
employer in Israel, employing some 70,000 workers in its various economic enterprises and 
provided medical services for nearly 70 per cent of the population.  In order to reverse its' 
                                                 
834 Murray to Gormley, 15 February 1977, MRC, MSS.292D/956/511/2. See also Prittie, The economic war 
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decline and restore its authority, Mason wrote, "the Histadrut may need radical re-
organisation, including electoral reform, and perhaps to hive off some of its activities to the 
Government or the private sector." He concluded that the Histadrut's future depends on future 
Government policies and the Israeli economy. "It will survive, but in what form and with 
what influence is uncertain."839 
When the Labour Party lost the Israeli general election it was much more than just a change 
of government, it was a political earthquake. The socialist and Zionist ideals of Ben Gurion 
and Mapai which had controlled the political scene for over 35 years were replaced by the 
Likud movement led by Menachim Begin, which was a mixture of Revisionist Zionism, the 
supporters of Jabotinsky and the land of Israel movement.840 Members of the British 
government were deeply suspicious of the new Prime Minister, who they saw as an ex-Irgun 
terrorist and the natural successor to Jabotinsky who championed a Greater Israel stretching 
from the Jordan to the Mediterranean. The Labour Left, led by Mapai, had dominated the 
political scene from 1935 onwards, firstly in the Yishuv, the Jewish community in Palestine, 
from 1930s until 1948 and had formed every government since independence. In 1965 Mapai 
merged with Ahdut HaAvoda, its main rival on the Left, to form the Alignment and three 
years later Rafi joined with the Alignment to form the Israel Labour Party. Mapai also 
controlled the Histadrut which had administered the Yishuv. The General Secretary of the 
Histadrut was always been a senior party member, a member of the Knesset (Parliament) and 
frequently a Government Minister, an arrangement which allowed the Histadrut to work very 
closely on international issues with the Labour Party.    
Mike Walsh, the former head of TUC International department , described the special 
relationship that existed between the Israeli Government and the Histadrut:  “In the first half 
of the 1970s and the 1980s, Israel was denied diplomatic recognition in large parts of the 
world and that made the significance of Histadrut very much greater, because it was Histadrut 
through its trade union credentials that could get a presence for Israel in all sorts of countries 
in the Middle East and Africa. This was why we supported the work of their Afro-Asian 
Institute. During the 1980s the Histadrut became diplomatically less significant because as 
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FCO 93/1178. 
 
840 For more information about Likud's victory in the 1977 election see; Tessler, A History of the Israeli-
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things developed, with greater diplomatic recognition, the Israeli presence through Histadrut 
became less and less important. It was the face of Israel in many countries. It was really 
important, not just to Histadrut but to the whole Israeli state to be represented on the 
governing bodies of the ILO and the ICFTU.”841   
Soon after the election, Mason, met with the Histadrut to discuss future Histadrut relations 
with the new Right wing government.842  He reported that the Histadrut were prepared to wait 
and see what the new government had to offer but their first task was to rebuild the Labour 
Party and the Histadrut type of Zionism on which the state was founded.843 Mason also 
reported that Meshel had been invited to attend the TUC Congress in September. He 
recommended that a meeting be arranged between Meshel and Judd, the Minister of State at 
the Foreign Office, because "Meshel is currently the most powerful Labour Party figure in 
Israel because he is the only one with a power base and is a sensible and shrewd observer of 
the Israeli scene."844 During their discussions Judd told Meshel that, although the PLO had 
said and done some quite unacceptable things there could be no lasting settlement which did 
not take account of their views. He confirmed that the government's position of not 
recognising the PLO had not changed.845 While in Britain, Meshel invited the TUC to attend 
the Histadrut Convention which took place in November 1977. Once again they declined the 
invitation on grounds of "unavoidable domestic commitments " for all their  senior General 
Council members.846   
Shortly after the UN had adopted a mandatory arms embargo on South Africa in November 
1977, the TUC met with the Secretary of State at the Foreign Office. As a supporter of the 
anti-apartheid movement in South Africa, the TUC told him of their concern about the reports 
of Israeli military cooperation with South Africa. The Minister replied saying that "Israeli 
military cooperation with South Africa was a matter of international concern to be raised with 
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the Israeli government at an early opportunity and he added that an approach at trade union 
level might also be helpful."847 Israel's economic alliance with South Africa, which flowed 
from secret negotiations by Shimon Peres, Israel's Foreign Minister, had by 1977 resulted in 
South Africa being Israel's single largest customer for arms. The new Begin government, 
rather than being opposed to arms sales to South Africa was "more than happy to violate the 
UN embargo."848 It was therefore no surprise that Histadrut replied that "they had been 
formally notified by the Israeli Foreign Ministry that Israel abided fully by the UN resolution 
banning arms sales to South Africa."849  There is no record of the TUC taking any further 
action on this matter. 
Between the 1973 war and Israel's  invasion of Lebanon in 1982,  the ICFTU kept a watching 
brief on the situation in the Middle East and only discussed matters or issued statements 
when tension in the region rose or when serious incidents justified a response.850 The 
Histadrut continued to be an active participant in ICFTU but from 1977 onwards its actions 
were limited as the Labour Alignment, of which it was part, no longer governed Israel. There 
was also limited contact with the TUC as well as very little discussion of Israel-Arab conflict 
either by the General Council or the International committee, for example there is no record 
of any discussion of the 1978 Camp David accords. The only mention of them is in the report 
of the 1979 ICFTU World Congress which adopted a resolution welcoming the Camp David 
agreement.851  The result was that the TUC made very few interventions with the Histadrut 
over PLO terror attacks on Northern Israel, preferring instead to support ICFTU actions.852  
The TUC starts to move away from Israel and towards support for the Palestinians  
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A series of events took place at the time of the 1979 TUC Congress which appear to be the 
beginning of a serious effort by grassroots activists to gain TUC support for the Palestinian 
cause. In August, Len Murray  received what appeared at the time  an unsolicited letter from 
the Beirut based Palestine Trade Unions Federation (PTUF), the trade union wing of the PLO 
which drew attention to the problems of the Israeli occupation and called for TUC support.853 
As it turned out it was the first move in a campaign to promote Palestinian trade union rights 
in Britain. A few weeks later, a petition calling for the recognition of Arab trade unions in the 
West Bank and Gaza was circulated at Congress by the UK Palestine Coordination (UKPC) 
committee. The aim of UKPC which worked under the LMEC umbrella and had PLO 
support, was to play a pivotal role in promoting the UK campaign for Palestinian rights, as 
well as coordinating and supporting Palestinian solidarity groups and activists on campus and 
in the trade unions.854  
One of the first actions of the UKPC was to circulate a petition at the 1979 TUC Congress 
calling for the recognition of Arab trade unions in the occupied West Bank and Gaza and the 
release of a jailed trade activist. The petition, which was signed by 250 trade unionists - 
including "General Secretaries and shop stewards" - was sent to the Israeli Minister of 
Defence, who was responsible for the administration of the the West Bank and Gaza.855 The 
signing of this petition by such a large number of delegates is significant as it shows that 
already in 1979 there was a groundswell of support at grassroots level for Palestinian rights.    
In October UKPC approached Moss Evans, the General Secretary of the TGWU who wrote 
to Murray asking for information about TUC and ICFTU policy towards the UKPC. Murray 
replied saying that they had no information about UKPC but had made inquiries with the 
ICFTU.856 The TUC also received a letter from the UKPC saying that they were arranging for 
a PTUF delegation to visit to the Britain in November and had requested a meeting with the 
TUC. On the advice of the TUC international Department in order to hear the views of the 
PTUF, Murray arranged for the PTUF to meet with a member of the International 
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department.857 The ICFTU then told the TUC that the ICFTU had no contact with the PTUF 
and that "the PTUF is generally considered to be a tool to promote the Palestinian cause in 
the Middle East conflict amongst trade union organisations at international level rather than a 
real trade union body." 858 Shortly after receiving this reply the PTUF’s visit to London was 
cancelled due to "visa difficulties."859   
Murray had not arranged to meet with the PTUF himself because, according to Mike Walsh,  
"Murray was very resistant to the International department opening up any contact with the 
Palestinian Trade Unions, but it did happen towards the end of his time as General 
Secretary."860 Aaron Barnea, the Histadrut European representative, thought that this was 
because Murray had "fundamentally changed how he thought of the conflict" after his 
discussions in August 1975 with Israeli Prime Minister  Yitzhak  Rabin. 861 Murray had been 
persuaded to arrange a meeting with the PTUF after reading a very detailed memo prepared 
by Hargreaves, the Head of the International department, who had very close links with the 
Foreign Office. The Foreign Office permitted informal contact with the PLO even though the 
official Government's policy was not to have any formal contacts until the PLO renounced 
violence. 862 Murray, did not want to meet the PTUF himself because, at that time, he was 
opposed to having contact with the Palestinian trade unions.863  
Over the next 12 months the Histadrut became increasingly concerned about the growing 
support for the PLO within the European trade unions. It noted the increasing support  for the 
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pro-Palestinian activists within the Labour Party, although they had not yet made an impact 
on the TUC. However, in February 1981 the Histadrut highlighted their concerns in a report 
to the Israel Foreign Ministry which outlined their plans to send delegations to six European 
countries including Britain for three weeks in order to challenge PLO propaganda.864 These 
plans do not appear to have come to fruition.  
TUC visit to Israel and Egypt 
Cousins, Hayday and Jones who all believed that the trade union movement had a role to play 
in any settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict, failed to bring together the Arabs and the 
Histadrut. It was the Americans, the AFL-CIO, at their 1977 annual convention who 
succeeded, when they brought together the Histadrut General Secretary and the President of 
the Egyptian Federation of trade unions, when they shook hands on the platform in the 
manner of Sadat and Begin.  
Frank Cousins and Fred Hayday, whose attempts to try and bring about direct contact 
between the Histadrut and the Egyptian trade union movement after the 1967 Six-Day war 
failed mainly because the political situation in the Middle East in the aftermath of the war 
worked against them. To their credit  they never gave up, even though they found it difficult 
playing the role of honest broker when the TUC was perceived by the Arabs as a pro-Israel 
organisation. It fell to the Americans, ten years later, in the wake of President Sadat's historic 
visit to Jerusalem to bring together the Histadrut General Secretary and the President of the 
Egyptian Federation of trade unions, at the 1977 AFL-CIO annual convention when they 
shook hands on the platform in the manner of Sadat and Begin. Following the meeting the 
Histadrut issued a formal invitation to the Egyptians to visit Israel telling the ICFTU that 
"any settlement should be with all Arab countries" and that they would be willing to host to 
delegations from other Arab counties.865 The following year, Aaron Barnea, the Histadrut 
European representative asked Britain's union leaders who had contacts with Arab trade 
unions to tell them of the Histadrut's desire to establish links with the Arab unions.866 
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Three years later, as a result of this initiative and improving contacts between Israel and 
Egypt, a TUC delegation went to both countries in November 1980.867 The report of their 
visit made it clear that the Histadrut was critical of the Israeli Government's settlement 
policies and were not involved in trade union activity in the occupied territories. The 
Histadrut were however, like many Israelis, opposed to any contact with the PLO until the 
PLO had accepted Israel's right  to exist. The TUC delegation told the Egyptian Federation of 
Labour (EFL) that the Histadrut were committed to Israel's survival as well as the peaceful 
resolution of the Middle East conflict and wanted to establish closer links with them. The 
EFL, who were reluctant to improve its links with Histadrut in case they caused 
embarrassment to their Government, told the delegation that although Egypt accepted Israel's 
right to exist and supported the peace treaty with Israel, any lasting resolution of the Arab-
Israel conflict would have to involve the PLO and all the countries of the region, not just 
Israel and Egypt. The TUC representatives replied saying that they "understood the need for 
care and the importance of timing, and that if at any time it appeared that the TUC might be 
of help in fostering better relations it would be glad to assist."868  
The Israeli Air force's successful strike on Iraq's Osirak nuclear reactor on 7 June 1981 
ensured Menachem Begin's re-election as Prime Minister in Israel's general election at the 
end of  June. On the 10 July the IDF resumed its attacks on Palestinian targets in Southern 
Lebanon which culminated in the bombing of  PLO buildings in downtown Beirut on 17 July 
which killed as many as 300 people. The international outcry that followed led to worldwide 
condemnation of Israel's actions, and a temporary embargo on the export of US aircraft to 
Israel.869  It was therefore no surprise that the ICFTU reacted to events by issuing a statement 
on 23 July which  not only condemned the PLO attacks and the disproportionate response the 
Israeli army, and also called on affiliates to bring pressure on their governments to bring 
about a ceasefire.870 The General Council agreed to Len Murray's suggestion that TUC send a 
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telegram to the Histadrut which expressed their concern "at the increasingly dangerous 
situation in the Middle East and its repercussions for world peace."871  This was an unusual 
step for the TUC because in recent years they been happy to back the ICFTU in these type of 
situations and there had been very little direct contact the Histadrut on political matters even 
though a TUC delegation had visited Israel the previous year. It is not clear who raised the 
matter but it was probably a Left-wing member of the council and a supporter of the 
Palestinians. The Histadrut's  reply to the ICFTU, which was also sent to the TUC, noted that 
a ceasefire was now in place which had put an end to "the senseless killing of innocent 
civilians on both sides of the border".  The letter pointed out that the tension had been caused 
by the Syrian army presence in Lebanon and that Israel had "no dispute with the government 
or the people of the Lebanon."872  The conflict was discussed again at the next Council 
meeting when it was suggested that Arab trade union organisations should also be asked for 
their views on recent developments. Accordingly, Murray wrote to the Federation of 
Petroleum Trade Unions (FPTU) in the Lebanon in October to ask for their views on how the 
international trade union movement could help to bring about a peaceful solution to the 
situation.873 This appeared to be a strange move for the TUC as they had not had any direct 
contact with the Lebanese unions for several years. However, in view of increasing support 
amongst trade unions for the Palestinians, both at grass roots and at the TUC, Murray was 
obviously aware of the need to do something. 
The Norwegian Federation of Trade Unions, who had been in contact with the Palestine 
General Federation of Workers and the Histadrut, wrote to the TUC in July saying that they 
had asked the ICFTU to lead a campaign for  a peace settlement in the Middle East. The 
ICFTU statement on the violence which condemned the PLO attacks and the disproportionate 
response the Israeli army, also called on affiliates to bring pressure on their governments to 
bring about a ceasefire.874 The TUC told the Norwegians that although they supported their 
efforts they did yet not have any direct contact with the Palestinians.875 The following 
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January after their meeting with the Foreign Office, the TUC pledged to use their contacts, 
including those with the Histadrut, to urge negotiations for a lasting and just peace agree-
ment876 and invited the Histadrut as an official guest to the 1982 TUC Congress.877  
The Lebanon War  
The 1982 Lebanon War began on 6 June when Israel invaded southern Lebanon ostensibly to 
remove the PLO from the area in order to protect northern Israel from terrorist attacks.878 
However it was soon evident that the military operation which had been masterminded by 
Defence Minister Sharon had more far reaching ambitions to occupy all of Lebanon up to 
Beirut and the surrounding areas  and eliminate the PLO rather than just clear a 40 kilometre 
area on Israel's northern border.  
The incident which triggered the invasion took place in London rather than Israel or Lebanon. 
On 3 June 1982, Palestinian gunmen belonging to the Abu Nidal group shot and seriously 
wounded Shlomo Argov, Israel's Ambassador to Britain. Abu Nidal, whose group had broken 
away from Fatah and the PLO in 1974, had carried out the assassination attempt in order to 
provoke the Israelis into military action against the PLO.   
The June meeting of the ETUC, which was held within days of the invasion, was used by the 
TUC and others to express their concerns. A proposal to issue a ETUC statement was turned 
down on the grounds that any ETUC action duplicated the work of the ICFTU.879  The TUC 
then received a copy of the Histadrut's telegram to the 1CFTU  which said  that invasion had 
been carried out in self-defence in order to prevent attacks on Israel from Southern Lebanon. 
The Histadrut had also endorsed a statement made by the Israeli Labour Party calling on the 
Israeli army to stick to its original plan of only venturing 40 kilometres inside Lebanon, 
"supporting the establishment of an effective international force to guarantee peace and 
stability in the Lebanon and calling for the withdrawal of all foreign forces from the 
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Lebanon." They also called for negotiations to be started leading to the re-establishment of an 
independent Lebanon with which Israel would live in peaceful co-existence and that the 
Israeli army should not occupy Beirut.880 The statement issued by the Tunisian ICFTU 
affiliate, the UGTT, which was circulated by the ICFTU,  reflected the Arab point of view.  
The ICFTU called for a strict observance of the ceasefire, the withdrawal of both Israeli 
forces and armed Palestinian groups from Lebanon and for negotiations in which both the 
Israelis and the Palestinians would recognise the other's right to exist.881 When the TUC 
International committee met on 5 July it decided against publishing its own statement even 
though a draft statement had been prepared which highlighted the suffering amongst civilians 
and supported the ICFTU call instead.882  
On 16 August, Murray wrote to both the Histadrut and FPTU to ask for their views on the 
situation.  Murray made it very clear to the Lebanese that he thought that the Israeli invasion 
was "impossible to justify on the grounds that it is necessary to secure Israel against terrorist 
attacks on Israel by the PLO" and that the force they had used in Beirut was 
disproportionate.883 His letter to the Histadrut was more forthright, saying that "the prolonged 
shelling and bombing of Beirut and the killing of Lebanese civilians and the destruction of 
their homes as a result appears to go far beyond action necessary to protect Israel against 
terrorist attacks." Murray then compared the IRA's terrorist attacks in London to the Israeli 
armed forces whose actions had been "on a scale which is not justified on the grounds that it 
is aimed at combating terrorism." He concluded by asking if the Histadrut had condemned the 
destruction of Beirut and the killing of Lebanese  civilians  and whether it had taken the issue 
up with the Government.884 
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The Trade Union Friends of Palestine (TUFP )  
Scotland has always had a tradition of independence and no more so than in Scottish Labour 
movement  which created the TUFP which was to play a major role at the TUC regarding 
support for the Palestinians. The Scottish Trades Union Congress (STUC), which was formed 
in 1897 to protect workers' rights in Scotland, is an independent trade union centre for 
Scotland and is not connected in any way with the TUC. It first became interested in the 
Arab-Israeli conflict in the early 1970s.885 In  October 1975 the STUC adopted a resolution 
which described the situation in the Middle East as a threat to world peace but also 
recognised both  Israel's right to exist as well as the rights of the Palestinian people.886 Copies 
of their resolution were sent to the Egyptian and Israeli Ambassadors in Britain. Benny 
Shiloh, the labour attaché at the embassy, met with the STUC General Secretary to discuss 
the resolution. Shiloh was told that founding of the State of Israel had been a mistake and that 
the Histadrut had declined a visit by the STUC because they had wanted to visit neighbouring 
Arab countries.887 Shiloh concluded after several meetings with the STUC that they were 
dominated by communists which explained their unfavourable position towards Israel. He  
recommended that the STUC General Secretary should be invited to visit Israel in order to 
prevent future STUC anti-Israeli actions.888  
Elsewhere in Scotland, Dundee became from 1969 onwards, a centre of grassroots support 
for the Palestinian cause amongst the local Labour Party,889 and trade union activists and 
students at Dundee University.890 The TUFP was established in Dundee in June 1980 to 
promote support for a Palestinian homeland within the trade union movement. The founders 
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included George Galloway, then a local Labour Party activist, Yousef Allen, a Palestinian 
postgraduate student at Dundee University and  Dundee MP, Ernie Ross. They all understood 
that in order to gain Labour Party support for the Palestinian cause, they first needed to gain 
the backing of the trade unions and the TUC because the block voting system used at Labour 
Party conferences gave the trade unions disproportionate power and influence over Labour 
Party policy decisions.891 By September 1982  the TUFP, which had been backed by Allen's 
links with the PLO, could count on support from activists from both wings of the Labour 
Party. Support from the Left included the General Secretaries of the Fire Brigades union 
(FBU), the Engineers (AUEW) and the Railway union ASLEF as well as officers from the 
General and Municipal Workers union (GMWU) , the TGWU and the Scottish Miners. David 
Warburton, a senior Officer of the GMB Union, who was a member of the LMEC,  brought 
with him the right wing of the trade union movement when he joined the TUFP, which  
previously had only been supported by the Left. 892 
Israel's invasion of Lebanon provided the TUFP with the opportunity to change TUC policy. 
In September 1982 at the TUC Congress,  Ken Cameron, General Secretary of the FBU and 
member of TUFP, tabled an emergency motion, written by Galloway, which condemned 
Israel’s invasion of Lebanon and recognised “the national rights of the Palestinian people to 
self-determination within an independent sovereign state.”893 The  TUC International 
department recommended to the General Council that they should support the emergency 
motion but with reservations as it differed in certain aspects from existing TUC  policy and 
the TUC had never before dissociated themselves from the call for negotiations based on UN 
resolution 242.  The emergency motion went further than resolution 242 because "242 does  
not refer to the Palestinians by name and only affirms the necessity for achieving a just 
settlement of the refugee problem." The Council were warned that if the emergency motion 
were adopted without any reservations, it would rule out other "possible ways in which 
Palestinian aspirations might be satisfied" and it was thought that the FBU would not want to 
                                                 
891 Author's interviews with George Galloway, Secretary of the TUFP 1980-83, London, 19 October 2011 and 
Mike Walsh, TUC International Department , 1966-99, 6 November 2007, London. Walsh described the work 
of Yousef Allen, who became the British representative of the PTUF during the 1980s as “although not part of 
the PLO office in London, he did have an influence on the unions and the TUC because of the access he had to 
Palestinian sources.”  
892 LMU, TUFP Newsletter, September 1982 and author's interview with George Galloway, Secretary of the 
TUFP, 1980-83. 
893 LMU, TUC Congress proceedings 1982, International Committee debate, pp 615-7 and author's interview 
with George Galloway, Secretary of the TUFP 1980-83.  
239 
 
stand in the way of any settlement that was acceptable to Palestinians. The Council were also 
advised that if the motion was adopted, any influence the TUC had with the Histadrut might 
be reduced.894 
In the three days leading up the debate there were lengthy discussions between the FBU and 
the General Council. The unions appeared to be divided as the FBU were supported by the 
TGWU and the GMB and the General Council by NALGO and the AEUW. Cameron was put 
under a lot of pressure by the General Council who promised that if he withdrew the motion 
it would be considered by the International committee.895 On the advice of colleagues, 
Cameron  refused their requests which gave the General Council no alternative but to oppose 
the motion.  
Opening the debate, on the last day of Congress, Cameron said that "this motion in fact points 
the real direction for peace and security for all the states, including Israel" and he found it strange 
that the General Council were opposed to this motion as he had not been trying to be divisive in any 
way.  He told delegates that they could not let the crisis in the Lebanon pass without making a state-
ment  on the matter and made the point that "If the General Council cannot go along with the policy 
of the British Labour Party, then there is something wrong with the General Council in their 
attitude towards this motion."896 Opposing the motion, Tom Jackson, the Chairman of the 
International committee, speaking on behalf of the General Council informed delegates that 
they did not have to pass this motion in order to record their dislike of what had happened in 
Lebanon or ensure that UN resolution 242 was upheld because the TUC had already endorsed the 
ICFTU statement on the matter. He then told the Congress that "You do not need to pass this 
motion because of your understandable feeling for the need to have a homeland for the 
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Palestinian people. That too is the policy of the General Council." This was technically not 
true as this was not General Council policy.  TUC policy was to support the ICFTU statement 
which only referred to the rights of the Palestinian people but not that the only way that their 
rights can secured was through an independent state.897 Jackson urged delegates to oppose the 
motion because the Council believed it was wrong at this crucial and important stage of developments 
in the Middle East and had said to Cameron " let us not divide ourselves. Let us see what will be the result 
of the discussions that are taking place." He continued “We are in an extremely important and 
delicate stage of Middle Eastern politics and this is not the moment for us in Brighton, with all the 
troubles that we have got, to go muddying the waters still further.”898 His appeal to Congress was in 
vain, as the motion was carried, on a show of hands, by a very substantial majority with no 
need for a card vote. Jackson who was considered to be pro-Israel and due to retire after 
Congress took the defeat personally as he believed it reflected on his chairmanship of the 
International committee.899 Cameron told this author that the main purpose had been to debate the 
subject and he had been surprised by the overwhelming support he received for the motion. Galloway, 
on the other hand, who had been lobbying at Congress, had always felt confident of 
success.900 
The TUFP, rather than one of the more established groups had succeeded, not only because they were 
in the right place at the right time, but because the TUFP had brought together young ambitious Left-
wing Labour party politicians and union activists as well as having a direct connection with 
Palestinians and the PLO.901 Their connection with Dundee and the local University had also 
contributed to their success because the city's identification with the Palestinian cause during the 1970s 
had been driven by the many Arab students that had been studying there. The TUFP continued to 
build on its success at the TUC  over the next few years and its supporters included the 
General Secretaries of ASLEF, FBU, AUEW-TASS, the Tobacco Workers union and 
SOGAT, several of whom were members of the TUC General Council.  It  was active within 
many unions including the AUT, AUEW-TASS, NATFHE, ACTT, SOGAT, NUPE, NUM, 
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NUJ, NALGO, the TGWU and the Scottish TUC. The TUFP campaigned for the 
disaffiliation of the Histadrut from the ILO and a boycott of Israeli goods and services.   
A week after the TUC Congress, the National Union of Miners (NUM) which had been very 
supportive of Israel and the Histadrut in the past, passed an emergency resolution on Lebanon which 
condemned "the brutal attack by Israel on the Lebanon in pursuit of what appears to be their 
"final solution" of the Palestinian problem."902 
Ken Cameron, the General Secretary of the FBU, told this author that Israel’s invasion of 
Lebanon and the intense media coverage of the bombing of Beirut had  helped bring about 
increased support for the Palestinians in both the unions and the Labour Party because the 
reports on TV news bulletins every night had helped change opinions.903 The TUC received 
many letters from all over the world as well as local Trades Councils and union branches 
calling on them to condemn the Israeli invasion and give recognition to the PLO and endorse 
the creation of a Palestinian state.904 Ernie Ross MP, one of the founders of the Trade Union 
Friends of Palestine (TUFP)  invited the TUC to join an ad-hoc committee against the Israeli 
invasion  which had been formed in support of the Palestinian people.905 The only previous 
time that the TUC had received so many letters regarding the Arab-Israel conflict was in 
1948, when American unions wrote to the TUC calling on them to support the newly declared 
State of Israel.906  
Support for the Palestinians within the Labour Party at constituency level, especially in 
London and Scotland, illustrated the successful infiltration of the Trotskyist activists and the 
influence of the Left. 907 Their opposition and anger against Israel's invasion of Lebanon 
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played an important part in changing the Party's position on Israel. In August the Jewish 
Chronicle reported that the Labour Party conference scheduled for the end of September had 
received two resolutions on the Middle East, both of which were anti-Israel, one condemning 
the Israeli invasion of Lebanon, the other advocating support for an independent Palestinian 
State. Yet by the beginning of September, no less than 46 emergency motions had been 
submitted to the Labour Party's conference. The FBU's motion urged that "Her Majesty's 
Government should insist in the strongest possible terms that America cease to support the 
Zionist fascists in the present Israeli Government."908 The invasion also brought about a 
significant reaction from the Parliamentary Labour Party. Between April and June 1982 there 
were three Labour-sponsored pro-Palestinian EDMs, while there was not a single Labour-
sponsored pro-Israel EDM. In June 1982 Michael Foot sponsored an EDM which condemned 
Israel's invasion of Lebanon and endorsed the UN Security Council's call for an immediate 
cease-fire and the withdrawal of all Israeli forces from Lebanon.909 Following the successful 
TUC Congress motion, the Labour Party NEC presented to a resolution their annual 
conference which was critical of Israel. The resolution, which was unanimously approved, 
condemned the massacre in the Beirut refugee camps and the complicity of the Begin 
government as well as calling for the establishment of a Palestinian State, with the PLO to be 
involved in negotiations.910 The conference also adopted very two "hostile" anti-Israel 
motions, which were narrowly approved due to trade union support. 911 These resolutions 
marked the final collapse of the pro-Israel consensus within the labour movement and 
provided an opportunity for Labour grassroots condemnation of Israeli policy. It showed how 
far TUC and Labour Party activists had moved towards the Palestinian nationalist cause since 
1967.  
During the 1960s  Bert Ramelson, the CPGB's industrial organiser, abandoned the previous 
strategy of working for change primarily at grass roots level  and instituted a new approach 
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which was to put his own people in leading positions in the unions in order influence union 
policy.912 A new approach was necessary because the Party had been in a gradual decline 
since the late 1940s because of the Cold War and the refusal by the Labour Party to allow the 
CPGB affiliate. By the late 1970s, Ramelson's new strategy had given the CPGB 
considerable power and influence within the trade union movement, as many leading unions 
had either communist, or communist supported members on their executive committees.  At 
the end of each year Ramelson would send a list of policies to his members within the unions 
which the CPGB wanted the trade unions to take up. This ensured that the most important of 
these polices would appear on the agenda of the TUC Congress the following September. All 
Communist delegates would meet before Congress and discuss tactics to ensure success for 
Communist polices and election of their candidates.913  Along with the three communists who 
sat on the TUC General Council in 1982, Ken Gill, General Secretary of TASS, George Guy,  
General Secretary of the Sheet Metal Workers union and Mick McGahey, vice-president of 
the Mineworkers, there were other Left wingers who frequently voted with them, whilst not 
communists themselves, felt comfortable with Communist policies and were also members of 
the caucus that Ramelson had organised.914 The result was that the CPGB was able to 
influence decisions made by the General Council and TUC and Labour Party policy.915 Even 
though the CPGB were supportive of the Russian pro-Arab policy on the Middle East and the 
Palestinian right to their own homeland, they were not involved in any way with the FBU 
motion. Their support for the FBU motion had been both coincidental and advantageous as it 
ensured that a resolution condemning Israel had been adopted, something which had never 
previously been achieved.916  
 The killings at the Sabra and Shatila Palestinian refugee camps 
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916 Author's interview with George Galloway, Secretary of the TUFP 1980-83, London, 19 October 2011. 
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If the invasion of Lebanon harmed Israel's support and international reputation, the killing of 
800 Palestinian and Lebanese civilians which took place between 16-18 September by 
Lebanese Phalangist militia in the Sabra and Shatila Palestinian refugee camps in Beirut 
caused anger and outrage throughout the world and no more so than at the TUC and the 
ICFTU. The killings were blamed on the Israelis as they had controlled access to the 
camps.917 These events marked a profound shift in the attitude of the TUC and the unions to 
the problems of the Middle East. Two days after the massacre, the TUC issued a statement 
which expressed their horror and outrage at the brutal murder of civilian refugees in Beirut.918 
It was followed by a call for an independent international inquiry into the killings.919 The 
ICFTU sent affiliates copies of their statement as well as those from the Histadrut and the 
UGTT. The ICFTU, as well as being "shocked and disgusted by the barbaric massacres" once 
again repeated the call for the fundamental rights both of Israel and the Palestinians to be 
recognised on the basis of UN resolution 242. 920 The UGTT blamed the massacres on the 
"bloodthirsty Zionists and their allies," comparing the killings to the acts of the Nazis saying 
that Israel was "a colonialist and racist state and an aggressor."921 The Histadrut expressed 
their "revulsion and profound shock at the massacres" and called for the resignation of the 
Prime Minister and Defence Minister, the immediate withdrawal of Israeli forces from Beirut 
and for a judicial enquiry into the killings.922 
The TGWU  called on the TUC to impose a boycott on all Israeli ships and aircraft until they 
withdrew their troops from the Lebanon.923 The International department advised that for a 
boycott to be effective, international agreement and support would be needed, which had not 
been forthcoming when they had canvassed the ICFTU and other national trade union bodies. 
                                                 
917 For more information about Sabra and Shatila see: Tessler, A History of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, 
pp.590-9 and Morris, Righteous Victims a History of the Zionist-Arab Conflict 1881-2000,  pp.543-9. 
918 TUC Finance and General Purposes Committee  statement, 20 September 1982, MRC, 
MSS.292D/956/511/2. 
919 TUC General Council minutes, 22 September 1982, MRC, MSS.292D/20/16 and TUC General Council 
statement, 22 September 1982, MRC, MSS.292D/956/511/2. 
920 ICFTU Press release, 21 September 1982 and ICFTU letter to Murray, 22 September 1982, both 
MRC,MSS.292D/956/511/2. TUC International Committee report, IC1/8, 4 October 1982, MRC, 
MSS.292D/901/23. 
921 Kersten letter to LM 22 September 1982, MRC,MSS292D/956/511/2 
922 Histadrut statement 20 September 1982, MRC,MSS292D/956/511/2 
923 TGWU letter to TUC, 20 September 1982, MRC,MSS.292D/956/511/2. 
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Their memo revealed that "It would be unprecedented for the General Council to boycott 
another country's vessels and aircraft to force political decisions by it" and that the TUC 
stood a much better chance of influencing Israel through the Histadrut "even though so strong 
is the feeling" within unions movement for a boycott. The proposal for a boycott was not 
adopted by the General Council.924 In Israel the "Peace Now" movement held a rally in Tel 
Aviv on 25 September 1982 attended by 400,000 Israelis. It called for the establishment of a 
commission to investigate the massacres, as well as the resignation of the Defence 
Minister Sharon.925 Although the demands expressed by this rally and the statement issued by 
the Histadrut were similar to the TUC's own demands there was no acknowledgement of this 
fact by the TUC.     
Copies of the Congress resolution were sent to the Foreign Secretary, the Labour Party, the 
ICFTU, the Histadrut, the FPTU, the Israeli and Lebanese Ambassadors, and the UN. They only 
received replies from the Labour Party,926 the Foreign Secretary 927 and the Israel Embassy. The 
Israeli response was that "Israeli military operations against terrorists in the Lebanon had 
been designed to bring an end to the death, destruction, and terrorism initiated by the PLO 
against Israel and its citizens and that they constituted a legitimate exercise of the right to self 
defence."928 The International committee report to the 1983 Congress omitted the words in italics 
                                                 
924 Walsh memo to Murray, International Department  paper IC1/8 on the Middle East, International Committee 
minutes, all 4 October 1982 and MRC,MSS.292D/956/511/2, General Council minutes, 4 October 1982, 
MRC,MSS.292D/956/511/3. 
925 "The Lebanon War", Ynet news, 8 January 2006. Retrieved 4 May 2014. 
926 The Labour Party reply said that they supported a peaceful permanent settlement which guaranteed national 
self-determination for everyone within secure and internationally recognised borders and called on the both the PLO 
and the State of Israel  to recognise each other's legitimate claims to statehood. Labour Party to the TUC, 3 
December 1982, MRC,MSS.292D/956/511/3 also TUC International Committee minutes, 10 January 1983, 
MRC,MSS.292D/901/2. 
927 The International committee considered that the Foreign Secretary's general comments were not sympathetic 
to those of the TUC, but noted that he had said that the Congress resolution was close to the view taken by the 
European Community and the British Government. They only differed regarding the creation of Palestinian state 
which the Government believed had to be decided by all the parties directly concerned. The TUC then asked 
Francis Pym, the Foreign Secretary, for his comments on their call for independent inquiry into the killings. He 
replied saying that he doubted "whether a further investigation at this stage would serve much purpose". TUC 
International Committee minutes, 1 November 1982, MRC, MSS.292D/901/23, Foreign Secretary to Murray,4 
October 1982, Murray to Foreign Secretary, 29 October 1982 and Foreign Office reply,12 November 1982, all 
MRC, MSS.292D/956/511/2. 
928 The words in italics were omitted from the LMU, the International Committee report, TUC Congress 
proceedings 1983,  p.216, but were reported in full in the TUC International Committee minutes, 1 November 
1982,  MRC, MSS.292D/901/2. 
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which had been Israel’s justification for her invasion of Lebanon.929 This omission showed  bias 
against Israel, which reflected the attitude to Israel within the unions and the General Council.  
Meshel replied on behalf of the Histadrut saying that they were disappointed that the TUC  
resolution only demanded the withdrawal of the Israeli armed forces and not the withdrawal 
of all foreign forces from Lebanon. He wrote that "as far as the establishment of an 
independent, sovereign state for the Palestinian people, which your resolution advocates, I am 
sure that far from bringing peace and security, such a separate state is a certain recipe for 
constant tension and more war and bloodshed."930 
The  Palestine Trade Unions Federation (PTUF), based in Syria, thanked the TUC for their 
support and asked for a meeting with the TUC. Murray was advised that the PTUF were 
affiliated to the communist WFTU and replied that they were only interested in making 
contact with unions that were independent and representative of  their members.931 The TUC 
also received letters from local Trades Councils detailing resolutions that had been adopted 
regarding the recognition of the PLO,932 the establishment of a Palestinian homeland,933 a 
boycott of Israel934 and one which compared Israeli actions in Beirut with the Nazis 
extermination of the Jews.935   
On the 11 January 1983, representatives of the General Council met with a Histadrut 
delegation in London. This discussion provided an ideal opportunity for both groups to 
                                                 
929 The Charge de Affaires also explained that Israeli forces would leave the Lebanon as soon as agreement had 
been reached on the withdrawal of all foreign forces and that  Israel rejected the idea of an  independent Palestinian 
state but recognised the rights of Palestinians  according to the Camp David agreement. In further correspondence with 
the TUC, the Embassy wrote that Israel deplored and condemned the murder of Palestinians but flatly rejected 
"accusations of direct or indirect complicity" and had established a judicial inquiry committee. TUC to Israel 
Embassy, 30 September 1982, Israel Embassy to the TUC, 5 October 1982 both MRC, MSS.292D/956/511/2,  
Israeli Embassy to the TUC, 8 November 1982, MRC, MSS.292D/956/511/3. 
930 Meshel added that the Histadrut supported the position of the Israeli Labour Party, that a just solution to the 
Palestinian problem can only be found "on the basis of territorial compromise with Jordan whose Palestinian 
citizens account for over 60% of the Jordanian population." Their letter also reminded the TUC of the death and 
destruction caused by the eight year old Lebanon civil war which had involved the PLO and the Syrian army. 
Meshel to Murray, 21 December 1982, MRC, MSS.292D/956/511/3. 
931 PTUF to the TUC, 3 October 1982 , Walsh memo to Murray, 15 October 1982, TUC reply to PTUF, 28 
October 1982, all  MRC, MSS.292D/956/511/3 
 
932 Portsmouth Trades Council to the TUC, 15 October 1982, MRC, MSS.292D/956/511/3. 
 
933 Harwich Trades Council to the TUC, 19 October 1982, MRC, MSS.292D/956/511/3. 
 
934 Southampton Trades Council to the TUC, 25 October 1982, MRC, MSS.292D/956/511/3. 
 
935 Runcorn Trades Council to the TUC, 1 November 1982, MRC, MSS.292D/956/511/3. 
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explain their respective positions. The meeting was probably arranged by Eli Marx, the 
Histadrut's former European representative who was now working for the International 
department  of the TGWU. In their opening remarks, the TUC made it clear that even though 
there was a long history of friendly relations between both countries, many people in Britain 
had reassessed their attitude to Israel  as a result of the Israeli invasion of Lebanon, their     
"brutal, protracted, bombardment of Beirut" and the massacres at the Sabra and Shatila  
refugee camps. These events had resulted in increased support for the Palestinian people. The 
Histadrut responded by making clear that they had opposed the Lebanon invasion, the 
bombing of Beirut, and advocated the withdrawal of Israeli forces from Lebanon. But in their 
opinion, the PLO had been liable for much of the suffering in Lebanon and most Israelis 
believed that the PLO would refuse to recognise and negotiate with Israel.936  
The Histadrut also said that they opposed the policy of settlements in the occupied territories 
and supported discussions with the Palestinian people, but would not accept the PLO as their 
representative. The delegation were told then that if a peaceful solution were to be found, 
Israel would have to reach an understanding with representatives of the Palestinian people 
and it seemed that most of the Palestinians accepted the PLO as their representatives. The 
Histadrut were also asked if they had any contact with the Palestinians or any of the Arab 
trade unions in the Middle East. They confirmed that they did not have any contact with the 
PLO as they controlled the GFPTU which they did not regard as a proper trade union 
organisation. They added that, although, they were prepared to meet without any 
preconditions  representatives of any Arab trade unions, this would not happen unless their 
government's had given them permission to do so. When asked "if the TUC could be an 
intermediary," the Histadrut replied that they already had links with Egyptian trade unions. 
and the TUC should understand that a precondition of any contact with Arab trade unions, 
was that they should first recognise Israel and at present dialogue was not possible as they 
unreservedly supported the PLO. The Histadrut added, that it was difficult to see how the 
TUC could help in the circumstances. In conclusion, the Histadrut asked for the 
understanding of the TUC of "the obstacles which other countries in the region put in the way 
of peace"  and the political constraints on its position as "many Israeli working people 
supported the aggressive nationalistic policies of the Begin Government and had criticised the 
                                                 
936 TUC report of the meeting with representatives of the Histadrut, report, IC5/2, 11 January 1983, MRC, 
292D/956/511/3. 
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Histadrut for its condemnation of the invasion of Lebanon, the bombardment of Beirut, and 
for its call for an inquiry into the massacres." The meeting closed with a TUC representative 
reminding everyone that as tensions had been rising in the occupied territories "it was 
essential that there should be negotiations between the Israeli authorities and genuine 
representatives of the Palestinians." and that the "TUC hoped that the Histadrut, would in turn 
understand the concerns of working people outside the Middle East region and take any 
opportunity to contribute to a dialogue which could lead to a just and lasting peace."937  
The Histadrut's feelings about the meeting are not recorded. Apart from receiving the 
comprehensive TUC report of the meeting, the minutes of the International committee 
indicate very little as regards to future TUC thinking. The committee noted the Histadrut's 
rejection of the TUC's offer to help and suggested that the TUC should continue to build links 
with Arab trade unions in the hope that trade union involvement in any future peace 
settlement might be useful. They also discussed the National Union of Teachers (NUT) 
proposal to send a TUC delegation to the Lebanon and the occupied territories to investigate 
the position of Palestinian working people. The committee were advised that although the 
Histadrut supported a visit, the Israeli authorities would not allow the delegation to have 
contact with Palestinian representatives in the West Bank and in Beirut. Under the 
circumstances they agreed not to go ahead with the visit.938 Although Murray did not allow 
the TUC to have any official contacts with the PLO during the early 1980s, he was aware that 
Mike Walsh, the Head of the International department had made informal contact with the 
PLO through Yousef Allen at the TUFP. At this time Walsh  had already been in contact with 
the General Federation of Palestinian Trade Unions (GFPTU) and hoped to speak with a 
Palestinian trade unionist who was visiting Britain at the end of January 1983.939  
Conclusion 
From 1945 onwards the Histadrut had put a lot of time and effort into lobbying the TUC 
especially at key moments, in order to gain TUC support for Israel. The result was that the 
TUC rarely took the initiative and only discussed Israel related issues at the Histadrut's 
                                                 
937 The Histadrut had come to London at the invitation of the TGWU. Their visit was organised by Eli Marx, 
their former representative, who now worked for the TGWU. Ibid. 
938 International Committee minutes, 7 February 1983, MRC, MSS.292D/956/511/3. 
939 Walsh memo Murray, 7 February 1983, MRC, MSS.292D/956/511/3 and author's interview with Mike 
Walsh, Head of TUC International Department 1980-99. 
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request except when events such as the 1956 and 1967 wars impacted on Britain. 
Consequently, the overall effect was that over the years, the TUC was like 'the dog that didn't 
bite,' it made a lot of noise to very little effect. However from the 1973 war onwards, the 
TUC became proactive rather than reactive to events in the Middle East. This was because 
the Left, who were in control of the TUC, felt confident enough to take their concerns about 
Israel's actions and her behaviour towards the Palestinians directly to the Histadrut. Their 
support for the Palestinian cause was welcomed by grassroots activists in both the unions and 
the Labour Party.  
The outcome of this move away from Israel resulted in the 1982 TUC Congress resolution 
which was the first time the TUC had  adopted a motion critical of Israel. Why had the 
Histadrut allowed this to happen? Firstly, the Histadrut's importance in Israel had declined in 
the 1970s as had its international role supporting the Israeli government in world affairs. Its 
international and domestic influence declined even further with the Likud victory in Israel's 
general election of 1977. Secondly, the Histadrut leadership had decided in the early 1970's 
that because the TUC's main focus was now Europe and Russia, their priority was the ICFTU 
and the German and Scandinavian unions rather than the TUC. Although they maintained 
contact with the British unions and the TUC, the bulk of the lobbying was carried out by the 
Israeli embassy, TUFI and the 35s. Consequently they lacked the contacts and leverage to 
avoid the passage of a hostile motion.  
Could the Histadrut have done more? - Certainly. The decision to move to Brussels in 1968 
took place at the wrong time, when changes were taking place in Britain within the labour 
movement and they were frequently told afterwards that they had  made a mistake and missed 
an opportunity. But the Histadrut, like the TUC, had limited resources for overseas 
programmes and were never able to build the necessary links to identify and educate future 
British union leaders about Israel. This lack of resources meant that whilst they concentrated 
on the leadership of the unions they had no answer  to the  changes that were taking place at 
grassroots level.  Another factor which affected the outcome was the wrong emphasis placed 
on visits to Israel by prominent figures from the unions and the TUC. These trips have always 
been and still are a top priority for the Israelis and the Histadrut, but too much effort was 
concentrated on making these guests into friends and not political allies. The visitors 
throughout this period were always shown the work and achievements of the Histadrut along 
with a bit of tourism so that on their return to Britain, they praised Israel. Only on a few 
occasions was any attempt made to incorporate into their itinerary serious political 
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discussions in order for them to understand Israel's position in the Middle East, so that in 
times of trouble their friendship hopefully could be turned into sympathy and support.  
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Conclusion 
The main purpose of this study has been to explore and explain the attitude of the British 
trade union movement towards Israel and discover if it has changed. This question, which has 
never been properly investigated before is important because from the 1960s onwards, the 
Israel-Palestine conflict has become an increasingly contentious and divisive issue especially 
for the trade union movement.  
The most surprising discovery has been that although the Labour Party  was established as 
the political wing of the trade union movement, the TUC had a totally different attitude when 
it came to public support for Israel. Apart from 1945-50 the Labour Party has been one of 
Israel's staunchest supporters, whilst the TUC only really engaged with Israel between 1962-
73. It is often assumed that because both the Histadrut and the TUC have frequently referred 
to the friendship between them which stretches back to the 1920s, the TUC, have always, like 
their partners in the British labour movement,940 the Labour Party, identified themselves with 
Israel.  
Why was this was so? It was due to a number of factors, including the Labour Party's 
involvement in international politics and its longstanding support for a Jewish homeland as 
well as its relationship with the British electorate and the Jewish community. While some 
Israelis remained bitter towards Britain due to the events of the 1930s and 40s  many Mapai 
and Histadrut members, because of their European background, identified themselves with 
Britain and the British labour movement and made connections with the British Labour party 
through the Socialist International. 
The trade unions and the TUC have not had that same close relationship with the Jewish 
community as the Labour Party and the CPGB. The majority of Britain’s Jews who joined the 
Labour and Communist Parties in the 1930s, had left their trade union roots behind them after 
the Second World War when they moved into the middle classes. From then on, Anglo-
Jewry's support for Israel in Britain was directed towards the political parties and Parliament 
and not the trade unions, which no longer had a large number of Jewish members to put 
pressure on them. 
                                                 
940 The TUC is not affiliated to the Labour Party along with many unions who are affiliated to the TUC. The 
TUC represents both affiliated and non-affiliated trade unions.   
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Whilst it has not been a problem for Jews to be Labour members of Parliament, only a 
handful of few Jews have become union leaders.  The only Jewish trade unionist who spoke 
up for Israel in the period of this study was Solomon Lever of the London Jewish Bakers 
union, who represented his union at TUC Congress in the 1940s and 50s. The move towards 
the Left within the unions in the late 1960s and 70s saw three Jewish left-wingers, hold 
prominent positions, Laurie Sapper, General Secretary of the Association of  University 
Teachers (AUT), his brother, Alan Sapper, General Secretary of the Association of 
Cinematograph, Television and Allied Technicians (ACTT) and John Tuchfeld, Assistant 
General Secretary of TASS, all of whom were silent on Israel. Both Alan Sapper and 
Tuchfeld were members of the CPGB and associates of Bert Ramelson, the industrial 
organiser for  the CPGB. Throughout the study there have been a number of trade union 
leaders, who stood up for Israel, the most prominent being Sam Watson, Frank Cousins, Fred 
Hayday, Jack Jones and George Woodcock,  none of whom had any Jewish connections. 
Anti-Zionism  has  been a feature of the CPGB's Middle East policy since 1945 apart from a 
short period when the State of Israel was established. At that time Jewish members of the 
CPGB did not have a problem in identifying themselves as Jews and Communists but many 
left the Party in the 1950s over the revelations of antisemitism in the Soviet Union. Since 
then the majority of Jews who remained in the CPGB such as Bert Ramelson were anti-
Zionists.  
When it came to international politics, the TUC under Tewson rigidly followed, not only the 
Bevin doctrine towards Israel but also Foreign Office advice to promote Britain's influence in 
the Middle East. Understandably, the TUC's priority in the international field was the ICFTU 
and Israel/Palestine was only one of a number of issues relating to international politics and 
the Cold War. Whereas the Labour Party were never afraid of giving their public support to 
Israel, it was only towards the end of this study that the Parliamentary Party's public support 
for Israel started to wane.  
The lack of contact between the international affairs departments of the TUC and the Labour 
Party, came about because each organisation had different priorities. Whereas of the Labour 
Party was concerned with the political dimension of international matters, the TUC's only 
requirement for their involvement was that there had to be a trade union element. For 
example, in the 1960s the TUC worked with the emerging unions in South Africa and not the 
political, anti-apartheid movement. They did not become involved with the campaign for 
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Soviet Jewry until the mid-1980s because of the lack of a trade union connection. If 
involvement demanded them linking up with a political movement such as the African 
National Congress (ANC) or the PLO and their trade union affiliates, then the TUC always 
said no.  When the Labour Party was in power, however, it was important  for the TUC to 
have contact with the Party and the government. The TUC worked very closely with the 
Attlee government and had regular meetings with the Foreign Office during the Wilson and 
Callaghan administrations. When the Labour Party was not in power, the TUC considered 
that the Party did not have much to contribute on the international issues and was often of 
little use the TUC, as they could be an embarrassment to the TUC's work both domestically 
and internationally. This was especially true, when the Trotskyists had a big influence on the 
Labour Party during Michael Foot's time as leader of the Labour Party in the 1980s.  Michael 
Walsh, the Head of the TUC International department, had very little contact during this 
period with his opposite number at the Labour Party because he did not trust her or her 
advisors.941  
Between 1945 and 1982, Histadrut-TUC relations tended to reflect the state of Anglo-Israel 
relations. The TUC's reaction to incidents or crises in the Middle East throughout this study 
was invariably low key and non-committal. Frequently, the TUC only committed itself long 
after an incident or crisis had passed. The exceptions were the public support for Israel when 
the UN adopted its infamous ‘Zionism is racism' resolution in 1975, and their condemnation 
of Israel’s invasion of Lebanon in 1982. Although the TUC were horrified, in 1975, by the 
AFL-CIO's withdrawal from the ILO over the recognition of the PLO (as it would radically 
effect the work of the ILO), the TUC refused to publically support the Israelis and the 
Histadrut.  
All of Tewson's successors as TUC General Secretary, including George Woodcock, Vic 
Feather and Len Murray were supportive of Israel, yet they all preferred to work, whenever 
necessary, behind the scenes especially at the ICFTU and TUC General Council. Even 
though the TUC worked closely with the Labour party in many areas, international issues was 
not one of them. This lack of contact and interaction between the international departments of 
the Labour party and the TUC certainly affected the TUC's understanding of the Arab-Israel 
conflict. 
                                                 
941 Author's Interview with Mike Walsh, Head of TUC International Department,1980-99, London, 14 
December 2013.  
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The Labour Party had a long record of adopting pro-Israel motions at its annual conference, 
yet the trade union movement only once used its dominant "block vote" at the Labour Party 
conference to make a significant impact on the Arab-Israel conflict. This was in 1982, when 
the Labour Party adopted a similar resolution to one which the TUC had approved a few 
weeks earlier.  
The attitude of the TUC towards the Histadrut and Israel between 1945 and 1982 can be split 
into three distinct periods, the first period from 1945 to 1962 was one of indifference, which 
was followed by the eleven years of engagement until around the time of the 1973 Yom 
Kippur war, the last period from 1973 to 1982 saw a gradual transformation of attitudes 
within the TUC into active hostility against the Histadrut. 
As chapters one and two show, after 1948, no matter how hard the Histadrut tried to rebuild 
relations with the British labour movement, the TUC always held back when it came to 
political support for Israel. This was of course in complete contrast to the Labour party who 
had successfully re-engaged with Israel in the 1950s. Anglo-Israel relations started to 
improve from 1958, so that by 1966 they were at an all-time high. In contrast TUC relations 
lagged behind and only improved due to the efforts of Frank Cousins and the new TUC 
General Secretary, George Woodcock. It was a similar story with the Histadrut development 
programmes in Africa and their Afro-Asian Institute, which impressed the Foreign Office, 
several years before they had TUC approval.  
The 1967 Six-Day War provided Frank Cousins and Fred Hayday with the opportunity for 
the trade union movement to play their part in bringing peace to the Middle East. As shown 
in chapters two and three, their efforts failed, but not before causing anxiety at the Foreign 
Office who were also concerned about the Histadrut's successful lobbying of the TUC 
General Council. The Histadrut never took advantage of this "golden" period in relations and 
by moving their Europe base from London to Brussels most of the goodwill generated was 
wasted.  
The final chapter covers the period of growing hostility towards the Histadrut. With the Left 
in charge both at grassroots and leadership level the TUC and the unions moved closer to the 
Palestinians. By 1982, the move away from Israel was complete with the TUC's adoption of 
its first resolution in support of the Palestinian right to their own homeland, along with 
criticism of Israel's invasion of Lebanon.  
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Unlike the American or even the German trade unions, who often gave their unconditional 
support to Israel, the Histadrut always had to work hard to try and gain the TUC's backing. 
The TUC always did the best it could but it was rarely what the Histadrut had hoped for.  
However the one thread which runs right through this study, is that the Histadrut was always 
trying to build friendly relations with the TUC in order to gain their support at times of crisis 
yet the TUC was often indifferent in its response to the Histadrut's overtures. 
From 1945 onwards the TUC always gave priority to their own interests and those of the 
British government which frequently meant that any support given to Israel and the Histadrut 
was given behind the scenes. The TUC's response to major international events and issues has 
been always determined by either the attitude of the main unions or the TUC General 
Secretary, but never the Labour Party. The advice on these matters offered by the 
International department to the General Secretary and the International committee often came 
from the Foreign Office. Bevin, the Foreign Secretary and former TUC President, was a very 
powerful and influential figure who was never challenged from within the TUC over his 
policies on Palestine and Israel. Even after his death in 1951, nothing changed as the TUC 
continued to follow his opinions and attitudes. TUC-Histadrut relations were poor whilst 
Tewson was General Secretary, for not only did he support Foreign Office policies but he  
also opposed the Histadrut's international aid programmes as he saw them as an ally of his 
arch rivals the AFL-CIO. Although after Suez, Barkatt realised that the TUC and the unions 
were not the friends that the Histadrut had thought they were, he tried unsuccessfully to make 
connections. Nothing really changed, however, until after Tewson and the old guard had 
retired, when a new generation of leaders came onto the scene. Frank Cousins led a revival of 
interest in international affairs within the unions taking a stronger, more radical political line. 
Why, one asks would the TUC continually rebuff the Histadrut which was the most powerful 
trade union organisation in the Middle East and a member of the ICFTU executive, in favour 
of an Arab trade union movement which, with one of two exceptions, such as Tunisia and  
Lebanon, were ineffective, and state controlled and political in nature.942 The answer is the 
                                                 
942 The Labour attaché in Beirut wrote that by 1970, the International Confederation of Arab Trade Unions 
(ICATU) had labour affiliates in all Arab countries, except Tunisia. However, the significance of ICATU "lies 
more in the labour-political sphere than in industrial relations" as since 1967, ICATU's main concern has been 
to mobilise Arab labour support for  the Palestinian cause, and "the gaining of international labour sympathy for 
it" Labour attaché Beirut, "Trade unions in the Arab world", TNA:PRO, November 1971, LAB13/268.  
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politics of Middle East and the British Foreign Office, which seems to have influenced the 
TUC International department and especially Tewson into following government policy 
which resulted in an unwillingness to offend the Arabs at the expense of Israel, as well as the 
promotion of links with the Arab unions, in order to reduce the influence of the Histadrut. 
Throughout  the 1950s and 1960s the TUC were engaged in a battle with the AFL-CIO, for 
the leadership of the ICFTU. The Histadrut became a pawn in that battle when Tewson 
opposed  the Histadrut's nomination for the executive committee in 1953. They clashed again 
over the Histadrut's aid programmes for African and Asian states which received substantial 
financial support from the Americans. The Histadrut spent fifteen years, between 1948 and 
1963 lobbying the TUC before they made the breakthrough with Tewson's successor, George 
Woodcock  who thought that international projects should be left to others to manage, such as 
the ICFTU. This was the start of a “golden” period in relations, with Cousins, Hayday, 
Feather and Woodcock leading the TUC's engagement with Israel and the Histadrut. 
Sometime after the 1967 war, the TUC stopped issuing their own statements and press 
releases and gave their backing instead to the ICFTU's pronouncements on the Middle East. 
The Labour Party, unlike the TUC, made it clear that their friendship and support for Israel 
would not stop them making statements critical of the actions of the Arab States. 
During the 1960s and 70s, when Britain and Israel had similar economic problems and were 
both ruled by Labour Governments, British civil servants regularly monitored how Israel 
dealt with prices and incomes, inflation and industrial disputes, which did not appear to 
interest the TUC.  Although the Foreign Office admired the success of the Histadrut's Afro-
Asian Institute in the developing countries in Africa and Asia, they were unable to persuade 
the TUC to play a bigger role in international development projects, probably because 
Woodcock was the General Secretary and the TUC did not have the necessary resources to 
send specialists abroad.  
Cousins' attempt after the 1967 war to use the unions to bring peace to the Middle East was 
certainly a genuine effort on his part, but it ultimately failed because the Foreign Office took 
control of his initiative in order to help restore British links with the Arab world. Once reality 
had set in, after Israel's stunning victory in the 1967 Six-Day War and the Histadrut had  
moved its office to Brussels, support for Israel began to wane. This coincided with rising 
interest by the grassroots labour movement in the Palestinians and the PLO. During this  
period delegations regularly shuttled backwards and forwards between Israel and the UK, a 
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pattern which only came to an end in the 1980s when support for Israel could no longer be 
guaranteed. 
The 1970s saw Jones and Scanlon lead the TUC's re-engagement with Russia and Eastern 
Europe and a move away from the rest of the world in order to work more closely with 
European trade union movement.  Although Jones, as a friend of Israel, managed to contain 
any criticism of Israel, he used every excuse in order not to become involved in the Soviet 
Jewry campaign which  he saw as counterproductive to their plans for improving links with 
the Russian and Eastern bloc unions. The TUC's response to the Histadrut's request for 
support after the 1973 war can be seen as the start of the period of re-evaluation of attitudes 
towards Israel within the trade union movement  which led  to hostility towards Israel and the 
Histadrut and, finally the 1982 Congress resolution. Amongst these changes was the 
discussion, by Congress of the concept the human rights. Whilst Jack Jones was in charge of 
the International Committee, the TUC stood firm and would only consider human rights 
issues when they had a trade union connection. With his retirement in 1978, Congress passed 
a resolution which allowed the TUC more flexibility in its interpretation of human rights.943 
This was a big step for the TUC as it opened the door for them to openly support non-trade 
union political issues in future. The coming together of the human rights dimension in 
political matters coupled with the changes in the social and political landscape in the 1970s, 
ensured the successful landmark vote at the 1982 Congress in favour a Palestinian homeland.  
The need for an international political matter to have a trade union connection seems so have 
been introduced into the TUC's mindset by Tewson in 1940. Previously both the TUC 
General Council and International committee had regularly discussed events in Palestine 
without mention of the need for a trade union connection. The TUC was also a member of the 
National Council of Labour and had taken a leading role in international matters in the 1930s. 
During the first half of the 1950s, the TUC consistently followed an international policy 
based on support of the UN and rearmament for the defence of peace with the wish that every 
opportunity should be used for negotiations to end the state of tension.944 Again this had no 
specific trade union linkage. It appears, therefore, that this practice was used by the TUC 
                                                 
943 Congress debate on motion on human rights, LMU, 1978 TUC Congress report, pp.591-2. 
944 International policy document submitted to the 1954 TUC Congress, IC 6/5, 22 July 1954, MRC, 
MSS292/9101/11. 
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leadership to stop discussion of what they considered to be an embarrassing subject only 
when all other avenues had failed. The general acceptance of the concept of human rights in 
the 1970s put an end to this practice.  
With nobody able to fill the void once Jones had retired, international policy was usually left 
to Murray, TUC General Secretary, who became very critical of Israel's policies towards 
Lebanon.  At the same time, the International Department, with  Murray's tacit support started 
to make contact with the PLO and Palestinian trade unionists. Opposition towards Israel 
became more open in 1977 with the political upheaval in Israel when Likud came to power 
and the Histadrut were no longer part of the Israeli government. The TUC now started to take 
political positions on the conflict, whereas only a few years earlier it had restricted itself to 
involvement only if there was a trade union connection. The culmination of the period of 
hostility towards Israel came with the 1982 TUC Congress and the passage of a resolution 
which for the first time criticised the actions of the Israeli government in Lebanon and 
publically backed Palestinian claims for statehood. This action by Congress began the 
process of transforming the attitude of the TUC and the unions towards Israel and the 
Palestinians. When Anglo Jewry realised in the 1970s that they needed to be proactive within 
the Labour movement in order to rebuild support for Israel it was too late. Their belief that 
the LFI and TUFI could fill the gap left by the departure of the Histadrut was also mistake 
because they concentrated on recruiting support for Israel from union leaders whilst the Left 
built support for the Palestinians at the grass roots.  
From 1945 until 1977, the Histadrut was always clear that its international role was to support 
the Israeli government in whatever way it could. After 1977, with the Israeli Labour Party in 
opposition, the Histadrut was no longer sure of its international role. Labour's defeat 
confirmed the Histadrut's loss of influence and power in Israel. By then also there had been a 
similar decline in the influence of the international labour movement in world affairs. In 
Britain, the Histadrut's biggest mistake was the move to Brussels which unfortunately 
coincided with the upsurge in interest in the Palestinian cause. It is not clear if the Histadrut  
ever really understood the motives and priorities of the TUC. Their most powerful weapon in 
the battle for hearts and minds was and still is, to take people to Israel in order to better 
understand Israel's problems and the political situation. These efforts more often than not 
failed because of the Histadrut's inability in most cases to convert friends into political allies. 
It is also clear that once the Histadrut realised in the 1970s that the TUC's main focus was 
259 
 
Europe and the Eastern Bloc, the Histadrut turned its back on Britain and gave priority to its 
European friends.  
 In the 1920's shortly after the Histadrut had been formed Ben Gurion and his colleagues 
decided to lobby both the American and British Labour movements for support for a Jewish 
homeland in Palestine. The results of their efforts had startlingly different outcomes. Between 
1930 and 1948 the Histadrut received the active backing for Zionist efforts from leading 
American trade unionists such as George Meany, William Green and David Dubinsky who 
promoted the immigration of Jewish refugees to Palestine and the establishment an 
independent homeland for the Jews there.945 After 1948 they continued to actively and 
publically support the Histadrut and Israel. In Britain however it was a different story as the 
priority for Dov Hoz and Berl Locker who represented the Zionist leadership in London in 
the 1930s and 1940s was to gain the support of the Labour Party leadership, which they did. 
Yet, despite their best efforts, the TUC consistently declined to adopt an independent stand 
on Zionism and Jewish affairs. All appeals for support made to them were rejected and 
passed onto the Labour Party.946 It took the two emissaries more than 10 years to reach this 
conclusion.  
Bevin had a good working relationship with Citrine who became General Secretary in 1934,  
the same year Bevin was first elected to the General Council. Even though Citrine and Bevin 
often agreed on policy it is not known why Citrine and the TUC were out of step with Bevin 
over Palestine before 1945 and were unwilling to publically support the Histadrut in their 
own right, or when they first adopted the policy of leaving Palestine issues to the Labour 
Party. We do know, however, that when they became General Secretary both Tewson and 
Woodcock continued with Citrine's non-committal course of action. In 1940 Tewson, 
presumably on the orders of Citrine, told Hoz that the TUC could not become directly 
involved in political matters and that although Congress had made declarations in regard to 
Palestine before it had only done so at the at the request of the Jewish Labour Movement.947 
                                                 
945 For more information about the US unions support for the Histadrut and Israel see: Peter Hahn, "The 
influence of organized labor on U.S. policy toward Israel, 1945-1967", in Empire and revolution : the United 
States and the Third World since 1945, (Columbus : Ohio State University, 2001), pp.154-77 and  A.M. 
Howard.," Sowing the Seeds of Statehood: Garment Unions , American Labor, and the establishment of the 
State of Israel 1917-1952", (unpublished  Doctor of Philosophy thesis, University of Florida, 2003). 
946 Locker to Mapai Central Committee, 6 October 1943, Gorny, The British Labour Movement and Zionism 
1917-1948, p.190. 
947 Memo of meeting between Tewson and Dov Hoz, 4 March 1940, MRC, MSS292/956.9/3. 
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Three years later Locker included Citrine as a member of the group of Labour Cabinet 
Ministers who thought it advisable to "water down" any pro-Zionist proposals.948 
When Tewson became General Secretary he extended this policy to include not taking any 
action if there was not a trade union connection nor to favour one side over the other. It is not 
clear either whether the leaders of Mapai and Histadrut have recognised the crucial 
differences between their labour movement and their British counterpart and understood why 
the TUC acted as it did. Whereas Mapai has always controlled the actions of the Histadrut, 
the Labour Party and TUC were and still are two independent organisations each with a 
separate leadership with no overlap or connection other than as part of the same labour 
movement. Locker and Ben Gurion certainly understood the differences as well as the 
motivation of the TUC, whereas their successors including Barkatt may not have.   
If the Histadrut knew that the TUC would never challenge the Labour Party over Palestine, 
why then did they continue to lobby them, even though they knew it was a thankless task? 
Firstly, because Britain was the ruling power in Palestine. Secondly, because the TUC 
worked closely with Churchill's wartime government and was a key partner in Attlee's 
Labour administration. Thirdly, because the TUC was the driving force behind the WFTU 
and the Histadrut used the WFTU to pressurise the TUC. Throughout this period the trade 
union movement was very influential in terms of world politics in Britain, the USSR and the 
USA. Consequently the Histadrut had no alternative but to adopt the role of supporting the 
drive for a Jewish homeland in Palestine. 
The archives show that between 1945 and 1948 the Histadrut failed to recruit any leading 
British trade unionist to their cause which meant that at such a crucial moment the Zionist 
point of view was not heard by the General Council. Thus the Histadrut's contact with the 
TUC during this period was mainly by telegram and letter which was unhelpful. Under these 
circumstances it is not surprising that their inability, before the war, to gain support from the 
unions contributed to the TUC's ambivalence towards the problems of Jewish refugees 
fleeing from Nazi Germany. 
Whereas Ben Gurion could depend on Harold Laski or Richard Crossman and others in the 
Labour Party to raise their concerns with the Labour Government, the Histadrut had no one to 
                                                 
948 Gorny, The British Labour Movement and Zionism 1917-1948, p.178. 
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contact until after Sam Watson had been to Israel in 1950. Even then Watson, the General 
Secretary of the National Union of Mineworkers (Durham Area) and a leading member of the 
Labour Party National Executive Committee, had difficulty in influencing the TUC, because 
he was not a member of either the General Council or the International Committee. The first 
Israeli labour attaché in Britain, Moshe Bar-Tal who had actively lobbied the International 
Department and the leaders of the main unions did not have any more success than his 
predecessors because Deakin and his colleagues, ex-colleagues of Bevin, controlled the 
General Council. By contrast, the 1960s were a golden period in relations because the 
Histadrut had gained the support of George Woodcock, Fred Hayday and Frank Cousins. 
 After the war the American unions lobbied both the American and British governments  
saying that after all the pain and persecution that the Jews had suffered during the war 
Palestine was the Jewish national homeland and that all the Jews in the displaced persons 
camps should be allowed to emigrate there. They gained the support of their own government 
but not the Labour government or the TUC. Most of the time the American trade unionists 
wrote directly to either Attlee or Bevin rather than the TUC, which they knew was a lost 
cause. They also spoke out on behalf of the Jews on many occasions at rallies and 
fundraisers. Compared to the Americans, British trade unionists did virtually nothing on 
behalf the Jews in Europe or Palestine. The record shows that the TUC was silent, letting the 
Labour Party speak on their behalf. Bevin's presidential address in 1937 was only one of 
three times the unfolding tragedy of the Jews in Europe and their efforts in Palestine were 
mentioned at TUC Congresses during the 1930s. The news of the murder of tens of thousands 
of Jews in Poland in 1942 resulted in the passing of notes of regret by the General Council 
and was never discussed again. The only time the Holocaust and the murder of 6 million Jews 
by the Nazis was ever mentioned at the TUC Congress both during and after the war was in 
1943 in the address given to congress by Isidore Nagler, the AFL fraternal delegate.949 After 
1945 the TUC defended the actions of its partner, the Labour government. Could Hoz and 
Locker have done more in the 1930s and 1940s to build links with the TUC? - Probably, but 
the outcome would have been the same. Their primary target was always the Labour Party 
and its leadership, not the TUC. 
Their successful lobbying of the Labour Party in the 1930s laid the groundwork for the 
support given to Israel by the Labour Party after 1948. The TUC, however, was a different 
                                                 
949 MRC, the TUC annual report for 1943, p. 271.  
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story as they were  unable to persuade either Citrine, Tewson and Deakin to speak out on the 
Jews behalf. While the leadership of the TUC, unlike the Americans, appears not to have 
been motivated by the Holocaust to mobilise the unions behind the Jewish claim for a 
homeland in Palestine, the reality was that they had had fewer Jewish members, there were 
almost no Jewish leaders, their focus was habitually domestic –and they just didn’t care 
enough. 
The Histadrut or Mapai did not appear to have known that the attitude of the TUC towards 
the Histadrut was vigorously influenced by the leadership's close rapport and involvement 
with the wartime government which had continued well into the 1950s resulting in the TUC 
giving priority to supporting Britain's interests elsewhere in the Middle East. That there was 
no support for Israel on the General Council just made it easier for Deakin, Roberts and 
Tewson. What did not help the Histadrut throughout the period of this study was a general 
ignorance within the general population in Britain and especially the trade unions of the 
Zionist movement, Jews, Israel and the Holocaust. This lack of knowledge about Israel's 
achievements and the threats she faced was commented on many times over the years by 
several Histadrut representatives. 
The TUC became involved with the Israel-Palestine conflict due to circumstances rather than 
choice. As a leading member of the WFTU, the TUC leadership had to defend the actions of 
the Labour Government in Palestine whereas at the ICFTU in the 1950s, they supported the 
government's pro-Arab initiatives. The General Council was advised by the International 
Department who produced briefing papers whenever necessary.950 The TUC never had a 
policy on relations with Israel, as the Middle East was never a priority for them. Its approach 
at any moment in time was decided by the Chairman of the International committee and the 
General Secretary. In the 1950s Deakin, Roberts and Tewson supported the government's 
pro-Arab policies, whereas in the 1960s Woodcock, Hayday, Cousins were pro-Israel. In the 
first half of the 1970s Jones, a Left winger and Feather ensured that the TUC remained pro-
Israel. Their successors Jackson and Murray continued to support Israel but they found it 
increasingly hard to do so at a time when the General Council had started to question Israel's 
policies towards Palestinians.  
                                                 
950 The main briefing papers produced by the International department were about developments in Palestine 
1947-8, Suez, Soviet Jewry and the 1982 Lebanon invasion. They did not produce anything for the 1967 Six 
Day war or the 1973 Yom Kippur war.  
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Whereas the Labour Party was always able to issue a statement in support of the Israel at 
times of crisis even when they were in Government, the TUC never once backed the 
Histadrut and Israel publically.  When it did issue a statement, such as in 1967, it was very 
careful not to take sides, unlike its American or German counterparts who made it quite clear 
that they supported Israel. It seems this reluctance to make public statements led, in the late 
1960s, to the TUC deciding, as a matter of policy, to endorse the ICFTU's actions. Why did 
they continue with this position which was first used by Tewson in 1940? Woodcock told the 
Histadrut in 1963 that the TUC would only make political statements in the most 
extraordinary matters, such as Cuban missile crisis and in 1968 the International Committee 
decided not to make a protest to the Algerian government on the Histadrut's behalf as it might 
lead to the TUC being asked in future to protest to foreign governments on other matters. In 
the 1950s when the TUC had no real ties with Israel, unlike the Labour Party, Tewson found 
there was no need to alter this policy. When Woodcock replaced Tewson, he naturally 
continued with this policy. But we do not know the real reason why the TUC took this stance 
in the first place. However, towards the end of this study, once support for human rights 
issues had become part of the political agenda and support for the Palestinians within the 
labour movement was on the increase, only then did the TUC move away from not taking 
sides and started to question Israel's actions. 
In 1945, the Histadrut was busy lobbying the TUC to intercede with the British government 
on behalf of Jews in Palestine and relations between the two bodies were best described as 
cold, mainly because Bevin was Foreign Secretary and Tewson, did not want to take sides. 
This  study ends in 1982, but this time it was the TUC who were lobbying the Histadrut on 
behalf of the Palestinians. Relations between the Histadrut and the TUC were once again 
poor. The thesis has shown an oscillating relationship, situations changed, men changed, but 
after four wars and 37 years, the lobbying still goes on.   
 
 
 
 
 
264 
 
 
Appendix 1 
List of Organisations and Personnel  
British Legation / British Embassy in Israel – Ambassador  
1948-49 No representation 
1949-51 Sir Alexander Knox Helm 
1951-54 Sir Francis Evans 
1954-57 Sir John Walter Nicholls 
1957-59 Sir Francis Brian Anthony Rundall 
1959-63 Sir Patrick Hancock 
1963-65 Sir John Greville Stanley Beith 
1965-69 Sir Michael Reginald Hadow 
1969-72 Sir Ernest John Ward Barnes 
1972-75 Sir Bernard Ledwidge 
1975-76 Thomas Anthony Keith Elliott 
1976-80 Sir John Mason 
1980-81 John Robinson 
1981-84 Sir Patrick Moberly 
 
British Legation / British Embassy in Israel – Labour Attaché 
1950-53 Ivor Thomas 
1953-55 William Poulsom 
1955-57  William Harry Marsh  
1958-61 John Parker   
1962-67 Cyril Marshall  
1967-70 O. John Skinner 
1970-73 T. Spence 
1973-78 S.T. Corcoran (Resident in Athens)  
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1978-80 R. J. Ross (Resident in Athens)  
Foreign Office labour advisor on international labour questions 
1949-51  H Gee      
1952-53   J.A. Diack   F.C. Mason - assistant 
1954-55 D.C Barnes   O. Kemp- assistant 
1956-58 G.F. Bulmer   O. Kemp- assistant 
1959-63 W.A Treganowan 
1963-76      G. Foggon    (Job title now FCO Overseas labour advisor)   
1977-79  H. Hurst    (M. Walsh seconded to FCO from TUC for two years)  
1980-81 H. Hurst 
1982-83 E. Toms 
 
Histadrut -General Secretary  
1944-49  Yosef Sprinzak  
1949-50 Pinchas Lavon 
1950-56 Moredchai Namir  
1956-61 Pinchas Lavon  
1961-69  Aharon Becker  
1969-73 Yitzhak Ben-Aharon  
1973-84 Yeruham Meshel  
 
Histadrut - International Department  
1948-56       Reuven Barkatt  Director  
1956 -60   Reuven Barkatt  Chairman, Ezra Hayut Director 
1960-64 Yehudit Simchoni Chairman, Ezra Hayut Director  
1964-67 Yehudit Simchoni Chairman, Zeev Levin Director     
1967-68 Zeev Haring  Chairman, Hugo Morratt Director 
1968-69       Zeev Haring  Chairman, Shmuel Bahat Director 
1969-74      The Histadrut General Secretary, Yitzhak Ben-Aharon, was the Chairman of  
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  the International Department with Shmuel Bahat as  the Director.  
1974-83      The Histadrut General Secretary, Yeruham Meshel, was the  Chairman of the 
  International Department with Shmuel Bahat as Deputy Chairman  of the  
  International Department and Avraham Alon as the Director 
  
Histadrut / Jewish Agency / Palestine Labour Political Committee / Poale Zion - London  
1945-48   Berl Locker 
1948-70   Schneier Levenberg  
 
Histadrut representative based in London  
1960-64 Gideon Ne'eman 
1964-68 Eli Marx 
 
Histadrut European representative based in Brussels 
1968-71 Hanan Lehmann 
1971-75 Yonah Yagol 
1975-78 Aaron Barnea  
1978-81 Yachov Hadassi 
1981-86  Michael Ziff 
 
ICFTU – President 
1949–53   Sir Vincent Tewson  
 
ICFTU – General Secretary 
1949-60 J. H. Oldenbroek 
1960-67 Omer Becu 
1967-72  Harm G. Buiter 
1972-82 Otto Kersten 
1982-92 John Vanderveken  
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Israel Legation / Embassy – Ambassador 
1948-49 Joseph Linton 
1949-50 Mordechai Eliash 
1950-50 Mordechai Kidron 
1950-59 Eliahu Elath 
1959-65  Arthur Lourie 
1965-70 Aharon Remez 
1970-73 Michael Comay 
1974-77 Gideon Rafael 
1977-79 Abraham Kidron 
1979-82 Sholmo Argov 
 
Israel Legation / Embassy – Labour Attaché 
1952-53  Moshe Bar-Tal  
1974-77 Benny Shiloh  
 
Israel Labour Party representative in London  
1972-74  Israel Gat 
 
Ministry Of Labour  
The main contact for the labour attaché 
1950-58 A. Greenhough  
1958-63 A. Gordon Wallis DFC 
1964-65    A. G Read  
1966-68 J Oates 
Responsibility transferred to the Department of Employment and Productivity  
1969  J. Oates 
1970-73 Miss E.R. Rylands ,  J.E.D. Slater 
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TUC - General Secretary  
1926-46 Sir Walter Citrine 
1946-60   Sir Vincent Tewson   
1960-69 George Woodcock 
1969-73  Vic Feather 
1973-84 Len Murray 
 
TUC - Chairman of the International Committee  
1945-47 Sir Joseph Hallsworth  
1948-55 Arthur Deakin  
1955-57 Sir Charles Geddes  
1957-63  Sir Alfred Roberts  
1963-72 Sir Frederick Hayday 
1972-78 Jack Jones   
1978-82 Tom Jackson 
1982-85 Moss Evans  
 
TUC - Head of International Department  
1946-52 Ernest Bell 
1952-59  Donald Bowers 
1960-79 Alan Hargreaves 
1980-99 Michael Walsh  
 
WFTU – President 
1946  Sir Walter Citrine 
1946-49 Arthur Deakin 
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Appendix 2 
 
The Histadrut 
 
This 1977 report on the history and functions of the Histadrut was appended to the 
memorandum from the British Ambassador in Tel Aviv to the Secretary of State for Foreign 
and Commonwealth Affairs which was titled "The Israeli trade union federation; decline of a 
triple pillar of the State," Unfortunately the last few pages of this restricted circulation report 
are missing, TNA: PRO,  25 April 1977,  FCO93/1178.   
1. The Histadrut (its official title in English is "General Federation of Labour in Israel"), is a 
unique and powerful organisation. Until the establishment of the State of Israel there were 
only two important institutions of the Jewish community in Palestine: the Jewish Agency, for 
political affairs and the Histadrut, responsible for economic, labour, social, education affairs 
and many other public services and amenities too. Since 1948 the Histadrut has yielded 
formal responsibility in some of these fields to the Government. But at all levels its 
involvement in the economic life of the country is so great that it is often dubbed "a 
government within a government". It represents some 85% of wage and salary earners, and is 
also the second largest employer in the country (after the Government), employing some 
70,000 workers in the economic enterprises which it directly owns, and three times this 
number in enterprises in which it has an interest. Its mass membership embraces 65% of all 
Israeli adults. It provides medical services to nearly 70% of the population. This 
memorandum which in its earlier paragraphs draws on a study prepared in 1975 by the U.S. 
Labour Attaché, in close consultation with Histadrut leaders, examines what the Histadrut is, 
and the influence it exerts on Israel's economic and political life. 
History 
2. The word socialism was hardly mentioned at the First Zionist Congress in Basle in 1897. 
But over the next two decades "socialist Zionism" became the strongest political force in the 
movement for Jewish national renaissance. This was due in large measure to the origins and 
background of the young men and women who came to Palestine from Russia in the Second 
Aliyah (wave of immigration) of 1904-6. Like other early Zionists they were then beginning 
to circulate. But it was only on arriving in Palestine that they succeeded in welding their 
socialist and Zionist thinking into a practical programme. The early settlers organized 
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themselves into two Zionist groups, both established in 1905: one (Workers of Zion) and a 
second (The Young Worker) which was rather more pragmatic. The two groups maintained a 
bitter rivalry, preventing the emergence of a unified labour movement. 
3. Towards the end of the First World War, when the hardships of everyday life put the 
survival of the early collective settlements at risk, help came in the form of a new wave of 
immigration, chiefly from Russia and Poland, and inspired by the Balfour Declaration and the 
granting of the Palestine Mandate to Britain. Between 1919 and 1923 some 37,000 new 
immigrants arrived in Palestine. The existing formations did not necessarily correspond to the 
requirements or aspirations of these new settlers. In 1919 a new socialist party called Union 
of Labour was created, and Workers of Zion merged with it. The new party was intended to 
become a trade union federation embracing all existing Labour Zionist groups: this ambition 
receded when the Young Worker faction refused to join. This finally brought home to the 
parties that their competition was weakening the common purpose. While there was a place 
for several political factions to represent different ideologies, surely practical and non-
political activities such as trade-unionism, sick funds etc could be jointly undertaken, 
avoiding a wasteful duplication? In 1920 a convention representing the various political affil-
iations finally succeeded in reaching agreement, and in December of that year the Histadrut 
was formed. Its constitution stated that: "The Histadrut unites all workers in the country 
living on the fruits of their own toil without exploiting the labour of others". Thus began the 
first unified labour movement in Israel. 
4. The first Secretary-General (1920-35) was David Ben-Gurion. With the other early leaders 
his aim was to achieve through the Histadrut his life dream of building a Jewish state based 
on socialist (not necessarily Marxist) principles. This objective, together with the unique 
conditions of Palestine, caused the organisation to develop in a very different way from trade 
unionism elsewhere. The first major task of the Histadrut was to foster economic 
development and to provide employment to new settlers. To facilitate this in 1923 it 
established a holding company (Hevrat Haovdim). In  the absence of adequate state- provided 
social services for Jewish immigrants during the Mandate it developed a universal sick fund 
(Kupat Holim). The organisation established a network of schools; it operated labour 
exchanges; it ran cultural centres and sports teams; it published its own newspaper Davar 
(still one of the leading dailies); and maintained its own publishing company. To protect 
Jewish life and property from Arab attacks, the Haganah (defence) was placed under the 
Histadrut's control. 
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5. With the establishment of the State in 1948 the Histadrut ceased to be the main source of 
authority in the economic life of the Jewish community. Many of its top leaders went into the 
Government and became the decisive force in Mapai (Labour Party of Israel), which 
controlled both the Histadrut and the newly- established Government. The Haganah was 
converted into the Israel Defence Forces. While the Histadrut retained its sick fund and 
certain other welfare activities, the Government assumed principal responsibility for health, 
education and welfare matters, as well as for the promotion of economic growth. But the 
Histadrut's direct participation in the economy as a major employer and trader, and its 
intricate involvement in Governmental and Party decision making, survived and developed 
further. 
Membership 
6. Members of the Histadrut belong to the central organisation, to whose central treasury they 
pay all fees; only then do they become assigned to a national or craft trade union. This gives 
the central organisation considerable more authority than might be the case in other labour 
movements. One does not have to be a wage-earner in the direct sense of the term to join the 
Histadrut. "Workers who live by the fruits of their own toil without exploiting the labour of 
others" is interpreted as including all men and women of 18 years or more, apart (usually) 
from people who employ three or more workers. Thus professional people, supervisory and 
managerial personnel and housewives (who are deemed to work at home) may be full 
members of the Histadrut, having full voting and other rights. 
7. In January 1977 the Histadrut claimed 1.3 million members two-thirds of the adult 
population. Roughly half the membership is female: and of this group half are housewives. 
More than 8% of the total membership are Arabs. In addition the youth and student 
organisation has 28,000 paid-up members aged 14-18. 
All members of kibbutzim (a) fully collective settlements) and moshavim (b) cooperative 
settlements, with shared marketing arrangements but privately-owned capital and profits, are 
automatically members of the Histadrut. 
Structure 
8. The Histadrut officially translates its name into English as the General Federation of 
Labour in Israel, but in fact in is not a federation like the TUC. It is a centralised organ-
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isation. Its national, industrial and craft unions are subordinate to the central authority of the 
Histadrut, as are its local and Regional Councils and 15,000 Works Committees, 
9. The Histadrut governs itself as a parliamentary democracy. Its highest authority is its 
Convention which is held every 4 years and decides basic policy. The Convention elects a 
Council of 501 members which is the supreme authority between Conventions. The Council 
elects an Executive Committee of 167 members, which in turn elects an Executive Bureau 
(22 members). This last body meets weekly, usually on Sunday, the same day as the Israel 
Cabinet, and it is in fact quite similar in operation to the Cabinet. Its members head the two 
dozen or so departments (e.g. Trades Union Department, Social Insurance Centre, Cultural 
and Educational Centre, International Affairs Department etc) which handle day-to-day 
business. The chief executive officer is the Secretary-General, elected by the Executive 
Committee. 
10. The Secretary-General has an important political ro1e; he must try to coordinate, by direct 
contacts with the Party an. the Cabinet, the Histadrut policies with those of the political 
leadership. Circumstances, as well as personalities play a part in determining how successful 
he will be in this; but it is fair to say that the task has become much more difficult in recent 
years. 
11. Organizationally the structure outlined above is similar to that of the Israel Labour Party 
(indeed the Labour Party copied the Histadrut pattern); but elections to the Histadrut 
Convention are comparable rather to those for general elections to the Knesset (Parliament). 
Just as for Knesset elections, each political party selects (usually through a nominating 
committee) a list of candidates to serve as delegates to the Convention. On polling day the 
whole membership may vote for the list of the national party of their choice; representation at 
the Convention is then determined by the same system of proportional representation as 
governs Knesset elections. The party balance among delegates to the Convention is in effect 
carried over to all other institutions of the Histadrut too. Until now the most important 
officials of the Histadrut, like those of the Government, have always been from the ex-Mapai 
wing of the Labour Party. This "arrangement" had to be formalised when Mapai merged with 
other factions in 1969 to form the Labour Party; and again shortly afterwards when Mapam 
decided to join the Labour Party in a formal Alignment. Under the terms of these two 
agreements, a precise key was fixed to determine the allocation of seats on the Executive 
Bureau and Histadrut governing bodies, namely: ex-Mapai 47%, ex-Achdut Avoda 19%, ex-
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Rafi 15% and Mapam 19%. In some cases the coalition agreement forming the Cabinet of the 
Government of Israel may also specify that a coalition partner should receive seats on the 
Histadrut Executive Bureau; for instance the Independent Liberal Party currently has two 
seats (but the National Religious Party, which is affiliated to an entirely separate labour 
movement, has none). 
Political Control 
12. From this it can be seen that the Histadrut Executive closely mirrors the political balance 
in the Government. (In the early days of the State, some would say, it was the other way 
round: the Government mirrored the composition of the Histadrut Executive). The chief 
feature has been the traditional dominance of Mapai, and although this is now breaking down 
with the merging of the former factions in the Labour Party, the power of ex-Mapai is still 
evident. 
13. Since its formation in 1969 the Labour/Mapam Alignment has lost ground in successive 
elections over the combined share of the poll which its constituent parties had won in the 
1965 Knesset and Histadrut elections. Nevertheless at the last Histadrut elections in 1973, the 
nadir to date of the Alignment's strength, it still polled 58% to the 23% of Likud (centre-right 
opposition). For the foreseeable future the centre-left is likely to continue to be far and away 
the most important powerbase in the Histadrut's political makeup. 
Histadrut/Government Relations 
14. The Histadrut and the Government have been controlled by the same political alignment 
since the foundation of the State in 1948. Not surprisingly, therefore, they tend to keep 
generally in step. There could be no question of constant and fundamental disagreement, 
because the leaders of both Histadrut and Government owe allegiance to the same body, the 
Labour Party, which has the ultimate right to dismiss them. But because of the nature of their 
roles, differences have always existed and particularly in the fields of wage and tax policy. 
Histadrut leaders have traditionally advocated policies which they conceive as promoting 
members’ interests, whereas the Government has been guided rather by its general priorities 
for national economic stability and growth. As early as 1949 these differences of approach 
led to clashes and they have persisted more or less sharply ever since. It could be argued that 
coordination of policy between Party and Histadrut began to weaken after the resignation of 
Ben-Gurion, a former Histadrut Secretary-General, from the Premiership. 
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Collective Bargaining 
15. Collective bargaining is in theory the Histadrut's most important function. Unlike 
procedures elsewhere, it is the Histadrut itself rather than individual unions which has 
responsibility for national and inter-industry negotiations. The task is handled by the Trade 
Union Department, whose primary role is to set wage policy guidelines and to negotiate 
national agreements covering uniform increases of wages, cost of living allowances and 
minimum rates. The Department is headed by a Chairman elected by the Histadrut Executive 
Bureau. His role is an important one, particularly in a period when unions are attempting to 
gain 'leapfrog' advantages over each other, and disturb the delicate system of differentials. 
Policy decisions adopted by the Trade Union Department must be confirmed by the 
Executive Committee or a sub-group of it, and thus every wage agreement approved by the 
Trade Union Department has the backing of the Histadrut as a whole. In addition to the Trade 
Union Department there are Permanent Committees for production, transportation and 
service workers, whose functions are advisory rather than executive. Two special 
Departments are responsible for negotiations on behalf of workers with academic 
qualifications, and on behalf of teachers; otherwise all national wage negotiation is 
coordinated through the Trade Union Department. 
16. Of course not all wage bargaining is national; many wage contracts are signed at the local 
level, where the counterpart of the Trade Union Department is the local labour council. It is 
the local labour council structure which saves the Histadrut from the charge of being over-
centralised and out of touch with the worker. For most members, daily contacts on matters 
such as medical and social services, welfare, pensions, legal, cultural or educational questions 
are with the local labour council rather than either the union branch or the Histadrut central 
headquarters. It is responsible for a wide range of social activities, and most Histadrut 
members, which is to say most of the population, benefit regularly from one or other of the 
services of institutions administered by the local labour council. But in addition to these 
services the local labour council resolves the vast majority of industrial disputes not 
immediately settled at the shop-floor level. Indeed, except in the case of large scale multi-
plant enterprises where national negotiating mechanisms are specifically laid down, no 
"official" industrial action can be taken locally without the prior sanction of the local labour 
council. Furthermore, the negotiation of collective agreements with local enterprises, on the 
basis of the national agreements negotiated by the Trade Union Department on behalf of the 
whole industry, is the responsibility of the local labour council, not of the trade union 
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concerned. The system works because the labour council is itself staffed by representatives of 
the union. Specialised trade union officials, who may often represent several unions, are 
attached to the labour council and maintain the liaison between the local branches of the 
union and its national representatives in Tel Aviv (just as they link the local members with 
the Histadrut's own national headquarters). Elections to the local labour council take place 
every four years at the same time as elections to the Histadrut headquarters and the turnout is 
almost as high as at Parliamentary elections. The existence of this local tier of the Histadrut, 
which is largely ignored in public discussion of the organisation, ensures that it never 
becomes too dangerously cut off from the views of the membership. Indeed it has been 
argued that, whatever decline in influence the Histadrut's central institutions may suffer, the 
grass-roots activities will be able to continue indefinitely so long as they offer facilities for 
their members which could not conveniently be provided by any alternative body. 
17. At the level of the individual enterprise collective bargaining is handled by works 
committees. Most enterprises have at least two: for industrial personnel, and for white-collar 
staff. In a few enterprises there are additional works committees representing particular skills 
and groups. Sometimes ad-hoc works committees are established in order to exert pressure on 
the Histadrut over specific issues. Within factories the authority of works committees is often 
quite substantial, including matters of hiring, firing and promotion, and the negotiation of 
'supplements' to national wage agreements. These supplements, awarded on the grounds of 
special local conditions, and which in cash terms may be of considerable value, are in reality 
often determined by the strength or militancy of the works committee, as well as its 
assessment of the profitability of the enterprise and hence what the employer could afford to 
pay. Works committees have in recent years become an increasingly powerful factor in 
collective bargaining, often acting without Histadrut authority. During 1974 about 70% of 
full and partial strikes in Israel, generally instigated by works committees, were called 
without the required local or national Histadrut approval. The pattern continued through 1975 
and 1976. 
18. If the local labour council is responsible for all collective bargaining which is not handled 
by the works committee on the shop floor or by the Trade Union Department at the national 
level, what role is left for the 35 national trade unions and their network of local branches? In 
theory, their role is purely advisory. Historically, the unions developed very late, emerging 
only in the third decade of the Histadrut's development. Histadrut leaders have always tended 
to concentrate on the national interests of its membership, rather than allow particular 
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sectional interests to develop and acquire disproportionate strength and bargaining power: for 
example, the interests of housewives and children should be protected as much as those of 
steel workers. In recent years this theory has tended to break down, as more multi-plant 
enterprises have developed. It has become increasingly difficult for example, to isolate labour 
disputes in the Ashdod port from the port of Haifa, and the possibilities for leapfrogging 
gains have been exploited by the local union leaders who have been prepared to forego 
Histadrut authorisation, and even to break the law, in order to pursue sectional interests. This 
has led to an increase in the number of labour disputes which, although 'unofficial', have 
nevertheless had the backing of the whole work-force in the enterprises concerned. The effect 
of this development is a dilution of the authority of the official organisation, whether the local 
labour council or the Trade Union Department. It thereby weakens the structure of the 
Histadrut as a whole. 
19. The Trade Union Department of the Histadrut has a difficult task in reconciling these 
various forces. It finds itself increasingly caught between its own broad national objectives in 
wage policy, and the militant thrust of strong local councils, competing unions and ad-hoc 
works committees. Confrontations are complicated by entrenched traditional wage 
differentials: any increase gained by one group, for whatever valid special reason, is at once 
demanded by other groups who claim “linkage”. The chain reaction ensures that a special 
bonus for one small group is often won within a few months by an entire industrial sector, 
regardless of economic considerations. 
The Labour Economy 
20. Another factor distinguishing the Histadrut from other labour movements is its ownership 
of a large slice of the nation's productive capacity and of financial and marketing services. 
Hevrat Ovdim (the industrial and economic arm of the Histadrut) or rather the enterprises 
grouped under its ultimate control, produces an output amounting to 25% of the gross 
national product. The enterprises employ over 300,000 persons in kibbutzim and moshavim, 
manufacturing industry, service, transportation and marketing cooperatives and non-profit 
enterprises. In agriculture it is especially strong, producing 65-70% of national output. 
Obviously the businesses within Hevrat Ovdim have to be managed in a way not significantly 
different from a normal profit-making enterprise. Dependent largely on capital from overseas 
for development, much of it private investment, considerations of profitability and efficiency 
determine policy to an extent which the early Histadrut leaders might have found alarming. 
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With this 'capitalist' outlook it is perhaps not surprising that Hevrat Ovdim has on the whole 
failed to create a sense of ownership - either among its own employees or generally among 
Histadrut members (who are automatically members of Hevrat Ovdim). Efforts at labour 
participation in management have borne little fruit; Histadrut-owned enterprises are in 
practice not much different from private ones in this respect, despite various formal 
arrangements for worker participation. The ideological goal of "self-labour", whereby 
cooperatives should do all manual and other work rather than hire outside labour, has long 
been eroded in practice. Moshavim and even industrial kibbutzim have increasingly engaged 
unskilled paid labour; and the cooperatives have been reluctant to share their new prosperity 
by admitting additional members, preferring to hire outside workers instead. 
21. As a large employer, the Histadrut obviously has to face its own problems in labour 
relations. One of the problems of the labour-movement ownership of enterprises is labour 
relations. Workers are represented through works committees, local councils and unions just 
as in the private sector, and labour agreements closely resemble those of the private sector. 
One area in which the Hevrat Ovdim companies do still to some extent set the pace for the 
rest of the labour market is in fringe benefits; pay may be higher on occasion in the private 
sector, but arrangements for pensions, training and welfare benefits generally run higher in 
the Histadrut-owned enterprises, and job-security is probably greater. But even in these fields 
conditions have evened out across the labour market in recent years, and it is doubtful 
whether a worker in the private sector would now be significantly less rewarded than his 
counterpart in a Histadrut enterprise, taking all factors into consideration. 
22. A corollary of this is that labour problems have also begun to emerge in Hevrat Ovdim. 
There were nine strikes, and three times as many partial stoppages, in 1974; figures have not 
been published for 1975 or 1976 but the evidence suggests that the number of disputes and 
workers involved have both risen. 
Arab Membership 
In 1925 a separate union for Arabs was set up on the grounds that the economic and social 
gap between Jewish and Arab workers needed to be bridged for the good of both sides. But at 
this stage the Arab organisation did not have full rights in Histadrut-decision making, and it 
was not until 1959 that Arabs were accorded full membership rights including the right to 
vote. Considering that Arabs now account for some 8 to 9 per cent of the total, membership, 
they are under-represented in the governing bodies of the Histadrut. No Arab has ever been 
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elected to the 22 member Executive Bureau. Of the 167 members of the Executive 
Committee only 5 are Arabs. The most senior positions held by Arabs in the Histadrut 
include the Secretary of the Nazareth Labour Council and two deputy-Chairmen of the Arab 
Affairs department. 
24. The Arabs have always supported the Alignment in the Histadrut; in 1973 62% voted for 
the Alignment, but it may be significant that there were no less than 27% who voted for the 
Communist Rakah. Nevertheless evidence suggests that increasing integration of Arabs into 
Histadrut organisations is a fact and services to Arab members have increased considerably: 
some would argue, not before time. 
International Affairs 
25. The Histadrut has always been active internationally. It was a founding member of the 
World Federation of Trades Unions. It left the WFTU in 1950 when communist domination 
of that body was well established, and in 1953 joined the International Confederation of Free 
Trades Unions. In the years which followed, its contacts with overseas labour movements, 
particularly in countries with social democratic governments, were expanded. During the 
1960s the Histadrut helped build up the labour movements of several African countries. 
These links survive and even prosper. In 1960, with financial help from the ILO, AFL-CIO 
and other sources, the Histadrut established an Afro-Asian Institute for Labour Studies and 
Cooperation. Since its inception this institute has provided training for some 5,000 labour 
officials, either through training courses in Israel or special seminars conducted abroad. In the 
years since 1973 the institute has provided an important link to Black Africa and more than 
half of the students now studying there are from countries with which Israel has no formal 
diplomatic relations. The Histadrut also maintains extensive bilateral relations, with 
representatives in New York, Oslo, Rome and Buenos Aires, covering USA, Canada, 
Western Europe, Scandinavia and all of Latin America. The representative in Brussels 
promotes its relations with international trade unions. 
Finances 
26. The Histadrut's main source of income is its membership subscriptions. These now run at 
more than IL550 million (£35 million) but over half of this is from sick-fund dues, most of 
which is expended on medical services. About one-quarter of subscriptions collected are put 
towards the Histadrut's general operating budget of some IL180 million (£12 million). The 
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balance is made up from government grants, international assistance and transfers from 
Histadrut economic enterprises. 
27. On the expenditure side, about half of the general operating budget is allocated to local 
councils; of the remainder a large part goes to the Trade Union Department, including funds 
for the national unions. A lot is spent on staff. The Histadrut employs some 3,500 people 
including 20% in headquarters, and 40% in the local councils. 
28. The Histadrut maintains a strike fund of around IL80 million. This may seem small: but it 
is a characteristic of Israel labour relations that Histadrut strike pay is seldom necessary: 
strikes have traditionally been short, and when they are concluded with a new wage 
agreement they tend to be backdated to include the period of the strike. Thus the fund has 
never been seriously run down. 
Recent Developments 
29. The difficulties which the Histadrut has faced in recent years have been those of Israel as 
a whole. The economic boom and blossoming self-confidence which characterized the years 
of 1967-72 brought prosperity to wage-earners; when the boom began to falter the 
expectations of continuing wage increases contributed to inflation, labour instability and a 
centrifugal tendency within the labour movement. The 1973 war, with its great strains on 
economic resources, compounded these genuine difficulties; but with it came an erosion of 
confidence in the future, and a decline in the public's faith in its traditional political leaders. 
There was an outbreak of wildcat strikes which the Histadrut opposed but was unable to 
control. As individual unions, and even breakaway works committees in individual factories, 
grew ever stronger and more militant the Histadrut leadership found itself in danger of being 
by-passed. In order not to lose grip entirely with its members it had to compromise with 
them, usually after a bitter confrontation, and underwrite wages demands for particular 
groups which it had previously opposed on grounds of national interest. This led to 
leapfrogging, at an increasing pace. Coordination of financial and fiscal policy with the 
Government became increasingly difficult. In 1976 the Government gave way to several 
groups of public workers who withdrew or interrupted their labour, to embarrassment of the 
Histadrut which would have preferred the Government to stand firm. At the same time the 
Histadrut resisted the Government's policies of reductions (in real terms) of social welfare 
payments and subsidies on basic products. The public squabble at that moment between the 
Secretary-General and the Government was as sharp as at any time in recent years. To the 
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general public, while both sides appeared indecisive, the Histadrut looked the more feeble of 
the two with serious challenges to its authority. 
Problems and Challenges 
30. With many of its early functions taken over by the State, the Histadrut has groped for a 
new function in a changing society and economy. Its leaders continue to argue that the 
Histadrut should do more than fight for more pay or better working conditions for its 
members: that it should still serve as a dynamic, pioneering element in the development of 
the State and economy. They maintain that they continue to hold important cards...... 
The remainder of the memorandum was not in the file.  
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Appendix 3 
The structure of the TUC 
The purpose of this appendix is to explain the structure and working of the TUC for the 
period of this thesis. 
The TUC is the representative body for Britain’s trade union movement, and is responsible 
for looking after workers and union interests in Great Britain. Its work involves lobbying the 
Government and campaigning on economic and social issues. The TUC is the oldest national, 
independent trade union organisation in the world. The first TUC Congress was  held in 1868 
and since then the annual Congress has been held at the beginning of September every year,  
when delegates from affiliated unions meet to discuss the major issues of the day.The 
leadership and the policies of the TUC have always reflected the views of the member unions 
and their relationship with the Labour Party.  
TUC policy is set by Congress each year, but between Congresses, the General Council, 
which is elected by Congress, is responsible for the management of the TUC's programmes 
and policies. The TUC President, who is also elected by Congress, chairs General Council 
meetings and is consulted by the General Secretary on all major issues. The General 
Secretary is responsible for every aspect of the TUC’s work and operation.  
Each year at its first post-Congress meeting, the General Council elects, from amongst its 
own members, the member of the International committee.  This committee which met every 
month had the power to implement and develop policy and deal with any urgent business. 
The International committee, as a sub-Committee of the Council, was supported by a team of 
permanent staff led by the Head of the International department. The role of the International 
department was to provide information and advice on international affairs to the TUC 
General Council and the International committee as well as maintaining contact with trade 
unions of other countries and various international bodies including, the International Labour 
Organisation (ILO), the International Confederation of Trade Unions (ICFTU) and the 
European Trade Union Confederation (ETUC).  
Trade union membership in Great Britain, which in 1945 was 6.5  million continued to 
increase and peaked in 1979 at 12.6 million members before falling to 11  million in 1982. 
The number of unions affiliated to the TUC over the same period fell from 191 to 105. 
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